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Individuals with OCD avoid minor risks that are unrelated to their obsessive fears and 
this general risk-aversion is implicated in treatment failure and relapse. However, a lack of 
understanding of the cognitive biases driving general risk-aversion has hampered therapeutic 
efforts to address this problematic cognitive-behavioural pattern. This research was designed 
to advance understanding of these cognitive biases in order to potentially improve treatment 
outcomes for individuals with OCD. 
Perception of threat is a significant causal factor in risk-aversion and this research was 
designed to investigate the cognitive biases driving threat overestimation, and consequent 
risk-aversion, in general situations among individuals with OCD. Beck, Emery, and 
Greenberg’s (1985) model of threat perception formed the theoretical basis for this 
investigation. This model states that threat perception and consequent anxiety within a 
situation are the result of cognitive computations involving the perceived probability and 
perceived cost of potential negative events, along with perceived ability to cope with those 
events. However, no validated scales existed to measures these constructs, so the first 
undertaking in this research was to create the Multi-Dimensional Risk Assessment Scale 
(MDRAS) to perform this important task. 
The aim of Study 1 was the development of the MDRAS, a scale designed to assess 
perceptions of the probability and cost of specific negative events, as well as perceived ability 
to cope with those events. The events selected were unrelated to typical OCD concerns and 
include some everyday risks as well as some risks that are situated in the future. Items were 
generated based on items from two existing scales, the Everyday Risk Inventory-Australian 
Revision (ERI-AUS, Cicolini & Rees, 2003) and the Social Readjustment Rating Scale 
(SRRS, Holmes & Rahe, 1967). Two hundred and twenty two non-clinical participants, 
consisting of students at Curtin University and community members recruited through 
snowball sampling, completed the 19-item MDRAS. Principal components analyses (PCA) 
revealed that the MDRAS conformed to its intended factor structure, with the Probability, 
Cost, and Coping scales containing two factors relating to everyday risks and future risks. 
However, several items did not load as planned and were removed from the scale. A second 
PCA demonstrated that the shortened, 14-item version of the MDRAS contained 7 items 
assessing threat perceptions for everyday risks, and 7 items assessing threat perceptions for 
potential future risks. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) indicated that, in addition to two 
subordinate factors, Total Probability, Total Cost, and Total Coping scores could also be 
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interpreted. As intended, the MDRAS appears to assess perceived probability and cost of 
potential negative daily and future events, and perceived ability to cope with those events. 
In Study 2 the pattern of relationships between the MDRAS scales and a measure of 
negative affect, a measure of obsessive beliefs, and a measure of perceived control was 
examined. Participants were the same individuals who had participated in Study 1. They 
completed the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988), the Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ; OCCWG, 2005), and the Anxiety Control 
Questionnaire (ACQ; Rapee, Craske, Brown, & Barlow, 1996) in addition to the MDRAS. 
Results provided evidence for the internal consistency as well as the convergent and 
discriminant validity of the MDRAS scales. It was concluded that the MDRAS appears to be 
a reliable and valid measure of perceptions of the probability and cost of negative events, and 
of perceived ability to cope with those events. 
In Study 3 MDRAS scores were compared among 21 individuals with OCD, 17 
anxious controls, and 29 non-anxious controls. Participants completed the MDRAS and the 
PANAS in addition to a measure of obsessive symptoms – the Obsessive-Compulsive 
Inventory-Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002). Analyses of variance (ANOVAs) indicated that 
individuals with OCD perceived a higher cost of negative events and perceived their ability to 
cope with those events as lower than did non-clinical individuals. This was true for both the 
MDRAS Total Cost and Coping scales, as well as for the Everyday and Future Cost and 
Coping Scales, with medium to large effect sizes in each case. However, individuals with 
OCD did not estimate a higher probability of the occurrence of everyday or future negative 
events than did non-clinical individuals. This indicates that general risk-aversion among 
individuals with OCD is driven by inflated cost and reduced coping ability estimates. 
However, ANCOVAs revealed that, after controlling for negative affect, there were no 
differences between the OCD and the non-anxious groups on any of the MDRAS scales. This 
suggests that negative affect, rather than OCD specifically, is related to cost and coping 
ability biases, and consequent risk-aversion. In addition, ANOVAs revealed that the OCD 
group did not score differently from the anxious controls on any MDRAS scale, suggesting 
that all anxious individuals are likely to perceive heightened levels of cost associated with 
general negative events, and demonstrate low subjective ability to cope with those events. 
This is consistent with theories suggesting that general risk-aversion is a transdiagnostic risk 
factor for anxiety in general, rather than any specific diagnosis (Maner & Schmidt, 2006). It 
was concluded that individuals with OCD are risk-aversive because they overestimate the 
cost of potential negative events, and underestimate their ability to cope with those events. 
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However, a similar conclusion was drawn for other anxious individuals and there was no 
evidence that general risk-aversion is a phenomenon specific to OCD. 
It was concluded that general risk-aversion is likely to be an important target for 
treatment across anxiety disorders and it would seem prudent to target biased estimates of the 
cost of negative events, and/or perceived ability to cope with those events, in order to reduce 
threat perception and general risk-aversion among anxious individuals. Methods for 
achieving this were discussed. In addition, it was concluded that the MDRAS has the 
potential to be a useful research and clinical tool for assessing the cognitive biases involved 
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Introduction to Risk-Aversion in OCD 
Everyday life is filled with decisions involving risk, even when that risk is not 
explicitly recognised or acknowledged. This can include choosing to drive a car, cross the 
street, engage in social interaction with an unknown person, and many other “normal” 
activities. Risk decision making involves choices in situations that potentially involve 
positive and/or negative outcomes, but where the occurrence of those outcomes is uncertain 
(Maner & Schmidt, 2006; Yates & Stone, 1992). Although some individuals are risk-seeking 
(sensation seeking) and some are risk-avoidant (consistently choosing the ‘safest’ option in 
order to avoid harm, often at the cost of potential gains), the majority of individuals are risk-
bearing, accepting and tolerating risk as a necessary, although not always enjoyable, part of 
healthy functioning (Nicholson, Soane, Fenton-O’Creevy, & Willman, 2005).  An 
individual’s tendency to take risks, or risk propensity, appears to be somewhat consistent 
across situations and is influenced by a multitude of factors including personality, age, and 
gender (Horvath & Zuckerman, 1993; Mishra & Lalumiere, 2011; Nicholson et al., 2005). 
Individuals also demonstrate a level of domain-specificity in their risk propensity, although 
those with strong risk-aversive or risk-taking tendencies are more consistent across domains 
(Nicholson et al., 2005). Most perspectives (e.g., Lejuez et al., 2002) assume that a balanced 
level of risk-taking is important for normal, adaptive functioning, with extreme risk-taking or 
risk-avoidance resulting in negative psychological, physical, interpersonal, and emotional 
consequences. 
Pathological avoidance of disorder-specific risk (for example social risks for 
individuals with social phobia or bodily sensations for individuals with panic disorder) is a 
key feature of all anxiety disorders (Cisler & Koster, 2010; Foa, Franklin, Perry, & Herbert, 
1996; Nelson, Deacon, Lickel, & Sy, 2010; Uren, Szabo, & Lovibond, 2004). 
Understandably, research has tended to focus on the cognitive biases (particularly 
overestimation of threat) contributing to avoidance in these disorder-specific situations. 
However, avoidance of general risks that are unrelated to specific disorders has received very 
little attention in the literature (Maner & Schmidt, 2006). It has been suggested, however, that 
individuals with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) demonstrate a pervasive pattern of 
risk-aversion that is evident across life domains, even in situations not related to their 
obsessive fears (Cicolini & Rees, 2003; Frost, Steketee, Cohn, & Griess, 1994; Steketee & 
Frost, 1994). In this context, risk-aversion entails individuals’ tendencies to respond intensely 
to signals of aversive stimuli, thereby learning to inhibit behaviour to avoid the possibility of 
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negative consequences (Lorian & Grisham, 2010; Steketee & Frost, 1994). Risk-aversion 
among individuals with OCD extends beyond their obsessive fears and permeates all aspects 
of their daily lives, resulting in and being reinforced by the perception of the world as a 
profoundly dangerous place (Cicolini & Rees, 2003; Steketee & Frost, 1994). As will be 
examined later in this chapter, and in more detail in Chapter 3, this is of potential clinical 
significance in terms of treatment failure and the high rates of relapse observed among 
individuals with OCD following therapy (Clark, 2005; Lyoo, Lee, Kim, Kong, & Kwan 2001; 
Rees, 2001; Simpson, Zuckoff, Page, Franklin, & Foa, 2008; Stobie, Taylor, Quigley, Ewing, 
& Salkovskis, 2007). 
Theorists from various perspectives, in various cultures, have asserted that individuals 
with OCD appear to exhibit high levels of risk-aversion or harm-avoidance, and that this is 
central to OCD pathology (Abed & de Pauw, 1999; Alonso et al., 2008; Brune, 2006; 
Cicolini & Rees, 2003; Feygin, Swain, & Leckman, 2006; Frost et al., 1994; Lyoo, Yoon, 
Kang, & Kwon, 2003; McFall & Wollersheim, 1979; Pietrefesa & Coles, 2009; Rees, 2001; 
Rees, Anderson, & Egan, 2006; Salkovskis, Forrester, & Richards, 1998; Salzman, 1980, as 
cited in Frost et al., 1994; Steiner, 1972; Steketee & Frost, 1994). These claims have come 
from studies directly examining risk-taking among individuals with OCD (e.g., Cicolini & 
Rees, 2003; Frost et al., 1994; Rees et al., 2006; Steiner, 1972; Steketee & Frost, 1994), from 
studies into the personality of these individuals (e.g., Alonso et al., 2008; Ettelt et al., 2008; 
Kima, Kang, & Kima, 2009; Lyoo et al., 2003), and from evolutionary theories (e.g., Abed & 
de Pauw, 1999; Brune, 2006). It is important to note that risk-aversion as it applies to OCD 
involves avoidance of normal risks (for fear of negative consequences) that are involved in 
everyday functioning, rather than the avoidance of sensation-seeking risks or thrills (Cicolini 
& Rees, 2003; Steketee & Frost, 1994). This type of risk-aversion will subsequently be 
referred to as general risk-aversion or everyday risk-aversion.  
Tallis (1995) suggested that individuals with OCD are hypersensitive to risks and 
appear to have heightened awareness of causal pathways to harm. They can easily articulate 
potential negative consequences within a situation and are likely to assume a negative 
outcome unless there is evidence that one will not occur (Pietrefesa & Coles, 2009). This 
tendency to appraise a situation as dangerous because of a lack of evidence that the situation 
is safe results in high levels of risk-avoidance in order to avoid the possibility of negative 
events (Frost et al., 1994). 
Despite the lack of a comprehensive understanding of general risk-aversion, Rees and 
colleagues have provided evidence that it is central to the distinct personality profile of 
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individuals with OCD, and that it is critical to the aetiology and maintenance of the disorder 
(Cicolini & Rees, 2003; Rees et al., 2006). Rees et al. (2006) suggested that “individuals with 
OCD are generally risk-aversive and that this trait might underlie the more specific situations 
they avoid as part of the clinical disorder” (p. 38). Studies using various measures of risk-
aversion or harm avoidance in diverse cultures have consistently demonstrated that it 
correlates positively with the severity of OCD symptomatology and might be linked to a 
primary diagnosis of OCD, with some specific relationship to OCD separate from its 
relationship with anxiety and negative affect (Cicolini & Rees, 2003; Frost et al., 1994; Lyoo 
et al., 2001; Lyoo et al., 2003; Mancini & Gangemi, 2004; Rees et al., 2006; Steiner, 1972; 
Steketee & Frost, 1994). 
However, simply knowing that individuals with OCD are risk-aversive provides little 
clinically useful information. Understanding the factors that contribute to avoidance of 
general risk among this population is important to provide potential avenues for therapeutic 
gain. Indeed, the cognitive biases driving general risk-aversion among individuals with OCD 
are poorly understood (Woods, Frost, & Steketee, 2002). Given the possible treatment 
implications of reducing risk-aversion among individuals with OCD, it is important to 
investigate these biases. A key variable involved in avoidance is the cognitive evaluation of 
the level of threat/risk involved in a situation, or threat appraisal (Bouchard et al., 2007; 
Drabant et al., 2011; Field & Lester, 2010; Hazen, Vasey, & Schmidt, 2009; Horvath & 
Zuckerman, 1993; Kverno, 2000; Legerstee et al., 2009; Lu, Daleiden, & Lu, 2007; Muris & 
van Doorn, 2003; Warren, Zgourides, & Jons, 1989). Individuals who appraise a situation as 
containing a high level of threat will experience anxiety and are more likely to avoid that 
situation than individuals who perceive lower levels of threat (Bogels & Zigterman, 2000; 
Klumpp & Amir, 2010; Lapsekili, Uzun, & Ak, 2010; Rapee, 1997). Indeed, it has been 
suggested that risk/threat appraisal is the key cognitive variable that mediates the link 
between individuals’ risk propensities and their risk-taking or risk-avoiding behaviour (Sitkin 
& Pablo, 1992). 
Perception of threat is what initiates the anxiety process (Berenbaum, Thompson, & 
Bredemeier, 2007; Butler & Mathews, 1987; Cano-Vindel, Miguel-Tobal, Gonzalez-Ordi, & 
Iruarrizaga, 2009; Klumpp & Amir, 2010). Anxiety disorders involve persistent 
overestimation of threat, and consequent anxiety and avoidance (which fuels further threat 
overestimation), in situations that pose little objective danger. It follows, therefore, that 
among individuals with anxiety disorders, overestimation of threat is central to disorder-
specific risk-aversion (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985; Butler & Mathews, 1987; Cisler & 
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Koster, 2010; Nelson et al., 2010; Stopa & Clark, 2000; Taylor et al., 2010; Uren et al., 2004; 
Voncken, Bogels, & Peeters, 2007). Like other anxiety disorders, OCD is characterised by 
high levels of perceived threat, and consequent avoidance of disorder-specific “threatening” 
situations (Belloch et al., 2010; Grayson, 2010; Rachman, 1997; Salkovskis, Forrester, & 
Richards, 1998). However, given the pervasive tendency of individuals with OCD to avoid 
risk in general situations, they would also appear to overestimate threat in a variety of 
everyday situations that are not related to their disorder. 
However, from a cognitive perspective, perception of threat is multifaceted. Beck et 
al. (1985) proposed a model of threat perception that is commonly accepted as applicable 
across anxiety disorders (Field & Lester, 2010; Hazen et al., 2009; Uren et al., 2004). In 
essence, this model suggests that threat perception is based on several separate, although 
related, cognitive conceptualisations: the perceived probability of the occurrence of negative 
consequences; the perceived cost or awfulness of those consequences; and perceived ability 
to cope with those consequences. Perceived rescue factors such as intervention from other 
people are also likely to be involved although these are difficult to operationalise and will not 
be addressed in this study. Overestimation of threat/risk occurs when an individual 
overestimates the probability and/or cost of potential negative events within a situation, 
and/or underestimates his/her ability to cope with those events. Individuals with anxiety 
disorders demonstrate biases in at least one of these appraisal mechanisms (Beck et al., 
1985). Therefore, avoidance of general risk among individuals with OCD is likely to be 
caused (at least partially) by one or more of these cognitive biases. However studies of these 
biases in OCD are scarce, with none to date focusing on cognitive distortions related to 
inflated perceptions of risk/threat driving avoidance of general events and situations. Before 
discussing general risk-aversion among individuals with OCD in more detail, it is necessary 
to review OCD as a disorder, and provide an overview of the current study. 
 
OCD: The disorder 
OCD is characterised by repetitive thoughts, images, and impulses. Interpretation of 
these intrusive, obsessive cognitions generates anxiety which the individual attempts to 
relieve through compulsive, ritualistic behaviour (Belloch et al., 2010; Salkovskis, 1985, 
1989; Steketee, 1993; Tallis, 1995; Taylor et al., 2010). The diagnostic features of OCD are 
recurrent obsessions or compulsions, which have been recognised by the individual as being 
excessive or unreasonable, and which take more than one hour a day or cause “marked 
distress or significant impairment” (American Psychiatric Association, 2000, p. 456). Most 
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individuals with OCD experience several types of obsessions and compulsions (Chamberlain 
& Menzies, 2009). Factor analytic studies have suggested that OCD symptoms can be 
divided into six categories: checking compulsions; washing rituals; hoarding; ordering and 
symmetry compulsions; cognitive neutralising; and sexual, aggressive, or religious 
obsessions (Taylor et al., 2010). 
Although it appears that culture can exert some influence on the form and content of 
OCD (Abramowitz, Deacon, Woods, & Tolin, 2004; Greenberg & Witzum, 1994), the core 
features of OCD are probably relatively independent of cultural variations, with the exception 
of the content of obsessions (Fontenelle, Mendlowicz, Marques, & Versiani, 2004). Washing 
and checking compulsions are highly prevalent in all cultures, suggesting that they “may 
represent an intrinsic feature of OCD” (Fontenelle et al., 2004, p. 408). 
The lifetime prevalence of OCD has been estimated at 2-3% worldwide (Angst, 1994; 
Chamberlain & Menzies, 2009; Greenberg & Witzum, 1994; Hollander, 1997, Sasson et al., 
1997). It is equally prevalent in men and women and, left untreated, is usually a chronic 
condition that follows a relapse-remit cycle beginning in late childhood or early adolescence 
(Chamberlain & Menzies, 2009; Taylor, 2005). 
Individuals with OCD experience lower quality of life that non-clinical individuals, 
depressed individuals, haemodialysis patients, and heroin-dependent individuals (Bobes et 
al., 2001; Eisen et al., 2006). Indeed, they appear to have similar levels of quality of life to 
individuals with schizophrenia, leading Bobes et al. (2001) to suggest that “OCD is as 
devastating as schizophrenia” (p. 244). The greatest levels of disability among individuals 
with OCD appear to be in areas of social, familial, and occupational functioning, with 
severity of symptomatology significantly positively related to impairments in quality of life 
(Bobes et al., 2001; Eisen et al., 2006). The relatives of individuals with OCD also experience 
a lower quality of life than the general population (Stengler-Wenzke, Kroll, Matschinger, & 
Angermeyer, 2006). Unsurprisingly, 30-67% of individuals with OCD have a comorbid 
diagnosis of major depressive disorder (Fineberg, Fourie, Gale, & Sivakumaran, 2005; 
Sasson et al., 1997; Tukel, Meteris, Koyuncu, Tecer, & Yazici, 2006). 
 
Treatment Difficulties for Individuals with OCD 
Despite the success of cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) for OCD (e.g., 
Khodarahimi, 2009), the disorder remains renowned for its treatment resistance and high 
rates of symptom relapse following apparently successful therapy (Clark, 2005; Foa, 
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Franklin, & Kozak, 1998; Himle & Franklin, 2009; Rees, 2001; Simpson et al., 2008; Stobie 
et al., 2007; Tolin et al., 2007). 
Among individuals who are offered CBT, a large number refuse treatment or 
terminate early. For example, Foa et al. (2005) reported that 22% of their 37 OCD clients 
withdrew from the study upon learning that they were to undergo CBT including exposure to 
feared stimuli, which is a crucial part of treatment for any anxiety disorder (Andrews et al., 
2003). In addition, 28% of those who commenced ERP failed to complete treatment, resulting 
in only 21 of 37 clients (57%) completing therapy. Given that approximately 25% of 
treatment completers fail to respond optimally to ERP or experience relapse, often because of 
poor adherence to homework exposure exercises or covert neutralisation to avoid facing 
feared scenarios (Clark, 2005; Fairfax, 2008; Lyoo et al., 2001; Lyoo et al., 2003; Olsen, 
Mais, Bilet, & Martinsen, 2008; Stobie et al., 2007; Whittal, Robichaud, Thordarson, & 
McLean, 2008), this demonstrates that overall treatment success is modest. It is, therefore, 
not surprising that somewhere between 40-50% of individuals with OCD who seek treatment 
do not respond, taking treatment refusal, dropout, non-response, and relapse into 
consideration (Corchs et al., 2008; Simpson et al., 2008). In addition, even individuals who 
successfully complete treatment and experience significant long-term gains are likely to 
continue to experience residual symptoms (Abramowitz, Foa, & Franklin, 2003; Friedman et 
al., 2003; Rowa et al., 2007) and often to use medication to control these symptoms (Whittal 
et al., 2008). Although medical treatments such as SSRIs can be effective in reducing OCD 
symptoms, they do not appear to enhance the efficacy of cognitive behavioural therapy when 
used in combination (Foa et al., 2005). Treatment failure is the reason why individuals with 
OCD form a high percentage of those undergoing dangerous neurological procedures that are 
implemented as a final option for treatment-refractory cases (Stobie et al., 2007). 
OCD is recognised as one of the most difficult clinical disorders to treat (Fairfax, 
2008). There have been few attempts to uncover the reasons behind treatment failure in OCD 
(Stobie et al., 2007) and consequently the treatment literature offers few insights into how to 
deal with individuals who do not respond to CBT or medical treatments (Carmin, 2005). The 
effectiveness of treatments for OCD has currently reached a plateau and new perspectives are 
required to improve the efficacy of cognitive-behavioural treatments, in terms of treatment 
adherence, effectiveness in reducing symptoms, and maintenance (Carmin, 2005; Clark, 
2005; Cottraux, Bouvard, & Milliery, 2005; Simpson et al., 2008; Tolin, 2009; Twohig, 
Hayes, & Masuda, 2006; Whittal et al., 2008). For reasons that will be explained in Chapter 
8 
 
3, a focus on general risk-aversion in OCD has the potential to improve treatment 
effectiveness and long-term maintenance among individuals with OCD. 
 
This Research 
Given its prevalence across cultures and its wide ranging negative social and 
emotional impact, it is not surprising that OCD is one of the leading causes of disability in the 
industrialised world (Catapano et al., 2006; Doron & Kyrios, 2005; Eisen et al., 2006). For 
this reason, it is imperative to continue efforts to improve OCD treatment outcomes and 
examine ways to enhance maintenance of therapeutic gains. A focus on general risk-aversion 
has the potential to achieve both of these goals. 
In the current research, Beck et al.’s (1985) model will be utilised to investigate the 
perception of threat in general risk scenarios among individuals with OCD. In particular, 
estimates of the probability and cost of negative events, and perceived ability to cope with 
those events, will be examined. It is of clinical and theoretical significance to determine 
which of these cognitive mechanisms distinguishes the threat/risk perceptions of individuals 
with OCD from those of non-clinical individuals. Given that threat perceptions drive risk-
aversive decisions (Butler & Matthews, 1987; Cano-Vindel et al., 2009; Eisenberg, Baron, & 
Seligman, 1998; Tallis, 1995; Yates & Stone, 1992), any observed distortions are likely to be 
responsible for heightened levels of anxiety and general risk-aversion among individuals with 
OCD, and could become a target for therapeutic intervention. In addition, this research will 
compare individuals with OCD to other anxious individuals to determine whether differences 
in patterns of threat perception are evident. 
Chapter 2 will present general cognitive-behavioural models of OCD and studies that 
have examined various belief patterns amongst this population, with emphasis on concepts 
relevant to risk-aversion. Chapter 3 will introduce the concept of general risk-aversion as it 
pertains to OCD and to other anxiety disorders. The evidence for risk-aversion in OCD will 
be from evolutionary theories, personality research, and studies that have directly researched 
risk-taking. Recent evidence that general risk-aversion represents a transdiagnostic factor 
across anxiety disorders will also be reviewed, along with evidence that general risk-aversion 
might be linked to treatment failure and relapse. Following this, Chapter 4 will present Beck 
et al.’s (1985) model of threat perception and anxiety and evidence for its general validity. 
Chapter 5 will examine this model as it applies specifically to OCD, highlighting available 
evidence that individuals with OCD are likely to demonstrate biased probability, cost, and/or 
coping ability judgements. The aims of this research will also be presented, along with a 
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discussion of the lack of suitable measures to assess threat perceptions in general risk 
scenarios. Chapter 6 will present Study 1, involving the creation and factor analysis of the 
Multi-Dimensional Risk Assessment Scale (MDRAS), which is designed to measure the 
various elements (perceived probability, perceived cost, and perceived ability to cope) of 
Beck et al.’s model in general scenarios that are unrelated to typical OCD concerns. Chapter 
7 will present Study 2, involving the initial validation of MDRAS using a measure of 
obsessive beliefs, a measure of perceived control, and a measure of negative affect. Chapter 8 
will present Study 3, examining threat perception biases among individuals with OCD, 
anxious control participants, and non-clinical individuals using the MDRAS. Finally, Chapter 
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Cognitive-Behavioural Theories of OCD 
General Principles of Cognitive-Behavioural Theories of OCD 
Obsessions are intrusive and repetitive thoughts, images, or impulses that are 
unacceptable to the individual and serve no functional purpose (e.g., Rachman & Shafran, 
1998). Obsessive content is ego-dystonic and involves themes of violence/aggression, 
contamination, doubting, unwanted sexual imagery, or unwanted urges such as blasphemy or 
swearing in church. In addition, obsessions are not excessive worries about everyday 
problems, but are focused on events that have very low probability of occurring (APA, 2000). 
The occurrence and/or content of obsessions are viewed as threatening by the individual, 
invoking anxiety and the urge to resist the thoughts or to prevent the consequences (usually 
involving harm to the self or to other people) that could arise if the obsessive content were 
actualised (Rachman & Shafran, 1998; Radomsky, Rachman, & Hammond, 2001; Tallis, 
1995; Taylor et al., 2010; Wells & Papageorgiou, 1998). 
Obsessions often lead to compulsions, which are repetitive, stereotyped, intentional 
acts that are driven by an internal pressure to neutralise obsessions and reduce anxiety 
(Moulding, Kyrios, Doron, & Nedeljkovic, 2009; Rachman & Shafran, 1998; Salkovskis, 
1985, 1989; Steketee, 1993; Tallis, 1995; Taylor et al., 2010). Because compulsive behaviour 
is driven by various obsessive thoughts, it can manifest in various and highly idiosyncratic 
ways, including cleaning, checking, hoarding, obsessional slowness, counting, covert 
cognitive neutralisation, and many others (Radomsky et al., 2001). Although levels of insight 
can vary, individuals with OCD usually regard compulsions as irrational or excessive (APA, 
2000). This creates resistance against the urge to perform them and results in negative self-
perceptions when these behaviours do occur (Rachman & Shafran, 1998; Sasson et al., 1997). 
Attempts to neutralise obsessive thoughts and anxiety can also involve avoidance of feared 
situations or reassurance seeking (Salkovskis, Forrester, & Richards, 1998). 
Cognitive-behavioural theories are currently the most widely accepted paradigm for 
the explanation of OCD maintenance and resulting treatments have successfully reduced 
symptoms and improved long-term prognosis for individuals with OCD (Belloch et al., 2010; 
Foa & Franklin, 2001; Julien et al., 2008; Wheaton, Abramowitz, Berman, Riemann, & Hale, 
2010). An important step towards current cognitive-behavioural theories of OCD was the 
recognition that unpleasant intrusive thoughts, images, and impulses are not categorically 
separate from normal thinking and are, in fact, an almost universal human phenomenon (e.g., 
Rachman & de Silva, 1978) that are not, by themselves, indicative of pathology (Rachman, 
1997). Cognitive-behavioural theorists have hypothesised that individuals with OCD make 
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negative, dysfunctional appraisals of naturally occurring intrusions, and that these cognitive 
appraisals are what drive OCD (Taylor et al., 2010). 
Complete consensus has not been reached regarding the cognitive biases that lead to 
misinterpretation of intrusive thoughts as threatening (Tolin, Brady, & Hannan, 2008). 
However, a large group of experts in the field, the Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions 
Working Group (OCCWG, 1997) suggested that six types of beliefs are commonly accepted 
as being important in OCD. The first of these beliefs is overestimation of threat (Rachman, 
1997, 2002), involving perceptions of elevated probability and cost of negative events. 
Another is inflated responsibility for harm (Salkovskis, 1985, 1989), which involves the 
belief that one has the power to cause or prevent negative events. Over-importance of 
thoughts is also implicated in OCD and involves the belief that the occurrence of a negative 
thought is enough to signal that thought’s importance (this includes thought-action fusion, 
another cognitive error in OCD that will be discussed later) or that the thought reveals the 
individual’s true nature (Teachman, Woody, & Magee, 2006). Need to control thoughts is 
another OCD-related bias that involves the belief that it is necessary and possible to control 
one’s thinking (Clark & Purdon, 1993; Wells, 2000). Perfectionism refers to beliefs that 
mistakes and imperfections cannot be tolerated, and that it is possible to avoid mistakes and 
reach perfect solutions (Frost & Steketee, 1997). Intolerance of uncertainty (IU, Carr, 1974) 
is also associated with OCD and is the excessive tendency to perceive the potential 
occurrence of negative events as unacceptable, regardless of their probability (Holaway, 
Heimberg, & Coles, 2006; OCCWG, 1997). The OCCWG (1997, 2001, 2003, 2005) has 
proposed that all of these cognitive biases are likely to operate in OCD, although research 
(Faull, Joseph, Meaden, & Lawrence, 2004; OCCWG, 2003, 2005; Taylor, McKay, & 
Abramowitz, 2005; Woods, Tolin, & Abramowitz, 2004; Wu & Carter, 2008) has suggested 
that they can be grouped into three belief domains – Responsibility and Threat 
Overestimation (RT); Importance/Control of Thoughts (ICT); and Perfectionism/Intolerance 
of Uncertainty (PC). Each of these constructs will be briefly examined later, however it is 
first necessary to illustrate the interplay between cognitive and behavioural factors in OCD. 
This will be done using the example of Salkovskis’ (1985, 1989) widely established 
cognitive-behavioural model. 
 
Salkovskis’ Cognitive-Behavioural Model of OCD 
Clinical observations suggest that, unlike in other disorders, the anxiety of individuals 
with OCD often centres on potential harm occurring to other people, rather than the self. In 
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addition, the individual fears being the source of that harm (Ehntholt, Salkovskis, & Rimes, 
1999). Based on this, Salkovskis (1985) hypothesised that, in OCD, negative appraisals of 
intrusive thoughts are typically linked to maladaptive beliefs concerning personal 
responsibility or blame for possible harm to others or to the self. When an individual with 
OCD experiences an intrusion, he/she perceives him/herself as responsible for preventing the 
negative events within it from occurring. In this context, responsibility is defined as the belief 
that one has the power to bring about or prevent subjectively important negative outcomes. 
These outcomes are perceived as essential to prevent, can be physical or moral in nature, and 
can be situated in the past, present, or future (Salkovskis, 1989; Salkovskis, Forrester, 
Richards, & Morrison, 1998; Salkovskis et al., 2000). Researchers have argued that most 
individuals with OCD tend to believe that having any influence over an outcome renders 
them responsible for that outcome. In addition, they lack the ‘omission bias’ exhibited by 
non-clinical individuals, whereby responsibility is assumed primarily for actions, rather than 
inactions (Foa et al., 2001; Salkovskis, Forrester, & Richards, 1998; Salkovskis, Forrester, 
Richards, & Morrison, 1998; Siev, Huppert, & Chambless, 2010). In other words, individuals 
with OCD perceive themselves as responsible for preventing negative outcomes that could 
occur through their own actions or inactions and they perceive the failure to prevent harm as 
equivalent to directly causing harm (Siev et al., 2010). Importantly, it is now clear that 
individuals with OCD can experience inflated responsibility even when they recognise that 
they cannot actually exert influence over a situation (Salkovskis & Freeston, 2001). In 
essence, Salkovskis and colleagues argued that, although perception of high levels of threat is 
necessary for the development of anxiety, it is only when this is regularly coupled with 
perceived responsibility for that threat that OCD (as opposed to another anxiety disorder) will 
develop. 
Importantly, for some individuals with OCD, the occurrence of intrusions, rather than 
their content, can be the main focus of responsibility appraisals. This appears to be 
attributable to a cognitive phenomenon known as “thought action fusion” (TAF) that is 
commonly exhibited by individuals with OCD (Altin & Gencoz, 2011). TAF will be 
discussed in more detail later in this chapter, but individuals who experience TAF perceive 
the occurrence of negative obsessional thoughts as inherently bad, and perceive themselves as 
responsible for preventing the future occurrence of those thoughts (Rachman, 1997; 
Salkovskis, 1989). However, consequent efforts to suppress intrusive thoughts are 
counterproductive and actually result in increased frequency of intrusions (Grisham & 
Williams, 2009; Magee & Teachman, 2007). This failure to control one’s own thinking is 
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then interpreted as a sign of an impending loss of control over one’s thinking or of oneself. 
Further counterproductive attempts to control the occurrence of the thoughts ensue, as the 
individual attempts to prevent or avoid perceived negative consequences associated with 
losing control (Salkovskis, Forrester, & Richards, 1998). Interestingly, this demonstrates 
Salkovskis’ recognition of the other cognitive biases (i.e., importance and control of 
thoughts) that might operate in OCD. Salkovskis, Forrester, and Richards (1998) considered 
various cognitive biases to be important in OCD, particularly overimportance of thoughts and 
the importance of controlling thoughts, as well as perfectionism. However in this theory they 
are believed to be triggered by, or a variant of, perceptions of inflated responsibility for harm. 
Salkovskis (1985) suggested that if the occurrence or content of intrusive cognitions is 
appraised as an indication that the individual has become responsible for harm to him/herself 
or others, then several important and reciprocal effects are likely: The intrusions elicit mood 
disturbance (typically heightened levels of anxiety), which increases the attention focused on 
them. This makes the intrusions and related ideas more accessible, resulting in the urge to 
neutralise them and their potentially harmful consequences. Subsequent attempts to achieve 
this goal can include behavioural and cognitive neutralising responses such as compulsive 
behaviour, covert cognitive neutralisation (such as thinking a “good” thought to counteract 
the “bad” obsession), reassurance seeking, avoidance, and attempted thought suppression. 
These attempts are usually counter-productive and result in a spiral of intrusive thoughts 
leading to maladaptive cognitive, behavioural, and affective responses (Salkovskis, Forrester, 
& Richards, 1998). 
Neutralising (including rituals or compulsive behaviours) consists of voluntarily 
initiated activity that is designed to avert the possibility of being blamed by oneself or by 
others for any possible harm, to bring relief from the mood disturbance elicited by negative 
automatic thoughts, and to control the further occurrence of intrusive cognitions (Rachman, 
1997; Rachman & Shafran, 1998; Salkovskis, 1985, 1989). For example, an individual who 
experiences constant intrusive images associated with harming others may avoid using sharp 
objects, or may check constantly for ‘danger’ such as electrical appliances being left on. The 
individual believes that these actions prevent the occurrence of potential negative outcomes 
and this temporarily relieves the anxiety and guilt that arise from the fear of being held 
responsible for those outcomes. 
Neutralising and avoidance of feared situations are successful in providing the desired 
reduction in anxiety, resulting in them being adopted in similar situations in the future 
(Lovibond, Mitchell, Minard, Brady, & Menzies, 2009; Salkovskis, 1985; Salkovskis, 
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Thorpe, Wahl, Wroe, & Forrester, 2003). However the reduction in anxiety is temporary and 
the individual does not learn that obsessional anxiety dissipates naturally over time without 
the performance of rituals or avoidance. In addition, neutralising is credited with preventing 
feared outcomes (which would not have occurred regardless of neutralising behaviours), 
reinforcing the belief that neutralising is necessary and increasing the probability of it being 
used to cope with subsequent perceived threats and anxiety. Therefore, neutralising and 
avoidance prevent both long-term anxiety reduction and the disconfirmation of the 
individual’s negative beliefs but are likely to generalise to other anxiety inducing situations 
(Salkovskis, 1989; Salkovskis, Forrester, Richards, & Morrison, 1998). 
Salkovskis, Forrester, and Richards (1998) suggested that the behaviour of individuals 
with OCD is best understood from a safety seeking/risk-avoiding perspective, whereby they 
react in ways that they believe will be most effective in reducing the threat of being 
responsible for avoidable harm. Safety behaviours can therefore be directed either at 
preventing harm or at preventing responsibility for harm. However, if an individual with 
OCD accepts that they might be able to prevent even potential harm, responsibility may be 
increased by this knowledge alone. 
 
Evidence for the role of inflated responsibility in OCD. 
The important role of inflated responsibility appraisals in OCD has been demonstrated 
in numerous studies using various methodologies including questionnaires (e.g., Altin & 
Gencoz, 2011; Foa, Amir, Bogert, Molnar, and Przeworski, 2001), manipulation of 
responsibility (e.g., Arntz, Voncken, & Goosen, 2007; Bouchard, Rheaume, & Ladouceur, 
1999), and treatment outcome measures (e.g., Ladouceur, Leger, Rheaume, & Dube, 1996). 
In addition, Responsibility/Threat Estimation appears to be a vulnerability factor for OCD 
development across cultures (Yorulmaz, Gencoz, & Woody, 2010). 
Salkovskis et al. (2000) examined responsibility attitudes and responsibility appraisals 
among 83 individuals with OCD, 48 anxious controls, and 218 non-clinical individuals. 
Results indicated that individuals with OCD had significantly higher scores than either 
comparison group on the measure of responsibility attitudes and the measure of responsibility 
appraisals, with this result remaining after controlling for negative affect. The combination of 
responsibility attitudes and interpretations accounted for an additional 33% of unique 
variance in OCD symptoms after anxiety and depression accounted for only 14% of the 
variance in the first step of the analysis (Salkovskis et al., 2000). Overall, Salkovskis et al. 
suggested that their results are consistent with the theory that individuals with OCD are 
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characterised by an inflated sense of responsibility for potential harm which is somewhat 
specific to OCD, rather than anxiety in general. Similarly, Foa et al. (2001) found that 
individuals with OCD exhibited greater responsibility in low-risk and OCD-relevant 
situations than did non-clinical or anxious control participants. Likewise, Cougle, Lee, and 
Salkovskis (2007) demonstrated that individuals with checking and non-checking OCD had 
more general responsibility beliefs than did anxious or non-anxious controls. They suggested 
that evidence indicates that inflated responsibility beliefs are a causal factor in OCD.  
Bouchard et al. (1999) found that manipulation of responsibility among non-clinical 
individuals influenced levels of checking behaviours, also suggesting a causal role for 
inflated responsibility in OCD rituals. Responsibility and threat appraisals predict significant 
variance in intention to act to avert threat (i.e., neutralise) (Moulding, Kyrios, & Doron, 
2007). Finally, Ladouceur et al. (1996) demonstrated that directly targeting inflated 
responsibility beliefs is an effective therapeutic option for individuals with OCD, furthering 
the argument that this cognitive bias is central to OCD pathology. 
O’Leary, Rucklidge, and Blampied (2009) found evidence that inflated responsibility 
beliefs are specific to OCD, rather than to anxiety in general. They demonstrated that 
individuals with OCD endorsed significantly more responsibility attitudes and beliefs than 
did either an anxious or a non-anxious control group, which did not differ on either measure. 
This result remained after controlling for depression. Both anxious groups scored higher on 
TAF than did the non-anxious group, but there were no differences between the two anxious 
groups. This is consistent with the findings of Steketee, Frost, and Cohen (1998) and 
Bouchard et al. (1999). TAF, however, appears to occur in a variety of anxiety disorders, 
particularly those where superstitious beliefs are present (O’Leary et al.). Consistent with this 
finding, Altin and Gencoz (2011) demonstrated that inflated sense of responsibility mediated 
the relationship between OCD symptoms and TAF among a large non-clinical sample. This 
lends support to Salkovskis, Forrester, and Richard’s (1998) assertion that other cognitive 
beliefs relevant to OCD might be mediated by inflated responsibility beliefs. 
 
Other Cognitive Distortions in OCD 
Since Salkovskis (1985, 1989) introduced his cognitive-behavioural account, several 
theorists have suggested cognitive distortions other than inflated responsibility that might 
also underlie OCD. As previously mentioned, distortions regarding inflated responsibility, 
overestimation of threat, intolerance of uncertainty, perfectionism, importance of thoughts, 
and control of thoughts are involved in OCD (Faull et al., 2004; Taylor et al., 2005; 
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OCCWG, 1997, 2001, 2003, 2005). Studies using the Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ; 
OCCWG 1997, 2005) demonstrated that these constructs were stable cognitive processes 
among individuals with OCD, but that they were closely correlated and could be grouped into 
three belief domains: RT; PC; and ICT. RT involves perceived responsibility for bad things 
happening, a desire to prevent harm, and beliefs about the consequences of inaction. High 
scores on PC indicate high and absolute standards for task performance, rigidity, and concern 
about mistakes. ICT involves fear of the consequence of having intrusions and feeling the 
need to get rid of them (OCCWG, 2005). 
It is important to note that theories emphasising various beliefs as important in OCD 
do not directly challenge Salkovskis’ (1985, 1989) cognitive-behavioural framework or 
suggest that inflated responsibility is not important in OCD, they simply expand on cognitive-
behavioural understanding of this disorder. All cognitive-behavioural theories of OCD 
recognise that interpretation of intrusions, rather than intrusions themselves, is the basis for 
OCD (Abramowitz, Nelson, Rygwall, & Khandker, 2007). The behavioural mechanisms 
discussed above are similar across theories, it is only the cognitive beliefs/distortions that 
drive these mechanisms that differ. These distortions will be briefly reviewed because they 
are likely to relate to overestimation of threat in general situations among individuals with 
OCD.  
 
Overestimation of threat. 
Individuals with OCD overestimate threat in a variety of situations (e.g., Moritz & 
Jelinek, 2009; Moritz & Pohl, 2009; Overton & Menzies, 2005; Rachman, 1998). The OCD-
specific application of the cognitive biases involved in Beck et al.’s (1985) model of threat 
perception will be reviewed in Chapter 5. Although of crucial importance to OCD 
maintenance (Rachman, 1998) overestimation of threat is not unique to OCD and is, as 
already discussed, a cognitive distortion associated with all anxiety disorders. However, 
among individuals with OCD, overestimation of threat is multifaceted (Moritz & Pohl, 2009) 
and is likely to be linked to other cognitive errors. For example Rachman (1997) linked ICT 
to threat overestimation in OCD. He suggested that individuals with OCD interpret intrusive 
cognitions as revealing important but hidden elements of their personality, such as “I am 
evil” or “I am dangerous”. These personally salient negative cognitions are too threatening to 
be ignored or dismissed and therefore they persist, often resulting in fear of specific negative 
consequences, such as harming another person, losing control, or being rejected by anyone 
who discovers the content of the obsessive thoughts. These negative interpretations then 
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serve to make a range of previously neutral stimuli potentially threatening (Rachman, 1998). 
For example, if an individual misinterprets intrusive thoughts about harming others as a sign 
that he/she is evil, any object that could potentially be used to harm other people can be 
perceived as a source of threat, generating anxiety and provoking further obsessions. This 
strengthens the catastrophic misinterpretation and results in a cycle of increased frequency of 
obsessions that are triggered by a widening array of external stimuli and accompanied by 
avoidance and/or neutralising (Rachman, 1998). 
Importantly, Salkovskis, Forrester, and Richards (1998) linked inflated responsibility 
beliefs directly to overestimation of threat among individuals with OCD by suggesting that if 
individuals with OCD judge themselves as responsible for preventing negative outcomes, this 
increases the perceived cost/awfulness of those outcomes, resulting in heightened threat 
perception. Salkovskis and colleagues were the first researchers to directly link their 
cognitive-behavioural theory of OCD to Beck et al.’s (1985) model of threat perception and 
their contention is supported by evidence that responsibility and threat estimation appear to 
form the same construct in OCD (OCCWG, 2003, 2005). This, along with how other 
cognitive distortions in OCD might be linked to threat perceptions, will be addressed more 
thoroughly in Chapter 5. 
 
Perfectionism/intolerance of uncertainty. 
Unhealthy perfectionism is common among individuals with OCD (Moretz & 
McKay, 2009; Wu & Cortesi, 2009), as well as other clinical disorders (Egan, Wade, & 
Shafran, 2011; Frost & Steketee, 1997; Rheaume, Freeston, Dugas, Letarte, & Ladouceur, 
1995). The distinguishing feature of clinically significant perfectionism is the presence of 
personally demanding standards and overdependence on self-evaluation in at least one 
important life domain, which continues despite the occurrence of adverse consequences 
(Shafran, Cooper, & Fairburn, 2002). Unhealthy perfectionism is primarily involved in OCD 
subtypes involving symmetry and “not-just right experiences”, rather than those involving 
overestimation of threat (e.g., Polman, O’Connor, & Huisman, 2011). However, individuals 
with OCD are particularly averse to making mistakes, doubt their ability to perform tasks 
competently (to their own high standards), and have a high fear of failure (Frost & Steketee, 
1997; Shafran et al., 2002; Sassaroli et al., 2008).  From this perspective, unhealthy 
perfectionism can be tentatively linked to low perceived ability to cope with negative events 
(and consequent threat overestimation and risk-aversion) among individuals with OCD. It is 
also possible that high levels of perfectionism could predispose individuals to overestimate 
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their level of responsibility in various situations (Bouchard et al., 1999), thereby indirectly 
driving inflated cost estimates of negative events. In addition, unhealthy perfectionism is 
related to intolerance of uncertainty – individuals with OCD often perceive perfectionism as a 
means to avoid any potential mistakes or unexpected outcomes. 
As early as 1974, Carr suggested that individuals with OCD commonly have 
difficulty tolerating any level of uncertainty. More recently, IU has been suggested to be an 
important cognitive variable contributing to OCD symptoms (Tolin, Abramowitz, Brigidi, & 
Foa, 2003). It is heightened among individuals with OCD compared to non-clinical 
individuals and most anxious groups (Gentes & Ruscio, 2011; Grayson, 2010; Holaway et al., 
2006; Steketee et al., 1998; Tolin, Abramowitz, et al., 2003). Lind and Boschen (2009) found 
that IU predicted OCD symptoms among a mixed sample of individuals with OCD and non-
clinical individuals. Holaway et al. (2006) obtained similar results, although IU was no higher 
among individuals with OCD than those with GAD. 
IU involves behavioural efforts to prevent uncertainty by controlling events and 
outcomes, and the inhibition of action in the presence of any uncertainty. It also involves 
interpreting being uncertain as reflecting negatively upon the self, with consequent anxiety, 
stress, and frustration (Tolin, Abramowitz, et al., 2003). It is likely that IU is prevalent among 
individuals who believe that they lack adequate skills to cope with potential threats and 
consequently attempt to prevent any probability of the occurrence of negative events 
(OCCWG, 1997). Tolin, Abramowitz, et al. (2003) suggested that the pathological doubt 
commonly displayed by individuals with OCD is likely to be related to their inability to 
tolerate uncertainty. 
IU is postulated to drive OCD symptoms because it causes any possibility of negative 
outcomes to be deemed unacceptable (i.e., threatening), and therefore rituals and/or 
avoidance behaviour are initiated in order to prevent even the remote possibility of negative 
outcomes (Grayson, 2010). In addition, it is likely that IU is partially responsible for the 
repetitive nature of OCD rituals – individuals repeat rituals because of inability to tolerate 
uncertainty regarding whether they completed the ritual correctly (Tolin, Abramowitz, et al., 
2003). As will be discussed in Chapter 5, IU suggests that perceptions of elevated threat 
among individuals with OCD need not involve overestimates of the probability of negative 
outcomes in order to generate anxiety – the possibility, however remote, of a feared/negative 





Importance/control of thoughts. 
 As previously mentioned, many individuals with OCD believe that merely having a 
thought, particularly a recurring one, signals that the thought is important (OCCWG, 1997; 
Teachman et al., 2006). Some individuals with OCD believe that not neutralising following 
an intrusive thought is equivalent to wanting the events within that thought to actually occur. 
They consequently regard themselves as being responsible for taking steps to prevent any 
harm, and subsequent responsibility for that harm, that may result from intrusions (Greenberg 
& Witzum, 1994; O’Leary et al., 2009; Rachman & Shafran, 1998; Salkovskis, Forrester, 
Richards, & Morrison, 1998; Tallis, 1995). 
Teachman et al. (2006) conducted an experimental study involving 156 non-clinical 
participants split into three groups. Individuals who were informed that their intrusive 
thoughts are important and indicative of their true values made stronger evaluations of the 
self as dangerous than did individuals who received no instructions, or who were told that 
their intrusive thoughts are unimportant. There was a stronger effect for individuals with 
higher levels of preexisting OCD beliefs. In addition, self-reported beliefs about the 
importance of intrusions were positively related to OCD-relevant beliefs. Similarly, 
Teachman and Clerkin (2007) demonstrated that manipulation of beliefs about the immorality 
of intrusive thoughts led to changes in implicit evaluations of the self as dangerous and 
immoral, and that these changes interacted with preexisting levels of obsessive beliefs. 
TAF involves assigning excessive importance to thoughts and is common among 
individuals with OCD. It can involve two separate, although related elements: Moral TAF 
and Likelihood TAF. Moral TAF is a process whereby thoughts and actions regarding harm 
are perceived as morally equivalent (Altin & Gencoz, 2011; Greenberg & Witzum, 1994; 
O’Leary et al., 2009; Salkovskis, Forrester, Richards, & Morrison, 1998). Likelihood TAF 
involves the belief that the occurrence of a negative thought increases the likelihood that the 
contents of that thought will be actualised (OCCWG, 1997). Hence, TAF can cause thoughts 
of negative consequences, such as harm occurring to a loved one, to be perceived as being 
threatening because of increased perceived probability of harm, or because of increased 
perceived cost of harm due to the perception that the individual is morally responsible for the 
potential occurrence of those outcomes. This can produce counterproductive attempts at 
preventing the occurrence of intrusions, which actually serve to increase their occurrence 
(Grisham & Williams, 2009; Magee & Teachman, 2007), resulting in a spiral of thought 
control attempts and increased frequency of intrusions (Purdon & Clark, 2000; Rassin, 
Diepstraten, Merckelbach, & Muris, 2001). 
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Therefore, ICT appears to drive OCD symptoms by resulting in increased salience 
and frequency of obsessive cognitions, as well as inflated beliefs in the importance of acting 
to ensure that the content of thoughts does not eventuate (O’Leary et al., 2009; Rassin et al., 
2001). However, it is likely that assigning high levels of importance to thoughts, and 
subsequent attempts to control those thoughts, are features of pathological anxiety rather than 
OCD specifically, although they might be more important in OCD (Abramowitz, Whiteside, 
Lynam, & Kalsy, 2003; OCCWG, 1997; Rasin et al., 2001). Nevertheless, TAF in particular 
is likely to be related to primary appraisal of threat – influencing the perceived probability 
and/or cost of feared events that are contained in obsessive thoughts. 
However, given the commonly observed close correlations between various obsessive 
beliefs, the utility of studying them separately is questionable. As a result, the majority of 
recent studies have attempted to address them simultaneously. 
  
Comparison of Cognitive Distortions in OCD 
In general, research (e.g., Taylor et al., 2005; Wu & Carter, 2008) has supported the 
structure of obsessive beliefs proposed by the OCCWG (2005).  Current models of OCD 
indicate that these three types of dysfunctional beliefs are involved in OCD development and 
maintenance (Kaiser, Bouvard, & Milliery, 2010; Taylor et al., 2010), although some studies 
have continued to assess them as six separate constructs (e.g., Myers, Fisher, & Wells, 2008). 
It is clear that dysfunctional beliefs, particularly RT, are important factors in OCD 
symptomatology and are likely to be premorbid risk factors for OCD development (e.g., 
Abramowitz, Khandker, Nelson, Deacon, & Rygwall, 2006; Abramowitz et al., 2007; Belloch 
et al., 2010; Calleo, Hart, Bjorgvinsson, & Stanley, 2010; Myers et al., 2008; Tolin, Woods, 
& Abramowitz, 2003). There have not, however, been consistent findings regarding how 
these specific beliefs relate to OCD symptoms (Belloch et al., 2010; Tolin et al., 2008; 
Wheaton et al., 2010; Wu & Carter, 2008). Wu and Carter (2008) suggested that “it does not 
appear that unambiguous one-to-one relations between OBQ beliefs and OCD symptoms are 
typical” (p. 833).  However, when measured as a combined construct as recommended by the 
OCCWG (2005), it appears that RT is consistently related to OCD symptom dimensions, 
with the possible exception of ordering (Belloch et al., 2010; Calleo et al., 2010; Taylor et al., 
2010; Tolin et al., 2008; Wheaton et al., 2010). ICT and PC have also been consistently 
linked to OCD symptoms, but specific relationships have varied across studies. 
Using a sample of 5015 non-clinical participants, Taylor et al. (2010) found that RT 
significantly predicted all six OCD symptom types. PC only predicted ordering symptoms 
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and ICT predicted obsessing as well as weakly predicting washing and neutralising. Overall, 
dysfunctional beliefs accounted for 23% of the variance in OCD symptoms. Taylor et al. 
(2010) tested the fit of a model in which RT drove ICT and PC, and where PC drove ICT. 
This model was a good fit for the data, suggesting that RT might be driving other OCD 
beliefs. Taylor et al. suggested that RT is particularly important in predicting OCD 
symptoms, which is consistent with Salkovskis’ (1985, 1989) theory of OCD. Consistent with 
this, Tolin et al. (2008) found that RT was significantly related to all OCD symptoms 
assessed except for ordering, whereas the ICT and PC were not related to all symptoms. 
Belloch et al. (2010) suggested that consensus has been reached regarding the general 
dysfunctional belief domains involved in OCD, although the dimensionality of these domains 
remains to be delineated, as does their specific relationship to OCD versus anxiety disorders 
in general. In particular, although individuals with OCD have higher levels of obsessive 
beliefs than non-clinical individuals, it is unclear whether any of these beliefs are, in fact, 
specific to OCD given the inconsistency of results obtained using the OBQ (Belloch et al., 
2010; Viar, Bilsky, Armstrong, & Olatunji, 2011). However, Tolin et al. (2008) suggested 
that research using the OBQ has largely, although not uniformly, indicated that individuals 
with OCD endorse more obsessional beliefs than do other anxious individuals. Similarly 
Julien et al. (2008) found that their OCD group scored higher than the anxious control group 
and the non-anxious group on all obsessive belief domains. 
It is possible that none of the obsessive belief domains hypothesised to be central to 
OCD are, in fact, unique to the disorder (although inflated responsibility for harm is not 
prominent in cognitive models of other anxiety disorders). It is plausible that it is their pattern 
of interaction that is directly involved in OCD symptoms (Taylor et al., 2010). Given that 
they are closely correlated with each other (Belloch et al., 2010; Myers et al., 2008; Taylor et 
al., 2010 Tolin et al., 2008) it is also possible that obsessive beliefs are representative of a 
broader, as yet undefined, cognitive construct that drives OCD (e.g., Doron & Kyrios, 2005). 
This is consistent with studies suggesting that the OBQ, although assessing the constructs 
suggested by the OCCWG, also contains a larger, general factor (e.g., Faull et al., 2004; 
Taylor et al., 2005; Woods et al., 2004; Wu & Carter, 2008). 
It is also possible that the high level of intercorrelation between obsessive beliefs can 
be attributed to the reciprocal nature of these beliefs, which interact to generate OCD 
symptoms (Frost & Steketee, 2002; Taylor et al., 2010). For example, heightened levels of 
responsibility are likely to increase the need to act perfectly, reinforcing beliefs about the 
importance of controlling thoughts. Rheaume et al. (1995) also provided an example whereby 
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the occurrence of an obsessive thought might be interpreted as indicating that the individual 
is likely to cause harm to others (i.e., increased threat), while also indicating that the 
individual is inherently flawed (violating perfectionistic standards). Responsibility for the 
prevention of the harm, as well as moral responsibility, is then assumed. 
The importance of “obsessive cognitions” in OCD pathology is not in dispute, only 
their unique contributions and interrelationships remain unclear. However, although cognitive 
biases predict OCD symptoms, significant variance in each symptom dimension is typically 
unaccounted for by these biases, indicating that other variables are also involved in OCD 
symptoms (Moulding, Doron, & Kyrios, 2007; Moulding et al., 2009; Wheaton et al., 2010). 
In addition, it appears likely that some individuals with OCD do not endorse any of the 
beliefs typically associated with the disorder (Chik, Calamari, Rector, & Riemann, 2010; 
Polman et al., 2011; Taylor et al., 2006), increasing the likelihood that other cognitive factors 
might be involved. In particular, low sense of control over situations and a sense of low self-
efficacy have been hypothesised to be involved in OCD pathology (Doron & Kyrios, 2005). 
 
The Role of Variables Related to Control in OCD 
Doron and Kyrios (2005) suggested that “Traditional cognitive theories of OCD have 
also neglected some important aspects of Beck’s (1976) cognitive triad” (p. 417). The 
individual’s perceived ability to cope with potential negative events, although central to Beck 
et al.’s (1985) cognitive model, is largely ignored. This is evident in the OCCWG’s (1997) 
definition of heightened threat estimation in OCD as involving overestimates of the 
probability and cost of negative events, without considering perceived coping ability. 
Doron and Kyrios (2005) suggested that the individual’s self-perceptions and world-
view, although not widely studied, are important in the development and maintenance of 
OCD. Guidano and Liotti (1983) argued that, although all anxious individuals perceive the 
world as threatening, what differentiates individuals with OCD is that they also perceive the 
world as controllable, at least to some extent. Doron and Kyrios posited that this perception 
of controllability drives the individual to assume responsibility for preventing negative 
outcomes, and consequent rituals or avoidance. 
However, perception of the world as controllable does not equate to the perception of 
the self as competent to provide this control, and individuals with OCD often do not perceive 
themselves as capable of exerting the desired level of control over potentially aversive 
situations (Doron & Kyrios, 2005). Building on the notion that the perception of the world as 
threatening but controllable underlies OCD (Doron & Kyrios, 2005; Guidano & Liotti, 1983), 
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Moulding and Kyrios (2006) discussed two broad concepts relating to control: Sense of 
control (SC) and desire for control (DC). SC incorporates self-efficacy, internal locus of 
control, and other variables contributing to the perceived level of control that is available to 
the individual in a particular situation. DC relates to the individual’s general desire to exert 
control over events in their daily lives. Individuals who have a high DC but low SC in a given 
situation are prone to psychological distress, particularly anxiety and depression (e.g., Baron 
& Logan, 1993, as cited in Moulding & Kyrios, 2006). 
Based on previous findings that OCD symptoms were related to low SC (McLaren & 
Crowe, 2003; Zebb & Moore, 2003), Moulding and Kyrios (2006) suggested that 
discrepancies between an individual’s DC and SC could generate anxiety and motivate 
compulsive behaviour as a means to reduce anxiety and exert control, even in situations 
where high levels of magical thinking are involved. As such, DC-SC discrepancies are likely 
to be involved in OCD pathology (Moulding & Kyrios, 2006).  
Moulding and colleagues have provided evidence that DC-SC discrepancies are 
important in the prediction of OCD symptoms. For example, Moulding et al. (2007) 
demonstrated that manipulation of responsibility and perceived threat influenced appraisals of 
DC in a large non-clinical sample. DC was significantly higher in the high versus low 
responsibility condition and the high versus low threat condition, with moderate effect sizes. 
SC, however, was not influenced by threat manipulation, and was only influenced to a small 
degree by manipulation of responsibility (Moulding et al., 2007). Moulding, Doron, Kyrios, 
and Nedeljkovic (2008) replicated these results in a clinical sample of individuals with OCD. 
This suggests that perception of potential threat, and/or perceived responsibility for potential 
harm, generates a high desire to control potential negative outcomes among individuals with 
OCD. However, increased desire for control in the presence of potential negative outcomes is 
accompanied by perceived inefficacy to exert that control, resulting in individuals with OCD 
feeling responsible but incapable of preventing negative outcomes. This is consistent with 
Salkovskis and Freeston’s (2001) suggestion that inflated responsibility for harm does not 
necessarily equate with increased perceptions of ability to prevent that harm. Importantly, 
Moulding et al. (2008) demonstrated that DC-SC discrepancies were not present in an 
anxious control group, suggesting specificity to OCD and the possibility that coping self-
efficacy might be lower among individuals with OCD compared to other anxious groups. 
Higher DC and lower SC predict OCD symptoms after controlling for anxiety and 
depression (Moulding & Kyrios, 2007; Moulding et al., 2009). Lower SC drives OCD 
symptoms directly and indirectly, whereas higher DC drives OCD symptoms indirectly via 
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increased obsessive beliefs (Moulding et al., 2009). It appears that higher levels of DC are not 
a risk factor for OCD unless they are coupled with significantly lower SC. In other words, 
individuals with OCD lack a sense of being able to control the occurrence of potential 
negative events. This is indirect evidence that individuals with OCD are likely to 
underestimate their ability to cope with negative events and that this could underlie their 
general risk-aversion. 
  
Summary of Cognitive-Behavioural Theories of OCD 
In summary, cognitive-behavioural theorists have suggested that several cognitive 
distortions are involved in the development and maintenance of OCD. It is clear that each of 
these distortions is important in OCD, but it is equally clear that they are overlapping 
constructs and the dimensionality of obsessive beliefs remains somewhat ambiguous. One 
important over-arching construct that encompasses many of the cognitive distortions outlined 
in this chapter is risk-aversion. The link between risk-aversion and cognitive constructs in 
OCD will be made in Chapter 5. General risk-aversion will now be reviewed as it pertains to 
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Risk-Aversion in OCD and other Anxiety Disorders 
Chapter Overview 
The discussion of risk-aversion among individuals with OCD will be divided into 
three sections. The first section will briefly review evolutionary theories suggesting that OCD 
is related to risk-aversion. The second section will examine personality research suggesting 
that individuals with OCD are harm-avoidant. Finally, evidence from studies employing 
specific scenarios to directly assess risk-taking and risk attitudes among individuals with 
OCD will be outlined. Following this, evidence that risk-aversive/harm-avoidant personality 
is present in other disorders, and that general risk-aversion might be implicated in the 
pathogenesis of other anxiety disorders, will be examined. A discussion of the possible role 
of general risk-aversion in treatment failure and relapse will conclude the chapter. 
 
Evolutionary Theories of OCD as a Risk-Aversive Disorder 
Abed and de Pauw (1999) proposed that OCD involves overactivity of the evolved 
cognitive process used to generate risk scenarios in the absence of actual experience of those 
scenarios. In other words, obsessive cognitions and behaviour can be conceptualised as an 
“off-line risk avoidance process” (Abed & de Pauw, 1999, p. 245) designed to anticipate and 
avoid potential risks at some future time, even if those risks have not been experienced. 
Building on this, Brune (2006) proposed that from an evolutionary perspective, OCD 
can be considered as “an extreme on a continuum of evolved harm-avoidance strategies” (p. 
317), involving a pathological exaggeration of the evolved ability to cognitively represent 
potential consequences of thoughts, actions, and situations. The brain areas involved in the 
imagination of future scenarios and detecting threat (in particular the prefrontal cortex, the 
anterior cingulate cortex, the thalamus, the insula, and the caudate nucleus) are overactive in 
individuals with OCD (Brune, 2006; Feygin et al., 2006). This cognitive and behavioural 
threat detection process evolved as a means of anticipating and avoiding potential threats to 
wellbeing and of anticipating future events. For the majority of human existence it has been 
far more adaptive to falsely respond to a situation as a threat than to ignore a genuinely 
dangerous scenario. However, in the modern environment, where genuine threats to safety 
are less common, this tendency is prone to false alarms, resulting in some individuals 
erroneously perceiving a multitude of potential threats (potentially located at an unspecified 
future time). Over-anticipation of potential threats and attempts to avoid these threats can 
result in behavioural rigidity, the extreme of which is seen in OCD symptoms (Brune, 2006; 
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Feygin et al., 2006). These evolutionary processes are unlikely to be restricted to OCD-
specific concerns and could be linked to general risk-aversion in OCD. 
Although research into the evolutionary basis of OCD remains speculative, theories 
relating it to risk-aversion are congruent with the notion of obsessions as involving the 
cognitive anticipation of negative events that need to be controlled (Brune, 2006). This 
research is also congruent with research into the personality profile of individuals with OCD 
which suggest they are highly harm-avoidant. 
 
Evidence of Risk-Aversive Personality in OCD 
Research investigating the personality profile of individuals with OCD has 
consistently demonstrated that this population is high in personality traits relating to risk-
aversion. Largely, this research has been conducted using Cloninger’s (1987) 
psychobiological model of personality.  
Cloninger’s (1987) psychobiological model proposed three temperament dimensions, 
termed novelty seeking (NS), harm avoidance (HA), and reward dependence (RD). A fourth 
dimension, labelled persistence (P) was subsequently added (Cloninger, Svrakic, & Przybeck, 
1993). Temperament is posited to involve a large (40-60%) heritable component (Alonso et 
al., 2008; Lyoo et al., 2003). NS involves excitement and approach in response to novel 
stimuli and impulsiveness in decision making and is negatively related to risk-aversion, 
although more from a sensation-seeking perspective (Alonso et al., 2008). RD involves the 
tendency to be sociable and sensitive, and is related to feelings of attachment towards other 
people (Ongur, Farabaugh, Iosifescu, Perlis, & Fava, 2005). P involves the tendency to be 
hard working, industrious, and stable (Cloninger et al., 1993).  
Of particular relevance to risk-aversion is the temperament of HA, which is “the 
tendency to respond intensely to signals of aversive stimuli, thereby learning to inhibit 
behavior (sic) to avoid punishment, novelty, and frustrative non-reward” (Cloninger, 1987, p. 
575). Individuals high in HA tend to be cautious, fearful, tense, apprehensive, nervous, timid, 
doubtful, discouraged, insecure, passive, negativistic, or pessimistic even in situations that do 
not worry other people (Cloninger et al., 1993). They are usually characterised by 
anticipatory anxiety and concern about future problems, fear of uncertainty, shyness, and 
fatigability (Alonso et al., 2008; Kima et al., 2009; Pfohl, Black, Noyes, Kelley, & Blum, 
1990). Thus, the personality dimension of HA is closely related to risk-aversive attitude and 
behaviour (Cloninger et al., 1993). Each temperament dimension appears to be related to a 
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specific neurotransmitter system, with HA relating to the serotonin system (Richter, 
Summerfeldt, Joffe, & Swinson, 1996).  
To date, research utilising Cloninger’s (1987) Tridimensional Personality 
Questionnaire (TPQ) and its successor, the Temperament and Character Inventory (TCI; 
Cloninger, 1994) has consistently demonstrated that individuals with OCD are highly harm 
avoidant, regardless of their treatment status (Alonso et al., 2008; Ettelt et al., 2008; Gothelf, 
Aharonovsky, Horesh, Carty, & Apter, 2004; Kima et al., 2009; Lyoo et al., 2001; Lyoo et 
al., 2003; Marchesi, Ampollini, DePanfilis, & Magini, 2008; Pfohl et al., 1990; Richter et al., 
1996; Savron, Montanaro, Mordent, & Pitti, 2007). 
For example, Pfohl et al. (1990) compared 25 individuals with OCD to 35 non-
clinical controls on the TPQ. Individuals with OCD scored significantly higher on the HA 
dimension than did non-clinical individuals, with this result remaining after controlling for 
age and gender. Similar results were reported by Richter et al. (1996), who demonstrated that 
higher HA among individuals with OCD (N = 32) compared to matched non-clinical 
individuals (N = 32) remained after controlling for depressed mood. Furthermore, Alonso et 
al. (2008) demonstrated that higher levels of HA among individuals with OCD remained after 
excluding participants with comorbid diagnoses. 
Results from differing cultural contexts have consistently demonstrated higher levels 
of HA among individuals with OCD compared to non-clinical individuals, even after 
accounting for the impact of negative mood (Cruz-Fuentes, Blas, Gonzales, Camarena, & 
Nicolini, 2004; Kima et al., 2009; Lyoo et al., 2001; Lyoo et al., 2003; Savron et al., 2007). It 
therefore appears that high levels of HA are a universal feature associated with OCD. 
It also appears that HA predicts OCD severity independently of mood factors, with symptom 
severity increasing as HA increases (Kima et al., 2009; Lyoo et al., 2001; Lyoo et al., 2003; 
Savron et al., 2007). With the exception of Alonso et al. (2008), research has suggested that 
there is specificity in the OCD-HA relationship after accounting for mood factors (Kima et 
al., 2009; Pfohl et al., 1990; Richter et al., 1996). However, it should be noted that depression 
is also closely related to HA so the degree of specificity might be small (Alonso et al., 2008; 
Lyoo et al., 2003).  
Ettelt et al. (2008) demonstrated that individuals with OCD (N = 75) scored 
significantly higher on HA than did matched controls (N = 75). In addition, first degree 
relatives of individuals with OCD demonstrated higher levels of HA than controls. This is 
important because studies into other personality dimensions among relatives of OCD 
sufferers have typically not demonstrated personality pathology (Ettelt et al., 2008), 
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suggesting that HA might be a distinguishing feature of the personality profile of OCD 
relatives. This led Ettelt et al. to suggest that HA might be a familial risk factor for OCD, 
both in terms of inherited temperament and because of overprotective parenting from harm-
avoidant parents engendering risk-aversive behaviours and beliefs in their children. 
 Studies using the TPQ and TCI have consistently demonstrated that individuals with 
OCD have high levels of HA, but findings for the other temperament dimensions have been 
inconsistent (Alonso et al., 2008; Kima et al., 2009). For example, Pfhol et al. (1990) found 
that individuals with OCD scored higher on RD (although this difference was small), but not 
on NS, than did non-clinical individuals. However, Lyoo et al. (2001) did not find significant 
differences in RD between individuals with OCD and non-clinical individuals. Findings of 
low NS among individuals with OCD are also not ubiquitous, with some studies (e.g., Alonso 
et al., 2008; Lyoo et al., 2001) suggesting NS is low among individuals with OCD and others 
suggesting that it is not (e.g., Gothelf et al., 2004; Kima et al., 2009; Richter et al., 1996). 
Inconsistent findings on NS suggest that individuals with OCD are not necessarily averse to 
taking risks in order to obtain positive outcomes or pleasure. Rather, it is the avoidance of 
risks/potential threats related to potentially aversive stimuli (related to HA) that is likely to be 
central to OCD. From a personality standpoint, HA appears to be the feature that consistently 
distinguishes individuals with OCD from non-clinical individuals (Richter et al., 1996). 
Alonso et al. (2008) suggested that the observed high levels of HA among individuals with 
OCD is consistent with the theory that high levels of estimated risk, combined with distorted 
estimates of one’s ability to prevent harm, result in individuals with OCD viewing situations 
as being dangerous until proven safe. 
Interestingly, and consistent with the proposition that high levels of HA are central to 
OCD, dysfunction of the serotonin system is posited to play a role in OCD (Gross, Sasson, 
Chopra, & Zohar, 1998) and selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) are an effective 
medical treatment for OCD (Abramowitz, Brigidi, & Roche., 2001; Foa et al., 1998). Given 
that HA is believed to involve the serotonin system (Richter et al., 1996), it is possible that 
the effectiveness of SSRIs is linked to their alteration of HA-related cognitive functions, 
although this is speculative. 
High levels of risk-aversive personality among individuals with OCD have also been 
reported using other personality measures. For example Wu, Clark, and Watson (2006) found 
that individuals with OCD scored significantly lower than non-clinical individuals on the 
risk-taking scale of the SNAP-2 personality scale (Clark, 1993). For most of the personality 
constructs assessed, there were no significant differences between the groups, again 
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suggesting that avoidance of risk might be part of the unique personality profile of 
individuals with OCD. 
 Sensitivity to punishment is a personality construct that is also closely associated with 
avoidance of risk (e.g., Demaree, DeDonno, Burns, & Everhart, 2008). Fullana et al. (2004) 
demonstrated that students with high levels of OCD symptoms (N = 25) were significantly 
more sensitive to punishment than were students with low levels of OCD symptoms (N = 28). 
In addition, individuals with clinical OCD (N = 56) were significantly more sensitive to 
punishment than were non-clinical individuals (N = 40), with OCD symptom severity 
significantly positively correlated with sensitivity to punishment in the clinical group.  These 
results remained after controlling for anxiety and depression. Greater sensitivity to 
punishment among individuals with OCD is a likely contributor to the high levels of risk-
aversion commonly observed in this population, and relates to increased sensitivity to causal 
pathways to harm (e.g., Tallis, 1995). 
Studies using the NEO-PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 1992) will be discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 5. However, findings have consistently suggested that individuals with OCD score 
low on the competence facet of the conscientiousness domain (Rector, Hood, Richter, & 
Bagby, 2002; Rees et al., 2006; Samuels et al., 2000). This facet is likely to be related to 
avoidance of risk because individuals who have low self-rated competence are likely to 
believe that they cannot cope with the potential negative consequences of risk (Beck et al., 
1985; Boekaerts, 1991; Nicholls, Polman, & Levy, 2010; Ozer & Bandura, 1990). 
Importantly, the items comprising the NEO PI-R are not related to any typical OCD concerns 
or symptoms, reinforcing the notion of general risk-aversion in OCD. 
Another interesting finding is that individuals with OCD score significantly lower 
than depressed individuals on the actions facet of the NEO-PI-R Openness domain (Rector et 
al., 2002; Rees et al., 2006). This indicates that they are unwilling to try new activities, and 
find it difficult to adapt to change (Costa & McCrae, 1992). The actions facet correlates 
highly with the construct of harm avoidance and general risk-aversion (Costa & McCrae, 
1992), further supporting the notion that individuals with OCD might be particularly risk-
aversive and suggesting that interventions for OCD should begin to directly target risk-
aversion in general, not only as it specifically applies to OCD symptoms (Rees et al., 2006). 
Overall, results of personality studies have consistently indicated that individuals with 
OCD are highly harm-avoidant. However, it is somewhat unclear whether high HA among 
individuals with OCD is primarily related to their OCD symptoms, depression, anxiety, a 
combination of these, or some other factor/s (e.g., Alonso et al., 2008; Kima et al., 2009; 
32 
 
Lyoo et al., 2001). Overall, the evidence suggests that there is some specificity to OCD, 
although negative affect is also clearly important. Only a small number of studies have 
directly compared individuals with OCD to other groups of clinical individuals on the TCI. 
Lochner et al. (2005) demonstrated that individuals with OCD were more harm-
avoidant (and lower on NS) than individuals with trichotillomania when assessed on the TCI, 
although both groups scored above non-clinical means. There were no differences between 
the groups on other personality dimensions assessed by the TCI, again suggesting that HA 
might be central to the personality profile of individuals with OCD. However, depressive 
severity was not controlled in the analyses, suggesting that differences in depressive severity 
could have contributed to the observed difference in HA between groups. Similarly, Kim and 
Grant (2001) found that individuals with OCD were more harm-avoidant than pathological 
gamblers or non-clinical individuals on the TPQ. Gamblers, however, did not differ on HA 
compared to non-clinical controls. Kusunoki et al. (2000) found that individuals with OCD 
and those with major depression both scored higher on HA than non-clinical individuals, but 
no different to each other. A complicating factor, however, is the use of medical treatments in 
this study because it appears likely that anti-depressant medication can influence HA scores 
(e.g., Spittlehouse et al., 2010), rendering interpretation of the results somewhat difficult. 
Although some evidence suggests that individuals with OCD have higher levels of 
HA than some other clinical groups, these studies, with the exception of Lochner et al. 
(2005), have not compared individuals with OCD to other groups of anxious individuals who 
would be expected to be highly harm-avoidant (e.g., Maner & Schmidt, 2006). Gothelf et al. 
(2004) found that children with OCD scored higher on HA than non-clinical children, but not 
higher than other clinically anxious children. Gothelf et al. suggested that harm-avoidant 
personality might be involved in the development of anxiety disorders in general. 
Regardless of its disorder specificity, harm-avoidant personality is clearly prevalent 
among individuals with OCD. Although not necessarily directly causing risk-aversive 
behaviour, high levels of HA and related personality constructs are likely to engender a risk-
aversive propensity, which is likely to drive overestimation of threat in various scenarios 
(Sitkin & Pablo, 1992). Overestimation of threat, which will be examined later, does drive 
risk-aversive behaviour (Beck et al., 1985; Berenbaum, Thompson, & Bredemeier, 2007; 
Klumpp & Amir, 2010; Maner & Schmidt, 2006). Therefore, the personality of individuals 
with OCD is likely to be indirectly involved in their risk-aversive cognitive and behavioural 
patterns. However, direct evidence for risk-aversive preferences is best elicited through 
research that directly assesses risk intentions and behaviour, and this will now be reviewed. 
33 
 
Specific Evidence of General Risk-Aversion in OCD 
Steiner (1972) designed a risk-taking questionnaire to “make a rapid and simple 
assessment of risk-taking attitudes” (p. 365). This scale assessed attitudes to risk-taking in the 
areas of driving, money, danger, conscientiousness, social risks, and alcohol and drugs. 
Steiner administered the questionnaire to a group of psychiatric patients (including 
“obsessional”, “manic-depressive”, “depressive neurosis” “other neurosis”, “schizophrenic”, 
“personality disorder”, and “antisocial” diagnoses) and non-psychiatric control groups 
(doctors, accident patients, and surgery patients). The obsessional group scored significantly 
lower on risk-taking compared to all other participant groups, apart from the manic-
depressive, depressive neurosis, and other neurosis groups. However, given the relatively 
small number of obsessional participants, Steiner suggested that it is possible that significant 
effects were missed. Steiner commented that the observed low risk-taking scores among the 
obsessional group are consistent with clinical experience that suggests that these individuals 
tend to be cautious. Given that the questionnaire assessed risk attitudes in non-OCD 
situations, these results are highly suggestive of general risk-aversion in OCD, although it 
must be noted that the precise diagnostic nature of the “obsessional” group is unclear, and 
some individuals might have met criteria for obsessive-compulsive personality disorder 
(OCPD) rather than OCD. 
Most validated measures of risk-taking or risk-aversion assess sensation-seeking risks 
that are performed in pursuit of pleasure. This type of risk-taking, although possibly reduced 
in individuals with OCD compared to non-clinical individuals (Lapsekili et al., 2010) is not 
directly relevant to OCD, which appears to be characterised more by attempts to avoid or 
prevent harm through the avoidance of general, mild, but non-pleasurable risks (Cicolini & 
Rees, 2003; Steketee & Frost, 1994). With this rationale, Steketee and Frost (1994) 
developed and validated the Everyday Risk Inventory (ERI), which assesses risk-taking 
intention relating to these ordinary general activities.  
 The ERI and a version of the ERI revised for use with Australian samples (Cicolini & 
Rees, 2003) have demonstrated good psychometric properties, with high levels of internal 
consistency and test-retest reliability (Cicolini & Rees, 2003; Garratt-Reed, 2004; Steketee & 
Frost, 1994). The ERI also correlates in the expected direction with other risk-taking 
measures and has good discriminant validity (Cicolini & Rees, 2003; Steketee & Frost, 
1994). 
Steketee and Frost (1994) found that individuals with OCD (N = 23) scored 
significantly lower on the ERI (indicating lower levels of general risk-taking) than did non-
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clinical participants (N = 38) even after controlling for age and gender. This same pattern was 
demonstrated on the Jackson Personality Inventory (JPI, Jackson, 1970) risk-taking scale. 
Results remained unchanged when any ERI items that might be considered relevant to OCD 
checking or washing concerns were eliminated, suggesting that risk-aversion is a trait that 
permeates all aspects of the lives of individuals with OCD. 
Frost et al. (1994) compared individuals with sub-clinical OCD symptoms (13 in 
sample 1, 21 in sample 2) with non-clinical individuals (15 in sample 1, 23 in sample 2) on 
the ERI and the JPI. Results indicated that individuals with sub-clinical OCD symptoms 
reported significantly higher risk-aversion on the ERI and the JPI than did non-clinical 
individuals. This was consistent across both samples used. It therefore appears that risk-
aversion is important across the spectrum of OCD severity, from sub-clinical to highly 
impaired.  
Using a version of the ERI adapted for use with Australian samples (the ERI-AUS), 
Cicolini and Rees (2003) replicated the results of Steketee and Frost (1994) and Frost et al. 
(1994) using a sample of 143 non-clinical individuals and 17 individuals with OCD. Non-
clinical participants were classified as either sub-clinical or non-clinical based on a measure 
of OCD symptomatology. Individuals with OCD scored lower than non-clinical individuals 
on the ERI-AUS, indicating higher levels of general risk-aversion. Consistent with Steketee 
and Frost (1994), the same pattern of results was obtained after deleting items that could be 
related to OCD symptoms, indicating that individuals with OCD make risk-aversive decisions 
even in situations that are not relevant to OCD concerns. Although the clinical group scored 
lower on the ERI-AUS than the sub-clinical group, this difference failed to reach 
significance. It should be noted, however, that this appears to have been related to the 
relatively small sample size in the clinical group. The magnitude of the difference in ERI-
AUS scores between the clinical and sub-clinical group was higher than the magnitude of the 
significant difference between the sub-clinical and non-clinical groups. Cicolini and Rees 
reported a positive relationship between risk-aversion and OCD severity, even when items 
relevant to OCD were excluded from the analysis (this relationship was also reported by Rees 
and van der Klift, 2000). Cicolini and Rees acknowledged that it remained unclear whether 
individuals with OCD would be more risk-aversive than other anxious individuals on the 
ERI-AUS. 
Overall, findings using the ERI have indicated that individuals with OCD are more 
risk-aversive than non-clinical individuals (Cicolini & Rees, 2003; Frost et al., 1994; Steketee 
& Frost, 1994). Importantly, Garratt-Reed (2004) demonstrated that general risk-aversion, 
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assessed using the ERI-AUS, was not reduced by standard cognitive-behavioural therapy for 
OCD despite significant reductions in both OCD symptoms and depressive severity. This 
indicates that, although risk-aversion related to OCD concerns is reduced by OCD therapy, 
core level beliefs surrounding threat and risk are not. These beliefs are therefore maintained, 
constituting a risk for future relapse (Maner & Schmidt, 2006; Rees, 2001). The findings of 
Garratt-Reed are congruent with suggestions that the cognitive patterns involved in risk-
aversive behaviour among individuals with OCD permeate all aspects of an individual’s 
thinking and behaving, and are not simply a result of OCD symptomatology (Cicolini & 
Rees, 2003; Frost et al., 1994; Lyoo et al., 2003; Steketee & Frost, 1994). 
Foa et al. (2003) found that, for objectively low risk and OCD-relevant events, 
individuals with OCD (N = 18) required more information about the scenario before making 
a risk-related decision than did non-clinical individuals (N = 18). They also required more 
time to make the decision. Difficulties in making decisions were related to perceived level of 
risk/threat, rather than to obsessionality (Foa et al., 2003). This suggests that individuals with 
OCD are risk-aversive because of heightened perceptions of threat in a situation. It also 
indicates that they are not risk-aversive because of their OCD symptoms, suggesting that risk-
aversion could be a premorbid risk factor for OCD rather than a symptom of the disorder 
(Foa et al., 2003), which is consistent with the finding that it is not ameliorated during 
therapy (Garratt-Reed, 2004).  
Individuals with OCD typically experience high levels of guilt, often associated with 
the belief that they have not lived up to their responsibilities (Frost et al., 1994; Mancini & 
Gangemi, 2004). Mancini and Gangemi experimentally manipulated participants’ feelings of 
guilt and innocence and demonstrated that, among non-clinical participants, guilt for having 
acted irresponsibly was associated with the avoidance of risks. In contrast, individuals who 
perceived themselves as victims were more likely to engage in risky behaviour. Mancini and 
Gangemi suggested that it might be possible to link obsessive-compulsive individuals’ risk-
aversion to their moral assumptions. In other words, individuals with OCD might prefer 
riskless choices because of fear of guilt and feelings of not living up to their responsibilities. 
A recent study (Lorian & Grisham, 2011) did not find significant differences between 
individuals with OCD and non-clinical individuals in terms of general risk-taking on the 
Domain-Specific Risk-Taking Scale (DOSPERT; Blais & Weber, 2006). However, this result 
might have been largely due to low power, with the OCD group demonstrating a non-




 Although relatively few in number, studies have consistently demonstrated that 
individuals with OCD demonstrate high levels of risk-aversive preferences in a wide range of 
daily situations that do not relate to their OCD. However, risk-aversive cognitive biases 
among individuals with OCD are not well understood. Before examining the importance of 
delineating these biases, it is necessary to briefly examine emerging evidence that general 
risk-aversion is present in other clinical disorders and might, in fact, represent a 
transdiagnostic risk factor for anxiety disorders. Evidence of high HA in other clinical 
disorders will be examined, followed by evidence of risk-aversive decisions among anxious 
individuals.  
 
Risk-Avoidant Personality in Other Disorders 
Cloninger’s (1987) theory suggests that individuals with anxiety disorders are likely 
to score high in HA (Allgulander, Cloninger, Przybeck, & Brandt, 1998). Although some 
studies have suggested higher levels of HA among individuals with OCD than other clinical 
groups (e.g., Kim & Grant, 2001; Lochner et al., 2005), few direct comparisons have been 
made between OCD samples and other anxious samples. One study did not find significant 
differences in HA or NS between OCD and anxious control participants (Gothelf et al., 
2004). Therefore, the extent to which risk-aversive personality is specifically related to OCD, 
or more prevalent in OCD compared to other anxiety disorders, is unclear. However, a large 
body of evidence suggests that high HA is associated with a variety of psychological 
disorders, and some authors have suggested that high levels of HA might be a predisposing 
factor for psychological difficulties in general, or at least for anxiety difficulties (e.g., 
Mortberg, Bejerot, & Wistedt, 2007; Olatunji, Unoka, Beran, David, & Armstrong, 2009).  
For example, depressed individuals have been found to score higher on TCI HA than 
non-clinical individuals and HA is positively correlated with, and accounts for a large 
proportion of variance in, depressive severity (Halvorsen et al., 2009; Ongur et al., 2005). HA 
appears to be a vulnerability factor contributing to depression (Halvorsen et al., 2009), 
although it is also influenced by depression and appears to reduce during therapy that reduces 
depressive symptoms (Hruby, Nosalova, Ondrejka, & Preiss, 2009; Spittlehouse et al., 2010).  
  Individuals with social anxiety score higher than non-clinical individuals in HA (Cho 
et al., 2009; Lochner et al., 2007; Mortberg et al., 2007; Pelissolo et al., 2002). Pelissolo et al. 
suggested that HA appears to be more central to social anxiety than are other personality 




It also appears likely that individuals with generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) or 
panic disorder (PD) score higher than non-clinical individuals on HA (Allgulander et al., 
1998; Rettew, Doyle, Kwan, Stanger, & Hudkiak, 2006; Starcevic, Uhlenhuth, Fallon, and 
Pathak, 1996), although not significantly differently from each other (Starcevic et al., 1996). 
High levels of HA have been found in many anxiety and non-anxiety disorders, including 
anorexia nervosa (Rousset, Kipma, Ades, & Gorwood, 2004), psychosomatic disorders 
(Gulec, 2010), body dysmorphic disorder (Pavan et al., 2006), and bipolar disorder (Huynh, 
Guile, Breton, Desrosiers, & Cohen, 2010). In addition, Etter (2010) found that daily smokers 
had higher scores on TCI HA than former smokers or non-smokers. Among daily smokers, 
higher HA was related to higher levels of tobacco dependence. 
Olatunji et al. (2009) found that TCI HA was significantly positively associated with 
all scales of the Symptom Checklist-90 (SCL-90, Derogatis, 1977) among a sample of 121 
non-clinical individuals. These scales include obsessive-compulsive, anxiety, depression, 
phobic anxiety, somatisation, interpersonal sensitivity, hostility, paranoid ideation, and 
psychoticism. This suggests that HA might be involved in a wide range of clinical disorders, 
operating as a “higher order generalized risk factor for the development of psychopathology 
in general” (Olatunji et al., 2009, p. 141). Claims that HA is a general risk factor for 
internalising disorders have also been made by Starcevic et al. (1996) and Rapee, Schniering, 
and Hudson (2009). 
Kotov, Gamez, Schmidt, and Watson (2010) conducted a meta-analysis of 175 studies 
assessing personality structure according to the Big 5 (neuroticism, extraversion, 
conscientiousness, agreeableness, and openness) or Big 3 (negative emotionality, positive 
emotionality, and disinhibition versus constraint) models of personality among individuals 
with various anxiety disorders and depression. There was little disorder-specificity regarding 
personality profiles, again suggesting that personality traits related to risk-aversion (such as 
inhibition-disinhibition) might be relatively similar across clinical disorders. 
Findings have also indicated that individuals with anxiety disorders exhibit inhibited 
temperaments (similar to a harm-avoidant personality) early in life (Gladstone, Parker, 
Mitchell, Wilhelm, & Malhi, 2005; Schwartz, Snidman, and Kagan, 1999). Rapee et al. 
(2009) suggested that high levels of inhibition among children are associated with greater risk 
for a variety of clinical disorders in later life, although inhibition does not necessarily result 
in significant levels of discomfort or interference for the individual. Rettew et al. (2006) also 
postulated that not all individuals with high levels of HA develop psychological disorders, 
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and that individuals with high HA but good coping or emotion regulation skills might be 
protected from clinical impairment. 
Although it is possible that individuals with OCD have higher levels of HA than 
individuals with other disorders, the evidence suggests that harm-avoidant personality is 
involved in a range of psychological difficulties, although whether it represents a risk factor 
for their development, or a consequence of their symptoms, remains unclear (Starcevic et al., 
1996). This is supported by studies (e.g., Alonso et al., 2008; Lyoo et al., 2003) suggesting 
that depressive symptoms largely mediate the OCD-HA relationship, although it should be 
noted that not all studies have found this (e.g., Kima et al., 2009; Richter et al., 1996). It 
remains possible, however, that there is a specific (albeit probably small) relationship 
between OCD and harm avoidant personality that is not accounted for by negative affect.  
 In addition to evidence indicating that various anxiety disorders (along with other 
clinical disorders) are linked to harm-avoidant personality traits, recent evidence has 
suggested that anxiety disorders might be related to general (as opposed to simply disorder-
specific) risk-aversive behavioural preferences and that general risk-aversion is a 
transdiagnostic risk factor for anxiety disorders (e.g., Lorian & Grisham, 2011; Maner & 
Schmidt, 2006). 
 
General Risk-Aversion as a Transdiagnostic Risk Factor for Anxiety Disorders 
Butler and Mathews (1983, 1987) demonstrated that individuals with high levels of 
trait anxiety perceived higher levels of risk/threat in various situations than did individuals 
with lower levels of trait anxiety. Other studies have replicated this finding (e.g., Constans & 
Mathews, 1993; Gasper & Clore, 1998). Anxiety has been demonstrated to correlate 
positively with risk-aversion in situations relevant to the self (Eisenberg et al., 1998; Zhou & 
Kong, 2010). It is, therefore, possible that a high level of trait anxiety, rather than a specific 
diagnosis of OCD, is related to general risk-aversion. Nicholson et al. (2005) demonstrated 
that, in general, risk propensity in daily situations is positively related to extraversion and 
negatively related to neuroticism. Given that anxious individuals tend to be low on 
extraversion and highly neurotic (Glinski & Page, 2010; Naragon-Gainey & Watson, 2011), 
they would be expected to be somewhat risk-aversive. Indeed, Steketee and Frost (1994) and 
Cicolini and Rees (2003) suggested that the ERI should be utilised with various other anxious 
groups in order to determine whether general risk-aversion is prevalent. 
However, until recently, despite widespread acknowledgement of the overestimation 
of threat/risk, and consequent risk-aversion, in disorder-specific situations among anxious 
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individuals, little research has been done regarding the possibility that anxious individuals 
possess a “fundamental and pervasive tendency to avoid risks” (Maner & Schmidt, 2006, p. 
181) independent from their specific diagnoses. However, recent research has suggested that 
high levels of general risk-aversion might be present among a range of anxious individuals 
and represent a risk factor for the development of anxiety disorders (e.g., Lorian, 2011; 
Lorian & Grisham, 2010, 2011; Maner et al., 2007; Maner & Schmidt, 2006). 
Maner and Schmidt (2006) proposed that individuals with various anxiety disorders 
are likely to periodically overestimate threat (probability and/or cost of negative events) in 
situations that are not related to their disorder, and that this propensity to overestimate threat 
might be involved in the development of anxiety disorders. Given that anxiety is an 
emotional state designed to signal the presence of possible danger, it is likely that it would 
predispose the individual to risk-avoidant decisions, as a means to avoid potential threats 
(Maner & Schmidt, 2006). Maner and Schmidt suggested that risk-avoidant decision making 
and anxiety are reciprocally influential, whereby overestimation of threat causes anxiety, 
which drives risk-aversion. Subsequently, this anxiety predisposes the individual to 
overestimation of threat in different situations, resulting in a spiral of faulty risk assessments 
eliciting anxiety, which causes risk-aversion and perpetuates appraisal biases. 
Maner and Schmidt (2006) utilised a sample of 171 students and took measures of 
trait anxiety, trait depression, risk-taking orientation (willingness to make risky decisions), 
and risk appraisals in various types of situations. Results revealed that trait anxiety was 
significantly positively correlated with the perceived likelihood and severity of negative 
outcomes, and significantly negatively correlated with perceived control over the occurrence 
of those outcomes. All of these significant relationships remained after controlling for the 
influence of depressed mood. There were no significant relationships between trait anxiety 
and any appraisals of positive outcomes. Trait anxiety was also significantly negatively 
correlated with risk-taking orientation, and this relationship remained significant after 
controlling for depressed mood. It is noteworthy that, after controlling for trait anxiety, the 
relationships between depressed mood and risk perceptions were all non-significant (Maner 
& Schmidt, 2006). 
Although risk-avoidant orientation was positively related to perceived probability and 
perceived costliness of negative events, Maner and Schmidt (2006) demonstrated that 
perceptions of severity of negative events uniquely predicted risk-avoidant orientation, 
although perceptions of likelihood did not. This suggests that perceptions of severity might 
mediate the link between trait anxiety and risk-avoidance (Maner & Schmidt, 2006), although 
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self-efficacy/perceived ability to cope with negative events (an important element of 
risk/threat appraisals) was not assessed, and it is possible that this factor might have mediated 
the observed results (Maner & Schmidt, 2006). 
Maner and Schmidt (2006) suggested that their results indicate that anxiety might be 
uniquely linked to pervasive risk-avoidant patterns and that this link is unlikely to be the 
result of spurious associations with depressed mood. The results also suggested that anxious 
people primarily avoid risky situations because they overestimate the costliness of potential 
negative outcomes. Consistent with this finding, Mitte (2007) demonstrated that trait anxiety 
was positively related to risk-aversive choices across various life domains when individuals 
were asked to choose either a risky or a safe alternative. This result was mediated by the 
subjective cost of the negative event – highly anxious individuals perceived negative events 
as more costly (in this case indicated by how bad they would feel if the event occurred) and 
this drove their risk-aversion. Individuals with higher levels of trait anxiety perceived 
negative events as more likely to happen to them than to other people, which Mitte suggested 
could be related to low perceived coping ability. 
Maner et al. (2007) conducted three studies, the results of which suggested that 
anxiety is associated with risk-aversive decisions in general situations. In the first study it 
was found that social anxiety is related to a tendency to make risk-avoidant decisions among 
non-clinical individuals. The second study demonstrated that high trait anxiety is related to 
risk-aversion among non-clinical individuals. The third study demonstrated that clinically 
anxious individuals are more risk-aversive than individuals with mood disorders, learning 
disorders, and non-clinical individuals (Maner et al., 2007). 
Several other recent studies have also suggested that general risk-aversion might be 
common among anxious individuals. For example, Lorian and Grisham (2010) demonstrated 
that, among non-clinical individuals, social anxiety symptoms were significantly negatively 
correlated with a behavioural measure of risk-taking, and were negatively related to self-
reported risk-taking in social and recreational domains (although not in the domains of 
financial, ethical, or health and safety) on the DOSPERT. In addition, risk-avoidance 
appeared to mediate the relationship between behavioural inhibition (a personality dimension 
similar to HA) and social anxiety, suggesting that it could be an important link between 
personality and pathological anxiety (Lorian & Grisham, 2010). Lorian and Grisham 
suggested that risk-avoidance might be an important component of the development of 
pathological social anxiety. It should be noted, however, that there was also evidence of 
disorder-specific risk-aversion given that the only self-report domains of risk-taking that were 
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related to social anxiety symptoms (social and recreational) are conceptually related to social 
anxiety symptoms, as acknowledged by the authors. This is especially important to consider 
given that other studies have suggested that individuals with social phobia only overestimate 
threat for events of a social nature (Nelson et al., 2010; Stopa & Clark, 2000; Uren et al., 
2004; Voncken et al., 2007).  It appears likely that individuals with social phobia 
overestimate threat in some general situations but not others.  
In a subsequent study, Lorian and Grisham (2011) found that individuals with GAD 
and individuals with social phobia were significantly less willing to engage in risky 
behaviour than were non-clinical individuals when assessed on the DOSPERT. Closer 
inspection again revealed that risk-aversion among these groups was restricted to social and 
recreational domains and was not present in the financial, ethical, or health and safety 
domains. 
Lorian and Grisham (2011) suggested that their results provide preliminary evidence 
for the notion that anxious individuals are risk-aversive in general situations. However, they 
also suggested that this risk-aversive bias is likely to be more complicated than suggested by 
Maner and Schmidt (2006) and that it is also likely to involve disorder-specific components. 
This would suggest that investigation of general risk-aversion on a disorder-specific basis is 
necessary. However, the results strongly indicate that general risk-aversion is unlikely to be a 
phenomenon that is specific to OCD, contrary to the suggestions of other researchers (e.g., 
Cicolini & Rees, 2003; Rees et al., 2006; Steiner, 1972; Steketee & Frost, 1994). 
Somewhat surprisingly, however, Lorian (2011) demonstrated that, as assessed on the 
ERI-AUS, 31 individuals with anxiety disorders (primarily social phobia or GAD) were no 
more risk-aversive than 27 non-clinical participants, even after accounting for the influence 
of age and gender. Consistent with previous studies, the anxious group was more risk-
avoidant on the DOSPERT scales relating to social, recreational, and financial risks, but not 
ethical or health and safety risks. Lorian suggested that anxious individuals are risk-aversive 
in various situations, but not consistently so. Interestingly, the ERI-AUS appears to assess 
less serious risks than the DOSPERT, and it is possible that the avoidance of these minor 
general risks is specific to OCD, rather than anxiety in general. 
In combination, the results of Lorian and Grisham (2010, 2011) and Lorian (2011) 
suggest that anxious individuals are risk-aversive in domains that are not related to their 
anxiety disorder. However, the results also indicate that risk-aversion is not present in all 
domains. In addition, the samples used in these studies primarily consisted of individuals 
with social phobia (who would be expected to overestimate risk in social and recreational 
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domains) and individuals with GAD (who would be expected to overestimate risk in a 
multitude of domains, Steketee & Frost, 1994). Therefore, although important preliminary 
evidence, these studies do not demonstrate unequivocally that general risk-aversion is present 
across anxiety disorders. However, they do highlight the complexity of the construct of risk-
aversion and demonstrate the importance of studying general risk-aversion in all anxiety 
disorders in order to delineate the cognitive errors that drive it, as well as to determine the 
level of disorder-specificity (if any) associated with these biases. 
It no longer appears likely that general risk-aversion is a phenomenon unique to OCD. 
However, as Maner and Schmidt (2006) suggested, the evidence of a pervasive risk-avoidant 
cognitive set among anxious individuals does not preclude disorder-specific cognitive 
patterns of risk appraisal. The results of Lorian and Grisham (2010, 2011) in particular 
suggest that, although there is likely to be some general risk-aversive bias among anxious 
individuals, there might also be a level of disorder-specificity to this bias. The finding of a 
general risk-aversive tendency among individuals with anxiety disorders does not diminish 
the importance of studying this bias in each disorder. Indeed, if general risk-aversion is 
implicated in a range of clinical disorders then the importance of delineating its cognitive 
basis is magnified, especially given its apparent negative impact on treatment outcomes. 
 
General Risk-Aversion and Treatment Difficulties in Individuals with OCD 
A reduction of general risk-aversion is a potential avenue for improving treatment 
outcomes among individuals with OCD. Indeed, general risk-aversion is speculated to be a 
significant factor relating to treatment failure, treatment dropout, and relapse among 
individuals with OCD (Cicolini & Rees, 2003; Lyoo et al., 2001; Lyoo et al., 2003; Rees, 
2001; Rees et al., 2006). 
 
Risk-aversion and the behavioural component of therapy. 
Risk-aversion is a core dimension underlying OCD (Summerfeldt, 2004) and has been 
linked to failure of the behavioural component of therapy because many individuals with 
OCD are not prepared to take the “risk” involved in non-neutralisation following exposure to 
feared situations (Lyoo et al., 2001). This could partially account for high rates of treatment 
refusal and treatment dropout. In addition, it could explain why treatment adherence is often 
low among individuals with OCD (e.g., Simpson et al., 2008). Reduction of the general risk-
aversive tendency among individuals with OCD is likely to increase their willingness to face 
feared scenarios (i.e., take the necessary risks to make therapy effective), improving 
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treatment seeking, treatment adherence (including the completion of homework exposure 
exercises), and overall treatment effectiveness (Lyoo et al., 2001; Maner & Schmidt, 2006; 
Rees, 2001). 
 
Risk-aversion and the cognitive component of therapy. 
In terms of the cognitive component of therapy, general risk-aversion presents 
problems because most individuals with OCD seem to perceive any probability of threat, or 
responsibility for negative outcomes, to be worth avoiding (this is related to IU). This renders 
reappraisal of estimates of the probability of negative events (the “cornerstone” of traditional 
cognitive therapy) ineffective when attempting to reduce obsessive avoidance or 
compulsivity (Grayson, 2010; Rees, 2001). Cognitive techniques aiming to disconfirm feared 
consequences of not neutralising are further complicated because many obsessive fears 
involve events that are situated in the distant future and individuals with OCD, because of 
their risk-aversive bias, are unwilling to accept the risk, however small, that these events 
might occur (Rees, 2001; Salkovskis, Forrester, Richards, & Morrison, 1998; Woods et al., 
2004). Therefore, reduction of general risk-aversion is likely to result in improved 
effectiveness of cognitive therapy for OCD (Rees, 2001). 
 
Risk-aversion and relapse. 
General risk-aversion among individuals with OCD is likely to cause the greatest 
problems during the maintenance phase of treatment, increasing the likelihood of symptom 
relapse (Lyoo et al., 2001; Lyoo et al., 2003). Given that general risk-aversion remains high 
following treatment (Garratt-Reed, 2004), individuals with OCD can be assumed to continue 
to perceive heightened levels of threat/risk in daily scenarios (Beck et al., 1985; Berenbaum, 
Thompson, & Bredemeier, 2007; Cano-Vindel et al., 2009; Klumpp & Amir, 2010), even if 
not actively exhibiting OCD symptoms. As Maner and Schmidt (2006) suggested, high levels 
of perceived general threat result in anxiety, which drives risk-aversion. However, this 
anxiety is also likely to drive further overestimation of risk/threat in a range of daily 
scenarios, resulting in a spiral back into heightened threat perceptions for OCD-relevant 
events and a consequent return of OCD symptoms (Rees, 2001; Rees et al., 2006). In 
addition, individuals are likely to resort to habitual coping mechanisms to deal with threat 
and anxiety (Beck et al., 1985), suggesting that heightened anxiety is likely to be dealt with 
through the use of familiar rituals among individuals with OCD. It is therefore likely that 
reduction of the general risk-aversive bias, and consequent reduction of risk-aversive 
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behaviour in everyday life, could enhance long-term therapeutic outcomes among individuals 
with OCD (Rees, 2001; Rees et al., 2006). Maner and Schmidt (2006) made a similar 
suggestion pertaining to improving treatment across anxiety disorders. 
 
The Importance of Reducing General Risk-Aversion in Individuals with OCD 
 It is important to note that, although risk-aversion appears to be somewhat linked to 
the personality of individuals with OCD (Alonso et al., 2008; Ettelt et al., 2008; Gothelf et 
al., 2004; Kima et al., 2009; Lyoo et al., 2001; Lyoo et al., 2003; Marchesi, et al., 2008; Pfohl 
et al., 1990; Richter et al., 1996; Savron et al., 2007) evidence has suggested that personality 
traits can be altered with therapy (Corruble, Duret, Pelissolo, Falissard, & Guelfi, 2002; 
Glinski & Page, 2010; Helson, Kwan, John, & Jones, 2002; Hoffart & Hedley, 1997; McCrae 
et al., 2000; Piedmont, 2001; Roberts, 1997; Santor, Bagby, & Joffe, 1997; Srivastava, John, 
Gosling, & Potter, 2003). Evidence has also suggested that HA among individuals with OCD 
and other clinical disorders is amenable to therapeutic influence and is likely to be partially 
dependent on symptoms (Allgulander et al., 1998; Corchs et al., 2008; Hruby et al., 2009; 
Lyoo et al., 2003; Mortberg et al., 2007; Savron, Bartolucci & Pitti, 2004; Spittlehouse et al., 
2010). 
If therapy can reduce risk-aversion in all aspects of the lives of individuals with OCD, 
then a potential causal or maintaining mechanism of OCD will have been minimised (Lyoo et 
al., 2001). However, reducing general risk-aversion is likely to require specially designed 
therapeutic strategies separate to those employed when focusing on risk-aversion that is 
specific to OCD-related situations (Garratt-Reed, 2004; Rees et al., 2006). Maner and 
Schmidt (2006) and Rees et al. suggested that these strategies should focus directly on the 
cognitive mechanisms underlying overestimation of threat in general situations. Therefore, 
the cognitive mechanisms through which general risk-aversion operates in individuals with 
OCD must be delineated. Steketee and Frost (1994) suggested that examination of risk 
perceptions in general situations, using Beck et al.’s (1985) model, is required in order to 
achieve this goal. However, to date no studies appear to have addressed this issue, either in 
OCD or any other anxiety disorder. It is consequently unclear to what extent individuals with 
OCD exhibit distorted estimates of the probability and/or cost of negative outcomes, or of 
their ability to cope with those outcomes, in general risk situations. 
Recent evidence that general risk-aversion is likely to be a transdiagnostic risk factor 
for anxiety (e.g., Lorian & Grisham, 2010, 2011) suggests that the importance of this research 
extends beyond improving treatment efficacy for OCD and that determining the nature of the 
45 
 
cognitive biases driving general risk-aversion could improve treatment outcomes across 
anxiety disorders. Indeed, Maner and Schmidt (2006) suggested that treatments for anxiety 
disorders might be improved with the addition of a component that focuses specifically on 
“global decision-making processes regarding risk” (p. 186). They suggested that “reducing 
risk-avoidant decision-making biases in apparently nonsymptomatic domains could reduce 
the presence of basic risk-avoidance and, in turn, could facilitate reductions in anxiety” (p. 
186). Maner and Schmidt also suggested that the cognitive distortions that drive heightened 
risk/threat perceptions in daily situations among different groups of anxious individuals 
would appear to be the most likely therapeutic avenue for reducing general risk-aversion. 
Delineating these distortions among individuals with OCD is the goal of the current research. 
Given that perception of elevated levels of threat drives anxiety and risk-aversion, 
understanding the cognitive mechanisms driving elevated threat perceptions among 
individuals with OCD and other anxious individuals is crucial to further the understanding of 
general risk-aversion among these individuals (Maner & Schmidt, 2006; Rees et al., 2006). 
From a cognitive perspective the reasons why individuals perceive heightened levels of threat 
can vary. Beck et al.’s (1985) model of threat perception and anxiety will be used to explore 
these in the current study. An understanding of these distortions would advance 
understanding of why individuals with OCD perceive high levels of general threat and 
consequently avoid general risks. It would also have potential implications for improving 
treatments for OCD and possibly for other disorders. Before examining existing evidence for 
the potential impact of various cognitive threat biases among individuals with OCD, Beck et 
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Beck et al.’s Model of Threat Perception and Anxiety 
Chapter Overview 
 This chapter will briefly review Beck et al.’s (1985) model of threat perception and 
anxiety. Initially, the cognitive processes involved in primary and secondary threat appraisal 
will be examined, before exploring the link between threat perception and anxiety. The role 
of threat misappraisal in anxiety disorders will be reviewed, and finally evidence for the 
validity of the model will be presented. 
Beck et al. (1985) suggested that automatic cognitive processing serves to simplify 
any encountered situation by reducing the amount of information that the individual 
perceives. The relevant environment is scanned and the individual determines which aspects 
of the situation, if any, warrant attentional resources. This cognitive operation results in much 
information being discarded and distorted, with the individual’s expectations, interests, 
motives, and concerns influencing the way in which the situation is perceived by determining 
which aspects of the situation are magnified, which are minimised, and which are ignored. 
Sometimes, cognitive processing leads to the perception of threat, which generates anxiety. 
Beck et al. suggested that appraisal of potentially threatening cues or situations involves 
primary appraisal, secondary appraisal, and reappraisal.  
 
Primary Appraisal – The Nature of the Threat 
During primary appraisal, the individual forms an initial impression of the situation. 
This can be generated on the basis of inadequate data but is crucial because it is the basis for 
the individual’s conceptualisation of, and response to, the situation. If an individual appraises 
a situation as posing a threat to his/her survival, functioning, or interpersonal attachment, a 
“critical response” (Beck et al., 1985 p. 39) is activated. This response is egocentric and 
involves appraisal in terms of “how does it affect me?” The individual selects and interprets 
data to provide a meaningful answer to this question.  
Carr (1974) proposed a model whereby “threat, upon which the experience of anxiety 
depends, is some multiplicative function of the subjective cost of an event and its subjective 
probability” (p. 315). Beck et al. (1985) expanded this concept. Once a threat (real or 
imagined) is detected, the probability of the occurrence of unpleasant outcomes is evaluated, 
along with the cost/awfulness of those outcomes if they were to occur (Beck et al., 1985).  
Initial estimates of the probability and cost of the potential negative event can be inaccurate, 




Secondary Appraisal – Perceived Ability to Cope 
At the same time as assessing the nature of the threat (primary appraisal), the 
individual assesses his/her resources for dealing with the threat. During this secondary 
appraisal process, the individual assesses the availability and effectiveness of internal and 
external resources that could be utilised to deflect or manage potential damage within the 
threatening situation. Although the individual has relatively separate conceptualisations of the 
dangers posed by a situation and his/her ability to cope with those dangers (Rapee, 1997), 
primary and secondary appraisals are usually integrated into the same overall evaluation 
(Beck et al., 1985). The individual considers the amount and probabilities of damage inherent 
in the threat in relation to his/her capacity to deal with it. The balance between perceived 
levels of threat and perceived ability to cope with potential consequences of threat drives the 
intensity of anxiety experienced within the situation. Beck et al.’s (1985) model of threat 




Perceived probability    Perceived cost/ 
   of threat  x awfulness of danger 
Anxiety =                              
   
Perceived ability to cope + Perceived ‘rescue’ factors 
 
 
Figure 1. Beck et al.’s (1985) model of threat perception and anxiety. 
 
Reappraisal 
As the situation develops, the individual constantly reappraises the properties of the 
threat itself, as well as his or her own coping mechanisms. This facilitates a clearer 
delineation of the danger and of coping resources. These calculations are influenced by 
personality factors, learning experiences, and memories, as well as by consideration of any 
possible benefits of the situation. As such they are susceptible to considerable error and 
variation (Beck et al., 1985). However, the more time and cognitive resources that are 
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devoted to the processing of the situation, the more accurate the perception of the level of 
threat and one’s ability to cope are likely to become (Beck et al., 1985). 
 
Threat and Anxiety 
When an individual perceives threat, his or her cognitive-motor apparatus is mobilised 
to deal with it immediately. If threat is judged to be low relative to the individual’s coping 
mechanisms, the individual might choose to eliminate the threat, perhaps through attacking 
the source. Conversely, if the individual judges threat/risk as being high relative to his or her 
coping resources, anxiety is generated and he or she is impelled to escape or avoid the threat, 
thereby reducing anxiety. The degree of anxiety experienced, and the amount of behavioural 
arousal, is proportional to the subjective estimate of danger (Beck et al., 1985). Therefore, 
high levels of anxiety, and consequent avoidance behaviour, can be experienced when a 
negative event is perceived as highly likely and/or highly costly, and/or when the individual 
believes that he/she cannot adequately cope with the potential negative outcomes. 
Beck et al. (1985) posited that when an individual perceives his/her coping ability to 
be insufficient to protect him/her from potential internal or external dangers, a cognitive-
affective schema state termed “the sense of vulnerability” (p. 67) is triggered. This self-
protective pattern automatically functions to terminate risk-taking behaviour, preventing the 
individual from moving closer to, or remaining within, the ‘dangerous’ situation (Beck et al., 
1985). Importantly, however, the individual can often overcome these inhibitory responses by 
approaching the threat. In addition, reappraisal can occur, whereby the individual recognises 
that the situation is either non-threatening, or can be adequately dealt with, thereby 
terminating the sense of vulnerability. 
Complex appraisals need not be completed in their entirety each time a situation is 
encountered because past experience in similar scenarios warns the individual what to expect 
and informs him/her of potential coping mechanisms (Beck et al., 1985; Butler & Mathews, 
1983). This involves the activation of cognitive schemas that facilitate the selection of 
relevant details of the situation and recollection of relevant information. Schemas are 
subconscious cognitive structures that are used to organise information that is processed. 
When a schema (or set of schemas) is activated, its content influences the way in which the 
individual perceives, interprets, and evaluates objects and events. In the majority of cases, 
these schemas facilitate rapid processing and problem solving, however once activated, they 
minimise the perception of information that is not relevant to the content of the schema (Beck 
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Anxiety has obvious evolutionary and self-protective importance. Therefore it follows 
that in anxiety disorders, anxiety itself is not the main problem. Rather: 
 
…the unremitting generation of anxiety represents a persistent, ineffective mechanism 
designed to impel the organism to reduce supposed danger that is activating the 
anxiety response. When, however, the problem is not an actual danger, but a 
misperception or exaggeration of the danger, the experience of anxiety is 
inappropriate for initiating remedial action. If the danger is nonexistent or 
exaggerated, the individual has no way to head it off (Beck et al., 1985, p.15).  
 
Anxiety disorders occur when cognitive processes continually, erroneously, structure 
external and/or internal experiences as signs of danger. All individuals regularly incorrectly 
appraise situations as threats but then reappraise them as non-threatening (from a survival 
standpoint it is clearly more adaptive to respond as if a situation is threatening when it is not, 
than to ignore situations that genuinely pose a threat). However, Beck et al. (1985) suggested 
that in anxiety disorders, these false alarms are not terminated by contradictory information 
because reappraisal either does not occur or fails to incorporate information that is 
inconsistent with the dominant cognitive vulnerability schema, which is more elaborate 
among individuals with anxiety disorders than among non-anxious individuals.  
To explain the source of this cognitive disregulation, Beck et al. (1985) used findings 
from earlier studies (e.g., Butler & Mathews, 1983) indicating that, in situations resembling 
past negative events or perceived failures, anxious people have enhanced access to negative 
memories of similar events compared to positive memories of those events. Therefore, in 
individuals with anxiety disorders the sense of vulnerability is easily triggered in situations 
resembling past failures or negative experiences. Once triggered, the vulnerability schema 
results in incoming data being processed in terms of the dangerous aspects of the situation, 
with the individual selectively attending to signs of danger or failure while ignoring safety 
signals. This heightened vigilance for potential threat can serve to further heighten perceived 
probability and cost of potential negative events. Similarly, recollection of past failures 
results in a focus on the individual’s weaknesses rather than his/her strengths, reducing 
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estimates of his/her ability to cope with possible negative outcomes. This selective processing 
results in biased and self-perpetuating perceptions of the situation as dangerous, and of the 
individual as being incapable of coping with potential negative outcomes. Thus, in anxiety 
disorders, “an upset of the regulatory functions of the cognitive system leads one to 
indiscriminately interpret environmental events as dangers” (Beck et al., 1985, p. 86). 
The behavioural element of anxiety disorders is also important. The perception of 
being unable to cope with a threat (which might be perceived as unrealistically likely and/or 
costly) results in difficulty instigating goal-oriented action and problem solving strategies 
(Beck et al., 1985). Even if the individual possesses the necessary skills to deal with the 
threat, these skills are likely to be overridden or inhibited by escape tendencies, expectations 
of failure, and anxiety. Thus, cognitive appraisals of threat generate anxiety, the experience 
of which feeds back into the cognitive system and results in the decision to prepare for 
defensive action. Escape from, or avoidance of the perceived threat is then initiated. In this 
manner, cognitive biases, anxious arousal, and behavioural changes interact to produce a self-
perpetuating cycle in which the individual perceives high levels of threat, generating high 
levels of anxiety that impair performance. In order to extinguish anxiety, the individual 
avoids or retreats from the situation, thereby confirming his/her fears of negative outcomes or 
belief in his/her inability to cope with the threatening situation. This causes similar situations 
to be appraised as even more threatening in the future. 
 
Disorder-specific cognitive biases. 
Beck et al. (1985) proposed that the sense of vulnerability is triggered largely in 
disorder-specific situations and that the cognitive biases involved in the generation of 
distorted perceptions of probability, cost, and coping ability are likely to vary across anxiety 
disorders, given that people with different disorders fear different, and often highly specific, 
events. It has been suggested by other researchers (e.g., Uren et al., 2004) that different 
elements of the model may be primarily important in the threat overestimation and anxiety 
associated with different disorders. As a result, it is necessary to examine Beck et al.’s (1985) 
model as it applies to various anxiety disorders. Salkovskis, Forrester, and Richards (1998) 
were the first researchers to adapt and apply Beck et al.’s (1985) model to OCD. However, 
prior to examining this work in detail, it is first necessary to briefly examine the wide body of 





General Evidence for Beck et al.’s Model 
Beck et al. (1985) asserted that when individuals are vigilant for danger within a 
situation they selectively attend to threatening cues and consequently perceive heightened 
levels of threat. This generates anxiety and results in avoidance or maladaptive behaviour. 
They also suggested that because individuals with anxiety disorders are hyper-vigilant for 
signs of danger, this results in frequently elevated threat perceptions and consequent anxiety. 
It is important to briefly examine evidence supporting this conceptualisation of anxiety and 
anxiety disorders. Following this, evidence for the theoretical and clinical utility of the 
various elements (perceived probability, perceived cost, and perceived coping ability) of the 
model proposed by Beck et al. will be discussed. To date, no studies appear to have attempted 
to integrate evidence relating to this model across anxiety disorders, so this represents an 
important step towards exploring its general validity. 
 
 Evidence for the importance of elevated threat perception in anxiety and anxiety 
disorders. 
Evidence has strongly supported Beck et al.’s (1985) proposal that anxiety arises from 
the processing of events as threatening. For example, Cano-Vindel et al. (2009) demonstrated 
that anxiety can be more effectively generated by presenting non-clinical individuals with a 
threatening situation than by inducing physiological arousal, suggesting that perception of 
threat is an important causal mechanism for anxiety. The fact that perception of threat causes 
anxiety has been further evidenced by studies that have manipulated or trained attention 
towards threat and demonstrated consequent effects on situational anxiety (e.g., Amir, Weber, 
Beard, Bomyea, & Taylor, 2008; Hazen et al., 2009; Klumpp & Amir, 2010; MacLeod, 
Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002).  
 Similar to Beck et al. (1985), Butler and Mathews (1983, 1987) proposed that 
individuals with high levels of trait anxiety possess more extensive and elaborate threat 
schemata than other individuals, and as such are more prone to perceive threat in a variety of 
situations. Recent behavioural and neurological evidence has supported this “spread of 
activation” hypothesis (MacNamara & Hajcak, 2010). Cisler and Koster (2010) asserted that 
“A wealth of research demonstrates that anxious individuals display an attentional bias 
towards threatening sources of information” (p. 204). This bias operates in anxious adults and 
children and is positively related to anxiety severity (Roy et al. 2008; Waters, Mogg, Bradley, 
& Pine, 2008). It occurs to a similar extent in all anxiety disorders and across cultures (Bar-
Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van Ijzendoorn, 2007; Lu et al., 2007) 
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and appears to involve facilitated attention towards threatening stimuli, difficulty disengaging 
attention from threatening stimuli, and in some cases deliberate but counterproductive 
attempts to avoid attending to threatening stimuli (Cisler & Koster, 2010; Verkuil, Brosschot, 
Putman, & Thayer, 2009). These processes are not typically observed in non-anxious 
individuals or individuals with depression (Eldar, Yankelevitch, Lamy, & Bar-Haim, 2010; 
Muris & van Doorn, 2003). 
Research has consistently demonstrated that anxious individuals perceive higher 
levels of threat than non-anxious individuals, and that perceived threat predicts situational 
anxiety in both clearly threatening situations and in ambiguous situations (Bogels & 
Zigterman, 2000; Rapee, 1997; Stober, 1997; Zvolensky, Heffner, Eifert, Spira, & Feldner 
2001). Because it drives anxiety, perceived threat is highly predictive of situational avoidance 
(Cisler & Koster, 2010; Nelson et al., 2010; Stopa & Clark, 2000; Taylor et al., 2010; Warren 
et al., 1989; Weinstein, 2000), which is a significant maintaining factor in anxiety disorders 
(Poulton & Andrews, 1996). It appears that perception of heightened threat causes anxiety, 
which then predisposes people to risk-aversive decisions and results in a spiral of further 
threat perception and anxiety (Maner & Schmidt, 2006). For this reason, attentional biases 
towards threat, and consequent overestimation of threat, are suggested to be important causal 
factors in the development and maintenance of anxiety disorders in adults and children, and 
the elimination of such biases is linked to large reductions in anxiety symptoms (Bouchard et 
al., 2007; Drabant et al., 2011; Field & Lester, 2010; Hazen et al., 2009; Kverno, 2000; 
Legerstee et al., 2009; Lu et al., 2007; Muris & van Doorn, 2003). 
Evidence has demonstrated that, as Beck et al. (1985) suggested, individuals with 
anxiety disorders exhibit interpretive biases for threat-related stimuli. However it is less clear 
to what extent these biases are disorder-specific versus being related to trait anxiety 
(Zvolensky et al., 2001). It is likely that both are involved to differing degrees in various 
anxiety disorders (Uren et al., 2004). High levels of trait anxiety appear to interact with biases 
in vigilance for threatening information to generate situational anxiety (Klumpp & Amir, 
2010; Mathews, Mackintosh, & Fulcher, 1997). Therefore, it is likely that individuals with 
anxiety disorders perceive heightened levels of threat largely when specifically vigilant for 
threatening cues, and not merely as a function of high trait anxiety. For example, worriers 
selectively attend to threatening information that is relevant to the content of their worries 
(Verkuil et al., 2009), individuals with panic disorder demonstrate threat vigilance and threat 
estimation biases for panic-related cues (Amir, McNally, Riemann, & Clements, 1996; Ehlers 
& Breuer, 1995; Teachman, 2005; Teachman, Smith-Janik, & Saporito, 2007), and 
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individuals with GAD are vigilant for more general threat (Coles, Turk, & Heimberg, 2007). 
However, what is not clear is the extent to which threat vigilance extends beyond disorder-
specific situations among individuals with anxiety disorders, or whether certain anxiety 
disorders are more likely to involve perceptions of elevated threat in a wide range of 
situations (De Cort, Hermans, Spruyt, Griez, & Schruers, 2008; Uren et al., 2004). Mathews 
et al. (1997) suggested that although individuals are usually vigilant for disorder specific 
threats, highly anxious individuals become more attentive threat cues once a potential threat 
is detected, suggesting that threat vigilance could partially generalise to non-disorder related 
scenarios. This is consistent with Maner and Schmidt’s (2006) conceptualisation of the link 
between anxiety and general risk aversion. It is also consistent with evidence suggesting that 
avoidance of general risk is common among anxious individuals (Lorian & Grisham, 2010, 
2011). 
 Importantly, cognitive theories of anxiety disorders, although often differing in certain 
aspects, “all consider a selective bias for threat information in attention, interpretation and 
memory a central characteristic that distinguishes anxious and non-anxious states” (Beck & 
Clark, 1997, p. 49). The core feature of cognitive theories of anxiety disorders (e.g., Clark, 
1986; Salkovskis, 1985, 1989; Stopa & Clark, 1993; Wells, 1995)  is that overestimation of 
threat associated with disorder-specific situations or stimuli (i.e., social situations for 
individuals with social phobia or bodily sensations for individuals with panic disorder) is the 
cause of  anxiety in those situations. This anxiety subsequently results in further increases in 
vigilance for threat, resulting in further increases in anxiety (Waters, Mogg, et al., 2008). 
Research evidence strongly supports Beck et al.’s (1985) assertion that clinically 
anxious individuals are vigilant for, and perceive heightened levels of threat, which drives 
their anxiety (Cisler & Koster, 2010; Verkuil et al., 2009). In addition, attenuation of threat 
vigilance biases can reduce threat perception and consequent anxiety (Mathews et al., 1997). 
However, as previously discussed, Beck et al. (1985) suggested that the cognitive bias driving 
threat overestimation can involve overestimation of the probability and/or cost of negative 
outcomes, as well as underestimation of one’s ability to cope with negative events. Evidence 
that these specific biases are linked to anxiety and anxiety disorders will be briefly reviewed. 
 
Primary appraisal - probability and cost. 
There is considerable empirical evidence to support Beck et al.’s (1985) assertion of 
the importance of the perceived probability and perceived cost of danger in determining 
situational anxiety (Rapee, 1997). Research has consistently demonstrated that “anxious 
55 
 
patients systematically overestimate the probability and/or cost of negative events in a variety 
of situations” (Poulton & Andrews, 1996, p. 413). Anxiety is positively related to the 
perceived probability and cost of negative events and to subsequent avoidance of situations in 
which these events might occur (Butler & Mathews, 1987; Gasper & Clore, 1998; Maner et 
al., 2007; Maner & Schmidt, 2006; Stober, 1997). These biases maintain high levels of 
anticipatory anxiety and consequently play an important role in maintaining various anxiety 
disorders (Stober, 1997). 
Warren et al. (1989) demonstrated that avoidance behaviour among various anxious 
and non-anxious groups was predicted by the product of the perceived probability and 
perceived cost of imagined negative consequences. Consistent with this, Weinstein (2000) 
demonstrated that perceived probability and perceived severity of harm made significant and 
substantial contributions to the prediction of motivation to act to obtain protection from 
hazards. When perceived probability was low to moderate (which would be expected for 
most clinical-anxiety relevant feared events) then a multiplicative relationship represented the 
data accurately – if perceived severity is held constant, motivation to act is approximately a 
linear function of perceived probability (and vice-versa).  
It is clear that increased probability and cost estimates for negative events drive 
anxiety. However, individuals with anxiety disorders are likely to perceive elevated threat 
primarily when specifically vigilant for danger (Klumpp & Amir, 2010). It is, therefore, 
likely that they particularly overestimate probability and cost for events that are directly 
related to their disorder (Foa et al., 1996; Nelson et al., 2010; Uren et al., 2004) and that these 
biases “play a causal or maintaining role” in the development of these disorders (Uren et al., 
2004, p. 482). Consequently, it is necessary to assess each disorder separately. Given the 
likely degree of disorder-specificity in exaggerated perceptions of the probability and cost of 
negative events (Nelson et al., 2010), the evidence for the importance of these biases will be 
briefly reviewed separately for several anxiety disorders. 
 
Primary appraisal biases in worry. 
Worry consists of uncontrollable and repetitive cognitions about future threatening 
events. As such it is considered to be the cognitive component of anxiety and is central to 
many anxiety disorders (Suarez & Bell-Dolan, 2001; Wells, 1995). Studies have consistently 
demonstrated that individuals who report excessive worries also overestimate the probability 
and cost of potential negative events related to their worry, and that these biases predict a 
large amount of variance in worry scores even after controlling for negative mood 
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(Berenbaum, Thompson, & Pomerantz, 2007; Macleod, Williams, & Bekerian, 1991; Suarez 
& Bell-Dolan, 2001). Evidence has largely suggested that, among worriers, elevated cost 
estimates for negative events is likely to be the cognitive distortion that primarily drives 
worry. Elevated probability estimates, although still somewhat related to worry, appear to be 
more closely linked to depression in this population (Berenbaum, Thompson, & Bredemeier, 
2007; Berenbaum, Thompson, & Pomerantz, 2007; Szabo, 2009). 
These results provide strong support for the role of primary threat appraisal in worry. 
Given that worry is considered to be a cognitive process that is involved in most forms of 
anxiety (Suarez & Bell-Dolan, 2001), this also provides evidence for the general importance 
of these processes in anxiety, supporting Beck et al.’s (1985) theory. 
 
Primary appraisal biases in social phobia. 
Individuals with social phobia and social anxiety symptoms perceive unpleasant 
social events as being more probable and more costly than do non-anxious individuals, and 
these biases are predictive of symptom severity even after controlling for negative mood (Foa 
et al., 1996; Lucock & Salkovskis, 1988; McManus, Clark, & Hackman, 2000; Rheingold, 
Herbert, & Franklin, 2003; Smari, Petursdottir, & Porsteinsdottier, 2001; Stopa & Clark, 
2000; Voncken, Bogels, & de Vries, 2003; Voncken et al., 2007). Elevated probability and 
elevated cost estimates both appear to drive social anxiety symptoms although perceived cost 
appears to be more influential (McManus et al., 2000; Nelson et al., 2010; Uren et al., 2004). 
Individuals with other anxiety disorders typically do not have strong probability or 
cost perception biases for negative social events (McManus et al., 2000; Stopa & Clark, 
2000). This suggests that inflated probability and cost estimates for negative social events are 
largely specific to social anxiety and are important in the maintenance of social anxiety in 
particular. Further evidence of the specificity of these biases is that socially anxious 
individuals do not generally estimate higher probability or cost of negative non-social events 
compared to other individuals – their biases are restricted to social situations (Foa et al., 
1996; Rheingold et al., 2003; Voncken et al., 2003; Voncken et al., 2007, although see Stopa 
& Clark, 2000, for conflicting results). It should be noted, however, that McManus et al. 
(2000) demonstrated weak elevation in probability and cost estimates of negative social 
events among anxious control participants, compared to non-clinical participants. This 
suggests that threat overestimation might occur to a small degree among anxious individuals 
in general situations not related to their anxiety disorders. 
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Comparison of primary appraisal biases in social phobia and panic disorder with 
agoraphobia. 
Evidence for different patterns of cognitive distortions across anxiety disorders has 
arisen from studies comparing various disorders. For example, Poulton and Andrews (1996) 
found that individuals with panic disorder with agoraphobia appraised significantly higher 
probability and cost of negative physical events than did individuals with social phobia. 
Conversely, individuals with social phobia rated negative social events as significantly more 
probable and costly than did individuals with panic disorder with agoraphobia. 
Uren et al. (2004) found that individuals with social phobia made significantly higher 
probability and cost ratings for negative social, but not physical, events compared to non-
anxious controls. In contrast, individuals with panic disorder rated both social and physical 
events as more likely and more costly than did the non-clinical participants. The results of 
this study are particularly interesting because they suggest the possibility that some anxiety 
disorders, such as social phobia, are characterised by primary appraisal biases in situations 
that are specific to the disorder in question. However other anxiety disorders, such as panic 
disorder, might involve primary appraisal biases in a wide range of situations that are not 
disorder-specific. These disorders are likely to be characterised by general risk-aversion 
However, McNally and Foa (1987) demonstrated that individuals with untreated agoraphobia 
only overestimated probability and cost for negative physical events, with no generalisation 
to other scenarios, so this hypothesis requires further investigation. 
In addition, Uren et al. (2004) found that perceived cost of negative social events was 
the strongest predictor of fear of negative evaluation among individuals with social phobia. 
Among individuals with panic disorder, perceived probability of physical events predicted 
self-reported body symptoms. This suggests that in some anxiety disorders perceived cost 
influences anxiety more strongly than does perceived probability, whereas in other anxiety 
disorders the opposite is true (e.g., Foa et al., 1996). 
 
Primary appraisal biases in specific phobias. 
Individuals with specific phobias overestimate the probability and cost of negative 
events related to their fears (de Jong & Peters, 2005). However, Williams and Watson (1985) 
found that perceived probability of negative outcomes did not predict significant variance in 
phobic behaviour, after controlling for the effects of self-efficacy, among 15 individuals with 
height phobia. Williams and Watson suggested that this raises the possibility that perceived 
coping ability is the most important threat variable for these individuals. This variable is 
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studied less frequently than primary appraisal processes, but evidence for its importance in 
threat perception and anxiety will be briefly reviewed. 
 
Secondary appraisal – coping. 
Prior to Beck et al.’s (1985) threat model, researchers had already demonstrated that 
anxiety is caused by the perceived loss of control over potential negative outcomes or the 
belief of being unable to cope with those outcomes (Geer, Davidson, & Gatchel, 1970; 
Lazarus, 1966). Bandura (1977) introduced the concept of “self-efficacy” as an individual’s 
beliefs about his or her ability to succeed in a situation. Although self-efficacy is situation 
specific, it can generalise, resulting in some individuals developing feelings of low self-
efficacy across situations and domains (Bandura, 1977, 1997; Benight & Bandura, 2004; 
Ozer & Bandura, 1990).  
Coping self-efficacy is closely related to general self-efficacy and is “a person’s belief 
in his or her ability to deploy strategies that will assist in coping with diverse threats or 
stressors” (Nicholls et al., 2010, p. 97). Coping self-efficacy is an important determinant of 
the level of threat perceived, and consequent amount of anxiety experienced, in a given 
situation. In general, people experience anxiety and consequently avoid situations in which 
they believe their coping resources will be exceeded, whereas they engage in situations and 
activities that they believe that they are capable of handling (Boekaerts, 1991; Ozer & 
Bandura, 1990; Wyatt, 1992). Indeed, risk-aversion and avoidance behaviour are strategies to 
cope with a situation or activity with which the individual does not feel confident (Hoffart, 
1995a; Williams & Zane, 1989). 
Similarly, Beck et al. (1985) suggested that clinically anxious people often have low 
self-confidence and diminished beliefs in their own ability to cope with threats. Indeed, a 
sense of diminished efficacy to cope with threat can “dominate the experiences of individuals 
with anxiety disorders” (Cloitre, Heimberg, Liebowitz, & Gitow, 1992, p. 570), resulting in 
many difficulties being perceived as unbearable threats and consequently generating anxiety. 
Hence, low self-confidence and perceived competence is associated with focus on the 
possible consequences of failure, and consequent escape (risk-aversion) or protective 
behaviours. 
It should be noted that there is a vast literature on the topic of coping, which is a 
multifaceted construct that requires further definition and understanding (e.g., Folkman & 
Moskowitz, 2004; Skinner, Edge, Altman, & Sherwood, 2003). However, for the purposed of 
this thesis, the focus will be on perceptions of one’s ability to cope with negative events, 
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rather than on coping behaviours themselves. Therefore, a review of the literature on coping 
behaviours, and on how these should be categorized (e.g., emotion-focused coping, problem-
focused coping), will not be attempted. 
 
Low perceived coping ability among clinically anxious individuals. 
Among individuals with clinical disorders, low perceived coping ability appears to be 
central to the experience of anxiety, and is closely related to symptom severity (Bogels & 
Zigterman, 2000; Bouchard et al., 2007; Casey, Oei, Newcombe, & Kenardy, 2004; Hoffart, 
1995b; Waters, Mogg, et al., 2008). In addition, improvements in self-efficacy regarding 
coping with anxiety symptoms have been demonstrated to predict symptom improvement in 
anxiety disorders (Bouchard et al., 2007; Casey, Oei, & Newcombe, 2004). Some of the 
evidence presented here involves studies that have assessed perceived control or general self-
efficacy. Although not the same as directly assessing perceived ability to cope, these studies 
still provide indirect evidence for the presence of a negative self-concept that ould be 
expected to relate to low perceived ability to cope among anxious individuals (Bandura, 
1977, 1997). 
Among individuals with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), secondary appraisal 
processes appear to be more closely related to symptom severity and anxiety than are primary 
appraisal processes (Cieslak, Benight, & Lehman, 2008; Kibler & Lyons, 2004). Indeed, low 
perceived ability to cope with PTSD-related events is actively involved in symptom 
maintenance and is an important target for treatment (Benight & Bandura, 2004; Kibler & 
Lyons, 2004). It appears likely that perceived inability to cope with trauma-related negative 
events is central to the development of PTSD (Cieslak et al., 2008). 
Lack of perceived control over symptoms is also widely recognised as being a 
significant vulnerability factor for panic disorder and a risk factor for the development of 
agoraphobia (White, Brown, Somers, & Barlow, 2006). This is indirect evidence for the 
presence of low perceived coping ability among individuals with panic disorder. Consistent 
with this, Ehlers (2002) found that perceived ability to cope with panic symptoms was lower 
among individuals with panic disorder than among non-clinical individuals. 
Cloitre et al. (1992) demonstrated that individuals with social phobia and individuals 
with panic disorder had significantly lower belief in their ability to exert control over events 
than did non-clinical individuals, which is consistent with the hypothesis that perceptions of 
diminished coping ability in specific situations are central to the experience of chronic 
anxiety. Stopa and Clark (1993) demonstrated that individuals with social phobia rated their 
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coping ability and their social skills in a social situation as lower than did anxious controls or 
non-anxious controls. In addition, individuals with social phobia gave themselves 
significantly lower ratings of their social skills than did an observer. This bias was not 
evident in either control group. This is further evidence that individuals with social phobia 
underestimate their ability to cope with (through using appropriate social skills) the potential 
threats involved in social situations specifically. Similarly, Smari et al. (2001) demonstrated 
that perceived social competence was strongly predictive of situational anxiety among 
individuals with social phobia, whereas other areas of competence were not. 
Williams and Watson (1985) found evidence that the level and strength of coping 
self-efficacy strongly predicted phobic behaviour among 15 individuals with height phobia. 
In addition, self-efficacy remained a strong predictor of phobic behaviour when anxiety and 
primary threat appraisals were held constant, whereas when self-efficacy was held constant, 
primary threat appraisals did not predict phobic behaviour. Williams and Watson 
hypothesised that treatment for phobias “might be more effectively directed toward raising 
clients’ perceptions of self-efficacy than toward disconfirming their beliefs in danger” 
(p.136). 
 
Perceived coping ability among non-clinical samples. 
Evidence also indicates that perceived coping ability is an important determinant of 
anxiety in potentially threatening situations among non-clinical individuals. For example, in a 
sample of 307 athletes, Nicholls et al. (2010) demonstrated that coping self-efficacy was 
negatively correlated with cognitive and somatic anxiety but positively correlated with 
performance satisfaction. Henselmans et al. (2010) found that, among women recently 
diagnosed with breast cancer, higher perceived ability to cope with their illness resulted in 
lower levels of distress. Consistent with this, Karademas and Kalantzi-Azizi (2004) 
demonstrated that perceived ability to cope with an exam was the key cognitive variable 
determining level of perceived threat and psychological symptoms among 291 university 
students, with higher perceived coping ability predicting lower perceived threat.  
In addition, lower coping self-efficacy is related to heightened perceptions of threat, 
and consequent avoidance and emotion-focused coping for internal and external negative 
events among various groups of non-clinical individuals (e.g., Oportot, 2004; Riley, Dennis, 
& Powell, 2010; Zvolensky et al., 2001). Conversely, higher coping self-efficacy for negative 
situations predicts approach towards potential threats and problem-focused coping behaviours 
(Dorsey, Miller, & Scherer, 1999; Oportot, 2004). High coping self-efficacy also predicts 
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positive psychological adjustment to pain (Altman, 2004; Feldner & Hekmat, 2001). Wyatt 
(1992) found that global self-efficacy was the strongest predictor of risk-taking in 
hypothetical scenarios among students (N = 682) and suggested that self-efficacy can 
influence risk-taking behaviour across a variety of situations. 
 
Evidence for the validity of Beck et al.’s model from treatment studies. 
Further evidence of the validity of Beck et al.’s (1985) model can be derived from 
studies demonstrating that therapy for anxiety disorders among adults and children must 
successfully reduce the level of threat perceived in disorder-specific situations in order to be 
effective (e.g., Beck & Clark, 1997; Jones & Menzies, 1998a, Legerstee et al., 2009; Muris & 
van Doorn, 2003; Nelson, et al., 2010; Poulton & Andrews, 1996; Waters, Mogg, et al., 2008; 
Waters, Wharton, Zimmer-Gembeck, & Craske, 2008). Indeed, this is the primary goal of 
cognitive and behavioural treatments for all anxiety disorders (Beck & Clark, 1997). 
Changes in primary or secondary appraisal processes are important targets for the 
treatment of anxiety (Bouchard et al., 2007; Cieslak et al., 2008; Poulton & Andrews, 1996; 
Williams & Watson, 1985; Zvolensky et al., 2001) and other disorders (e.g., Senbanjo, Wolff, 
Marshall, & Strang, 2009; Tucker, Brust, Pierce, Fristedt, & Pankratz, 2004). For example, 
reductions in the severity of social phobia symptoms are closely linked to, and appear to be 
caused by, reductions in the perceived probability and cost of negative social events (Foa et 
al., 1996; Lucock & Salkovskis, 1988; McManus et al., 2000; Nelson et al., 2010). Similar 
results have been found for individuals with agoraphobia (e.g., McNally & Foa, 1987). 
Bouchard et al. (2007) demonstrated that changes in cognitive variables and self-efficacy 
appear to precede symptom changes among anxious individuals, suggesting a causal role for 
these biases in symptomatology.  
 
Summary 
The body of evidence reviewed above provides clear validation of Beck et al.’s (1985) 
assertion that perceived threat generates anxiety. In addition, the claim that heightened levels 
of anxiety among individuals with anxiety disorders involves at least one cognitive bias 
related to threat perception (inflated probability and/or cost estimates, or low perceived 
coping ability) for disorder-specific events is conclusively supported. Indeed, the 
summarising of this literature represents an important contribution of the current research. 
However, most studies have focused only on primary or secondary appraisal 
processes, rather than Beck et al.’s (1985) model as a whole. This renders the possibility that 
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important mediation effects have been overlooked – for example studies suggesting that 
perceived cost is crucial to anxiety (e.g., Nelson et al., 2010; Uren et al., 2004) might have 
obtained different results if they had assessed perceived coping ability as well. This is clearly 
illustrated by the finding that, among individuals with height phobia, primary appraisal biases 
were present, but did not contribute to anxiety after accounting for perceived coping ability 
(Williams & Watson, 1985). Somewhat differently, Smari et al. (2001) found that biased 
estimation of probability, cost, and coping all independently predicted social anxiety. This 
highlights the need to explore primary and secondary threat perception simultaneously in a 
disorder-specific manner. 
It remains somewhat unclear to what extent individuals’ threat perception biases 
extend to events not directly connected to their anxiety disorder. Given the spread of 
activation proposed by Butler and Mathews (1983), evidence that trait anxiety is related to 
threat perception (Maner et al., 2007; Maner & Schmidt, 2006; Stober, 1997), and evidence 
of general risk-aversion among anxious individuals (Lorian & Grisham, 2010, 2011), it is 
likely that individuals with anxiety disorders sometimes perceive elevated threat in situations 
not directly related to their disorder. However this has received little attention in the literature 
and the specific cognitive biases involved in overestimation of general threat in various 
disorders are unclear (Maner & Schmidt, 2006). It is also likely that some disorders are 
characterised by distorted probability, cost, and/or coping estimates for a range of events, 
whereas other disorders are not (e.g., Uren et al., 2004). In order to effectively target threat 
perception biases through cognitive therapy (whether for disorder-specific or general events), 
the mechanisms involved in overestimation of threat for the anxiety disorder in question must 
be delineated.  
This further highlights the need for disorder-specific examination of threat perception 
biases pertaining to general risks. It is therefore important to examine threat perception biases 
for general events among individuals with OCD. Before this is attempted in the current study, 
however, the available evidence for Beck et al.’s (1985) threat model as it applies to OCD 
will be examined, largely focusing on evidence that individuals with OCD are likely to 
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Beck et al.’s Model in OCD 
As previously discussed, Beck et al.’s (1985) theory of threat perception and anxiety 
ascribes primary importance to biased processing of information as threatening. It is clear that 
individuals with OCD overestimate threat in situations relevant to their OCD (Amir, Najmi, 
& Morrison, 2009; Moritz & Jelinek, 2009; Moritz & Pohl, 2009; Overton & Menzies, 2005; 
Rachman, 1998) and, most likely, in general situations (Cicolini & Rees, 2003; Cisler & 
Olatunji, 2010; Steketee & Frost, 1994). Numerous studies have demonstrated that 
individuals with OCD have biases to preferentially process and recall threat-related 
information. These will be briefly reviewed before evidence for specific biases in primary 
and secondary threat appraisals among individuals with OCD are discussed. 
 
Processing Biases for OCD-Specific Threats 
In a review of the literature on threat perception biases in OCD, Muller and Roberts 
(2005) suggested that the evidence indicates that individuals with OCD have an attentional 
bias towards threatening information as well as difficulty inhibiting attention towards threat. 
Threat vigilance bias appears to be positively correlated with OCD symptom severity but not 
with depression, suggesting that it is OCD, rather than general mood disturbance, that is 
related to threat perception biases (Amir et al., 2009). In addition, these biases increase as 
perceived responsibility increases (Radomsky et al., 2001). Evidence from various 
methodologies, including dot-probe tasks, directed forgetting, and Stroop tasks suggests that 
individuals with OCD preferentially process task-irrelevant, threat-related information (Irak 
& Flament, 2009).  
Tata, Leibowitz, Prunty, Cameron, and Pickering (1996) found that individuals with 
OCD were vigilant for OCD-relevant threat on a dot probe task. The same was true for the 
anxious control participants for threat words relevant to their anxiety disorder. Because 26 
low trait anxious individuals demonstrated no threat vigilance biases or threat interference 
effects, the vigilance process observed in the OCD and highly trait anxious groups “may 
reasonably be considered as the active allocation of resources towards the location of a 
recently detected threat” (Tata et al., 1996, p. 58). Other studies have also demonstrated that 
individuals with OCD selectively attend to ideographic threat stimuli, whereas non-clinical 
individuals do not (e.g., Amir, Cobb, & Morrison, 2008; Foa & McNally, 1986; Lavy, van 
Oppen, & van den Hout, 1994). 
Evidence using Stroop tasks has consistently demonstrated that individuals with OCD 
selectively process OCD-relevant threat information and that the magnitude of this bias is 
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positively related to OCD severity (Amir et al., 2009; Foa, Ilai, McCarthy, Shoyer, & 
Murdock, 1993). Non-clinical individuals appear to demonstrate the opposite bias - being 
inclined to divert their attention away from threat (Foa et al., 1993; Muller & Roberts, 2005). 
Cisler and Olatunji (2010) found that increased threat vigilance among individuals 
with high levels of OCD symptoms (compared to individuals with low levels of OCD 
symptoms) appeared to be particularly linked to difficulty disengaging attention from 
potentially threatening stimuli. This indicates that individuals with OCD deliberately 
maintain attention on stimuli they perceive to be threatening, or alternatively exhibit deficits 
in the ability to inhibit the allocation of attention to threatening sources (Cisler & Olatunji, 
2010; Najmi, Hindash, & Amir, 2010). Selective attention deficits might be somewhat 
specific to OCD and do not appear to occur among individuals with panic disorder (Clayton, 
Richards, & Edwards, 1999). This suggests that individuals with OCD have a specific deficit 
relating to their ability to selectively ignore irrelevant internal and external threatening 
stimuli (Clayton et al., 1999). This process is likely to cause constant preoccupation with 
potential threats and consequent interference with daily functioning (Najmi et al., 2010). 
Najmi and Amir (2010) found that, among individuals with sub-clinical contamination fears, 
a therapy component focused on directing attention away from threatening stimuli effectively 
reduced attention bias to threat and increased behavioural approach toward feared stimuli, 
suggesting a causal role for attentional biases towards threatening information in OCD 
symptoms. 
It should be noted that several studies have failed to find evidence of enhanced threat 
vigilance for ideographically threatening stimuli among individuals with OCD (e.g., 
Kampman, Keijsers, Verbraak, Naring, & Hoogduin, 2002; Moritz et al., 2008; Moritz & von 
Muhlenen, 2008). However, Amir et al. (2009) demonstrated that this is likely to be because 
this bias is attenuated over successive trials within an experiment.  
In addition to threat vigilance, individuals with OCD have enhanced memory for 
OCD threat-related cues, difficulty forgetting negative information, and enhanced awareness 
of OCD-relevant potential negative outcomes compared to anxious controls and non-clinical 
individuals (Muller & Roberts, 2005; Olatunji, Connolly, Lohr, & Elwood, 2008; Wilhelm, 
McNally, Baer, & Florin, 1996). This suggests that they preferentially process threat-relevant 
information from memory. Irak and Flament (2009) demonstrated that individuals with high 
levels of OCD symptoms display a bias to preferentially process ideographic threat-related 
information when assessed in various memory paradigms, including cued recall, recognition 
memory, divided attention (i.e., simultaneously attending to two stimuli), and passive 
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attention (i.e., attempting to ignore threat-relevant stimuli). Given that individuals with low 
levels of OCD symptoms did not demonstrate this bias, Irak and Flament suggested that 
individuals with OCD are likely to be constantly preoccupied with threat-relevant stimuli 
within their environment, regardless of the presence of other stimuli or the performance of 
other tasks. 
Overall, the evidence presented clearly demonstrates that individuals with OCD are 
biased towards ideographically threatening information, both in terms of their attention and 
their memory, resulting in increased perception of threat and consequent anxiety and risk-
aversion in these situations (Muller & Roberts, 2005). Little effort has been directed towards 
examining attention or memory biases for general threats among individuals with OCD, 
although several studies have addressed this as a secondary issue in addition to studying 
OCD-specific threats. 
 
Processing Biases for General Threats 
Cisler and Olatunji (2010) found evidence that individuals high in contamination fear 
had difficulty disengaging attention from general sources of threat, not only those relevant to 
contamination. Similarly, Endrass, Kloft, Kaufmann, and Kathmann (2011) found that 
individuals with OCD benefited more from learning experiences involving negative events, 
but less from positive learning experiences, than did non-clinical individuals. Given that the 
learning tasks used were unrelated to OCD, this suggests that individuals with OCD are 
motivated to attend to potential negative events in general, in order to be able to avoid risks 
and potential harm (Endrass et al., 2011). Tata et al. (1996) demonstrated that individuals 
with OCD exhibited a general ‘threat interference effect’, whereby disruptions to cognitive 
processing were evident when threatening stimuli (regardless of whether they were relevant 
to OCD or social anxiety) were presented, as opposed to neutral stimuli. Foa et al. (1993) 
found that individuals with OCD were vigilant for general threat cues, not only OCD-relevant 
threat, on a Stroop task. In combination, these results suggest that individuals with OCD are 
hyper-vigilant for general threats, which is consistent with the notion that they are risk-
aversive in general situations (Cicolini & Rees, 2003; Steketee & Frost, 1994). 
Individuals with OCD are clearly vigilant for threat. More central to the current study, 
however, is an investigation of the cognitive elements that drive overestimation of threat in 
this population in general situations. Surprisingly little research has been conducted into 
what, from a cognitive perspective, causes individuals with OCD to perceive high levels of 
threat in various situations and the core distortion/s driving threat overestimation among 
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individuals with OCD remains unclear (Moritz & Pohl, 2009). Indeed, no study to date has 
examined the cognitive underpinnings of general risk-aversion among individuals with OCD. 
As was discussed in Chapter 3, the examination of the cognitive basis for general threat 
overestimation and consequent risk-aversion in OCD has potentially important therapeutic 
implications (e.g., Grayson, 2010; Maner & Schmidt, 2006; Rees, 2001). Before investigating 
this issue, existing evidence for the potential role of misperceptions of probability, cost, and 
coping ability in the threat perceptions and anxiety of individuals with OCD will be 
examined. It should be noted, however, that the evidence largely pertains to risk perceptions 
of events that are directly relevant to OCD symptomatology, rather than general events. 
 
Probability Estimates in OCD 
Early cognitive theorists assumed that individuals with OCD overestimated the 
probability of the occurrence of negative outcomes related to their OCD. For example, Carr 
(1971) asserted that individuals with OCD always overestimate the probability of the 
occurrence of unfavourable outcomes. Carr (1974) stated that because of this “all situations 
that have any potentially harmful outcome, however minimal, will generate a relatively high 
level of threat with its consequent anxiety” (p. 316). Carr (1974) proposed that compulsive 
behaviour is developed to reduce the subjective probability of harm in situations that are 
perceived as sufficiently costly to constitute a level of threat necessitating threat-reducing 
behaviour. This point of view received support from Foa and Kozac (1986). 
As has been previously discussed, individuals with high levels of negative affect 
and/or trait anxiety, and individuals with high levels of depression, tend to overestimate the 
probability of negative outcomes (Butler & Mathews, 1987; Constans & Mathews, 1993; 
Gasper & Clore, 1998). Individuals with OCD demonstrate heightened levels of all of these 
constructs (Alonso et al., 2008; Rachman, 1997; Salkovskis, Forrester, Richards, & Morrison, 
1998; Steketee, 1993; Tallis, 1995; Tukel et al., 2006), suggesting that they would be likely to 
overestimate the probability of the occurrence of negative events. 
The obsessive belief domain of likelihood TAF involves the belief that having an 
unacceptable thought actually increases the probability that unacceptable/negative 
consequences within the thought will occur (Altin & Gencoz, 2011; Greenberg & Witzum, 
1994; OCCWG, 1997; O’Leary et al., 2009; Rachman, 1997). It appears likely, therefore, that 
individuals with OCD who exhibit likelihood TAF beliefs would overestimate the probability 
of negative events related to their obsessions. It should be noted, however, that many 
individuals with OCD do not have elevated likelihood TAF beliefs (O’Leary et al., 2009). 
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Despite the aforementioned theoretical reasons to assume that individuals with OCD 
overestimate the probability of negative events, cognitive therapy that emphasises the 
reduction of estimated probability of the occurrence of feared events has proven to be far less 
efficacious among individuals with OCD than among those with other anxiety disorders 
(Grayson, 2010; Rees, 2001; Salkovskis, Forrester, & Richards, 1998, although see 
Krochmalik, Jones, Menzies, and Kirkby, 2004, for conflicting evidence). This suggests that 
overestimates of the probability of negative outcomes might not be typical among individuals 
with OCD. Indeed, Salkovskis (1985) disputed the notion that individuals with OCD 
necessarily perceive unrealistically high probabilities of negative events. He stated that the 
cognitive distortion involved in OCD involves an “inflated belief in the probability of being 
the cause of serious harm to others or self, or failing to avert harm where this may have been 
possible rather than an increased belief in the probability of harm per se” (p. 575). Other 
researchers have also suggested that probability overestimation is unlikely to be central to 
OCD threat overestimation (Grayson 2010; Rees, 2001). 
Unlike other anxiety disorders, such as social phobia, where it is clear that individuals 
have inflated estimates of the probability of negative events (Foa et al., 1996; Lucock & 
Salkovskis, 1988; McManus et al., 2000; Rheingold et al., 2003; Smari et al., 2001; Stopa & 
Clark, 2000; Voncken et al., 2003; Voncken et al., 2007), OCD appears to be different. Often 
the individual with OCD will feel very anxious about events that he/she knows have 
extremely low probabilities (Cicolini & Rees, 2003; Grayson, 2010; Rees, 2001; Salkovskis, 
Forrester, & Richards, 1998). This anxiety is likely to be driven by high estimates of the 
cost/awfulness of aversive events, and/or low estimates of ability to cope with such events. 
Because many obsessive-compulsive fears relate to events perceived to lie in the distant 
future, it is often impossible for individuals with OCD to be certain that their feared events 
will not occur, or that there is no probability of threat (Rees, 2001). 
The obsessive belief domain of IU is commonly elevated among individuals with 
OCD (e.g., Holaway et al., 2006; Tolin, Worhunsky, & Maltby, 2006). Individuals high in IU 
need not overestimate the probability of negative events in order to overestimate the threat 
involved in a situation. Grayson (2010) argued that in many cases, individuals with OCD 
recognise the low probability of their feared events, but cannot cope with the uncertainty 
around whether those events, however unlikely, might occur. This is likely to be the reason 
for the failure of probability re-estimation to reduce symptoms among many individuals with 
OCD (Grayson, 2010). It should be noted that IU does not preclude the possibility that 
individuals with OCD overestimate probability (it is possible to perceive exaggerated levels 
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of probability of negative events as well as having a low tolerance for uncertainty 
surrounding those events), however it renders probability overestimates unnecessary for the 
generation of anxiety. Indeed, it has been argued that, among individuals with OCD, it is the 
possibility, rather than the probability, of negative events, that drives obsessive anxiety 
(Salkovskis, 1985; Woods et al., 2002). 
There are, therefore, theoretical reasons to believe that individuals with OCD do 
overestimate the probability of negative events (e.g., likelihood TAF, high levels of NA). 
However, there are equally strong reasons to believe that they do not (e.g., IU, the failure of 
treatments based around probability re-estimation). One way of examining the presence and 
impact of inflated estimates of the probability of harm in OCD is to examine research that has 
directly investigated this cognitive distortion. Menzies and colleagues have conducted several 
studies into this issue. 
Jones and Menzies (1997) proposed that the primary cognitive distortion of 
individuals with contamination-related OCD is overestimation of threat. They demonstrated 
that perceived likelihood of catching a disease was strongly positively correlated with anxiety 
and urge to wash among OCD washers. Similarly, Overton and Menzies (2005) found that 
changes in beliefs about the probability of negative outcomes relating to their most salient 
OCD concern were significantly correlated with changes in OCD symptoms with treatment 
among 14 individuals with clinical checking OCD. In the nine participants who demonstrated 
major symptom change, beliefs in the likelihood of negative consequences underwent 
significant change in the two weeks prior to the change in symptoms. However there were 
also significant reductions in perceptions of the cost/severity of negative events and in the 
obsessive beliefs of IU and ICT, which could also have been responsible for the symptom 
reduction. Indeed, partial correlations revealed that changes in beliefs about the probability of 
negative events were no longer significantly correlated with changes in OCD symptoms on 
one measure of OCD symptoms (although they were to a small extent on the other) after the 
belief domains of severity, IU, and ICT were controlled (Overton & Menzies, 2005). 
Therefore, evidence for the importance of subjective probability of harm in the 
symptomatology of individuals with OCD from these studies is equivocal at best. 
Overton and Menzies (2002) found that individuals with OCD (N = 21) rated the 
probability and cost of danger associated with their most salient OCD fear as being 
significantly higher than did non-clinical participants (N = 21). However the relative 
importance of perceived probability and perceived cost was not explored. 
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Jones and Menzies (1998b) recruited a sample of 18 undergraduate students with sub-
clinical OCD washing symptoms. Participants underwent a behavioural avoidance test 
whereby they were asked to place their hands in a mixture of potting mix, animal hair, raw 
meat, and food scraps for five minutes. Participants were randomly assigned to either a high-
danger condition (whereby they were instructed that there was a possibility of serious illness) 
or a low-danger condition (whereby they were instructed that there was no possibility of 
serious illness). The mean rating of probability of disease was higher among the high-danger 
group than among the low-danger group. However, there were no differences in anxiety or 
urge to wash between the two groups, suggesting that manipulation of perceived probability 
of negative events does not influence obsessive anxiety or behaviours (Jones & Menzies, 
1998b). This study once again does not unequivocally demonstrate the importance of 
subjective probability of harm in the symptomatology of individuals with OCD, although 
small group sizes must be considered as a possible reason for failure to detect significant 
effects. 
A recent study has cast further doubt on the role of perceived probability of harm in 
OCD anxiety. Using the same method as Jones and Menzies (1998b), Thorpe, Barnett, 
Friend, and Nottingham (2011) demonstrated that perceived probability of harm following 
exposure to contaminants was not related to subsequent time spent hand washing, or anxiety 
experienced during the task among 35 non-clinical individuals. Perceived severity of disease, 
in contrast, was positively related to both anxiety and time spent hand washing. Thorpe et al. 
suggested that the results indicate that the perceived cost of disease, but not its perceived 
probability, is likely to be an important treatment target for OCD washing. Similar results 
were reported by Simos, Vaiopoulos, Giouzepas, and Parasehos (1995, as cited in Steketee et 
al., 1998), who found no relationship between OCD severity and probability estimation of 
dangerous events. 
Moritz and Jelinek (2009) found that individuals with OCD did not demonstrate 
higher estimates of the probability of OCD-relevant or negative events than did non-clinical 
individuals. A separate study by Moritz and Pohl (2009) replicated these findings and 
demonstrated that probability estimation was not correlated with OCD symptom severity. 
Critically, although individuals with OCD did not estimate the probability of negative events 
as higher than did non-clinical individuals, the provision of corrective information regarding 
the actual probability of negative events was less effective in appeasing the concerns of 
individuals with OCD than it was in appeasing the concerns of non-clinical individuals 
(Moritz & Pohl, 2009). This suggests that probability overestimation is not central to OCD 
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and that therapeutic efforts aimed at probability re-estimation are unlikely to be successful for 
this clinical group. 
The evidence to date is inconclusive regarding the role of inflated estimates of the 
probability of harm in threat overestimation among individuals with OCD. Menzies and 
colleagues reported evidence that individuals with OCD overestimate the probability of 
negative outcomes related to their OCD concerns. They also reported that symptoms change 
was related to changes in subjective probability of negative outcomes. However perceived 
probability was not uniquely related to changes in OCD severity after controlling for other 
cognitive distortions (Overton & Menzies, 2005). The majority of research has indicated that 
probability overestimation is not central to inflated risk/threat estimates among individuals 
with OCD (Grayson, 2010; Moritz & Jelinek, 2009; Moritz & Pohl, 2009; Salkovskis, 
Forrester, & Richards, 1998; Woods et al., 2002). Some evidence has indicated a possible 
role for inflated probability estimates in obsessive anxiety (Jones & Menzies, 1997; Overton 
& Menzies, 2005).  Others (e.g., Thorpe et al., 2011) have argued that probability estimation 
for negative events is not involved in obsessive anxiety, whereas perceived cost of those 
events is important in the prediction of this anxiety. It is also unclear whether any biases in 
perceived probability are specifically related to OCD or predominantly related to inflated 
levels of negative affect and trait anxiety. 
Overall, the available evidence suggests that overestimates of the probability of 
negative outcomes in feared scenarios might be less central to OCD than to other anxiety 
disorders. Indeed Menzies, Harris, Cumming, and Einstein (2000) demonstrated that 
manipulating perceived levels of responsibility for negative outcomes (a key feature of 
Salkovskis’ cognitive-behavioural theory of OCD) among a non-clinical sample did not 
influence the perceived probability of those outcomes. Perceived responsibility did, however, 
influence the perceived cost/awfulness of negative outcomes, with higher levels of 
responsibility resulting in higher levels of perceived cost. Given the importance of perceived 
responsibility in OCD, it is possible that perceptions of the cost of negative outcomes are 
more important that the perceived probability of those outcomes in this disorder. This is 
consistent with other findings (e.g., Overton & Menzies, 2005; Thorpe et al., 2011), as well 
as with Salkovskis, Forrester, and Richard’s (1998) assertion that perceived responsibility for 
harm drives OCD by inflating estimates of the cost of that harm. Evidence for inflated 





Cost Estimates in OCD 
Early theorists suggested that individuals with OCD overestimate the cost associated 
with potential negative events (e.g., Carr, 1974). As previously discussed, Salkovskis’ (1985, 
1989) cognitive-behavioural theory of OCD ascribes primary importance to the role of 
inflated responsibility for potential harm in the maintenance of obsessive-compulsive 
problems. Salkovskis, Forrester, and Richards (1998) reported that individuals with OCD 
perceive negative outcomes as being particularly awful or costly if they believe that they will 
be held responsible for those outcomes. They also suggested that these inflated cost estimates 
are likely to be what drives the inflated risk perception of individuals with OCD, especially 
given that individuals with OCD are usually aware that their feared consequences are 
unlikely. Therefore, according to Beck et al.’s (1985) model, they will experience high levels 
of anxiety in any situation in which they assume responsibility for possible negative 
outcomes, even if they make correct estimates of the low (but not zero) probabilities of the 
occurrence of those outcomes. This is in line with the work of Rachman (1997, 1998), who 
suggested that catastrophic misinterpretation of obsessive thoughts (i.e., perceiving them as 
particularly costly) is what drives OCD. Salkovskis, Forrester, and Richard’s work is 
important because, to date, it is the only cognitive-behavioural theory of OCD that directly 
links OCD cognitive biases to Beck et al.’s (1985) model of threat perception. Evidence has 
supported the hypothesis that inflated levels of responsibility for harm increase the subjective 
cost of an event, thereby generating heightened estimates of threat and obsessional anxiety.  
For example, Menzies et al. (2000) reported that, among a non-clinical sample, 
negative outcomes related to both checking and cleaning concerns were perceived as 
significantly more aversive by the group who felt personally responsible for those outcomes 
than by the group who did not feel personally responsible. Menzies et al. proposed that 
“perceived severity of potential outcomes is the driving mediator of OCD behaviour” (p. 
1031) but that perceived responsibility influences danger expectancies by influencing 
perceived cost of negative outcomes. Importantly, perceptions of responsibility did not 
influence the perceived probability of negative events (Menzies et al., 2000), which is 
consistent with the notion that probability overestimation might not be central to OCD threat 
perception. Other studies (Jones & Menzies, 1997; van Oppen & Arntz, 1994, as cited in 
Menzies et al., 2000) have also suggested that inflated personal responsibility for harm 
influences OCD indirectly by influencing estimations of the severity (but not the probability) 
of negative outcomes. 
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Another theoretical reason to believe that individuals with OCD overestimate the cost 
of negative events is the presence of moral TAF, which can include beliefs that a thought is 
equivalent to an action or is indicative of the individual’s true desires or intentions (Altin & 
Gencoz, 2011; O’Leary et al., 2009; Rachman, 1998). Hence, individuals with OCD who 
experience intrusive thoughts related to harming other people might interpret these thoughts 
as being as bad as if they had actually caused the harm and as evidence that, at a core level, 
they are evil or immoral people. Thus, they feel responsible for the perceived 
effects/immorality of their bad thoughts, which increases the cost associated with such ego-
dystonic cognitions (Rachman, 1998). In addition, individuals with OCD expect other people 
to blame them for any negative consequences that may arise (whereas other anxious 
individuals tend to expect people to be more lenient), which is likely to further increase the 
perceived cost/awfulness of these consequences (Salkovskis et al., 2000). 
Several studies have directly addressed the issue of perceived cost of negative events 
among individuals with OCD. Overton and Menzies (2002) demonstrated that individuals 
with OCD perceive negative events relevant to their OCD concerns as being more costly or 
aversive than do non-clinical individuals. Moritz and Jelinek (2009) found that individuals 
with OCD rated the cost of checking, interpersonal violence, and traffic accident-related 
events as significantly higher than did a psychiatric control group. Given that there were no 
differences in perceived probability between the groups, this again suggests that the 
perceived cost of negative outcomes is more important than their perceived probability to 
OCD threat perception and anxiety. Given that not all events in Moritz and Jelinek’s study 
were directly relevant to OCD, this provides preliminary evidence that overestimation of the 
cost of negative events might be involved in general threat overestimation among individuals 
with OCD.  
Perceived cost of negative events also appears to be related to OCD symptoms and 
anxiety. For example, Jones and Menzies (1997) found strong positive correlations between 
anxiety and perceived severity of potential consequences, and between urge to wash and 
perceived severity of potential consequences among OCD washers. Overton and Menzies 
(2005) demonstrated that changes in beliefs about the severity of consequences of 
ideographically important OCD-related events were significantly correlated with changes in 
symptom severity among their sample of 14 individuals with OCD. In addition, perceived 
severity of negative events accounted for unique variance in OCD severity, whereas 
perceived probability did not (Overton & Menzies, 2005).  These results suggest that, for 
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OCD-related concerns, perceived severity/cost of potential negative outcomes is an important 
determinant of OCD threat perceptions and anxiety. 
In their study of sub-clinical OCD washers (details reported above), Jones and 
Menzies (1998b) reported that the mean cost of disease rating among the high-danger group 
was significantly higher than among the low-danger group. Jones and Menzies suggested that 
their results are consistent with the suggestion that experimental manipulation of perceived 
cost of negative events resulted in changes in behavioural components of OCD washing, 
although given that individuals in the high danger group did not demonstrate significantly 
higher levels of anxiety that individuals in the low danger group, firm conclusions cannot be 
drawn. However, Thorpe et al. (2011) demonstrated that perceived severity of disease was the 
central mediator of time spent washing following exposure to contaminants, whereas 
perceived probability of contracting a disease was unrelated to time spent washing. This 
recent study is highly suggestive of the importance of perceived cost of negative events in 
driving OCD anxiety and behaviours. 
Evidence (e.g., Menzies et al., 2000; Moritz & Jelinek, 2009; Overton and Menzies, 
2002, 2005; Salkovskis, Forrester, & Richards, 1998; Thorpe et al., 2011) suggests that 
perceived cost/awfulness (which is probably related to inflated responsibility for harm) is 
central to risk perceptions of events related to obsessive-compulsive fears among individuals 
with OCD. However, little is currently known about the role of responsibility in perceptions 
of risk for general events that are not related to these fears. It is possible that the inflated 
estimates of threat in general situations (Cicolini & Rees, 2003; Steketee & Frost, 1994) 
exhibited by individuals with OCD are not due to inflated cost/awfulness estimates stemming 
from heightened levels of perceived responsibility. However, Steketee and Frost (1994) 
reported a positive correlation between responsibility and ERI risk-aversion, strengthening 
the possibility that perceived responsibility (and consequently high levels of perceived cost) 
is elevated in general risk scenarios among individuals with OCD. In addition, given their 
apparently heightened awareness of the causal pathways through which negative outcomes 
might eventuate, individuals with OCD might be hypersensitive to threats in a multitude of 
situations (Tallis, 1995), and might temporarily assume responsibility for averting danger in 
situations in which they detect possible threats to themselves, or critically, to other people. 
This is especially the case given that individuals with OCD lack the ‘omission bias’ that is 
exhibited by most individuals, whereby responsibility is assumed primarily for actions rather 
than inactions (Foa et al., 2001). Therefore, individuals with OCD are likely to perceive 
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possible negative outcomes as particularly costly even in situations that are not directly 
linked to their obsessive concerns. 
Overall, evidence for primary threat appraisal biases among individuals with OCD 
suggests that, in situations related to their OCD fears, overestimation of the cost/awfulness of 
potential negative events is likely to be more important in predicting anxiety than is 
overestimation of the probability of those outcomes. However, secondary appraisal involving 
low perceived coping ability is also likely to be involved in threat overestimation and anxiety 
among individuals with OCD. 
 
Coping Ability Estimates in OCD 
McFall and Wollersheim (1979) suggested that “the obsessive-compulsive individual 
evidences distortion in his (sic) secondary appraisal process by underestimating his (sic) 
abilities to cope with the threat in an adaptive or realistic manner” (p. 335). This results in 
anxiety and feelings of uncertainty. Indeed, McFall and Wollersheim suggested that rituals in 
OCD can be conceptualised as a means of attempting to cope with a perceived threat when 
individuals erroneously believe that they have no alternative means of coping. Guidano and 
Liotti (1983) and Steketee et al. (1998) echoed these sentiments. 
Mancini, D’Olimpio, and Cieri (2004) found that experimentally reducing non-
clinical individuals’ perceived ability to cope with a negative situation resulted in increases in 
obsessive-compulsive behaviour (checking, slowness, and uncertainty regarding 
performance) without influencing actual task performance within the situation. The increases 
in obsessive-compulsive behaviour were additional to those attributable to increased 
responsibility within the task. Mancini et al. proposed that, in conditions of high perceived 
responsibility, the belief that one is incapable of producing appropriate or positive outcomes, 
or is likely to make mistakes, will result in anxiety and an increase in the incidence of efforts 
to control one’s behaviour through checking and being overly careful. This is similar to the 
argument that perfectionism in OCD is related to low perceived ability to cope with potential 
negative events, as was discussed in Chapter 2. Mancini et al. also suggested that feelings of 
low perceived competence (low coping self-efficacy) might drive risk-aversion in OCD, and 
result in obsessive-compulsive behaviours, at least in situations where the individual believes 
that he or she is responsible for the outcomes of the situation. 
Steketee et al. (1998) demonstrated that individuals with OCD (N = 62) had lower 
beliefs in their ability to cope with negative events salient to OCD than did anxious controls 
(N = 45) or non-anxious controls (N = 34). Steketee et al. suggested that perceptions of low 
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coping ability appeared to have greater relevance to OCD than to other anxiety disorders. 
However this conclusion is somewhat problematic because the questionnaire used to measure 
perceived coping involved events that were related to obsessive thinking, so it is possible that 
individuals with OCD have lower coping self-efficacy than anxious controls in OCD-specific 
situations, but not general situations. Anxious control participants had lower beliefs about 
their coping ability than did non-anxious participants and Steketee et al. suggested that low 
coping self-efficacy is likely to play a role in the maintenance of anxiety disorders in general, 
even if it is more pronounced in OCD. 
Other than the studies by Mancini et al. (2004) and Steketee et al. (1998), surprisingly 
little research has been conducted into examining the coping self-efficacy of individuals with 
OCD for aversive events. In fact, only one other study (Woods et al., 2002), which will be 
reported later, has directly addressed this issue. However, indirect evidence for the 
importance of low perceived coping ability in the erroneous threat estimates of individuals 
with OCD is available in the form of studies demonstrating that individuals with OCD have 
low perceived self-competence, low levels of self-esteem and self-efficacy, and low levels of 
confidence in their ability to monitor and recall their own behaviour. As was discussed in 
Chapter 4, self-confidence and self-efficacy (particularly coping self-efficacy) are central to 
threat perception and anxiety (Boekaerts, 1991; Bouchard et al., 2007; Nicholls et al., 2010; 
Ozer & Bandura, 1990). 
Wu et al. (2006) demonstrated that individuals with OCD have lower self-esteem and 
lower self-entitlement than other psychiatric outpatients, suggesting that they exhibit a stable 
self-perception that is highly negative. Consistent with this, Lochner et al. (2005) 
demonstrated that individuals with OCD scored highly on the shame/defectiveness schema of 
the Young Schema Questionnaire (YSQ, Young, 1994). This suggests that they would 
perceive themselves as unable to cope with negative events. Individuals with trichotillomania 
did not score highly on this schema, suggesting that low coping self-efficacy is not simply the 
result of anxiety. Similarly, Doron, Kyrios, and Moulding (2007) found that low perceived 
competence in subjectively important life domains was related to higher OCD symptom 
levels. Finally, Fava et al. (1996, as cited in Ehntholt et al., 1999) found evidence that 
individuals with OCD reported having low self-esteem prior to the onset of their OCD 
symptoms, suggesting that it might be a risk factor for OCD development. 
Evidence suggests that individuals with OCD have low self-confidence and low self-
competence, which would be expected to reduce their perceived ability to cope with aversive 
outcomes (Aelterman, De Clercq, De Bolle, & De Fruyt, 2011; Rector et al., 2002; Rees et 
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al., 2006; Samuels et al., 2000). This is likely to further increase the level of threat perceived, 
and anxiety experienced, in various situations and result in avoidance of, or attempts to 
prevent aversive outcomes within, these situations (Boekaerts, 1991; Dar, Rish, Hermesh, 
Taub, & Fux, 2000; McNally & Kohlbeck, 1993; Salkovskis, Forrester, & Richards, 1998; 
van den Hout & Kindt, 2003). 
Samuels et al. (2000) found that individuals with OCD scored lower than non-clinical 
individuals on the competence and self-discipline facets of the Conscientiousness domain of 
the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PR-R, Costa & McCrae, 1992). In an effort to 
expand on this result Rector et al. (2002) utilised a sample of 98 individuals with OCD and 
98 individuals with major depression. Consistent with Samuels et al. (2000), results indicated 
that individuals with OCD had scores in the low range on the competence and self-discipline 
facets of the NEO PI-R (compared to non-clinical averages). This result might appear 
surprising, given that individuals with OCD are typically thorough, organised, and persistent 
(Rector et al., 2002). However, what it appears to reflect is the self-perception held by 
individuals with OCD that they are unable to perform tasks to an acceptable level and that 
they are inept and unable to adequately cope with their everyday lives (Rector et al., 2002). 
This strengthens the possibility that low coping self-efficacy might be central to threat 
overestimation and consequent risk-aversion among individuals with OCD. It should be 
noted, however, that after controlling for depressive symptoms, individuals with OCD did not 
score significantly differently from depressed individuals on the competence or self-
discipline facets (Rector et al., 2002), again suggesting that low coping self-efficacy might be 
present among various groups of clinical individuals.  
Rees et al. (2006) also found that individuals with OCD (N = 21) scored lower than a 
clinical control group (N = 39) on the competence and self-discipline facets of the NEO-PI-R. 
Interestingly, in the OCD group these facets were closely related to levels of OCD 
symptomatology (with scores declining as OCD severity increased) but were not related to 
levels of depression. Overall, individuals with OCD had particularly low estimates of their 
competence (Rees et al., 2006). NEO-PI-R competence items assess general self-beliefs and 
are not related to OCD symptoms, suggesting that individuals with OCD are likely to 
underestimate their ability to cope with various general threatening situations, which could 
underlie their high levels of general risk-aversion (e.g., Cicolini & Rees, 2003; Steketee & 
Frost, 1994). 
Ehntholt et al. (1999) reported further evidence that OCD might be particularly 
related to low perceived coping ability. Compared to the anxious and non-anxious controls, 
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individuals with OCD believed that other people would have a stronger negative reaction 
towards them if it were possible that they might cause harm or problems for other people. 
This suggests that in conditions of perceived responsibility for potential harm, individuals 
with OCD are likely to perceive others to judge them harshly, and consequently experience 
low self-esteem. This is likely to result in low perceived ability to cope with the situation 
and/or its potential negative consequences (Ehntholt et al., 1999). It should be noted, 
however, that perceptions of harsh judgement from others and the consequent effects on self-
esteem could also result in inflated cost estimates for potential negative events among 
individuals with OCD. 
Other studies have also demonstrated that individuals with OCD doubt their ability to 
cope successfully with negative outcomes, and that this bias might be more pronounced 
among individuals with OCD than among other anxious groups (although not individuals 
with major depression), including individuals with panic disorder (Frost & Steketee, 1997; 
Sassaroli et al., 2008). 
Further evidence for potentially low perceived coping abilities among individuals 
with OCD is found in several studies that demonstrate this population lack confidence in their 
memory, their ability to monitor their own actions, and their performance on tests, despite no 
objective performance deficits in these areas (Cougle, Salkovskis, & Thorpe, 2008; Dar et al., 
2000; Hermans, Martens, De Cort, Pieters, & Eelen, 2003; MacDonald, Antony, Macleod, & 
Richter, 1997; McNally & Kohlbeck, 1993; Moritz et al., 2007; Radomsky et al., 2001; Tolin 
et al., 2001; van den Hout & Kindt, 2003). TAF and heightened perceptions of responsibility 
also appear to result in ‘perceived impulsivity’, whereby individuals with OCD doubt their 
ability to control their actions or to prevent harm, and therefore perform compulsive 
behaviour repetitively (Cottraux & Gerard, 1998). Although this research is not directly 
linked to coping self-efficacy, it again suggests the presence of a highly negative, stable self-
concept among individuals with OCD. This is consistent with low perceived ability to cope 
with potential negative events. 
Low levels of self-competence and self-esteem among individuals with OCD suggest 
that they are likely to have low coping self-efficacy relating to potential negative events or 
threats (Boekaerts, 1991), thereby believing themselves to be incapable of adequately coping 
with these events. This implies that they will perceive high levels of threat/risk, and 
consequently exhibit risk-aversive behaviour in various situations, according to Beck et al.’s 
(1985) model. This is consistent with McFall and Wollersheim’s (1979) suggestion that 
therapy for OCD should include a component designed to improve the self-worth of clients. 
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More recently, Grayson (2010) also argued that enhancing coping self-efficacy in threatening 
situations is likely to be essential for long-term treatment gains among individuals with OCD. 
Another line of evidence for the importance of lowered perceived coping ability 
among individuals with OCD stems from the recent work of Moulding and colleagues 
(reviewed in Chapter 2) examining discrepancies between desire for control and sense of 
control among individuals with OCD. Overall, the evidence for the importance of SC and DC 
in the psychopathology of OCD is mounting (Moulding & Kyrios, 2006, 2007; Moulding et 
al., 2007; Moulding et al., 2009). In particular, it appears that OCD symptoms and obsessive 
beliefs are related to discrepancies between DC and SC. Individuals with OCD appear to 
have a high level of DC in threatening situations, which, although not directly problematic, is 
expressed through obsessive beliefs such as responsibility to prevent harm. High DC 
becomes problematic when paired with lower SC in a particular situation (Moulding et al., 
2009). In essence, a primary appraisal suggesting that a threat is present results in increased 
desire for control of the situation. However, individuals with OCD often do not perceive 
themselves as possessing adequate control, which results in low coping self-efficacy and 
consequently high levels of anxiety. Neutralising responses such as rituals and avoidance are 
motivated by the desire to reduce this anxiety. This is evidence (albeit indirect) of the role of 
low perceived ability to cope with threat in OCD pathology and suggests that secondary 
appraisal processes are likely to be central to the threat perceptions among individuals with 
OCD. Evidence of low SC in the presence of threat is also consistent with findings of low 
self-competence and self-confidence among individuals with OCD (e.g., Rector et al., 2002; 
Rees et al., 2006). 
Importantly, Moulding and Kyrios (2006) suggested that individuals with OCD are 
likely to have a high DC in many unpleasant situations, even those not related to their OCD. 
Clearly, this suggests that, if their SC is undermined in these situations, this will result in low 
coping self-efficacy and consequent high levels of threat appraisal. This indicates that general 
risk-aversion among individuals with OCD could be related to low coping self-efficacy for 
general negative events. Moulding and Kyrios (2007) suggested that it is likely to be 
important to identify factors that undermine SC in various situations (OCD-specific and 
general) among individuals with OCD as a means to improve coping self-efficacy. 
Steketee et al. (1998) suggested that low perceived coping ability would be expected 
to be present across the range of anxiety disorders, having a role in their development and 
maintenance. Consistent with this, Malouff, Thorsteinsson, and Schutte (2005) found that low 
levels of self-rated conscientiousness were associated with a variety of clinical disorders. 
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However, Kotov et al. (2010) found that OCD was one of the few disorders (along with panic 
disorder and depression) that remained significantly associated with conscientiousness after 
controlling for the effects of neuroticism. This suggests that low levels of perceived ability to 
manage daily activities might be more central to OCD and panic disorder than to anxiety in 
general. It should be noted, however, that facet-level traits within the conscientiousness 
domain (including competence) were not assessed. 
The available evidence suggests that individuals with OCD are likely to underestimate 
their ability to cope with various situations. Importantly, the findings of Rector et al. (2002), 
Rees et al. (2006), and Moulding and Kyrios (2006) indicate that low self-competence is 
likely to occur in a range of situations that are not related to typical OCD concerns. 
Therefore, it can tentatively be hypothesised that individuals with OCD are likely to 
underestimate their coping ability, and consequently overestimate threat, in a wide range of 
situations. Potentially this could account for the high levels of general risk-aversion among 
individuals with OCD. However, the evidence for low perceived coping among individuals 
with OCD is largely from studies that have not directly assessed this construct among this 
population. In addition, it is unclear whether individuals with OCD are more prone to 
underestimating their coping potential than are individuals with other clinical disorders, or 
whether low perceived coping ability among individuals with OCD is largely a product of 
negative affect (e.g., Ehntholt et al., 1999; Frost & Steketee, 1997; Rector et al., 2002; Rees 
et al., 2006; Sassaroli et al., 2008). 
 
Woods et al.’s Study into Probability, Cost, and Coping Ability Estimates in OCD 
The evidence presented to this point is largely derived from studies that have assessed 
(directly or indirectly) either the primary appraisal process or the secondary appraisal process 
among individuals with OCD. However, given that they are related constructs, it is important 
to assess perceived probability, perceived cost, and perceived coping ability simultaneously 
in order to obtain a more accurate perception of risk/threat judgements among individuals 
with OCD. The only study to have directly attempted this will now be reviewed. 
In Woods et al.’s (2002) study 1, 18 individuals with OCD wrote about three 
ideographically important negative events that they feared might happen to them in the 
future. The events that the respondents reported were typical OCD concerns (Woods et al., 
2002). Participants rated the probability that the event would occur, the severity of the 
consequences if it did occur, and how well they would cope if the event transpired. 
Probability, severity, and coping ratings were obtained by averaging the scores across all 
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three events, with coping ability reverse-scored so that lower scores indicated higher 
perceived coping ability. The correlation between OCD symptoms and perceived coping 
ability was significant (r = .72), indicating that as OCD severity increased, perceived coping 
ability decreased. There was also a significant positive correlation between perceived severity 
and OCD symptoms (r = .51). The correlation between perceived probability and OCD 
severity was not significant. In a simultaneous multiple regression analysis with obsessive-
compulsive symptom severity as the criterion, perceived coping ability was the only variable 
that contributed significantly to the prediction of OCD symptoms (sr
2
 = 0.43). As perceived 
coping ability increased, OCD symptoms decreased (Woods et al., 2002). Perceived 
probability, severity, and their interaction did not significantly contribute to prediction of 
OCD symptom severity. 
In study 2, 73 female undergraduate students wrote about two personally salient 
potential negative events. The events reported on were “typical student-related concerns” 
(Woods et al., 2002, p. 108). In this study, perceived probability, cost, and coping ability all 
related to OCD symptom severity, with effect sizes ranging from small to medium (Woods et 
al., 2002). In a simultaneous multiple regression analysis, perceived probability was the only 
variable that significantly predicted OCD symptoms (sr
2 
= 0.26), although a trend was 
evident for perceived severity. 
Overall, the results of Woods et al. (2002) indicate that as OCD symptoms increase, 
severity estimation increases and perceived coping ability decreases. These effects were 
larger in the clinical OCD sample than in the non-anxious control sample. Perceived 
probability was not significantly related to OCD severity in the clinical sample, which 
indicates that individuals with OCD might realise that the probability of their feared events is 
low (e.g., Grayson 2010, Rees, 2001; Salkovskis, Forrester, & Richards, 1998). Given that 
average OCD symptom severity among the clinical group was high this suggests that 
probability overestimation for personally salient OCD events might not be a central factor in 
threat perception and anxiety, although anxiety was not directly assessed. Woods et al. 
suggested that in clinical OCD, severity overwhelms probability, and that the commonly 
observed intolerance of uncertainty among individuals with OCD renders the very possibility 
of the occurrence of a feared event sufficient to cause severe distress. In addition, the fact that 
a different pattern of results was found for the non-clinical sample indicates that threat 
perception might be qualitatively different among individuals with OCD compared to non-
anxious individuals (Woods et al., 2002).  
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Several methodological concerns suggest that the results of Woods et al. (2002) must 
be interpreted cautiously. In particular, it is likely that the events reported by the OCD sample 
were more severe, more difficult to cope with, but less probable than the events reported by 
the student sample, and this is a flaw in the ideographic methodology used (Woods et al., 
2002). The low power involved in this study (especially among the clinical sample) must be 
considered. Predictors other than perceived coping might have made significant contributions 
to OCD severity in a larger sample, or in a regression model with more overall predictive 
ability, although it should be noted that the magnitude of the relationship between perceived 
probability and OCD severity was small. Other limitations include the fact that no formal 
diagnoses were conducted, and there was no inter-rater reliability check for diagnoses. In 
addition, the scale used showed poor internal consistency in both studies and its validity and 
reliability are untested.  
Overall, the findings of Woods et al. (2002) suggest that, in clinical OCD, “cognitive 
misappraisals other than probability overestimation (i.e., severity overestimation and coping 
underestimation) are likely to be important in the treatment of OCD” (p. 109). This is 
consistent with the body of literature reviewed above, which suggests that probability 
overestimation is unlikely to be central to OCD risk/threat overestimation. However, Woods 
et al. suggested that better methods of assessing perceived probability, severity, and coping 
ability (i.e., ones which have ecological validity and internal consistency) are required. 
Indeed, that is the primary aim of the current research. However, unlike Woods et al., this 
study will focus on general risk perceptions because they are likely to be more important in 
long-term treatment gains (Maner & Schmidt, 2006; Rees, 2001). 
 
Conclusions Regarding Perceived Probability, Cost, and Coping Ability Biases in OCD 
 Overall, it appears likely that individuals with OCD primarily overestimate OCD-
relevant threat because of overestimation of the cost of potential negative events, and 
underestimation of their ability to cope with those events. Results regarding overestimation of 
the probability of harm in threatening situations have been equivocal (e.g., Moritz & Jelinek, 
2009; Overton & Menzies, 2005; Thorpe et al., 2011), but overall suggest that individuals 
with OCD do not perceive unusually high probability of negative consequences associated 
with feared events (or that if they do, this bias is not uniquely predictive of OCD 
symptomatology or anxiety). 
It is difficult to predict whether the results from studies using OCD-specific 
risks/negative events will generalise to general risk scenarios. There is currently no 
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theoretical reason to suspect that a different pattern of results will be obtained for general 
threat scenarios than for OCD-specific threat scenarios. 
In terms of perceived probability of negative general events, research has suggested 
that anxious individuals do not usually overestimate probability for events that are not 
relevant to their particular disorder (Foa et al., 1996; Klumpp & Amir, 2010; Nelson et al., 
2010; Uren et al., 2004; Woods et al., 2002). There is no evidence that individuals with OCD 
will depart from this trend, particularly given that they do not seem to overestimate the 
probability of events that directly relate to their OCD fears. In addition, research (Menzies et 
al., 2000) has demonstrated that increased levels of perceived responsibility do not result in 
increased probability estimates. Therefore, even if individuals with OCD assume temporary 
responsibility for general negative events, this is unlikely to result in inflated perceptions of 
the probability of harm. It can, therefore, tentatively be hypothesised that individuals with 
OCD will not overestimate the probability of general negative events. 
Individuals with OCD do appear to overestimate the cost of potential negative events 
related to their OCD fears (e.g., Menzies et al., 2000; Moritz & Jelinek, 2009; Overton and 
Menzies, 2002, 2005; Salkovskis, Forrester, & Richards, 1998; Thorpe et al., 2011). In 
addition, it appears that individuals with OCD will overestimate the cost of negative events 
for which they feel responsible (Menzies et al., 2000; Salkovskis, Forrester, & Richards, 
1998). Given their apparent skill in recognising causal pathways leading to harm, and their 
tendency to perceive responsibility for failing to act to prevent harm (Siev et al., 2010), it is 
possible that they will temporarily assume responsibility for any situation in which they 
foresee the possibility of harm occurring. Therefore, from this perspective, it is likely that 
individuals with OCD will overestimate the cost of negative events relating to general threat 
scenarios. 
 In terms of perceived coping, studies have suggested that individuals with OCD are 
likely to have low coping self-efficacy in situations relevant to their OCD fears and in more 
general situations (Moulding & Kyrios, 2006; Rector et al., 2002; Rees et al., 2006; Woods et 
al., 2002). In addition, findings of low self-esteem and low self-confidence in multiple 
domains (Ehntholt et al., 1999; Wu et al., 2006) suggest that individuals with OCD are likely 
to underestimate their ability to cope with a wide range of negative events, even those not 
relevant to their OCD. It appears likely, therefore, that individuals with OCD will 




Aims of the Current Research 
This research aims to examine the cognitive distortions that result in overestimation of 
threat, and consequent anxiety and avoidance, in general situations (located both in daily life 
and in the more distant future) among individuals with OCD. If it can be determined that 
individuals with OCD perceive high levels of subjective probability and/or cost of general 
risks, or if they demonstrate low coping self-efficacy for potential negative outcomes, these 
biases could be targeted in therapy. Potentially, this could help to reduce the rates of relapse, 
and improve long-term treatment outcomes for individuals with OCD. 
 Overall, this literature review has presented evidence that individuals with OCD are 
risk-aversive even in situations that are not related to their OCD symptoms. It has also been 
demonstrated that this is likely to be related to overestimation of threat in these situations, but 
that the cognitive mechanisms driving threat overestimation in general events are poorly 
understood. Tentative evidence that individuals with OCD are likely to overestimate the cost 
of negative events, and underestimate their ability to cope with those events, was presented. 
However, given that this evidence is largely indirect and almost always relates to OCD-
specific fears, examination of threat perception biases in general risk scenarios is required. 
This is particularly important given the potential therapeutic benefits of uncovering 
mechanisms to reduce general risk-aversion among individuals with OCD and other anxious 
individuals.  
A significant problem, however, is that there currently are no suitable measures that 
assess the various elements of threat perceptions in general situations. Therefore, an 
important step towards uncovering the nature of threat perception biases that drive general 
risk-aversion in individuals with OCD and individuals with other anxiety disorders is the 
creation and validation of a theoretically driven scale that simultaneously assesses perceived 
probability, cost, and coping ability related to general risk events. Such a scale has the 
potential to be used to study general risk-aversion among various anxious and other clinical 
groups, and could facilitate the enhancement of treatments for a multitude of clinical 
problems. Therefore, the first two studies to be reported focused on the creation and 






STUDY 1 – CONSTRUCTION AND FACTOR ANALYSIS OF THE MULTI- 
 




Measuring Risk Perceptions         87 
MDRAS Item Generation         87 
 MDRAS Everyday Items        87 
 MDRAS Future Items         88 
Format of the MDRAS         89 
Method           92 
 Participants          92 
 Measures          92 
 Procedure          92 
Results           92 
 Data Screening         93 
 Principal Components Analysis of the MDRAS – Part One    94 
  MDRAS Probability Scale PCA      96 
  MDRAS Cost Scale PCA       97 
  MDRAS Coping Scale PCA       99 
Discussion – PCA Part One       100 
   MDRAS Probability Scale      100 
   MDRAS Cost Scale       101 
   MDRAS Coping Scale      101 
   Changes to the MDRAS      102 
  Shortened Version of the MDRAS      103 
PCA on the 14-Item MDRAS        103 
  PCA on the Shortened MDRAS Probability Scale    103 
  PCA on the Shortened MDRAS Cost Scale     104 
  PCA on the Shortened MDRAS Coping Scale    106 
Discussion – PCA Part Two       107 
CFA on the MDRAS         108 
  Fit Indices         108 
86 
 
  CFA on the MDRAS Probability Scale     109 
  CFA on the MDRAS Cost Scale      109 
  CFA on the MDRAS Coping Scale      110 
CFA Discussion        111 

























Measuring Risk Perceptions 
 Avoidance of general risks appears to be important in symptom maintenance and 
symptom relapse among individuals with OCD, and probably among other anxious 
individuals. Therefore it is important to assess the cognitive basis underlying avoidance of 
these risks using Beck et al.’s (1985) model of threat perception. However, despite previous 
calls for the development of measures to achieve this (e.g., Woods et al., 2002), none exist. 
Therefore, the aim of the current study was to create a measure that could be used to assess 
Beck et al.’s (1985) model of threat perception in relation to general unpleasant events, and to 
begin the process of validation through factor analysis. This required the construction of a 
questionnaire that assesses perceived probability, perceived cost, and perceived ability to 
cope with various general negative events that do not relate to typical OCD symptom 
dimensions or OCD fears (to avoid tapping into OCD symptomatology rather than general 
risk-aversion). 
It has been suggested that a significant difficulty encountered when attempting to use 
cognitive techniques to reduce risk-aversion and OCD symptoms among individuals with 
OCD is that many of the events that they fear are located in the distant future, rendering 
disconfirmation of feared consequences impossible (Rees, 2001; Salkovskis, Forrester, 
Richards, & Morrison, 1998; Woods et al., 2004). It was therefore considered important that 
the new scale assessed risk estimations for non-OCD specific events that could occur at 
unspecified times in the future, as well as risk estimates for everyday events. Therefore, the 
Multi-Dimensional Risk Assessment Scale (MDRAS, see Appendix A) was designed to 
assess perceived probability, perceived cost, and perceived coping ability for various general 
everyday and potential future scenarios. 
 
MDRAS Item Generation 
Given that new scales should, when possible, consist of items based on theoretical 
considerations (Simms, 2008), it was important to use existing measures to generate items for 
the MDRAS. It was also important that the items were not strongly related to typical OCD 
symptoms. Given that two types of items (everyday and future) were required, two separate 
measures were used for item generation. 
 
MDRAS Everyday Items 
Given the importance of using theoretically driven items that did not tap into OCD 
symptoms, the ERI-AUS was used as the basis for item generation for MDRAS Everyday 
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items. Current understanding of general risk-aversion among individuals with OCD was 
largely derived from studies using the ERI-AUS and its predecessor, the ERI, both of which 
assess avoidance of non-pleasurable activities involving minor levels of risk that are 
encountered in everyday life. ERI-AUS items contain various everyday unpleasant events 
that are often avoided by individuals with OCD, but are not related to OCD symptoms 
(Steketee & Frost, 1994). These items are conceptually congruent with the items required in 
the MDRAS Everyday Scales (Cicolini & Rees, 2003; Steketee & Frost, 1994). Cicolini and 
Rees (2003) adapted the original ERI for use with Australian samples. The ERI and ERI-
AUS can differentiate risk-taking attitudes between clinical OCD samples and non-clinical 
samples (Cicolini & Rees, 2003; Steketee & Frost, 1994) and between sub-clinical OCD 
samples and non-clinical samples (Frost et al., 1994), with scores decreasing as OCD severity 
increases. The ERI-AUS and the ERI are validated among individuals with OCD and non-
clinical individuals (Cicolini & Rees, 2003; Frost et al., 1994; Steketee & Frost, 1994). 
 Steketee and Frost (1994) demonstrated that the ERI has good convergent validity, 
correlating significantly with the Risk Taking scale of the JPI (r = .52) and with all four 
subscales of the Sensation Seeking Scale (Zuckerman, Colin, Price, & Zoob, 1964), with rs 
ranging from.41 to .72. Discriminant validity was demonstrated through a smaller correlation 
with the JPI responsibility scale (r = -.28). Men scored significantly higher than women on 
the ERI, which is consistent with those gender effects observed using other risk-taking 
inventories (Steketee & Frost, 1994). The internal consistencies of the ERI and ERI-AUS are 
good, with Cronbach’s alphas of .91 and .87, respectively (Cicolini & Rees, 2003; Steketee & 
Frost, 1994). Test-retest reliability of the ERI (r = .93 over a 14 day period) and ERI-AUS (r 
= .86 over a 10 week period) has also been demonstrated to be good (Garratt-Reed, 2004; 
Steketee & Frost, 1994). Many items on the ERI-AUS do not tap into OCD fears (Cicolini & 
Rees, 2003) and these items were considered for inclusion into the MDRAS. 
 
MDRAS Future Items 
The items for the MDRAS Future scales were derived from items on the Social 
Readjustment Rating Scale (SRRS, Holmes & Rahe, 1967). This scale contains items that 
involve typical negative events that many people will face at an undetermined point in the 
future. These items were included in the MDRAS to assess the typical cognitive style of 
individuals with OCD (concern with possible future negative events), without using OCD-
specific fears. The SRRS appears to be a valid measure of stressful symptoms (Hobson & 
Delunas, 2001; Scully, Tosi, & Banning, 2000) and is the most widely used scale of life stress 
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in various cultures (Sandoval & Acuna, 2008; Scully et al., 2000). It contains 43 items 
considered to be stressful, based on the amount of life change that each event entails. 
Although the original stress levels (out of 100) assigned to each event are likely to require 
revision given changes in society since the scale was created, Scully et al. (2000) argued that 
the SRRS is a good measure of stress-related outcomes. The MDRAS items are included in 
Table 6.1. 
 
Format of the MDRAS 
Initially, 19 items were selected for inclusion in the MDRAS scales. The first eight 
items were adapted from ERI-AUS items and comprised the MDRAS Everyday scales, 
assessing risk perceptions of potential everyday events that represent non-pleasurable risks 
which are unrelated to typical obsessive-compulsive concerns. These items are worded in the 
present tense. The remaining 11 items were adapted from SRRS items and comprised the 
MDRAS future scales, assessing perceptions relating to risks that many people will face at an 
undetermined time in the future, but that are not likely to be everyday occurrences for most 
individuals. These items are worded in the future tense. Items were chosen that represented 
different types of risk, such as physical risk, social risk, and occupational risk (e.g., Horvath 
& Zuckerman, 1993). In addition, future risks of differing severity levels (as determined by 
the SRRS ratings) were selected to provide ecological validity. 
For all MDRAS items, participants are asked to rate the probability of the occurrence 
of the specified unpleasant event within a scenario. They are also asked to rate the cost of that 
event, were it to occur, as well as how easily they believe they could cope with the event. 
Specified negative events were chosen, rather than allowing participants to imagine potential 
negative outcomes, because anxious individuals are likely to imagine negative events that are 
more costly and difficult to cope with, but also less probable, than the events imagined by 
non-clinical individuals (e.g., Woods et al., 2002). This would have rendered future between 
group comparisons on the MDRAS scales difficult to interpret. A Likert-type scale was used 
to score all MDRAS items, given that this type of scoring scale is typically used in risk 
research (e.g., Berenbaum, Thompson, & Bredemeier, 2007; Cicolini & Rees, 2003; Maner & 
Schmidt, 2006; Steketee & Frost, 1994). An example of the layout of the MDRAS can be 







Item Content: The Multi-Dimensional Risk Assessment Scale (MDRAS) 
1 You are driving at 20km/h above the speed limit on a major road. There is a risk that 
you will receive a speeding fine. 
2 You are driving at 20km/h above the speed limit on a major road. There is a risk that 
you will be involved in an accident, causing you to break your leg. 
3 You are outside for several hours without a coat on a cold, wet day. There is a risk 
that you will catch the flu. 
4 You borrow something from a friend without asking because he/she is unavailable. 
There is a risk that he/she will be very angry, placing strain on your friendship. 
5 You drive to a friend’s house without looking up directions or taking a map, even 
though you have only been there once before and it is a long drive. There is a risk 
that you will get lost, with no means of checking the correct route. 
6 You are forced to drive in a severe storm to do an errand you cannot postpone. There 
is a risk that this will be an unpleasant experience for you. 
7 You allow a stranger into your house to use the telephone. There is a risk that he/she 
will try to harm you. 
8 You are in an expensive restaurant with some friends. There is a risk that you will 
accidentally trip and drop your plate, which smashes and spills food all over you, 
causing everyone in the restaurant to stare at you and to giggle, making you feel 
very embarrassed. 
9 In the future there is a risk that your spouse or partner will die while you are still 
alive. 
10 In the future there is a risk that you will suffer serious injury or illness. 
11 In the future there is a risk that you will be fired from your job. 
12 In the future there is a risk that you will be forced to serve time in jail. 
13 In the future there is a risk that you will experience chronic insomnia. 
14 In the future there is a risk that you will experience a divorce. 
15 In the future there is a risk that you will experience sexual difficulties. 
16 In the future there is a risk that you will be required to completely stop eating your 
favourite food. 
17 In the future there is a risk that you will be forced to permanently use a walking 
stick. 
18 In the future there is a risk that you will be forced to begin a new line of work. 
19 In the future there is a risk that you will experience conflict with your new boss at 
work. 
Note. Items 1-8 = Everyday Risk items. Items 9-19 = Future Risk items. Italics = item deleted 







Example of the Format of MDRAS Items 
4. You borrow something from a friend without asking because he/she is unavailable.
 There is a risk that he/she will be very angry, placing strain on your friendship. 
 
a) What is the probability that he/she will be very angry, placing strain on your friendship? 
 
      1        2        3        4        5        6                      7 
 Almost              Very               Quite            Moderate            Quite                Very              Almost   
  None                Low                 Low                                        High                 High              Certain 
 
b) If he/she were very angry, placing strain on your friendship, how bad would that be for 
you? 
   
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Not At All   Minor        Inconvenience       Quite      Bad            Extremely    As Bad As I  
    Bad         Inconvenience                                Bad                                          Bad         Can Imagine 
 
c) How easily could you cope if he/she were very angry, placing strain on your friendship? 
 
      1        2        3       4         5        6        7 
Cope Very         Cope           Cope Quite     Cope, But            Difficult       Extremely        Could Not 
   Easily             Easily              Easily         With Some          To Cope         Difficult             Cope 




The MDRAS contains three distinct scales: The MDRAS Probability Scale; the 
MDRAS Cost Scale; and the MDRAS Coping Scale. Each was designed to contain two 
lower-order scales, corresponding to perceptions of risk in potential everyday situations and 
perceptions of risk in potential future situations. It was anticipated that the Everyday and 
Future MDRAS scales would be significantly positively correlated and that their scores could 
be combined into total MDRAS Probability, MDRAS Cost, and MDRAS Coping scores, 
although this was examined through factor analysis. Therefore, the MDRAS was designed to 
provide nine different scores: Total Probability; Everyday Probability; Future Probability; 
Total Cost; Everyday Cost; Future Cost; Total Coping; Everyday Coping; and Future Coping. 
The initial step towards validating the MDRAS was to determine whether the proposed factor 
structure was indeed present in the scales and this was achieved through principal 







There was a total of 223 non-clinical participants including 66 men (29.6%) and 151 
women (67.7%), with 6 participants (2.7%) not reporting gender. The mean age of 
participants was 32 years (SD = 13.1, range = 17.25 – 68.50), with men being somewhat 
older on average than women (35.3 and 30.6 respectively). One participant, who did not 
report gender, was excluded from the study after failing to complete the majority of items in 
the questionnaire package, resulting in a final data set of 222. 
 
Measures 
 Participants completed the MDRAS and a demographics page requesting age and 
gender (see Appendix B) as part of a larger battery of questionnaires that will be reported in 
Study 2.  
 
Procedure 
This research was approved by the Curtin University Human Research Ethics 
Committee. This approval covered all studies reported in this thesis. Participants were 
recruited from lectures and tutorial classes within the Faculty of Health Sciences at Curtin 
University. In addition, snowball sampling was used to obtain further participants from 
within the researcher’s social networks. Participants were given an information sheet, with 
slightly different versions for students and non-students (see Appendices C and D, 
respectively) and asked to complete the questionnaire package. In excess of 1000 
questionnaire packages were distributed (the exact number cannot be ascertained because 
several individuals distributed questionnaire packages within their places of work, but 
discarded remaining questionnaires without recording the number distributed), with a 
response rate below 22%. Questionnaires were returned anonymously to a survey collection 
box located in the School of Psychology at Curtin University, or were mailed to the 
researcher at Curtin University. 
 
Results 
 Data were analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS), versions 
15 and 17. LISREL 8.51 was used to perform the confirmatory factor analyses (CFA). Prior 
to analysing the MDRAS data, the MDRAS Coping items were recoded so that higher scores 
represented higher estimates of coping ability. This was done primarily to facilitate 
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interpretation in the subsequent analyses – higher scores on all three subscales represented 




 Univariate descriptive statistics were generated in order to assess the accuracy of data 
input. Data were checked to ensure that all values were within the eligible range for the 
MDRAS items (i.e., 1-7) (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). No data entry errors were detected. 
The pattern of missing data on the MDRAS was analysed. Out of 12711 observations, 33 
(less than 0.3%) were missing data. No variable was found to be missing more than 5% of the 
data. Given the small amount of missing data, the randomness of the missing data was not 
assessed (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Five participants had missing data on the MDRAS. In 
one case, the participant appeared to have simply missed several pages of the MDRAS (as 
well as not including demographic information) and was excluded from the analysis. Means 
substitution was used to replace the remaining missing data because any procedure for 
dealing with missing data will yield similar results when such a small amount of data are 
missing from a large data set (Raaijmakers, 1999; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001) and means 
substitution is the most commonly used method for replacing missing data in such scenarios 
(Buhi, Goodson, & Neilands, 2008; Raaijmakers). 
Among continuous variables, cases with z scores in excess of 3.29 are considered to 
be potential univariate outliers (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Twenty such cases were 
identified. Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) suggested that a good option for dealing with 
univariate outliers is to reduce the extremeness of their score. Although they suggested that 
this could be achieved by assigning outliers a score one unit larger (or smaller) than the next 
most deviant score, this was not practical in the current analysis because in most cases this 
would have resulted in no change in the outlying score (there was a maximum score of 7 on 
any item so if a score of 7 was an outlier, modifying it to be one score higher than the next 
most extreme score of 6 would have resulted in no change). Therefore scores were modified 
so that they fell as close as possible to 3.29 standard deviations of the mean for the respective 
variable. This approach was chosen largely to avoid the deletion of cases and consequent 
reduction of power for the planned analyses. Distributions were examined with outliers and 
after the outlying scores were modified. In some instances there was a substantially reduced 




 Normality of distributions for the MDRAS items was assessed graphically because 
statistical methods are overly sensitive to even slight departures from normality among large 
samples (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Histograms revealed that the distributions of several 
items were not perfectly normal, although in most cases they appeared to be satisfactory, 
given that PCA is relatively robust to violations of univariate normality (Allen & Bennett, 
2008; Coakes & Steed, 1999; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). However, the distribution for Item 
12a demonstrated a marked positive skew and leptokurtosis and the distribution for Item 12b 
demonstrated severe negative skew. Inspection of the data revealed that these items – which 
refer to the perceived (a) probability and (b) cost of being forced to spend time in jail, were 
unlikely to be appropriate as a means of assessing differences between populations because 
of the likelihood of floor and ceiling effects in the data, given that the mean perceived 
probability (1.47) was the lowest of any item on the MDRAS, and that the mean perceived 
cost (5.84) was the highest of any item. Item 12, which also demonstrated the lowest mean 
perceived coping score of any item (2.66), was subsequently deleted from the MDRAS. The 
remaining items were retained without transformation. 
In order to screen for multivariate outliers, a standard regression analysis was run with 
age as the dummy dependent variable. Mahalanobis distance (p < .001) was used to screen 
for multivariate outliers (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001) and, on this basis, seven cases were 
potentially multivariate outliers. However, a maximum Cook’s distance of .08 suggested that 
none were overly influential. In addition, Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) suggest that 
multivariate outliers should only be removed from a data set if there is clear evidence that 
they fall outside of the intended population of study. Given that the MDRAS has not been 
used previously, this could not be ascertained. Upon examination of the raw data, there was 
no evidence of random response patterns in any of the potential outlying cases and, 
consequently, all cases were retained. 
 
Principal Components Analysis of the MDRAS – Part One 
As was previously explained, the MDRAS was designed to incorporate three higher 
order factors – Total Probability, Total Cost, and Total Coping. Each of these was designed to 
contain two subordinate factors corresponding to Everyday and Future risk perceptions.  
Therefore, the expected factor structure for each scale of the MDRAS was a higher-order 
factor and two lower-order factors. However, it was considered to be overly presumptuous to 
expect a clear everyday/future risk dichotomy, given the possibility that factors relating to 
risk constructs such as physical risk, social risk, financial risk, manmade versus natural risk, 
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or other specific types of risk (e.g., Brun, 1992; Horvath & Zuckerman, 1993; Uren et al., 
2004) were also contained in the scale. Immediately conducting a CFA would result in the 
possibility of ignoring other potential risk-related factors in the MDRAS scales. Similarly, 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was considered to be inappropriate because the initial goal 
of this analysis was to generate hypotheses about the factor structure of the MDRAS scales, 
whereas EFA is concerned with revealing latent constructs (Park, Dailey, & Lemus, 2002). 
Therefore, for the purposes of reducing the data to a manageable number of constructs, 
prinicipal components analysis (PCA) was conducted (Norris & Lecavalier, 2010; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). PCA “is the solution of choice for the researcher who is 
primarily interested in reducing a large number of variables down to a smaller number of 
components” (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001, p. 612) and is particularly useful as a means of 
deriving hypotheses about the potential structure of the MDRAS scales which can then be 
tested via CFA (Smith, 1998). PCA is often a useful initial step in factor analytic procedures, 
given that it reveals information about the nature of the factors involved (Tabachnick & 
Fidell). PCA with promax rotation, which permits correlations between extracted 
components, was chosen because it was expected that any extracted components would be 
correlated, given that all items in each MDRAS scale were designed to assess the same 
construct, albeit with respect to different types of events. This type of analysis is commonly 
used when creating a new scale or modifying existing scales (Foa et al., 2002). Tabachnick 
and Fidell (2001) indicate that a sample size in excess of 200 is “fair” (p. 588) for PCA. 
The Kaiser criterion, whereby components with eigenvalues in excess of 1 are 
retained, is typically used in PCA. However, it tends to result in the retention of too many 
components (Hayton, Allen, & Scarpello, 2004). Therefore, the more reliable (Hayton et al., 
2004) parallel analysis was used to determine the number of components to be retained. 
Hayton et al. (2004) suggested that parallel analysis is “one of the most accurate methods for 
determining the number of factors to retain” (p. 192). This procedure involves the generation 
of 1000 random data sets with the same dimensions as the main PCA (222 cases by 18 items 
for each of the three MDRAS Total scales). Each of these data sets is then subjected to a 
PCA, generating 1000 eigenvalues for each of the 18 components in the initial solution. 
These eigenvalues are rank-ordered and the eigenvalue at the 95
th
 percentile for each 
component is specified. Comparison of eigenvalues from the PCA on the actual data with 
those at the 95
th
 percentile in the parallel analysis indicates how many components to retain. 
In the case of the MDRAS Total Probability, MDRAS Total Cost, and MDRAS Total Coping 
scales, the first component is retained if its eigenvalue exceeds 1.63, the second component is 
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retained if its eigenvalue exceeds 1.50, and the third component is retained if its eigenvalue 
exceeds 1.40. Extraction of components ceases as soon as the eigenvalue from the main 
analysis does not exceed the corresponding eigenvalue from the parallel analysis. Once 
parallel analysis has indicated how many components should be retained, the PCA on the 
observed data is rerun, forcing the data into this number of components. 
No PCA was conducted on a combination of the three MDRAS scales to test for the 
probability-cost-coping structure. This was because the three scales had face validity, with 
the wording of items clearly indicating whether perceived probability, perceived cost, or 
perceived coping ability were being assessed. Therefore, PCAs were conducted on each scale 
separately. 
  
MDRAS Probability scale PCA. 
Factorability of the data was assessed prior to commencing the PCA. In general, a 
dataset is suitable for PCA if it contains numerous correlations in excess of .3, demonstrates a 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy greater than .6, and has a 
significant Bartlett’s test of sphericity (Allen & Bennett, 2008; Coakes & Steed, 1999). There 
were numerous correlations in excess of .3, the KMO measure of sampling adequacy was .84, 
and Bartlett’s test of sphericity was large and significant, suggesting that the MDRAS 
Probability data were suitable for PCA. Coakes and Steed (1999) suggested that “pure 
variables have loadings of .3 or greater on only one factor” (p. 161). Therefore, items that 
demonstrated a loading of .3 or igher on only one factor were considered to be appropriate for 
inclusion in that factor. Subsequently, “split loading” will refer to an item with a loading of .3 
or higher on more than one component. 
The MDRAS Probability scale was submitted to a PCA with promax rotation. 
Communalities for all variables were above the acceptable minimum of .2 for factor analytic 
procedures (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). The internal consistency was high, with a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .85 that would not have been improved with the removal of any items. 
Using parallel analysis, two components, accounting for 40.62% of the variance, were 
extracted. The first component, with an eigenvalue of 5.18, accounted for 28.77% of the 
variance. The second component, with an eigenvalue of 2.13, accounted for 11.85% of the 
variance. The third component was excluded because its eigenvalue (1.30) was below the 
1.40 cut-off for inclusion. 
In accordance with standard procedures for parallel analysis, the MDRAS Probability 
scale was then submitted to a second PCA, whereby the data were forced into two 
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components. All communalities were above the acceptable minimum of .2 (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2001). The pattern matrix indicated that the last nine items loaded positively on 
Component 1 and the first nine items loaded positively on Component 2, with no split-




Pattern Matrix Loadings on MDRAS Probability Components Following PCA with 
Promax Rotation and Parallel Analysis (N = 222) 
MDRAS item Component 1 Component 2 
   
1 -.09 .58 
2 -.14 .79 
3 -.08 .66 
4 -.04 .62 
5 .13 .42 
6 .14 .54 
7 .02 .71 
8 .09 .60 
9 .21 .33 
10 .60 .09 
11 .55 .21 
13 .48 .23 
14 .73 -.04 
15 .69 .003 
16 .51 .11 
17 .61 .14 
18 .70 -.25 
19 .80 -.20 
Note. Loadings of .3 or higher are emboldened 
 
MDRAS Cost scale PCA. 
Factorability of the correlation matrix was assessed prior to commencing the PCA. 
There were numerous correlations in excess of .3, the KMO measure of sampling adequacy 
was .88, and Bartlett’s test of sphericity was large and significant, suggesting that the data 
were suitable for PCA (Allen & Bennett, 2008; Coakes & Steed, 1999). 
The MDRAS Cost scale was submitted to a PCA with promax rotation. All 
communalities were above the acceptable minimum of .2 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001) and 
the internal consistency was high, as indicated by a Cronbach’s alpha of .88 which would not 
have been improved with the removal of any items. 
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Using parallel analysis, two components were extracted, accounting for 41.47% of the 
variance in the data. The first component, with an eigenvalue of 5.93, accounted for 32.94% 
of the variance. The second component, with an eigenvalue of 1.54, accounted for 8.53% of 
the variance. The third component was excluded because its eigenvalue (1.32) was below the 
1.40 cut-off for inclusion.  
In accordance with standard procedures for parallel analysis, the MDRAS Cost scale 
was submitted to a second PCA, whereby the data were forced into two components. All 
communalities were above the acceptable minimum of .2 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). The 
item loadings from the pattern matrix can be seen in Table 6.4.  Items 1-7 and Item 11 loaded 
unambiguously onto Component 1. Items 10, 13-15, and 17 loaded unambiguously onto 
Component 2. The two components were strongly positively correlated (r = .55, p < .001). 
However Items 8, 9, and 16 loaded onto both components and Item 18 did not demonstrate a 
loading of above .3 on either. 
 
Table 6.4 
Pattern Matrix Loadings on MDRAS Cost Components Following PCA with Promax 
Rotation and Parallel Analysis (N = 222) 
MDRAS item Component 1 Component 2 
   
1 .76 -.25 
2 .64 -.01 
3 .63 .03 
4 .46 .25 
5 .75 -.09 
6 .76 -.12 
7 .56 19 
8 .38 .39 
9 -.31 .82 
10 .17 .61 
11 .46 .17 
13 .20 .54 
14 .03 .59 
15 -.13 .74 
16 .30 .34 
17 .04 .73 
18 .16 .29 
19 .36 .28 





MDRAS Coping scale PCA. 
Factorability of the correlation matrix was assessed prior to commencing the PCA. 
There were numerous correlations in excess of .3, the KMO measure of sampling adequacy 
was .89, and Bartlett’s test of sphericity was large and significant, suggesting that the data 
were suitable for PCA (Allen & Bennett, 2008; Coakes & Steed, 1999). 
The MDRAS Coping scale was submitted to a PCA with promax rotation. All 
communalities were above the acceptable minimum of .2 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001) and 
internal consistency was high, as indicated by a Cronbach’s alpha of .90 which would not 
have been improved with the removal of any items. 
Using parallel analysis, two components, accounting for 45.49% of the variance, were 
extracted. The first component, with an eigenvalue of 6.58, accounted for 36.56% of the 
variance. The second component, with an eigenvalue of 1.61, accounted for 8.93% of the 
variance. The third component was excluded because its eigenvalue (1.19) was below the 
1.40 cut-off for inclusion. 
In accordance with standard procedures for parallel analysis, the MDRAS Coping 
scale was submitted to a second PCA, whereby the data were forced into two components. 
All communalities were above the acceptable minimum of .2 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). 
The pattern matrix demonstrated a clean pattern of loadings whereby all items loaded 
positively onto one component and did not load onto the other (see Table 6.5). Items 1-8 
loaded positively onto Component 1. There were also smaller positive loadings from Items 
19, 11, and 18, which were job-related potential future items. Items 9, 10, and 13-17 loaded 
positively onto Component 2. The two extracted components were strongly positively 















Pattern Matrix Loadings on MDRAS Coping Components Following PCA with 
Promax Rotation and Parallel Analysis (N = 222) 
MDRAS item Component 1 Component 2 
   
1 .73 -.15 
2 .63 .10 
3 .71 -.06 
4 .78 -.10 
5 .79 -.11 
6 .73 -.04 
7 .70 .13 
8 .62 .13 
9 .03 .68 
10 .19 .59 
11 .48 .16 
13 .15 .49 
14 -.02 .71 
15 -.17 .77 
16 .16 .37 
17 -.12 .82 
18 .37 .25 
19 .53 .18 
Note. Loadings of .3 or higher are emboldened 
 
Discussion – PCA part one. 
The aim of Study 1 was to assess the potential structure of the newly created MDRAS 
Probability, MDRAS Cost, and MDRAS Coping scales. Although each was designed to 
incorporate factors of everyday risk perceptions (assessed through the initial eight items) and 
future risk perceptions (assessed through the remaining eleven items), it was considered 
presumptuous to ignore the possibility of other factors, such as physical risk or social risk 
(Horvath & Zuckerman, 1993; Uren et al., 2004) within the scales. Therefore, PCA was 
initially conducted on each scale with the intention of suggesting potential factor structures to 
be tested via subsequent CFA. 
 
MDRAS Probability scale. 
The initial PCA using parallel analysis on the 18-item MDRAS Probability scale 
(following the removal of Item 12) indicated the presence of two components. Item loadings 
generally supported the proposed structure of the MDRAS, with the first nine items loading 
positively onto Component 2, which was labelled MDRAS Everyday Probability and the final 
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nine items loading positively onto Component 1, which was labelled MDRAS Future 
Probability. Item 9, which was designed to assess future probability judgements, loaded onto 
MDRAS Everyday Probability rather than onto MDRAS Future Probability. However, the 
remaining items all loaded as expected on the respective components. No items loaded onto 
both components after ignoring loadings lower than .3 (Allen & Bennett, 2008), indicating 
that MDRAS Everyday Probability and MDRAS Future Probability, although positively 
correlated (r = .40), were distinct constructs. However the positive correlation between the 
components raised the possibility of a higher-order factor (MDRAS Total Probability), as had 
been intended.  
 
MDRAS Cost scale. 
The initial PCA using parallel analysis on the 18-item MDRAS Cost scale indicated a 
two-component structure. In addition, these components appeared to largely correspond to 
everyday and future cost judgements. The pattern matrix demonstrated that the first 8 items 
all loaded as planned, onto Component 1, which was labelled MDRAS Everyday Cost. 
However, there were unplanned positive loadings onto MDRAS Everyday Cost from items 
11, 16, and 19. In addition, Item 8 demonstrated unplanned split-loadings onto the second 
component. Of the 11 items designed to assess future cost, seven demonstrated the expected 
positive loadings on Component 2, which was labelled MDRAS Future Cost. However, Items 
9 and 16 also spilt-loaded onto MDRAS Everyday Cost and Items 11, 18, and 19 did not 
demonstrate loadings in excess of .3 on MDRAS Future Cost. Overall the results supported 
the existence of the everyday and future cost components, although the pattern of item 
loadings was less clear than that observed in the MDRAS Probability scale, with several 
items loading onto both components. MDRAS Everyday Cost and MDRAS Future Cost were 
strongly positively correlated (r = .55) indicating the possible existence of a higher-order 
component (MDRAS Total Cost), as had been planned. 
 
MDRAS Coping scale. 
The initial PCA using parallel analysis on the 18-item MDRAS Coping scale 
generally supported the presence of the proposed everyday and future components. The first 
eight items loaded unambiguously onto Component 1 as was intended. This component 
appears to represent coping ability estimates for everyday events and was labelled MDRAS 
Everyday Coping. However Items 11, 18, and 19 also loaded onto this component, rather than 
onto the future coping component as had been intended. The remaining items all loaded 
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unambiguously onto the second component as was intended, with this component labelled 
MDRAS Future Coping. The large positive correlation (r = .56) between the components 
indicated the possibility of a higher-order component (MDRAS Total Coping), as had been 
intended. 
 
Changes to the MDRAS. 
Overall the results of the initial PCA on each scale suggested that the scales 
conformed to the intended component structure. However, there were several problematic 
items that did not load in the expected manner on one or more of the scales. Item 9, which 
assessed judgements related to the potential death of a spouse, was problematic because it 
demonstrated inconsistent loading across the three MDRAS scales. Although it loaded in the 
expected manner on the Coping scale, it did not load as expected on the Probability or Cost 
scales. This item was rated as the most costly and difficult to cope with of all of the MDRAS 
items (after deleting Item 12) and it is possible that the extreme nature of the item resulted in 
the ambiguous loading pattern. In addition, some participants might have already experienced 
this event and this could have influenced their responses, especially in terms of the 
probability of this event occurring again. Item 9 was consequently deleted from the MDRAS 
scales. Item 8 was problematic because it loaded on both components on the MDRAS Cost 
scale, but in neither case was the loading strong. The fact that this loading pattern was not 
evident in the MDRAS Probability or the MDRAS Coping scales rendered this item difficult 
to interpret (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). The wording of Item 8 was somewhat ambiguous 
and this could account for the inconsistent loading pattern (e.g., Foa et al., 2002) across 
MDRAS scales. Given that this Item 8 was also likely to be tapping into social phobia fears 
(and would therefore reduce its utility among individuals with social phobia), it was 
subsequently deleted from the MDRAS scales. Items 11 and 19 were problematic because, 
although they loaded as expected onto the MDRAS Future Probability component, they 
loaded onto the MDRAS Everyday Cost and MDRAS Everyday Coping components. Both of 
these items dealt with potential problems at work (being fired and experiencing conflict with 
the boss) and it is possible that some participants in the current study were already 
experiencing such problems, resulting in these items being reflective of ongoing/everyday 
problems rather than potential future problems for these people. Both items were deleted 
from all MDRAS scales. Items 16 demonstrated a small split-loading on the MDRAS Cost 
scale but was retained because it performed as expected in the MDRAS Probability and 
MDRAS Coping scales. Item 18 loaded inconsistently across the scales. However, there was 
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no obvious reason for this ambiguity (although Item 18 relates to occupational risks, it refers 
to the possibility of having to begin a new line of work rather than an ongoing problem such 
as conflict with a boss) and it was decided to retain this item in the belief that it was likely to 
load as planned after the removal of Items 11 and 19, which also related to occupational risks. 
 
Shortened version of the MDRAS. 
The resultant MDRAS scales consisted of 14 items, seven of which were intended to 
comprise the MDRAS Everyday scales and seven of which were designed to comprise the 
MDRAS Future Scales. This shorter version of the scale was more parsimonious than the 
original, which had been somewhat cumbersome and time consuming to complete. In 
addition, the MDRAS Everyday and MDRAS Future scales were now of equal length. Given 
the exploratory nature of the current study, it was decided to repeat the PCAs on the MDRAS 
Probability, MDRAS Cost, and MDRAS Coping scales using the shortened version of the 
MDRAS. 
 
PCA on the 14-item MDRAS 
In order to assess the structure of the shortened MDRAS scales, PCAs with promax 
rotation were again run on each scale. Parallel analysis was again utilised and, with the 
current data (222 x 14), this resulted in the first component being retained if its eigenvalue 
exceeded 1.55, the second component being retained if its eigenvalue exceeded 1.41, and the 
third component being retained if its eigenvalue exceeded 1.31. 
 
PCA on the shortened MDRAS Probability scale. 
For the 14-item MDRAS Probability scale, communalities for all items were above 
the acceptable minimum of .2 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). The KMO measure of sampling 
adequacy (0.82) and a significant Bartlett’s test of sphericity indicated that the data were 
suitable for PCA (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Using parallel analysis two components were 
extracted, accounting for 42.89% of the variance in the data. The first component, with an 
eigenvalue of 4.14, accounted for 29.59% of the variance and the second component, with an 
eigenvalue of 1.86, accounted for 13.31% of the variance. The third component was excluded 
because its eigenvalue (1.20) was below the 1.31 cut-off for inclusion. Internal consistency 
was acceptable, with a Cronbach’s alpha of .81, which would not have been improved to a 
substantial degree with the removal of any items from the analysis. 
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In accordance with parallel analysis procedures, the PCA with promax rotation was 
repeated, forcing the data into two components. Communalities were all above the acceptable 
minimum of .2 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). The pattern matrix demonstrated that the first 
seven items loaded positively onto the MDRAS Everyday Probability component, while the 
last seven items loaded positively onto the MDRAS Future Probability component, with no 
split-loadings (see Table 6.6). There was a moderate positive correlation (r = .38, p < .001) 
between the components. The internal consistencies of the MDRAS Everyday Probability and 
the MDRAS Future Probability components were acceptable, with Cronbach’s alphas of .75 




Pattern Matrix Loadings on Shortened MDRAS Probability Components Following 
PCA with Promax Rotation and Parallel Analysis (N = 222) 
MDRAS item Component 1 Component 2 
   
1 .07 .59 
2 -.11 .80 
3 -.07 .68 
4 -.01 .61 
5 .16 .41 
6 .17 .54 
7 .04 .72 
10 .69 .02 
13 .54 .16 
14 .68 .01 
15 .78 -.07 
16 .58 .04 
17 .70 .08 
18 .61 -.19 
Note. Loadings of .3 or higher are emboldened 
 
PCA on the shortened MDRAS Cost scale. 
For the 14-item MDRAS Cost scale, communalities for all items were above the 
acceptable minimum of .2 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). The KMO measure of sampling 
adequacy (0.87) and a significant Bartlett’s test of sphericity indicated that the data were 
suitable for PCA. Using parallel analysis, the first component, with an eigenvalue of 4.82, 
accounted for 34.44% of the variance. However, the second component, which accounted for 
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10.06% of the variance, demonstrated an eigenvalue of 1.41, which is identical to the parallel 
analysis cut-off eigenvalue. This component was retained pending the results of CFA 
comparing one-factor and two-factor models. The third component was excluded because its 
eigenvalue (1.08) was below the 1.31 cut-off for inclusion. Internal consistency was high, 
with a Cronbach’s alpha of .85, which would not have been improved substantially with the 
removal of any items. 
In accordance with parallel analysis procedures, the PCA with promax rotation was 
repeated, forcing the data into two components. Communalities were all above the acceptable 
minimum of .2 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). The pattern matrix demonstrated that the first 
seven items loaded positively on the MDRAS Everyday Cost component and the last seven 
items loaded positively on the MDRAS Future Cost component, with no split loadings (see 
Table 6.7). There was a strong positive correlation (r = .53, p < .001) between the two 
components. The internal consistencies of the MDRAS Everyday Cost and MDRAS Future 
Cost components were acceptable, with Cronbach’s alphas of .76 and .80, respectively, which 
would not have been improved with the removal of any items. 
 
Table 6.7 
Pattern Matrix Loadings on Shortened MDRAS Cost Components Following PCA 
with Promax Rotation and Parallel Analysis (N = 222) 
MDRAS item Component 1 Component 2 
   
1 .65 -.11 
2 .72 -.05 
3 .51 .18 
4 .53 .16 
5 .71 -.03 
6 .78 -.10 
7 .74 .001 
10 .26 .52 
13 .10 .66 
14 .14 .48 
15 -.13 .73 
16 .19 .49 
17 -.13 .83 
18 -.14 .61 






PCA on the shortened MDRAS Coping scale. 
For the 14-item MDRAS Coping scale, communalities for all items were all above the 
acceptable minimum of .2 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). The KMO measure of sampling 
adequacy (0.88) and a significant Bartlett’s test of sphericity indicated that the data were 
suitable for PCA. Using parallel analysis, two components were retained, accounting for 
47.82% of the variance in the data. The first component, with an eigenvalue of 5.17, 
accounted for 36.96% of the variance and the second component, with an eigenvalue of 1.52, 
accounted for 10.86% of the variance. The third component was excluded because its 
eigenvalue (1.00) was below the 1.31 cut-off for inclusion. Internal consistency was high, 
with a Cronbach’s alpha of .86 that would not have been improved with the removal of any 
items.  
In accordance with parallel analysis procedures, the PCA with promax rotation was 
repeated, forcing the data into two components. Communalities were all above the acceptable 
minimum of .2 (Tabachnick & Fidell). The pattern matrix demonstrated that the first seven 
items loaded positively onto the MDRAS Everyday Coping component and the final seven 
items loaded positively onto the MDRAS Future Coping component, with no split-loadings, 
(see Table 6.8). There was a strong positive correlation (r = .50, p < .001) between the two 
components. The internal consistency of the MDRAS Everyday Coping component was high, 
with a Cronbach’s alpha of .85. The internal consistency of the MDRAS Future Coping 
component was acceptable, with a Cronbach’s alpha of .75. In neither case would 

















Pattern Matrix Loadings on Shortened MDRAS Coping Components Following PCA 
with Promax Rotation and Parallel Analysis (N = 222) 
MDRAS item Component 1 Component 2 
   
1 .69 -.09 
2 .69 .07 
3 .69 .01 
4 .79 -.11 
5 .73 .00 
6 .73 .02 
7 .73 .10 
10 .29 .50 
13 .14 .50 
14 .09 .60 
15 -.20 .83 
16 .09 .47 
17 -.14 .87 
18 .29 .33 
Note. Loadings of .3 or higher are emboldened 
 
Discussion – PCA part two. 
Clearly, the procedure used to test the item loadings on the 14-item MDRAS is 
suboptimal, given that the same data were used in the analyses that had been used to initially 
refine the scales. It would, therefore, be expected that the pattern of item loadings would 
closely conform to expectations. Nevertheless, this exploratory analysis confirmed that, in 
this data set at least, deletion of four items has improved the factor structure of the MDRAS 
scales, with parallel analysis demonstrating that each of the MDRAS scales (with the possible 
exception of the Cost scale) could be separated, as intended, into two components 
corresponding to everyday risk judgements and future risk judgements. Items loaded as 
planned on each component with no unplanned loadings or split-loadings, although item 18 
remained somewhat problematic, given that it loaded with similar magnitude onto the two 
Coping components. The PCA results suggest that the structure of the MDRAS is based 
around the distinction between everyday risk and future risk, with little interference from 
other potential risk domains. 
However, the observed components were positively correlated in all cases, indicating 
the possibility that a higher-order factor (Total Probability, Cost, or Coping) could be present 
in each MDRAS scale. This was not surprising because the MDRAS scales were each 
designed to be used as a unitary construct in addition to providing subscale scores. It makes 
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sense, therefore, to hypothesise the presence of a higher-order construct that drives the lower-
order risk scales. PCA - being an exploratory technique rather than a confirmatory technique 
- cannot be used to test the higher-order hypothesis. The higher-order hypothesis must be 
tested using a confirmatory technique such as CFA. CFA was therefore used to resolve the 
issue of whether each MDRAS scale contained a higher-order factor pertaining to total 
perceived probability, cost, or coping ability. It should be emphasised that the purpose of the 
CFAs was not to merely confirm the two-factor structure suggested by the previous PCAs, 
which would be a rather circulatory exercise involving confirming a factor solution with the 
same data from which the solution was derived. Rather, it was to expand on the PCA results 
and to clarify remaining questions about the structure of the MDRAS scales. Another 
important question pertained to the component structure of the MDRAS Cost scale, which 
was somewhat ambiguous because the second component had an identical eigenvalue to the 
cut-off for component retention suggested by parallel analysis procedures. It was unclear 
whether a one-factor or two-factor solution was preferable for the MDRAS Cost scale and 
CFA comparing the fit of the one-factor and two-factor models was required to determine 
whether to retain the two component structure for this scale. 
 
CFA on the MDRAS 
PCA results suggested that the shortened MDRAS could be meaningfully divided into 
Everyday and Future scales. However, several questions regarding the structure of the 
MDRAS scales remained. In order to answer these questions, CFA, using LISREL version 
8.51, was performed on each of the MDRAS scales. 
For the MDRAS Probability and MDRAS Coping scales, two models were tested. 
Initially, the fit of a two-factor model, whereby the first seven items loaded onto an Everyday 
factor and the remaining seven items loaded onto a Future factor, and the two factors were 
allowed to correlate, was tested. A second model was tested, whereby a higher-order factor 
was added to the two-factor model, so that the Everyday and Future factors both loaded onto 
a Total factor. This was to determine whether adding a higher-order factor improved the fit of 
the two-factor model. For the MDRAS Cost scale, the fit of three models was tested. In 
addition to the two models discussed above, a one-factor model where each MDRAS item 
loaded onto a single cost factor was examined, to determine the utility of retaining 






Because different fit indices evaluate model fit from slightly different perspectives, 
more than one fit index is generally reported. The present study used the following fit 
statistics: The Satorra-Bentler chi-square divided by its degrees of freedom (χ
2
/df), the 
comparative fit index (CFI), the non-normed fit index (NNFI), the standardised root mean 
square residual (SRMR), and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA). The 
Satorra-Bentler chi-square was used because it is less likely to be inflated by multivariate 
non-normality than is the standard chi-square statistic, while being equally reliable in the 
presence of multivariate normality (Yang-Wallentin & Joreskog, 2001). The cut-off criterion 
for the χ
2
/df statistic has been set between 2 and 5 (Hooper, Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008). 
More specifically, Kline (1998) proposed that a value less than or equal to 3 indicates an 
acceptable fit. The CFI compares the null model, in which all latent variables are assumed to 
be uncorrelated, to the hypothesised model.  The suggested criterion for a good fit is a CFI 
value greater than or equal to .95 (Benet-Martnez & Karakitapoglu-Aygun, 2003; Tabachnick 
& Fidell, 2001).  The NNFI compares the chi-square values of the null and the hypothesised 
model, a value greater than or equal to .95 indicates a good fit, although some reserchers have 
suggested as low as .85 is acceptable (Benet-Martnez & Karakitapoglu-Aygun, 2003; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). The SRMR is considered to be one of the more meaningful fit 
indices to report in a CFA analysis (Hooper et al., 2008).  It measures the square root 
difference between the residuals of the null model and the hypothesised model.  An SRMR of 
less than or equal to .08 is required for the SRMR to be considered a good fit (Hooper et al.; 
Marsh, Hau, & Wen, 2004).  The RMSEA is considered an important fit index as it takes into 
account the number of parameters in the hypothesised models and selects the most 
parsimonious model to analyse (Hooper et al., 2008).  A cut-off value value of between .06 
and .08 has been suggested as indicative of a good fit on this index (Diamantopoulos & 
Siguaw, 2000; Hooper et al.; Hu & Bentler, 1999). 
 
CFA on the MDRAS Probability scale. 
Results of the CFA on the MDRAS Probability scale are presented in Table 6.9. The 
NNFI (.91), CFI (.92), SRMR (.07), and χ
2
/df (2.60) all indicated that the two-factor model 
was a reasonably good fit for the data. Although the RMSEA (.09) indicated a moderate fit, 
this statistic tends to underestimate model fit among relatively small samples such as this 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). The higher-order factor model demonstrated fit indices that 
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were virtually identical to the two-factor model but did not exceed the fit of the two-factor 
model. 
 
CFA on the MDRAS Cost scale. 
Results of the CFA on the MDRAS Cost scale are presented in Table 6.9. The NNFI 
(.89), CFI (.91), SRMR (.08) and χ
2
/df (3.47) suggested that the one-factor solution was a 
moderate fit for the data, although the RMSEA (.11) indicated a poor fit. The two-factor 
solution was a superior fit, with the NNFI (.93), CFI (.94), RMSEA (.08), SRMR (.06) and 
χ2/df (2.57) all indicating a reasonably good fit. The higher-order factor model demonstrated 
fit indices that were similar to, but did not exceed, those of the two-factor model. 
 
Table 6.9 
Comparative Fit Indices for One Factor (Cost only), Two Factor, and Higher-Order Factor 
Models for MDRAS Probability, MDRAS Cost, and MDRAS Coping (N = 222) 
Model  RMSEA NNFI CFI SRMR χ
2
/df 
       
       
Probability       
 Two factor .09 .91 .92 .07 2.60 
       
 Higher 
order factor 
.09 .90 .92 .07 2.64 
       
Cost       
 One factor .11 .89 .91 .07 3.47 
       
 Two factor .08 .93 .94 .06 2.57 
       
 Higher 
order factor 
.09 .93 .94 .06 2.61 
       
Coping       
 Two factor .10 .93 .94 .07 3.12 
       
 Higher 
order factor 
.10 .92 .94 .07 3.16 
Note: RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; NNFI = non-normed fit index; 





CFA on the MDRAS Coping scale. 
Results of the CFA on the MDRAS Coping scale are presented in Table 6.9. The 
NNFI (.93), CFI (.94) and SRMR (.07) all indicated that the two-factor model was a 
reasonably good fit. The RMSEA (.10) and χ
2
/df (3.12) indicated a moderate fit. The higher-
order factor model demonstrated fit indices that were very similar to the two-factor model but 
did not exceed the fit of the two-factor model. 
 
CFA Discussion. 
For all three MDRAS scales, a solution containing two correlated factors 
corresponding to everyday risk judgements (items 1-7) and future risk judgements (items 10 
and 13-18) provided a good fit. In the case of the MDRAS Cost scale the fit of this model 
was superior to the one-factor solution whereby all items loaded onto a single factor. This 
finding was important because of the uncertainty regarding the retention of the second 
component in the prior PCA. It therefore appears that Everyday and Future scales can be 
interpreted for the MDRAS Probability, Cost, and Coping scales.  
For each MDRAS scale, a higher-order solution provided a good fit (although not 
improving the fit of the two-factor model), suggesting that total MDRAS Probability, Cost, 
and Coping scores can be meaningfully interpreted. This is supported by the fact that the 
internal consistencies of each MDRAS Total scales were high. Therefore, it appears that each 
MDRAS scale contains an overall factor consisting of all items, along with two correlated 
subordinate factors consisting of 1) Everyday risk items and 2) Future risk items. This 
supports the hypothesised (and intended) factor structure of the MDRAS. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The results of Study 1 suggest that the MDRAS scales can be used to measure 
perceptions of the probability and cost of two types of general risks (everyday and future), as 
well as perceived ability to cope with those events. In addition, it appears that the Everyday 
and Future subscales can be usefully combined into an overall scale score. Consequently, the 
MDRAS appears to provide nine meaningful scale scores: MDRAS Total Probability; 
MDRAS Everyday Probability; MDRAS Future Probability; MDRAS Total Cost; MDRAS 
Everyday Cost; MDRAS Future Cost; MDRAS Total Coping; MDRAS Everyday Coping; 
and MDRAS Future Coping. Given that PCA and CFA were conducted on the same sample, 
these factors will require replication among separate samples of clinical and non-clinical 
individuals. However the fact that the scale appears to be structured as planned reflects the 
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theoretical basis of the items selected. The MDRAS Total scales are likely to provide 
important information regarding the differences in risk perceptions between various clinical 
groups. However, the Everyday/Future distinction in the MDRAS scales could be equally 
important. The MDRAS Everyday scales could be particularly related to general risk-
aversion that appears to be common among individuals with OCD and among other anxious 
groups (Cicolini & Rees, 2003; Lorian & Grisham, 2010, 2011, Steketee & Frost, 1994) and 
could help to understand the cognitive mechanisms that drive this risk-aversion. However, it 
is unclear to what extent the MDRAS Future scales will relate to general risk-aversion. It is 
uncertain whether threat overestimation among individuals with OCD and other anxious 
individuals will extend possible future life events such as those in the MDRAS Future scales. 
Given their fear of potential future events (Grayson, 2010; Rees, 2001; Salkovskis, Forrester, 
Richards, & Morrison, 1998), it is likely that individuals with OCD will evidence cognitive 
distortions in their judgements of probability, cost, or coping ability related to these future 
events. However it is less certain that other anxious groups will evidence threat perception 
biases relevant to these events. It is possible that differential ratings of probability, cost, and 
coping ability for everyday and future events will distinguish between various clinical 
groups. It is also, however, possible that heightened levels of perceived probability and cost, 
and lowered perceived coping ability, will be ubiquitous among anxious individuals and 
mediated largely by anxiety and negative affect. 
One caution that must be noted is that the sample size utilised in Study 1 (N = 222) 
was somewhat smaller than ideal. Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) suggested that sample sizes 
larger than 200 are “fair” (p. 588) for PCA and CFA. However, ideally the results of the CFA 
should be replicated on a larger, independent sample. Future studies using the MDRAS 
should examine the possibility of reducing the scale further through eliminating items in 
order to reduce the amount of time required to complete the scale. In particular, item 18 still 
appears to be somewhat problematic. This item demonstrated inconsistent loadings in the 
initial version of the MDRAS and, although it loaded as planned in each scale of the 
shortened MDRAS, its removal would have fractionally improved the internal consistency of 
the MDRAS Total Probability and MDRAS Total Cost scales, as well as the MDRAS Future 
Probability scale. In addition, the observed factor structure among the non-clinical sample 
utilised in Study 1 might not be replicated among clinical samples, so the use of the MDRAS 
on such samples will initially require caution. 
These cautions notwithstanding, Study 1 appears to have provided sufficient evidence 
that the MDRAS, which is a theoretically derived scale, is structured as planned and is 
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therefore likely to be a useful clinical tool. However, before attempting to perform 
comparisons between groups, further validation of the MDRAS is necessary, particularly in 
terms of assessing the construct validity of the scales. In particular, it is important to ensure 
that the scales are performing as expected in relation to negative affect, because this is a 
strongly established correlate of threat perceptions and risk-aversion (Butler & Mathews, 
1983, 1987; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Maner & Schmidt, 2006). In addition, it is necessary to 
explore the discriminant validity of the MDRAS scales in relation to obsessive cognitions – 
although the MDRAS was designed to measure general risk-aversion that is common among 
individuals with OCD, it was not designed to tap into OCD-specific cognitive styles and if it 
does, its utility in other anxious groups will be reduced. Finally, it is important to establish 
that the primary appraisal (probability and cost) scales of the MDRAS are assessing a 
separate construct to the secondary appraisal (coping) scales. Therefore, Study 2 will aim to 
continue the exploration of the MDRAS Scales through examining the pattern of 
relationships between the MDRAS scales, a measure of NA, a measure of OCD cognitions, 
and a measure of perceived control over anxiety (which should be closely related to the 
MDRAS Coping scales). This is an important step in the validation of the MDRAS and is 
necessary before attempting to examine differences between clinical groups on perceptions of 
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Aim of Study 2 
Study 1 established that each of the MDRAS scales contains two separate, although 
related, constructs corresponding to everyday risk perceptions and future risk perceptions, 
which can be combined into overall risk perceptions.  It is now important to assess how these 
risk constructs correlate with other measures in order to ascertain the validity of the MDRAS. 
Study 2 aimed to achieve this through investigating the relationship between the MDRAS 
scales and a measure of negative affect (NA), a measure of perceived control over threat, and 
a measure of obsessive thinking. Negative affect is closely related to anxiety and depression 
(Dyck, Jolly, & Kramer, 1994) and is known to have a significant impact on risk perceptions, 
especially for self-referent events (e.g., Butler & Matthews, 1987; Gasper & Clore, 1998). 
Therefore, it was necessary to determine that the MDRAS scales related to NA. It was also 
important to determine how the MDRAS relates to other measures after controlling for NA. 
A measure of perceived control was used primarily as a means of demonstrating convergent 
validity for the MDRAS Coping scales, but also as a means of demonstrating discriminant 
validity of the MDRAS Probability and MDRAS Cost scales. The measure of obsessive 
beliefs was used in an attempt to provide discriminant validity for the MDRAS scales. Given 
that the MDRAS was designed to consist of events that are not specific to OCD, the 
relationships between the MDRAS scales and the OBQ scales are expected to be small and 
largely accounted for by NA. 
 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
The data for Study 2 were collected simultaneously with the data used in Study 1. 
Therefore, participant details are identical to Study 1. In addition to the MDRAS and 
demographics page, participants completed the Anxiety Control Questionnaire (ACQ; Rapee, 
Craske, Brown, & Barlow, 1996), the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; 
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), and the Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ; OCCWG, 
2005). The order of the scales was random to eliminate the possibility of order effects in the 
data, with the only exception being that the demographics page was first in each 
questionnaire package. A correlational design was used to test the relationships between the 
various measures. T tests were used to examine the difference between men and women on 






 The Multi-Dimensional Risk Assessment Scale (MDRAS). 
The shortened, 14-item version of the MDRAS was utilised, with data from deleted 
items being excluded. Details of this questionnaire were reported in Study 1. MDRAS 
Everyday scale scores (Probability, Cost, and Coping) for each participant were computed by 
summing the scores on the first seven items of the MDRAS and dividing the result by 7. The 
same procedure was used to obtain MDRAS Future scores, using the last seven items. The 
MDRAS Total scale scores were obtained by summing all items and dividing by 14. As 
explained in Study 1, Coping items were reverse-scored so that higher scores reflected higher 
perceived coping ability. 
 
 The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS). 
The PANAS (see Appendix E) is a 20-item self-report measure that assesses positive 
affect and negative affect. Only the NA scale was used in the current study, although 
participants completed the entire scale. NA indicates general subjective distress which 
includes anger, contempt, anxiety, fear, guilt, and disgust, with low NA being a state of 
calmness. NA broadly encapsulates the personality factor of neuroticism, and is closely 
linked to anxiety and risk-aversion (Crawford & Henry, 2004; Watson et al., 1988).  
The PANAS contains 10 items that assess PA, and 10 items that assess NA. Items 
were designed to be “relatively pure markers of either PA or NA” (Watson et al., 1988, p. 
1064) that did not exhibit high split-loadings on the other factor.  Participants are asked to 
rate the extent to which they have experienced a range of emotions over a specified time 
period. The researcher has the option of choosing several time frames, ranging from right 
now to generally – the general timeframe was used in the current study. Ratings are made on 
a 5-point scale, where 1 represents very slightly or not at all and 5 represents extremely. 
Scores on each NA item are summed to provide a total NA score. The emotion items that 
comprise the NA scale are distressed, upset, hostile, irritable, scared, afraid, ashamed, guilty, 
nervous, and jittery (Watson et al., 1988). 
 In their initial validation of the PANAS, Watson et al. (1988) used a large student 
sample, along with 267 non-students. There were no systematic differences on the PANAS 
between the two groups. Cronbach’s alphas for the NA scale ranged from .84 to .87, 
depending on the time frame used in the scale. In a small (N = 61) clinical sample, good 
internal consistency was demonstrated (Cronbach’s alpha = .91) for the NA scale using the 
timeframe of during the past few weeks. Eight-week test-retest reliability was acceptable: r = 
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.71 for the ‘general’ timeframe (r = .81 in the clinical sample) (Watson et al., 1988). Factor 
analyses provided support for the two-factor structure of the PANAS, and suggested that each 
scale (PA and NA) accurately assessed the intended construct (Watson et al., 1988). 
 The NA scale of the PANAS showed the expected positive correlations with the State 
scale of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (r = .51), the Hopkins Symptom Checklist (r = .65 
to .74), and the Beck Depression Inventory (r = .56 to .58) (Watson et al., 1988). In separate 
studies (Clark & Watson, 1986, as cited in Watson et al., 1988; Leeka, 1987, as cited in 
Watson et al., 1988) NA was responsive to changes in stress levels, when the PANAS was 
administered in the form how do you feel… at the present moment or in the form have you felt 
this way today. Watson et al. (1988) concluded that the PANAS is an internally consistent, 
reliable, and valid measure of the largely separate constructs of negative affect and positive 
affect. 
 Crawford and Henry (2004) conducted a CFA on the PANAS in a sample of 1003 
adults who were generally representative of the British population. After comparing various 
models, it was concluded that a two-factor solution provided the best fit for the data. The 
items loaded onto the factors in the manner suggested by Watson et al. (1988). Cronbach’s 
alpha for the NA scale was .85, providing further support for the internal consistency of this 
scale (Crawford & Henry, 2004). NA correlated significantly more highly with measures of 
anxiety than with measures of depression, providing further evidence for the construct 
validity of the NA scale. In addition, Crawford and Henry reported that demographic 
variables do not exert a significant influence over PANAS scores. They concluded that the 
PANAS demonstrated adequate psychometric properties in a large sample, and that the 
measure appears to possess good construct validity. Previous studies had also supported the 
factor structure of the PANAS and had successfully utilised the scale in diverse cultures and 
across the age range (e.g., Crocker, 1997; Dyck et al., 1994). 
 Among a sample of 223 club athletes, CFA suggested that a two-factor model was the 
best fit for the data (Tuccitto, Giacobbi, & Leite, 2010), although this model deviated slightly 
from the original model proposed by Watson et al. (1988). Gaudreau, Sanchez, and Blondin 
(2006) conducted CFAs of the PANAS on two separate French samples (N = 305 and N = 
217) using a short-term time frame. They suggested that the NA factor could be divided into 
two separate, although highly correlated factors, which they labelled “Afraid” and “Upset”, 
but that this finding did not compromise the utility of the NA scale. Recently, Leue and 
Beauducel (2011) suggested that an overarching factor termed affective polarity might also be 
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assessed by the PANAS, although the PA-NA distinction remained, with both factors 
demonstrating good construct validity.  
 
 The Anxiety Control Questionnaire (ACQ). 
 The ACQ (see Appendix F) was used as an additional measure of perceived 
coping/control in an attempt to add validity to the results of the MDRAS. It is a 30-item self-
report questionnaire designed to assess the individual’s perception of control over both 
internal reactions and external events. Items are scored on a 6-point scale (0 representing 
Strongly Disagree and 5 representing Strongly Agree) and item scores are summed to provide 
a total control score (some items must be reverse-scored). Although the ACQ was designed to 
assess the lower order factors of control over emotional reactions and control over external 
events (Rapee et al., 1996), some subsequent studies have suggested that the ACQ assesses 
three lower-order factors, along with an overarching ‘perceived control’ factor (Brown, 
White, Forsyth, & Barlow, 2004; Zebb & Moore, 1999). However Shujuan, Meihua, & 
Jianxin (2009) suggested that the lower order factors are likely to be method artefacts, and 
found only one factor among 212 Chinese adolescents. Only the overarching factor will be 
interpreted in the current study, given the ambiguity regarding the lower-order factor 
structure of the scale.  
The ACQ has demonstrated good psychometric properties. High levels of internal 
consistency have been reported across studies, with Cronbach’s alphas for the total scale 
ranging from .81 to .89 among clinical and non-clinical samples (Lang & McNiel, 2006; 
Rapee et al., 1996; Shujuan et al., 2009; Zebb & Moore, 1999). Rapee et al. (1996) reported 
high test-retest correlations over 1 week and 1 month (r = .88 and r = .82 respectively).  
The ACQ has demonstrated good validity. Rapee et al. (1996) reported good 
convergent and discriminant validity, with scores on the ACQ correlating significantly with 
scores on the Anxiety and Stress subscales of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales. It also 
correlated more strongly with measures of anxiety and stress than did more global measures 
of control (such as the Rotter Internal/External Locus of Control Scale). Although the ACQ 
correlated with other measures of anxiety and distress, these correlations were “far from 
unity” (Rapee et al., 1996, p. 288). Lang and McNiel (2006) reported that the ACQ was 
significantly negatively related to measures of depression and anxiety, with correlations of 
approximately -.5. Shujuan et al. (2009) reported negative correlations in the order of -.4 with 
the anxiety, depression, and body symptoms scales of the Chinese version of the SCL-90. In 
addition, Rapee et al. demonstrated that the ACQ is sensitive to change with therapy among 
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individuals with panic disorder. Zvolensky et al. (2001) found that the ACQ subscale scores 
were predictive of interpretive biases for threat. Zebb and Moore (1999) concluded that, 
although the underlying factor structure of the ACQ required further study, the measure is 
useful as an overall scale. 
In what represents the most thorough attempt to validate the ACQ, Brown et al. 
(2004) used a sample of 1550 clinically anxious individuals and 360 non-clinical individuals. 
Brown et al. concluded that the measure appears to be a useful indicator of the overall level 
of control that individuals perceive they have over their lives. Convergent and discriminant 
validity of the ACQ were demonstrated through the pattern of intercorrelations with measures 
of anxiety (the Beck Anxiety Inventory and the Anxiety scale of the Depression Anxiety 
Stress Scales) and depression (the Beck Depression Inventory and the Depression scale of the 
Depression Anxiety Stress Scale). 
 
The Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ). 
The OBQ (see Appendix G) is a 44-item measure designed to assess cognitive 
patterns that are relevant to current cognitive behavioural models of OCD. It was initially 
designed to assess six cognitive domains (responsibility; overimportance of thoughts; control 
of thoughts; estimation of threat; tolerance of uncertainty; and perfectionism), and items were 
selected that were relevant to these specific domains, but did not represent an OCD symptom 
or an emotional reaction (OCCWG, 2001). 
Participants completing the OBQ are asked to indicate the extent to which they agree 
or disagree with each statement, based on what they think they are like most of the time. 
Hence, the OBQ is designed to assess beliefs that are held across contexts, rather than state-
like symptoms (OCCWG, 2001, 2005). Ratings are made on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 
(disagree very much) to 7 (agree very much), and scores are summed to reach a total OBQ 
score, as well as separate factor scores. 
In two initial validation studies (OCCWG, 2001, 2003), an 87-item version of the 
OBQ demonstrated good internal consistency (Cronbach’s alphas ranging from .80 to .96 for 
the various subscales in different samples) and promising test-retest reliability (r ranged 
between .75 and .90 over a 12 day period). OCD participants obtained higher scores than the 
anxious control group and both groups of non-clinical individuals on all six subscales, 
although this difference did not reach significance for the perfectionism subscale between the 
OCD and anxious control groups. This provided evidence for the criterion validity of the 
OBQ (OCCWG, 2001). In addition, scores on each subscale were moderately correlated with 
121 
 
scores on measures of general distress and of obsessive-compulsive symptomatology, with 
partial correlations suggesting that the OBQ assesses OCD symptoms after controlling for 
negative affect. However, there was evidence that the discriminant validity of the OBQ was 
problematic because the scale related strongly to general emotional disturbance (OCCWG, 
2003). In addition, the six subscales were highly intercorrelated, and it was argued that factor 
analysis was required to reduce the number of dimensions in the OBQ (OCCWG, 2003). 
In a further study, the OBQ was submitted to factor analysis using a sample of 410 
individuals with OCD, 105 anxious control participants, 87 community controls, and 291 
students (OCCWG, 2005). Three factors emerged in both the OCD and student samples (the 
community and anxious control samples were too small to undergo factor analysis), and were 
labelled RT (which deals with preventing harm, the consequences of inaction, and 
responsibility for negative outcomes); PC (reflecting high and absolute standards of 
completion, rigidity, concern over mistakes, and feelings of uncertainty); and ICT (reflecting 
concern over the consequences of having intrusive thoughts, TAF, and the need to rid oneself 
of intrusive thoughts). Items that demonstrated loadings of .5 or higher on one of these three 
factors were retained in the measure, resulting in a new 44-item version of the OBQ 
(OCCWG, 2005). 
The internal consistency of the newly derived subscales was good, with Cronbach’s 
alphas of .93 for RT, .93 for PC, .89 for ICT, and .95 for the total score (OCCWG, 2005). 
The criterion validity of the 44-item OBQ was good, with OCD participants scoring 
significantly higher on the RT and the ICT subscales (but not on the PC subscale) than 
anxious controls. Anxious control participants scored higher than non-anxious participants on 
all subscales. In addition, the convergent validity of the 44-item OBQ was good, with the 
expected correlations between OBQ scores and scores on the Padua Inventory – Revised (PI-
R; Burns, Keortge, Formea, & Sternberger, 1996) subscales, which assess different aspects of 
OCD symptomatology (OCCWG, 2005). There was also support for the discriminant validity 
of the 44-item OBQ, with OBQ subscales predicting specific OCD symptoms, after 
controlling for general distress (OCCWG, 2005). In addition, the intercorrelations among the 
three new subscales (r = .42 – .57) were lower than those between the six originally proposed 
subscales. 
Although results of factor analyses have been inconsistent regarding the lower-order 
factor structure of the OBQ (e.g., Taylor et al., 2005; Woods et al., 2004; Wu & Carter, 
2008), the overall OBQ score accounts for the majority of variance in the scale and can be 
confidently interpreted. Taylor et al. (2005) suggested that their results indicate that, while 
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specific belief domains are likely important to OCD, the general OCD belief factor is more 
important and that various domains of OCD-related beliefs might overlap more than was 
previously believed.  
Wu and Carter (2008) found that the OBQ scales showed substantial partial 
correlations to OCD symptoms but not to depression or panic, supporting the convergent and 
discriminant validity of the OBQ. However the OBQ scales demonstrated moderate 
relationships with multiple OCD symptoms. Although not stated by Wu and Carter, this 
would again appear to support the argument (e.g., Taylor et al., 2005; Woods et al., 2004) 
that the overall OBQ score is the most relevant and that subscale scores must be treated with 
more caution. Although the subscales proposed by the OCCWG (2003, 2005) will be 
interpreted in the current study, the primary focus will be on the overall OBQ score. The 
OBQ scales can be used to predict OCD symptoms and the OBQ has been widely 
demonstrated to be a useful clinical tool (e.g., Belloch et al., 2010; Kaiser et al., 2010; Taylor 




Given that the MDRAS scales are designed to assess cognitive processes involved in 
risk perception, it was hypothesised that they would correlate with negative affect as assessed 
via the PANAS (positively for the MDRAS Probability and Cost scales and negatively for the 
MDRAS Coping scales). This hypothesis was made to test the convergent validity of the 
MDRAS scales because there is consistent evidence that anxiety and negative affect are 
highly positively correlated with threat perception and avoidance of risks (e.g., Butler & 
Matthews, 1987; Constans & Matthews, 1993; Lorian & Grisham, 2010; Maner et al., 2007; 
Maner & Schmidt, 2006; Uren et al., 2004). 
 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b 
Individuals with OCD are risk-aversive and overestimate threat (Cicolini & Rees, 
2003; Moritz & Jelinek, 2009; Moritz & Pohl, 2009; Overton & Menzies, 2005; Rachman, 
1998; Steketee & Frost, 1994). Therefore, it would be expected that, even among a non-
clinical sample, cognitive processes involved in risk/threat perception should be correlated 
with levels of obsessive beliefs. Consequently, it was hypothesised that the MDRAS 
Probability and MDRAS Cost scales would be significantly positively correlated with 
obsessive thinking (total OBQ scores) and that the MDRAS Coping Scales would be 
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significantly negatively correlated with obsessive thinking. This hypothesis was a further test 
of the convergent validity of the MDRAS scales. 
However, the MDRAS was designed to be a measure of risk attitudes in non-OCD 
situations so should not explain a high proportion of unique variance in obsessive beliefs after 
controlling for negative affect in a non-clinical sample. It was therefore hypothesised that the 
magnitude of the relationship between the MDRAS scales and the OBQ would be relatively 
small after accounting for PANAS NA scores. This hypothesis was designed to test the 
discriminant validity of the MDRAS scales. However, the MDRAS might explain some 
unique variance in OCD symptoms because some previous evidence (Abed & de Pauw, 1999; 
Cicolini & Rees, 2003; Feygin et al., 2006) has suggested that OCD might be a risk-taking 
disorder over-and-above the risk-aversion expected among non-OCD anxious individuals. 
  
Hypotheses 3a and 3b 
It was hypothesised that MDRAS Coping scores would be significantly positively 
correlated with ACQ scores, given that MDRAS Coping is designed to assess a conceptually 
similar construct to the ACQ. This hypothesis was designed to provide further evidence for 
the convergent validity of the MDRAS Coping scales. 
It was further hypothesised that the magnitude of the relationships between the 
MDRAS Coping scales and the ACQ would be higher than the magnitude of corresponding 
relationships between the ACQ and the MDRAS Probability scales or MDRAS Cost scales. 
This is because MDRAS Probability and MDRAS Cost are assessing primary appraisal 
processes and are likely to be less closely related to a measure of perceived control (the 
ACQ) than is MDRAS Coping, which assesses secondary appraisal processes (e.g., 
Zvolensky et al., 2001). This hypothesis was designed to further test the discriminant validity 
of the MDRAS Probability and Cost scales. 
  
Hypothesis 4 
It was hypothesised that the relationship between the MDRAS Coping scales and the 
ACQ would be stronger than the respective relationships between MDRAS Coping scales and 
the OBQ total scale. This hypothesis was designed to test the discriminant validity of the 
MDRAS Coping scales because perceived coping ability should be more closely related to 






It was hypothesised that the MDRAS scale scores would be more closely related to 
OBQ RT than to OBQ ICT. This hypothesis was designed to test both the convergent and 
discriminant validity of the MDRAS scales because the OBQ RT scale assesses threat 
estimation, which is congruent with the MDRAS scales’ assessment of the variable 
underlying threat overestimation. The OBQ ICT scale assesses the importance assigned to 
thoughts and their control, and is conceptually less closely related to threat perceptions. 
 
Hypothesis 6 
It was hypothesised that women would rate MDRAS events as significantly more 
probable and costly than men, and that men would rate themselves as being more able to cope 
with the MDRAS events than women. This hypothesis was designed to further examine the 
validity of the MDRAS scales because the majority of evidence has suggested that men are 
more willing to take risks than women in various types of situations, suggesting that they 
perceive less threat and/or have better coping self-efficacy (Cicolini & Rees, 2003; Conley & 
Peplau, 2010; Pawlowski, Atwal, & Dunbar, 2008; Steiner, 1972; Steketee & Frost, 1994). 
 
Results 
Data were analysed using SPSS version 17. As in Study 1, a conservative alpha level 
of .01 was used to judge statistical significance, given the large number of statistical tests 
performed. In addition, a Microsoft Excel program was used to compute Z scores to test the 




 Prior to analysing the data obtained from the remaining scales, the ACQ reverse 
scored items were recoded. Univariate descriptives were generated for the OBQ, PANAS, 
ACQ, age, and gender in order to assess the accuracy of data input. Data were checked to 
ensure that all points were within the eligible range for the respective scales (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2001). No data entry errors were detected. However, eight cases were deleted at this 
time because they contained large sections of missing data. In two cases the participant had 
failed to complete the second page of the OBQ (containing 27 of the 44 items) and in the 
remaining cases the participants had failed to respond to at least one of the questionnaires. 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) suggest that deleting cases with missing data is appropriate 
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when they are relatively few in number. This resulted in a sample of 214 participants (145 
women, 64 men, 5 gender unreported) for the remainder of the analyses. MDRAS data were 
not screened because the same data used in Study 1 were utilised, with outlying scores 
remaining modified. 
SPSS Missing Values Analysis was used to analyse missing data from the PANAS, 
the OBQ, the ACQ, age, and gender for the remaining 214 participants. No variable was 
missing more than 5% of the data so the pattern of missing data was not assessed 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Given that the amount of missing data was relatively small, 
means substitution was used to estimate missing values (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001), with the 
exception of missing values on gender. 
 Histograms and boxplots were examined to screen variables for normality and for the 
presence of univariate outliers. None of the MDRAS scales demonstrated obvious deviations 
from normality and there were few univariate outliers on any of these scales. The OBQ total 
scale, RT scale, and the PC scale showed no obvious deviations from normality. OBQ ICT 
demonstrated a moderate amount of positive skew. However, there were few univariate 
outliers on any of the OBQ scales. Scores on the ACQ showed no obvious deviations from 
normality and boxplots revealed no potential outliers. Scores on the PANAS demonstrated 
strong positive skew and boxplots revealed six potential outliers with very high scores. 
 No transformations were applied to the skewed variables because Tabachnick and 
Fidell (2001) suggest that “If a scale is meaningful or widely used, transformation often 
hinders interpretation” (p. 81). The OBQ ICT scale and the PANAS are both widely used 
clinical measures and transformation would have resulted in variables that were no longer 
assessing obsessive thinking or negative affect, but a logarithm of each. It is likely to reduce 
the theoretical utility of comparing MDRAS scores with transformed data from these scales. 
It would also rendered comparisons to previous studies impossible. It is also worth noting 
that, given that these scales are all designed to assess clinical symptoms, their usage in non-
clinical samples is likely to result in skewed distributions (e.g., Zebb & Moore, 1999) and it 
is better to work with skewed distributions that are representative of the underlying 
population rather than to distort the distribution simply to meet the parametric assumption of 
normality (Norman & Streiner, 2008). Correlations between variables were examined using 
Spearman’s Rho, and the pattern was not markedly different to that observed using Pearson’s 
r, again suggesting that transformations were not required. 
 It was recognised that outliers could potentially inflate the magnitude of correlations 
in the data. However the number of univariate outliers was relatively small and some outliers 
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are to be expected when dealing with such a large sample (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). 
Examination of raw data on outlying cases did not provide evidence for unusual response 
patterns. The pattern of correlations was examined for the entire data set and the data set after 
deletion of cases with outlying scores. Although correlations were higher when outlying 
scores were retained, the magnitude of this difference was relatively small. For example, the 
correlation between MDRAS Total Probability and MDRAS Total Coping was reduced from 
-.52 to -.48 with the removal of outliers.  It was decided to retain outlying scores for the 
remainder of the analyses. 
 The data were screened for multivariate outliers using regression with case number as 
the dummy dependent variable. Two separate regression analyses were conducted. The first 
involved scores for the complete scales of the MDRAS, the OBQ total score, the ACQ, 
PANAS NA, and age. The second analysis contained the scores for the everyday and future 
scales within each of the MDRAS scales, the separate OBQ subscales, the ACQ, PANAS 
NA, and age. Mahalanobis distance (p < .001) revealed one multivariate outlier in each 
analysis, accounted for by the same case. This case was not particularly influential, as 
indicated by a Cook’s distance of .08 and .07 in the respective analyses. In addition it was not 
detected as a univariate outlier on any of the variables. Examination of raw data did not 
reveal unusual response patterns and examination of the correlation matrix with the case 




 The mean scores for variables in the study are shown in Table 7.1. 
 
MDRAS descriptive statistics. 
Results indicated that the mean level of everyday perceived probability (3.57) was 
higher than future perceived probability (3.28), t (213) = 4.53, p < .001, although this was a 
small effect. The mean everyday cost score (4.06) was not significantly different to the future 
cost score (4.12), t (213) = 1.25, p = .21. Despite the lack of difference in perceived cost 
between the scales, mean perceived ability to cope with everyday events (4.48) was 
significantly higher than mean perceived ability to cope with future events (4.12), t (213) = 
7.50, p < .001. The magnitude of this difference was small. Correlations between the 





        Descriptive Statistics (N = 214) 
Scale M (SD) Minimum Maximum 
MDRAS Total Prob 3.43 (.71) 1.71 5.93 
MDRAS Everyday Prob 3.57 (.81) 1.43 5.71 
MDRAS Future Prob 3.28 (.88) 1.00 6.57 
MDRAS Total Cost 4.09 (.69) 2.36 5.86 
MDRAS Everyday Cost 4.06 (.78) 2.29 6.00 
MDRAS Future Cost 4.12 (.78) 2.34 6.29 
MDRAS Total Coping 4.30 (.67) 2.30 5.98 
MDRAS Everyday Cope 4.48 (.81) 2.03 6.71 
MDRAS Future Coping 4.12 (.70) 2.29 5.95 
PANAS NA 19.35 (6.50) 10 41 
ACQ 99.19 (19.71) 47 147 
OBQ 126.64 (37.19) 49 239 
OBQ RT 48.36 (16.32) 16 105 
OBQ ICT 25.45 (9.76) 12 58 

































1         
Ev 
Prob 
.82 1        
Fut 
Prob 
.85 .40 1       
Total 
Cost 
.52 .58 .30 1      
Ev 
Cost 
.55 .66 .28 .89 1     
Fut 
Cost 
.37 .37 .25 .89 .57 1    
Total 
Coping 
-.52 -.56 -.32 -.86 -.75 -.77 1   
Ev 
Coping 
-.56 -.62 -.32 -.76 -.82 -.53 .91 1  
Fut 
Coping 
-.35 -.35 -.24 -.77 -.50 -.86 .87 .57 1 
Note. All correlations were significant (p < .001). 
 
Descriptive statistics for the ACQ, the PANAS, and the OBQ. 
Correlations between the MDRAS and the other measures in the study are shown in 
Table 7.3 
The mean score on the ACQ was 99.18, similar to the 95.42 reported by Zebb and 
Moore (1999) and the 96.1 reported by Rapee et al. (1996) among their non-clinical 
population. It was higher than the 75.63 (Lang & McNiel, 2006) and the 73.8 (Rapee et al., 
1996) reported among psychiatric samples. In the current study, the ACQ demonstrated 
excellent internal consistency, with a Cronbach’s alpha of .91. 
 The mean PANAS NA score in the current study was 19.35. This is similar to the 
results of Watson et al. (1988) who reported a mean score of 18.1 among a non-clinical 
sample using the “in general” timeframe. In the current study, the PANAS NA scale 
demonstrated good internal consistency, with a Cronbach’s alpha of .88. 
The mean OBQ total scale score in the current study was 126.64, which is comparable 
to the overall mean score of 130.8 reported by Wu and Carter (2008) in a non-clinical sample 
(2008). The mean subscale scores of the OBQ in the current study were 48.36 for RT, 25.45 
for ICT, and 52.83 for PC. The corresponding means obtained by Wu and Carter were 47.9, 
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28.5, and 54.4, respectively. In the current study the OBQ total scale demonstrated excellent 
internal consistency, with a Cronbach’s alpha of .94. The internal consistency of the OBQ 
subscales was also good, with Cronbach’s alphas of .89, .90, and .84 for the RT subscale, the 
PC subscale, and the ICT subscale, respectively. The OBQ subscales were all significantly 
positively correlated, (rs ranging from .48 to .67). These correlations are somewhat higher 
than those reported by the OCCWG (2005) among the OBQ subscales, although the reason 
for this is unclear. 
 
Table 7.3 

















































































































































    .14 .05 .21
*
 
* p < .01. ** p < .001. 
 
Hypothesis 1 
 As can be seen from the correlations in Table 7.3, Hypothesis 1, that the MDRAS 
scales would be significantly related to NA, was supported for the MDRAS Total scales as 
well as the MDRAS Everyday and Future scales. In all cases the MDRAS Probability and 
MDRAS Cost scales were significantly positively correlated with PANAS NA scores, and 
MDRAS Coping scales were significantly negatively correlated with PANAS NA scores. The 







Hypothesis 2a, that the MDRAS scales would be related to obsessive thinking, was 
supported, with significant moderate correlations (r = .26 to r = .48) between the total OBQ 
score and each of the MDRAS scales (see Table 7.3). In general, correlations between the 
OBQ total score and the MDRAS Cost and Coping scales were of greater magnitude than the 
correlations between the OBQ total scale and the MDRAS Probability scale. 
In order to test Hypothesis 2b, that the relationship between the MDRAS and the 
OBQ would largely be accounted for by NA, it was necessary to run multiple regression 
analyses to determine whether MDRAS scores significantly predicted OBQ total scores after 
controlling for NA. Separate hierarchical multiple regression analyses were conducted with 
OBQ scores as the criterion, with PANAS NA and the MDRAS scales as the predictors. In 
the first analysis, MDRAS Total scores were used, whereas in the second analysis, MDRAS 
Everyday and MDRAS Future scores were used. In each case, PANAS NA scores were 
entered in the first step of the analysis and the MDRAS scale scores were entered in the 
second step, in order to determine how much variance in the OBQ scores were accounted for 
by MDRAS scales after controlling for NA. 
  
Analysis using the MDRAS Total scales. 
In Step 1, PANAS NA scores accounted for a significant 21.6% of the variance in 
OBQ scores, R
2
 = .216, F(1, 212) = 58.25, p < .001. In Step 2, MDRAS Total Probability, 
Total Cost, and Total Coping were entered simultaneously and accounted for a further 9.1% 
of the variance in OBQ scores, ΔR
2 
= .091, ΔF(3, 209) = 9.08, p < .001. This is a small effect, 
according to Cohen’s (1988) conventions (f
2
 = .10). Regression coefficients (see Table 7.4) 
revealed that none of the MDRAS Total scales contributed significant unique variance to 
OBQ scores, although MDRAS Total Cost approached significance (p = .02). This supports 
Hypothesis 2b, that the MDRAS scales would not account for a large amount of variance in 










Unstandardised (B) and Standardised (β) Regression Coefficients, and Part Correlations 
(sr
2
), For Each Predictor in Step 2 of a Regression Model Predicting OBQ Total Scores 
using MDRAS Total scores 
Variable B 95% CI for B β sr
2
 
NA 1.606* [.807, 2.405] .281 .228 
Total Probability 2.996 [-4.464, 10.456] .057 .046 
Total Cost 14.125 [1.994, 26.255] .262 .132 
Total Coping -3.579 [-16.307, 9.150] -.064 -.032 
*p < .01. 
 
Analysis using the MDRAS Everyday and the MDRAS Future scales. 
In Step 1, PANAS NA scores accounted for a significant 21.6% of the variance in 
OBQ scores, R
2
 = .216, F(1, 212) = 58.25, p < .001. In Step 2, MDRAS Everyday 
Probability, MDRAS Future Probability, MDRAS Everyday Cost, MDRAS Future Cost, 
MDRAS Everyday Coping, and Future Coping were entered simultaneously and accounted 
for a further 9.5% of the variance in OBQ scores, ΔR
2 
= .095, ΔF(6, 206) = 4.76, p < .001. 
This is a small effect, according to Cohen’s (1988) conventions (f
2
 = .10). Regression 
coefficients (see Table 7.5) revealed that none of the MDRAS scales contributed significant 










Unstandardised (B) and Standardised (β) Regression Coefficients, and Part Correlations 
(sr
2
), For Each Predictor in Step 2 of a Regression Model Predicting OBQ Total Scores 
using MDRAS Everyday and Future scores 
Variable B 95% CI for B β sr
2
 
NA 1.648* [.832, 2.463] .288 .230 
Everyday Probability 1.951 [-5.371, 9.273] .043 .030 
Future Probability .689 [-4.895, 6.274] .016 .014 
Everyday Cost 3.480 [-7.319, 14.280] .073 .037 
Future Cost 11.712 [-.015, 23.439] .245 .114 
Everyday Coping -6.385 [-16.534, 3.765] -.140 -.072 
Future Coping 5.114 [-8.053, 18.281] .096 .044 
*p < .01. 
 
Hypothesis 3 
As can be seen in Table 7.3, Hypothesis 3a, that the MDRAS Coping scales would be 
positively correlated with the ACQ, was supported, with large or moderate correlations in 
each case (Cohen, 1988).  
In order to test Hypothesis 3b, that the MDRAS Coping scales would be more closely 
related to the ACQ than would the MDRAS Probability and Cost scales, the correlations 
between the MDRAS Coping Scales and the ACQ were compared to correlations between the 
MDRAS Probability Scales and the ACQ and the MDRAS Cost Scales and the ACQ. 
Hypothesis 3b was supported for the comparison with the MDRAS Total Cost scale, with the 
correlation between MDRAS Total Coping and the ACQ (.61) being significantly higher than 
the correlation between MDRAS Total Cost and the ACQ (-.50, Z = 3.51, p < .001). 
Hypothesis 3b was also supported for the comparison with the MDRAS Everyday Probability 
and Everyday Cost scales, with the correlation between MDRAS Everyday Coping and the 
ACQ (.59) being significantly higher than the correlation between MDRAS Everyday 
Probability and the ACQ (-.45, Z = 2.96, p < .001) or between MDRAS Everyday Cost and 
the ACQ (-.47, Z = 3.60, p < .001). However Hypothesis 3b was not supported for the 
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comparisons with the MDRAS Total Probability Scale or the MDRAS Future Probability or 
Future Cost scales. The correlation between the MDRAS Total Coping scale and the ACQ 
(.61) was not significantly higher than the correlation between MDRAS Total Probability and 
the ACQ (-.52, Z = 1.69, p = .09). The correlation between MDRAS Future Coping and the 
ACQ (.47) was not significantly higher than the corresponding correlations between MDRAS 
Future Probability and the ACQ (-.42, Z = .44, p = .44) or between MDRAS Future Cost and 
the ACQ (-.42, Z = 1.71, p = .09).  
A possible explanation for the lack of significant differences in some of the observed 
correlations lies in the fact that all MDRAS scales and the ACQ were closely correlated with 
NA. These relationships have been reported in previous studies (Berenbaum, Thompson, & 
Pomerantz, 2007; Maner et al., 2007; Stapinski, Abbott, & Rapee, 2010; Szabo, 2009) and it 
is possible that they masked potential differences in the strength of relationships between the 
ACQ and each of the MDRAS scales. In order to determine whether this explanation had 
merit, hierarchical multiple regression analyses were conducted, with ACQ scores as the 
criterion and PANAS NA and MDRAS scores as predictors. In each analysis, PANAS NA 
scores were entered in the first step of the equation, and MDRAS scores were entered in the 
second step in order to examine the proportion of variance in ACQ scores that could be 
accounted for by the various MDRAS scales after removing the variance accounted for by 
negative affect. 
 
Multiple regression – MDRAS Total scales. 
In Step 1, PANAS NA scores accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in 
ACQ scores, R
2
 = .42, F(1, 212) = 156.01, p < .001. In Step 2, MDRAS Total Probability, 
Total Cost, and Total Coping scores were entered into the regression equation and accounted 
for an additional 12.1% of the variance in ACQ scores, ΔR
2 
= .121, ΔF (3, 209) = 18.45, p < 
.001. This is a small to medium effect (f
2
 = .14). Regression coefficients (see Table 7.6) 
revealed that MDRAS Total Coping accounted for a significant 4.97% of unique variance in 
ACQ scores, MDRAS Total Probability accounted for a smaller 1.56% of unique variance in 
ACQ scores and MDRAS Total Cost accounted for a non-significant .67% of unique variance 
in ACQ scores. This supports Hypothesis 3b for the MDRAS Total Scores, with MDRAS 
Total Coping accounting for more variance in ACQ scores than did the MDRAS Total 





Unstandardised (B) and Standardised (β) Regression Coefficients, and Part Correlations 
(sr
2
), For Each Predictor in Step 2 of a Regression Model Predicting ACQ Scores using 
PANAS NA and MDRAS Total Scores 
Variable B 95% CI for B β sr
2
 
NA -1.269** [-1.612, -.926] -.419 -.341 
Total Probability -4.338* [-7.541, -1.135] -.156 -.125 
Total Cost 4.667 [-.542, 9.876] .163 .082 
Total Coping 13.265** [7.799, 18.730] .451 .223 
*p < .01. **p <.001. 
 
Multiple regression – MDRAS Everyday and Future scales. 
In Step 1, PANAS NA scores accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in 
ACQ scores, R
2
 = .42, F(1, 212) = 156.01, p < .001. In Step 2, MDRAS Everyday 
Probability, MDRAS Future Probability, MDRAS Everyday Cost, MDRAS Future Cost, 
MDRAS Everyday Coping, and MDRAS Future Coping scores were entered into the 
regression equation and accounted for a an additional 12.7% of the variance in ACQ scores, 
ΔR
2 
= .127, ΔF(6, 206) = 9.71, p < .001. This was a small to medium effect (f
2
 = .14).  
Regression coefficients (see Table 7.7) revealed that MDRAS Everyday Coping contributed a 
significant 4.04% of unique variance in ACQ scores. None of the remaining MDRAS scales 
contributed significant unique variance to ACQ scores. This largely supports Hypothesis 3b 












Unstandardised (B) and Standardised (β) Regression Coefficients, and Part Correlations 
(sr
2
), For Each Predictor in Step 2 of a Regression Model Predicting ACQ Scores using 
PANAS NA and MDRAS Everyday and Future Scores 
Variable B 95% CI for B β sr
2
 
NA -1.283** [-1.632, -.934] -.423 -.338 
Everyday  Probability -1.838 [-4.971, 1.295] -.076 -.054 
Future Probability -2.183 [-4.573, .206] -.098 -.084 
Everyday Cost 4.701 [.080, 9.323] .186 .094 
Future Cost -.925 [-5.943,4.093] -.037 -.017 
Everyday Coping 9.487** [5.144, 13.831] .392 .201 
Future Coping 2.405 [-3.229, 8.040] .085 .039 
*p < .01. **p <.001. 
 
Hypothesis 4  
Hypothesis 4, that the MDRAS Coping scales would be more closely related to a 
measure of perceived control (the ACQ) than to a measure of obsessive beliefs (the OBQ), 
was supported for the MDRAS Total Coping Scale: The correlation between the MDRAS 
Total Coping scale and the ACQ (r = .61) was significantly larger in magnitude than the 
correlation between the MDRAS Total Coping scale and the OBQ total scale (r = -.46, Z = 
2.62, p = .004). Hypothesis 4 was also supported for the MDRAS Everyday Coping Scale: 
The correlation between the MDRAS Everyday Coping scale and the ACQ (r = .59), was 
significantly higher in magnitude than the correlation between the MDRAS Everyday Coping 
scale and the OBQ total scale (r = -.45, Z = 2.66, p = .006). However, Hypothesis 4 was not 
supported for the MDRAS Future Coping scale: The correlation between MDRAS Future 
Coping and the ACQ (r =.47) was not significantly higher in magnitude than the correlation 
between MDRAS Future Coping and the OBQ total score (r =-.37, Z = 1.73, p = .08). These 
results were possibly confounded by the high correlation between the OBQ and the ACQ 
scores (r = -.51). As a result, standard multiple regression analyses were conducted utilising 
the MDRAS Coping scales as the criterion, and ACQ and OBQ total scores, along with 
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PANAS NA scores, as predictors in order to determine the proportion of unique variance in 
MDRAS Coping scores accounted for by the ACQ and the OBQ. 
With MDRAS Total Coping as the criterion, the combination of PANAS NA, ACQ, 
and OBQ total scores accounted for a significant 41.3% of variance, R
2 
= .413, F(3, 210) = 
49.16, p < .001. This was a large effect (f
2
 = .70). Regression coefficients (see Table 7.8) 
revealed that ACQ scores predicted a significant 8.76% of unique variance in MDRAS Total 
Coping. OBQ total scores only predicted 2.25% of unique variance in MDRAS Total Coping. 
 
Table 7.8 
Unstandardised (B) and Standardised (β) Regression Coefficients, and Part Correlations 
(sr
2
), For Each Predictor in a Regression Model Predicting MDRAS Total Coping Scores 
using PANAS NA, OBQ, and ACQ Scores 
Variable B 95% CI for B β sr
2
 
NA -.017* [-.031, -.002] -.160 -.119 
ACQ .014** [.009, .019] .410 .296 
OBQ -.003* [-.005, -.001] -.179 -.150 
*p < .01. **p <.001. 
 
With MDRAS Everyday Coping as the criterion, the combination of PANAS NA, 
ACQ, and OBQ total scores accounted for a significant 39.1% of variance, R
2 
= .391, F(3, 
210) = 44.92, p < .001. This was a large effect (f
2 
= .64). Regression coefficients (see Table 
7.9) revealed that ACQ scores predicted a significant 9% of unique variance whereas OBQ 











Unstandardised (B) and Standardised (β) Regression Coefficients, and Part Correlations 
(sr
2
), For Each Predictor in a Regression Model Predicting MDRAS Everyday Coping Scores 
using PANAS NA, OBQ, and ACQ Scores 
Variable B 95% CI for B β sr
2
 
NA -.018 [-.036, .000] -.141 -.105 
ACQ .017** [.011, .023] .416 .300 
OBQ -.004* [-.006, -.001] -.168 -.142 
*p < .01. **p <.001. 
 
With MDRAS Future Coping as the criterion, the combination of PANAS NA, ACQ, 
and OBQ total score accounted for a significant 25.6% of variance, R
2 
= .256, F(3, 210) = 
24.08, p < .001. This was a medium to large effect (f
2
 = .34). Regression coefficients (see 
Table 7.10) revealed that ACQ scores predicted a significant 4.80% of unique variance, 
whilst OBQ total scores did not predict significant unique variance. 
 
Table 7.10 
Unstandardised (B) and Standardised (β) Regression Coefficients, and Part Correlations 
(sr
2
), For Each Predictor in a Regression Model Predicting MDRAS Future Coping Scores 
using PANAS NA, OBQ, and ACQ Scores 
Variable B 95% CI for B β sr
2
 
NA -.015 [-.032, .002] -.143 -.107 
ACQ .011** [.005, .016] .304 .219 
OBQ -.003 [-005, .000] -.147 -.124 
**p <.001. 
 
Overall the results of the regression analyses suggest that the ACQ predicts more 




Hypothesis 5 was not directly supported – in no case did the MDRAS scores correlate 
more strongly with OBQ RT scores than with OBQ ICT scores at an alpha level of .01, 




Comparison of the Magnitude of Correlations Between MDRAS Scales and OBQ RT/OBQ 
ICT Scales 
 Correlations Difference Between Correlations 
MDRAS Scale OBQ RT OBQ ICT 
 
Z Score p 
Total Probability .38 .30 1.61 .11 
Everyday Probability .36 .26 1.84 .07 
Future Probability .28 .24 .84 .40 
Total Cost .44 .32 2.23 .03 
Everyday Cost .43 .32 1.96 .05 
Future Cost .36 .25 1.93 .05 
Total Coping -.43 -.38 .86 .39 
Everyday Coping -.42 -.38 .82 .41 
Future Coping -.33 -.29 .66 .51 
 
 
Although none of the differences were significant at an alpha level of .01, the 
correlations between the MDRAS scales and the OBQ RT scale were, in all cases, higher 
than the correlations between the MDRAS scales and the OBQ ICT scale. Given that OBQ 
RT correlated highly with OBQ ICT (r = .64) the lack of significant findings is not 
surprising. To further examine the relationship between the MDRAS scales and the OBQ RT 
and OBQ ICT scales, regression analyses were run using each of the MDRAS scales as the 
criterion, entering PANAS NA, OBQ RT, and OBT ICT simultaneously as predictors. Part-
correlations were examined to determine the proportion of unique variance in MDRAS scale 
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scores accounted for by the two OBQ scales after removing the variance accounted for by 
negative affect. As can be seen in Table 7.12, OBQ RT accounted for unique variance in 
most MDRAS scales, whereas OBQ ICT did not account for unique variance in any MDRAS 
scale. This provides tentative support for Hypothesis 5. 
 
Table 7.12 
Percentage of Unique Variance in MDRAS Scales Accounted for by OBQ RT and OBQ ICT 
Scales After Controlling for NA 
MDRAS Scale OBQ RT OBQ ICT 
 % Variance p % Variance p 
Total Probability 1.80 .02 .02 .83 
Everyday Probability 2.78 < .01 .0001 .99 
Future Probability .38 .32 .04 .75 
Total Cost 4.28 < .001 .01 .87 
Everyday Cost 3.53 < .01 .05 .71 
Future Cost 3.17 < .001 .003 .94 
Total Coping 1.59 .03 .83 .11 
Everyday Coping 1.61 .03 .85 .11 




Independent samples t tests were conducted to assess gender differences in MDRAS 
scale scores among the 209 participants who had reported gender (145 women and 64 men). 
Descriptive statistics split by gender can be found in Table 7.13. The hypothesised gender 
differences were present for the MDRAS Total scales. Women’s mean MDRAS Total 
Probability and Total Cost scores were significantly higher than men’s, with small to medium 
effect sizes: MDRAS Total Probability, t (207) = -2.85, p = .005, d = .43; MDRAS Total 
Cost, t (207) = -2.85, p = .005, d = .43. Women’s mean MDRAS Total Coping score was 
significantly lower than men’s and this was a medium sized effect, t (207) = 3.46, p = .001, d 
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= .52.  Hypothesis 6 was also supported for the MDRAS Everyday Scales. Women’s mean 
Everyday Probability and Everyday Cost ratings were significantly higher than men’s: 
MDRAS Everyday Probability, t (207) = -4.40, p < .001, d = .66; MDRAS Everyday Cost, t 
(207) = -3.27, p = .001, d = .49. Men’s mean MDRAS Everyday Coping score was 
significantly higher than women’s, t (207) = 3.78, p < .001, d = .57. However, Hypothesis 6 
was not supported for the MDRAS Future Scales. Although for each scale the gender 
differences were in the expected direction, none of these differences reached statistical 
significance at an alpha level of .01. Mean scores for women on MDRAS Future Probability 
and MDRAS Future Cost were not significantly higher than men’s: MDRAS Future 
Probability, t (207) = -.62, p = .54, d = .09; MDRAS Future Cost, t (207) = -1.78, p = .08, d = 
.27. For MDRAS Future Coping, women’s mean score was not significantly lower than the 
corresponding mean for men, t (207) = 2.24, p = .03, d = .34. 
 
Table 7.13 
Descriptive Statistics Split According to Gender 
Variable Women Men 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
Total Probability* 3.53 .71 3.23 .67 
Everyday Probability* 3.74 .78 3.22 .79 
Future Probability 3.31 .86 3.23 .94 
Total Cost* 4.19 .71 3.89 .61 
Everyday Cost* 4.18 .80 3.80 .68 
Future Cost 4.19 .80 3.98 .73 
Total Coping* 4.19 .68 4.53 .59 
Everyday Coping* 4.34 .80 4.79 .76 
Future Coping 4.05 .72 4.28 .63 
PANAS NA 19.75 6.79 18.86 5.84 
ACQ 96.96 19.90 103.75 18.84 
OBQ Total 125.02 37.66 130.21 37.18 
OBQ R/T 47.81 16.35 49.74 16.89 
OBQ ICT 25.48 10.08 25.62 9.31 
OBQ P/C 51.73 17.04 54.85 16.63 




 In order to further investigate the psychometric properties of the newly created 
MDRAS, this study set out to explore the pattern of relationships between the MDRAS and 
other related and well established clinical measures. Importantly, major predictions regarding 
the relationships between MDRAS scales and other measures were supported.  
There is a wide body of literature endorsing the link between threat perception and 
NA/anxiety (e.g., Butler & Mathews, 1983, 1987; Cisler & Koster, 2010; Gasper & Clore, 
1998; Maner et al., 2007; Maner & Schmidt, 2006; Roy et al., 2008; Verkuil et al., 2009; 
Waters, Wharton, et al., 2008). In general, the perceived probability and perceived cost of 
negative events are positively related to anxiety and NA (e.g., Berenbaum, Thompson, & 
Pomerantz, 2007; Nelson et al., 2010; Poulton & Andrews, 1996; Uren et al., 2004; Voncken 
et al., 2007; Wells, 1995) and perceived ability to cope with negative events is negatively 
related to anxiety and NA (e.g., Bouchard et al., 2007; Casey, Oei, Newcombe, & Kenardy, 
2004; Cieslak et al., 2008; Waters, Mogg, et al., 2008; White et al., 2006; Zvolensky et al., 
2001). It was important that the MDRAS scales related to NA (assessed by the PANAS) in a 
manner consistent with this. Results suggested that this was the case – as assessed on the 
MDRAS, individuals with higher levels of NA perceived unpleasant general risks as more 
probable and more costly than did individuals with lower levels of NA. They also perceived 
themselves as less able to cope with these risks. The fact that the MDRAS scales related to 
NA in a manner consistent with previous risk/threat measures (and that these relationships are 
of clinically significant magnitude) provides important evidence for the convergent validity 
of the MDRAS scales, indicating that they assess cognitive processes that are relevant to 
threat perception. 
Further evidence for the convergent validity of the MDRAS is that it successfully 
captured the well-established positive relationships between obsessive thinking (assessed by 
the OBQ total score) and probability/cost estimates for negative events, as well as the 
negative relationship between obsessive thinking and perceived coping ability for negative 
events. This is consistent with the literature demonstrating that individuals with OCD 
perceive heightened levels of threat because of heightened perceptions of  the probability (in 
some instances) and cost of negative events, or because of low subjective coping ability (e.g., 
Amir et al., 2009; Cisler & Olatunji, 2010; Endrass et al., 2011; Irak & Flament, 2009; 
Menzies et al., 2000; Moritz & Jelinek, 2009; Najmi et al., 2010; Overton & Menzies, 2005; 
Steketee et al., 1998; Thorpe et al., 2011; Woods et al., 2002). The correlations were of 
medium strength, indicating clinically relevant relationships between the MDRAS scales and 
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obsessive-compulsive thinking. Interestingly, and consistent with the suggestion that 
probability overestimation might not be central to overestimation of threat among individuals 
with OCD, the correlations between probability ratings on the MDRAS and level of obsessive 
beliefs appeared to be somewhat lower than the correlations between cost and coping ratings 
on the MDRAS and level of obsessive beliefs, although significance tests were not 
conducted.  
When examined more closely, the pattern of relationships between the MDRAS scales 
and the OBQ also provided evidence for the discriminant validity of the MDRAS. Regression 
analyses indicated that, although the MDRAS scales were related to OBQ scores, this was 
eliminated when controlling for NA, suggesting that the MDRAS scales are not tapping into 
obsessive thinking and are likely to be measuring risk perceptions that are largely 
uncontaminated by OCD cognitive processes. This is important because the MDRAS was 
designed to measure general threat perceptions that are not related to obsessive concerns. It 
appears that the MDRAS may be suitable for use to assess risk perceptions in a variety of 
clinical groups without needing to control for the impact of obsessive beliefs. However, some 
previous research (Cicolini & Rees, 2003; Frost et al., 1994; Steiner, 1972; Lyoo, et al., 2001; 
Lyoo et al., 2003; Rees et al., 2006; Steketee & Frost, 1994) has suggested that risk-aversion 
might be related to a primary diagnosis of OCD and that risk-aversion among individuals 
with OCD is not merely a product of the high levels of negative affect that accompany the 
disorder. Therefore, the fact that the MDRAS scales in combination accounted for a small 
proportion of unique variance in obsessive beliefs is not problematic. It should be noted that 
the magnitude of the relationship between the MDRAS scales and obsessive thinking might 
be higher in a clinical sample, and this will require investigation in future studies. 
Interestingly, although regressions revealed that none of the individual MDRAS 
scales predicted significant unique variance in OCD symptoms, there was a trend for the Cost 
scales to do so, particularly when the MDRAS Total scales were used in the analysis. 
Although it is unwise to draw conclusions from non-significant (at the reduced alpha-level 
used in this study) trends, this is consistent with the clinically and empirically derived belief 
that threat biases other than probability estimation drive overestimation of threat, and 
consequent risk-aversion, among individuals with OCD (e.g., Cicolini & Rees, 2003; 
Grayson, 2010; Menzies et al., 2000; Moritz & Jelinek, 2009; Rees, 2001; Salkovskis, 
Forrester, & Richards, 1998; Thorpe et al., 2011; Woods et al., 2002). This provides further 
tentative evidence for the construct validity of the MDRAS scales. 
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Further evidence of the convergent validity of the MDRAS Coping scales is that they 
correlated positively with the ACQ – a conceptually similar measure assessing perceived 
control over anxiety and external events. In addition, the discriminant validity of the MDRAS 
Coping scales was demonstrated by the fact that the relationships between these scales and 
the ACQ were stronger than the relationships between these scales and a conceptually 
dissimilar measure of obsessive beliefs (the OBQ). This suggests that, as intended, the 
MDRAS Coping scales are assessing coping/control-related beliefs and are not assessing 
OCD-related cognitive processes.  
Further evidence for the divergent validity of the MDRAS Probability and Cost scales 
is that they related less strongly to perceived control over anxiety and external events (ACQ 
scores) than did the MDRAS Coping scales. Given the high (r = -.65) correlation between 
NA and ACQ scores (consistent with previous research, e.g., Stapinski et al., 2010), 
regression analysis controlling for NA were conducted to examine the relationship between 
the ACQ and the MDRAS scales. Results demonstrated that, when the MDRAS Total scales 
were used, perceived ability to cope with MDRAS negative events predicted more unique 
variance in ACQ scores than did the perceived probability or cost of those events after 
controlling for NA. When the MDRAS Everyday and Future scales were used, only the 
perceived ability to cope with everyday negative MDRAS events predicted significant 
variance in ACQ scores after controlling for NA. These results suggest that the perceived 
ability to cope with negative events as assessed on the MDRAS is more closely related to the 
ACQ than are the perceived probability or cost of those events. This provides further 
evidence for the convergent validity of the MDRAS Coping scales. These results also 
indicate that, despite being closely correlated, the MDRAS Cost and MDRAS Coping scales 
are assessing different constructs and are likely to be providing separate clinically relevant 
information about risk perceptions. 
It is important to note that perceived ability to cope with future events on the MDRAS 
was not predictive of significant unique variance in perceived control scores. However, this 
result is not problematic in terms of the validity of the MDRAS. It is possible that the 
perceived ability to control anxiety (as assessed by numerous ACQ items) is less important 
when assessing ability to cope with potential negative events in the future than it is when 
assessing immediately salient negative events. Conceptually, it is likely that individuals 
would not consider their level of control over anxiety to be important when assessing the 
threat involved in distant future events. However, perceived control over anxiety is likely to 
factor into the considerations of individuals assessing their ability to cope with immediately 
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relevant risks. This also indicates the possibility that risk perception for immediately 
significant events might involve different processes than risk perception for events at an 
unspecified future time. 
Although no other direct measures of threat perception were included in the current 
study, it was important to determine whether the MDRAS scales were more closely related to 
obsessive beliefs concerning threat (the OBQ RT subscale) than to obsessive beliefs 
concerning the importance/control of thoughts (the OBQ ICT subscale). Overall the results of 
the regression analyses suggested that this was the case, with obsessive beliefs about threat 
generally accounting for more unique variance in the MDRAS scales than did obsessive 
beliefs about the importance/control of thoughts, although in some cases neither type of belief 
accounted for significant variance after controlling for NA. Of particular importance is that 
obsessive beliefs about the importance/control of thoughts did not account for significant 
unique variance in any of the MDRAS scales. This provides support for the discriminant 
validity of the MDRAS scales, which were not designed to be related to beliefs about 
thinking. However, the relatively small amount of unique variance in MDRAS scores 
accounted for by either of the OBQ scales renders the results of these regression analyses 
difficult to interpret and of questionable clinical utility. It would be interesting to conduct 
similar analyses among a sample of clinical individuals with OCD to determine whether the 
amount of unique variance in MDRAS scores accounted for by the OBQ scales was higher. It 
can be concluded that the results provide partial support for Hypothesis 5 - the OBQ RT 
accounted for more unique variance in MDRAS scores than did the OBQ ICT, although the 
clinical significance of these differences is unclear. 
Another noteworthy finding is that the OBQ RT scales appeared to be more closely 
related to the MDRAS Cost scales than to the MDRAS Probability or the MDRAS Coping 
scales. OBQ RT accounted for significant unique variance in all of the MDRAS Cost scales, 
whereas among the remaining MDRAS scales it only accounted for significant unique 
variance in MDRAS Everyday Probability. Although this result, among a non-clinical sample 
and when dealing with such low proportions of variance, cannot be assigned too much 
importance, it suggests that perceived cost of negative events might be more central to OCD 
pathology than is the perceived probability of those events or perceived ability to cope with 
them. This supports research suggesting that probability overestimation is not central to OCD 
pathology (e.g., Overton & Menzies, 2005; Menzies et al., 2000; Salkovskis, Forrester, & 
Richards, 1998; Thorpe et al., 2011) although it does not support research suggesting that low 
perceived self-competence/coping ability is crucial (e.g., Boekaerts; 1991; Grayson, 2010; 
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Woods et al., 2002). However, Woods et al. (2002) did not find perceived coping ability to be 
important to OCD symptomatology among a non-clinical sample. A more thorough 
investigation of this issue will be undertaken in Study 3, among a sample of clinical 
individuals with OCD. 
It should be noted that research (e.g., Taylor et al., 2005; Woods et al., 2004; Wu & 
Carter, 2008) has suggested that the subscales scores of the OBQ are somewhat ambiguous 
and are less important than the overall OBQ score so the results using OBQ subscales must 
be interpreted with caution. This is consistent with the high correlations observed among the 
OBQ subscales in the current study. Therefore, it is not surprising that the MDRAS scales did 
not demonstrate large differences in their strength of relationships to separate OBQ subscales. 
The expected gender differences in the MDRAS scales were demonstrated. Previous 
research (Cicolini & Rees, 2003; Conley & Peplau, 2010; Pawlowski et al., 2008; Steiner, 
1972; Steketee & Frost, 1994) has suggested that women estimate higher levels of risk in 
various situations than do men. Consistent with this, women rated negative general events as 
more probable and costly on the MDRAS Total and Everyday scales than did men. Women 
also rated themselves as less able to cope with those events. This is encouraging for the 
construct validity of the MDRAS, which appears to be behaving in a similar manner to other 
measures of risk perceptions. The expected gender differences were not observed for the 
MDRAS Future scales, although for the Future Coping scales there was a trend for men to 
rate themselves as being more able to cope than did women. The majority of research into 
risk-taking differences across gender has focused on risk behaviours that are located in the 
present or imminent future (often the timeframe is not specified), rather than risks than are 
specified as being located in the future. Therefore, this result is not necessarily problematic 
for the validity of the MDRAS Future scales, although this matter certainly warrants further 
investigation. This result appears to demonstrate that the MDRAS Everyday and Future 
scales, although correlated, are measuring distinct constructs and that risk assessment for 
everyday events is likely to involve somewhat different cognitive processes to risk 
assessment for potential future events. 
It is also important to note that, in the current study, ratings of the probability and cost 
of negative events were positively correlated. This is counter-intuitive because, in general, 
more severe/costly negative events are less likely to occur. However, the observed positive 
correlation between these MDRAS ratings is frequently reported in risk studies (e.g., 
Berenbaum, Thompson & Bredemeier, 2007; Foa et al., 1996; Uren et al., 2004). This 
suggests that the MDRAS measures perceived probability and perceived cost of negative 
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events in a manner that is consistent with other risk/threat measures. It appears likely that 
although probability and cost are separate parts of a risk appraisal construct, these appraisals 
do not operate in isolation and individuals make overall risk appraisals as well as evaluating 
probability and cost (e.g., Uren et al., 2004). 
 Interestingly, age demonstrated negative correlations with the MDRAS Probability 
and MDRAS Cost scales, as well as positive correlations with the MDRAS Coping scales. 
Although these correlations were small (and in one case non-significant), they are in the 
opposite direction to what might be expected, based on previous research into sensation-
seeking risks. Typically, sensation seeking is negatively correlated with age (Zuckerman, 
1984). However it appears likely that older individuals perceive slightly lower levels of threat 
in general situations than do younger individuals. Alternatively, it is possible that some 
MDRAS items are more likely to occur, or more costly, for younger individuals than older 
individuals. This will require further investigation. 
 The scores obtained on the PANAS NA scale, the OBQ (and its subscales), and the 
ACQ were similar to scores obtained on these measures in other studies on non-clinical 
participants (Watson et al., 1988; Wu & Carter, 2008; Zebb & Moore, 1999). This indicates 
that participants in the current study are likely to be reasonably representative of the general 
population, at least in terms of their levels of negative affect, obsessive beliefs, and perceived 
control over anxiety. This suggests that the current findings are likely to generalise well. 
 The current study was limited by the fact that non-clinical participants were used. It is 
certainly possible that a different pattern of relationships between variables would be 
observed among clinical samples. However, non-clinical samples are frequently used in risk 
research (e.g., Jones & Menzies, 1998b; Lorian & Grisham, 2010; Menzies et al., 2000; 
Thorpe et al., 2011) and evidence suggests that non-clinical samples provide good analogues 
for research into OCD because most individuals have some level of obsessive beliefs 
(Warren, Gershuny, & Sher, 2002). Nevertheless, the pattern of relationships between the 
MDRAS scales and other measures requires examination among a sample of individuals with 
OCD and individuals with other anxiety disorders, particularly given that some evidence 
indicates that risk perceptions might be qualitatively different among clinical individuals than 
among non-clinical individuals (Woods et al., 2002). Another limitation is that the test-retest 
reliability of the MDRAS could not be ascertained because of the inability to identify 






Overall the results of Study 2 are promising in terms of the validity of the MDRAS 
scales. The MDRAS scales related in the expected manner with measures of NA and 
obsessive beliefs. In addition, they were not closely related to obsessive thinking after 
controlling for NA, indicating that, as planned, the MDRAS scales assess cognitive processes 
relating to ‘normal’ threat/risk perception that is separate from typical OCD cognitive 
patterns. Importantly the MDRAS Coping scales appear to relate more strongly to another 
measure of perceived control than do the MDRAS Probability and MDRAS Cost scales. This 
indicates that the MDRAS is assessing the separate constructs of primary and secondary 
threat appraisal. It also indicates that the MDRAS Cost and MDRAS Coping scales, although 
closely correlated, are assessing separate constructs. In addition, the MDRAS Everyday 
scales and the MDRAS Future scales appear to behave separately, suggesting that they are 
assessing different elements of risk perception. In particular, the MDRAS Everyday Coping 
scale accounts for significant unique variance in ACQ scores whereas the MDRAS Future 
Coping Scale does not. The precise reason for this is unclear, however it demonstrates that 
the two MDRAS Coping scales are assessing different dimensions of the perceived coping 
construct. 
 The evidence presented here indicates that the MDRAS performs as would be 
expected of a measure of risk/threat perceptions. This is true for its relationships with other 
measures, as well as the correlations between MDRAS scales. It is also true in terms of 
observed gender differences. Overall, the preliminary evidence presented here indicates that 
the MDRAS is likely to be assessing elements of threat perception. Although many questions 
regarding the scale remain, a trial using the MDRAS on clinical samples was warranted. Such 
a trial would potentially serve two functions – to provide further evidence for the validity of 
the MDRAS and to test for differences in threat perceptions among clinical and non-clinical 
groups. This, along with comparing the risk perceptions of individuals with OCD and 
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Aims of Study 3 
 The aim of Study 3 was to examine MDRAS scores in individuals with OCD 
compared to other anxious and non-anxious individuals. In particular, the study was designed 
to investigate which cognitive distortions (inflated estimates of perceived probability and/or 
cost, or reduced estimates of coping ability) distinguish threat perceptions of individuals with 
OCD from those of non-clinical individuals and are therefore likely to be involved in inflated 
general  risk perceptions and risk-aversion among individuals with OCD. Through the use of 
an anxious control group this study also aimed to investigate whether these distortions are 
specific to OCD, or are more closely related to NA. 
 
Hypotheses 
 It was hypothesised that individuals in the anxious groups (OCD and anxious control) 
would report higher levels of perceived cost and lower levels of perceived ability to cope 
with general negative events than the non-clinical group as assessed by the MDRAS. It was 
also hypothesised that the anxious control group, but not the OCD group would report higher 
probabilities of negative events on the MDRAS compared to the non-clinical group. Given 
the paucity of research into differences between clinical groups in terms of general threat 
perceptions, and evidence that general risk-aversion might be prevalent among anxious 
individuals, no hypotheses regarding differences between the two clinical groups were made. 




 There were three groups of participants, a non-clinical (NC) group, an OCD group, 
and an anxious control (AC) group. The NC group consisted of 42 individuals, 15 men and 
27 women (mean age = 23.07 years, SD = 7.40, range = 18 – 51.75) recruited from 
undergraduate psychology classes at Curtin University. The OCD group consisted of 21 
individuals, 8 men and 13 women (mean age = 39.10 years, SD = 13.13, range = 22.5 – 
63.75) recruited from the Curtin University Psychology Clinic. All clinical participants were 
currently receiving treatment. Inclusion into the OCD group required a primary diagnosis of 
OCD, as assessed by trainee clinical psychologists in a face-to-face structured diagnostic 
interview - the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV, Version 2.0/Patient Form (SCID-
I/P; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1996). In order to protect participant confidentiality, 
access to other diagnostic information was not available. Although clinicians were asked to 
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provide a complete diagnostic profile for all clients, in many cases this did not occur and as 
such the presence of comorbid diagnoses among many members of the OCD group cannot be 
ascertained. However, as stated, in all cases OCD was the primary diagnosis. The AC group 
consisted of 17 individuals, 8 men and 9 women (mean age = 41.78 years, SD = 13.75, range 
= 21.25 – 65) recruited from the same clinic as the OCD group. AC participants also 
underwent diagnosis using the SCID, and criteria for inclusion in the AC group were a 
primary diagnosis of an anxiety disorder other than OCD, and no comorbid diagnosis of 
OCD. The AC group consisted of eight individuals with a primary diagnosis of panic disorder 
(six with agoraphobia, two without agoraphobia), four individuals with a primary diagnosis 
of GAD, three individuals with a primary diagnosis of social phobia, and two individuals 
with a primary diagnosis of PTSD. Once again, in most cases information regarding 
comorbid diagnoses (other than OCD) was unavailable. 
 
Measures 
 The 14-item MDRAS and the PANAS have been described previously. As in Study 2, 
only PANAS NA scores were utilised, although participants completed the entire scale. 
  
The Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised (OCI-R) 
The OCI-R (Appendix I) is an 18-item self-report inventory designed to measure the 
severity of obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Participants are asked to report how much the 
experience related to each statement has bothered them in the past month. Responses are 
made on a 5-point Likert scale, with 0 representing Not at all and 4 representing Extremely. 
The OCI-R consists of six subscales, each of three items, relating to the OCD 
symptom subtypes checking, ordering, washing, obsessing, hoarding, and neutralising (Foa et 
al., 2002). Summing the factor scores provides an overall measure of OCD severity. Evidence 
has indicated that the proposed factor structure of the scales is valid in clinical and non-
clinical samples, with six lower-order factors driven by a single higher-order factor 
(Abramowitz & Deacon, 2006; Hajcak, Huppert, Simons, & Foa, 2004; Huppert et al., 2007; 
Roberts & Wilson, 2008).  
The internal consistency of the OCI-R is good. Foa et al. (2002) reported Cronbach’s 
alphas for the total score ranging from .81 for individuals with OCD to .93 for individuals 
with social phobia. Hajcak et al. (2004) also reported high levels of internal consistency for 
the total score (Cronbach’s alpha = .88) and a good level of internal consistency for the 
subscale scores (washing = .76, checking = .76, ordering = .84, obsessing = .77, hoarding = 
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.68, and neutralising = .61) in a sample of 395 non-clinical individuals. Similar results were 
also reported for a second sample of non-clinical individuals (Hajcak et al., 2004). Roberts 
and Wilson (2008) reported an internal consistency of .88 for the total scale and good to 
moderate internal consistency for the subscales. Huppert et al. (2007) reported good internal 
consistency for the total score (Cronbach’s alpha = .84) and most of the subscales (with the 
exception of neutralizing) among a large sample of individuals with OCD. 
Foa et al. (2002) reported a test-retest reliability of .82 over 1 to 2-week intervals for 
the total OCI-R score among individuals with OCD, and .84 among non-clinical individuals. 
Using a 4-week interval, Hajcak et al. (2004) reported test-retest correlations of .70 for the 
total scale, and between .54 and .77 for the subscales. 
The OCI-R has good convergent validity with scores correlating strongly and 
positively with scores on various measures of OCD symptoms including the Yale-Brown 
Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (Goodman et al., 1989), the Maudsley Obsessive-Compulsive 
Inventory (Hodgson & Rachman, 1977), and the PI-R (Foa et al., 2002; Hajcak et al., 2004). 
The divergent validity of the OCI-R is also adequate, demonstrating lower correlations with 
measures of worry, anxiety, depression, and perfectionism than with measures of OCD 
symptoms (Gonner, Leonhart, & Ecker, 2008; Hajcak et al., 2004). 
The OCI-R can be used to discriminate between individuals with OCD and non-
clinical individuals and between individuals with OCD and individuals with GAD. In 
addition, the OCI-R subscales differentiate individuals with different types of OCD 
symptoms (Huppert et al., 2007). The OCI-R is also sensitive to changes in symptoms with 
treatment (Abramowitz, Tolin, & Diefenbach, 2005) and has been successfully adapted for 
use in various languages and cultures, demonstrating good psychometric properties in each 
case (e.g., Fullana et al., 2005; Gonner, Hahn, Leonhart, Ecker, & Limbacher, 2009; Gonner 
et al., 2008; Malpica, Ruiz, Godoy, & Gavino, 2009; Woo, Kwon, Lim, & Shin, 2010). 
Overall, the OCI-R is a useful diagnostic tool (Foa et al., 2002). Abramowitz et al. (2005) 
calculated that a score of 22 or above on the OCI-R total scale could be considered a 
clinically significant level of symptoms, based on statistical analysis of average OCI-R scores 
from several studies. 
 
Procedure 
 Participants were given an information sheet, with slightly different versions for 
clinical and non-clinical participants (see Appendices J and K, respectively). They completed 
a questionnaire package consisting of the MDRAS, the PANAS, and the OCI-R, along with 
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the same demographics page used in studies 1 and 2. Non-clinical participants returned their 
questionnaires anonymously to a box at the psychology reception at the School of 
Psychology and Speech Pathology at Curtin University. Clinical participants returned their 
completed questionnaires to their clinician at the Curtin University Psychology Clinic. 
Clinicians then recorded diagnostic information for each client before placing the 
questionnaire into a box at the clinic reception. It was not possible to identify any of the 
participants from the information given. 
Although multiple comparisons were performed in this study, the exploratory nature 
of the research suggests that it is important to avoid missing significant between group effects 
and it was therefore deemed appropriate to retain an alpha level of .05 throughout. In 
addition, the fact that the comparisons in the study were theory-driven suggests that retaining 
an uncorrected alpha level is acceptable because the possibility of failing to detect significant 




Data were analysed using SPSS version 18. As in studies 1 and 2, MDRAS Coping 
items were recoded so that higher scores reflected higher subjective coping estimates. 
Univariate descriptive statistics were generated in order to assess the accuracy of data 
input. Data were checked to ensure that all values were within the eligible range for each 
scale. No data entry errors were detected. Missing values analysis revealed that no variable 
was missing more than 5% of its data, so the randomness of missing data was not assessed 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). No data were missing for age, gender, or any of the MDRAS 
items. Three participants failed to complete the entire PANAS, with this being the only 
missing data from this scale. Given the small number of clinical participants in the current 
study, deletion of cases was not considered to be the most appropriate method of dealing with 
the missing data on the PANAS. Instead, total PANAS NA scores for these three individuals 
(2 OCD and 1 AC) were calculated using means substitution based on each participant’s 
clinical group (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). However these cases will not be used when 
examining internal consistency data for the PANAS. One participant failed to respond to 
OCI-R Item 1 and another participant failed to respond to OCI-R Item 16. Given that only 
two data points were missing on the OCI-R, these were replaced through means substitution 
by clinical group (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). 
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Non-clinical participants were not screened prior to completing the questionnaire 
package and consequently it is possible that some individuals in this group would have met 
diagnostic criteria for OCD. Therefore, based on the recommendations of Abramowitz et al. 
(2005), any non-clinical participant with a score of 22 or higher on the total scale of the OCI-
R was excluded from the study. This led to the deletion of 11 cases. Although several 
individuals in the AC group demonstrated a high level of OCD symptoms on the OCI-R, it 
was not considered appropriate to remove these cases because these individuals did not meet 
OCD diagnostic criteria on the SCID, despite the presence of significant levels of OCD 
symptoms. 
 
Outliers and normality in the MDRAS scales. 
Data were screened for the presence of univariate outliers. Although there were 
several univariate outliers across the various MDRAS scales, only one case, in the AC group, 
accounted for univariate outliers in multiple scales. Tests of normality were conducted with 
this case excluded and Shapiro-Wilk statistics suggested that removing this case significantly 
improved the normality of the distributions of the MDRAS Total Cost scale and the MDRAS 
Future Cost Scale in the AC group. This case was consequently excluded from the remainder 
of the analyses. The remaining outliers were not modified. Examination of histograms for 
each MDRAS scale (in each clinical group) revealed that none of the scales demonstrated a 
distribution that differed significantly from normality. 
 
Outliers and normality in the PANAS and the OCI-R. 
Data were screened for the presence of univariate outliers in each clinical group. For 
PANAS NA, two outliers with high scores were detected in the NC group. These two cases 
were deleted from the analyses because of the possibility that these participants would have 
met diagnostic criteria for an anxiety or depressive disorder. For the OCI-R total score, one 
outlier with a high score was detected in both the OCD and AC group. This score was not 
modified for the OCD group because it is not surprising that someone with OCD would 
demonstrate elevated scores on a measure of OCD symptoms. However, the outlying case in 
the AC group was also an outlier on the OCI-R neutralising, checking, and washing scales. 
Examination of OCI-R total scores revealed that this participant’s score of 67 was second 
highest among all participants (including those with OCD). This raises the possibility that a 
diagnosis of OCD had been overlooked for this individual and it was deemed necessary to 
exclude this case from further analyses. Although there were outlying scores on several of the 
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OCI-R subscales, different cases accounted for these and it was not considered necessary to 
modify these data.  
Normality of the distributions of the PANAS NA and the OCI-R total and subscales 
was assessed for each group. Histograms suggested that the distribution of the PANAS NA 
scale did not significantly deviate from normality in any of the groups. However, the OCI-R 
total scale demonstrated a positively skewed distribution among the OCD group and each of 
the OCI-R subscales demonstrated a positively skewed distribution in at least one of the 
groups. Despite this, it was not considered to be appropriate to transform the OCI-R scales 
because doing so would alter the meaning of the scores (which indicate level of OCD 
symptoms) and render the interpretation of the meaning of these scores difficult (Tabachnick 
& Fidell, 2001). In addition, given that OCI-R scale scores did not depart from normality in 
all clinical groups, it was not considered appropriate to transform some OCI-R scale scores 
and not others. Correlations were examined using Spearman’s Rho and the pattern was not 
markedly different to that observed using Pearson’s r, again suggesting no transformations 
were necessary.  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 The final sample consisted of 29 non-clinical participants (8 men and 21 women), 21 
individuals with OCD (8 men and 13 women), and 15 anxious control participants (6 men 
and 9 women). Descriptive statistics for all of the variables used in this study can be found in 
Table 8.1. The internal consistency of the MDRAS scales was assessed on the entire sample. 
The MDRAS Total Probability scale and MDRAS Everyday Probability scale demonstrated 
good internal consistency (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001), with Cronbach’s alphas of .81.  The 
MDRAS Future Probability scale demonstrated acceptable internal consistency (Allen & 
Bennett, 2008), with a Cronbach’s alpha of .70. Slight improvements in internal consistency 
for the Total Probability scale and the Future Probability scale would have resulted from the 
removal of Items 10 and 14. 
 The MDRAS Total Cost scale and MDRAS Everyday Cost scale demonstrated good 
internal consistency (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001), with Cronbach’s alphas of .85 and .81, 
respectively. The MDRAS Future Cost scale demonstrated acceptable internal consistency 
(Allen & Bennett, 2008), with a Cronbach’s alpha of .69. This would have been slightly 
improved with the removal of Item 12. 
 The MDRAS Total Coping scale, the MDRAS Everyday Coping, and the MDRAS 
Future Coping scale demonstrated good internal consistency (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001), 
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with Cronbach’s alphas of .89, .86, and .78, respectively. A slight increase in internal 
consistency for the Future Coping scale would have resulted from the removal of Item 12. 
 
Table 8.1 
Descriptive Statistics: Mean Scores (and Standard Deviations) on Study Variables for Non-
clinical, OCD, and Anxious Control Groups 
Variable NC 
(n = 29) 
OCD 
(n = 21) 
AC 
(n = 15) 
Age 22.89 (7.33) 39.10 (13.13) 41.25 (12.67) 
PANAS NA 17.97 (3.87) 26.11 (6.82) 26.67 (6.92) 
OCI-R total 9.07 (4.57) 22.27 (14.56) 20.40 (11.51) 
OCI-R washing .66 (.94) 2.81 (3.61) 1.80 (2.11) 
OCI-R obsessing 1.93 (1.60) 4.95 (3.63) 4.87 (11.55) 
OCI-R hoarding 2.34 (1.61) 4.48 (3.76) 3.40 (3.09) 
OCI-R ordering 2.38 (2.27) 3.48 (4.04) 4.86 (3.04) 
OCI-R checking 1.17 (1.00) 3.95 (3.88) 3.20 (2.11) 
OCI-R neutralising .59 (.82) 2.60 (3.46) 2.27 (2.31) 
MDRAS Total Probability 3.42 (.67) 3.72 (.80) 3.82 (.65) 
MDRAS Everyday Probability 3.58 (.75) 3.91 (1.05) 4.06 (.86) 
MDRAS Future Probability 3.27 (.85) 3.53 (.86) 3.58 (.69) 
MDRAS Total Cost 3.83 (.71) 4.50 (.74) 4.39 (.35) 
MDRAS Everyday Cost 3.77 (.73) 4.59 (.87) 4.60 (.47) 
MDRAS Future Cost 3.90 (.83) 4.42 (.69) 4.18 (.52) 
MDRAS Total Cope 4.57 (.59) 3.64 (.72) 3.76 (.49) 
MDRAS Everyday Cope 4.73 (.58) 3.69 (.91) 3.76 (.59) 




In terms of overall level of OCD symptoms, OCI-R total scores for the OCD group in 
the current study (M = 22.27) were somewhat lower than those reported in other studies. For 
example, Foa et al. (2002), Abramowitz and Deacon (2006), and Huppert et al. (2007) all 
reported mean OCI-R total scores of between 26.30 and 28.01 among individuals with OCD. 
Among the AC group in the current study, mean level of OCD symptoms, as assessed by the 
OCI-R, (M = 20.4) was higher than those reported among a GAD sample (10.6) by Huppert 
et al. or an anxiety disorders sample (12.43) by Abramowitz and Deacon. The NC OCI-R 
mean in the current study (9.07) was lower than the 18.82 reported by Foa et al., the 19.91 
reported by Hajcak et al. (2004), or the 20.20 reported by Roberts and Watson (2008). It 
should be noted, however, that the NC mean in the current study was 15.65 prior to removal 
of cases considered to be in the clinical range. The internal consistency of the OCI-R total 
scale was excellent, with a Cronbach’s alpha of .90. 
Levels of NA in the NC group in the current study (M = 17.97) were consistent with 
the 16.00 reported by Crawford and Henry (2004), the 17.35 reported by Merz and Roesch 
(2011), and the 19.35 in Study 2 of the current research in large non-clinical samples. NA 
scores among the clinical groups (M = 26.11 for the OCD group and M = 26.67 for the AC 
group) are very similar to the 26.35 reported by Beck et al. (2003) among a clinical sample. 
This suggests that the current sample is comparable, in terms of NA, to samples used in other 
studies. The internal consistency of the PANAS NA scale was good, with a Cronbach’s alpha 
of .86. 
A one-way between groups analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant 
main effect for Group on age, F (2, 62) = 20.41, p < .001. Post-hoc analyses with Tukey’s 
HSD revealed that the OCD group was significantly older than the NC group, p < .001, 95% 
CI of difference [8.79, 23.62]. The AC group was also significantly older than the NC group, 
p < .001, 95% CI of difference [10.13, 26.59]. The OCD group did not differ in age from the 
AC group, p = .83, 95% CI of difference [-10.90, 6.59]. 
A one-way between groups ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for Group on 
PANAS NA, F (2, 62) = 17.35, p < .001. Post-hoc analyses with Tukey’s HSD revealed that 
the OCD group scored significantly higher than the NC, p < .001, 95% CI of difference [4.21, 
12.07]. The AC group also scored higher than the NC group, p < .001, 95% CI of difference 
[4.35, 13.06]. The OCD group did not differ from the AC group on levels of NA, p = .95, 
95% CI of difference [-5.20, 4.07]. 
A one-way between groups ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for Group on 
OCI-R total scores, F (2, 62) = 11.65, p < .001. Post-hoc analyses with Tukey’s HSD 
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revealed that the OCD group scored significantly higher than the NC group, p < .001, 95% CI 
of difference [6.06, 20.34]. The AC group also scored higher than the NC group, p < .001, 
95% CI of difference [3.40, 19.26]. However, unexpectedly, the OCD group did not score 
significantly higher than the AC group on overall OCD symptom levels, p = .86, 95% CI of 
difference [-6.55, 10.30]. 
ANOVAs revealed a significant main effect for Group on each of the OCI-R 
subscales. Post-hoc analyses using Tukey’s HSD revealed that the OCD group scored higher 
than the NC group on all OCI-R subscales with the exception of ordering. The AC group 
scored higher than the NC group on OCI-R obsessing, checking, and ordering subscales, but 
not on the washing, hoarding, or neutralising subscales. There were no differences between 
the OCD and AC groups on any OCI-R subscales. 
 
Between-Group Comparisons on the MDRAS 
 In order to test for between-group differences in perceptions of the probability and 
cost of negative events, as well as perceived ability to cope with those events, separate one-
way between groups ANOVAs were conducted on each of the MDRAS scales. The 
homogeneity of variance assumption was violated for the comparisons on the MDRAS Total 
Cost scale and the MDRAS Future Cost scale. Consequently, in addition to post-hoc 
comparisons using Tukey’s HSD (which assumes equal variances), post-hoc comparisons 
using Tahmane’s T2 test (which does not assume equal variances) were examined for these 
variables. The pattern of results was the same using either statistic and only Tukey’s HSD 
will be reported. Between group comparisons were repeated after controlling for age, 
however the pattern of results was identical so these analyses will not be reported. 
  
 MDRAS Probability. 
 Total Probability Scale. 
 ANOVA results demonstrated a non-significant main effect for Group on the 




 Everyday Probability Scale. 
ANOVA results demonstrated a non-significant main effect for Group on the 







Future Probability Scale. 
ANOVA results demonstrated a non-significant main effect for Group on the 




 Analyses on Combined Clinical Groups. 
Analyses on the MDRAS Probability scales were repeated after combining the two 
clinical groups to increase power. However, in no case did the combined OCD and AC group 
score higher on MDRAS Probability estimates than did the NC group. For the MDRAS Total 
Probability scale, F (1, 63) = 3.77, p = .06, η
2 
= .06. For the MDRAS Everyday Probability 
Scale, F (1, 63) = 3.25, p = .08, η
2 
= .05. For the MDRAS Future Probability Scale, F (1, 63) 
= 1.98, p = .16, η
2 
= .03. It should be noted that, although the comparison for the Total 
Probability scale approached significance, this was a small effect according to Cohen’s 
(1988) conventions. Effect sizes were also small for the MDRAS Everyday and MDRAS 
Future scales, indicating that the failure to find significant between group differences on 
MDRAS Probability scales was unlikely to be because of insufficient sample size. 
 
MDRAS Cost. 
Total Cost Scale. 
ANOVA results indicated that there was a significant main effect for Group on the 
MDRAS Total Cost scale, F (2, 62) = 7.26, p = .001, η
2
 = .19. Post-hoc comparisons with 
Tukey’s HSD revealed that the OCD group scored significantly higher than the NC group, p 
= .002, 95% CI of difference [.21, 1.12]. The AC group also scored significantly higher than 
the NC group, p = .03, 95% CI of difference [.05, 1.06]. However the OCD group did not 
score significantly differently to the AC group, p = .88, 95% CI of difference [-.42, .64]. 
It was decided to re-run this analysis after controlling for NA. Therefore, a one-way 
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was used to compare MDRAS Total Cost scores among 
the three groups after controlling for the influence of PANAS NA. The assumptions of 
homoscedasticity and homogeneity of regression and were not violated. After controlling for 
NA, there were no longer significant between group differences on the MDRAS Total Cost 
scale, F (2, 59) = 1.38, p = .26, η
2
 = .04.  
 
Everyday Cost Scale. 
ANOVA results indicated that there was a significant main effect for Group on the 
MDRAS Everyday Cost scale, F (2, 62) = 10.10, p < .001, η
2
 = .25. Post-hoc comparisons 
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with Tukey’s HSD revealed that the OCD group scored significantly higher than the NC 
group, p = .001, 95% CI of difference [.31, 1.32]. The AC group also scored significantly 
higher than the NC group, p = .002, 95% CI of difference [.27, 1.39]. The OCD group did not 
score significantly differently to the AC group, p = .998, 95% CI of difference [-.61, .58]. 
A one-way ANCOVA (assumptions of homoscedasticity and homogeneity of 
regression were met) showed that, after controlling for NA, there were no longer significant 
between groups differences on the MDRAS Everyday Cost scale, F (2, 59) = 1.21, p = .31, η
2
 
= .04.  
 
Future Cost Scale. 
ANOVA results indicated that there was a marginally significant main effect for 
Group on the MDRAS Future Cost scale, F (2, 62) = 3.07, p = .05, η
2
 = .09. Post-hoc 
comparisons with Tukey’s HSD revealed that the OCD group scored significantly higher than 
the NC group, p = .04, 95% CI of difference [.01, 1.01]. The AC group did not score 
significantly differently to the NC group, p = .45, 95% CI of difference [-.28, .84]. The OCD 
group did not score significantly differently to the AC group, p = .61, 95% CI of difference [-
.36, .83]. 
A one-way ANCOVA (assumptions of homoscedasticity and homogeneity of 
regression were met) indicated that, after controlling for NA, there were no longer significant 






Total Coping Scale. 
ANOVA results indicated that there was a significant main effect for Group on the 
MDRAS Total Coping scale, F (2, 62) = 16.49, p < .001, η
2
 = .35. Post-hoc comparisons with 
Tukey’s HSD revealed that the OCD group scored significantly lower than the NC group, p < 
.001, 95% CI of difference [-1.35, -.50]. The AC group also scored significantly lower than 
the NC group, p < .001, 95% CI of difference [-1.27, -.34]. The OCD group did not score 
significantly differently to the AC group, p = .83, 95% CI of difference [-.62, .38]. 
A one-way ANCOVA (assumptions of homoscedasticity and homogeneity of 
regression were met) demonstrated that, after controlling for NA, there were no longer 
significant between groups differences on the MDRAS Total Coping Scale, F (2, 59) = 1.35, 
p = .27, η
2
 = .04.  
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Everyday Coping Scale. 
ANOVA results indicated that there was a significant main effect for Group on the 
MDRAS Everyday Coping scale, F (2, 62) = 16.50, p < .001, η
2
 = .35. Post-hoc comparisons 
with Tukey’s HSD revealed that the OCD group scored significantly lower than the NC 
group, p < .001, 95% CI of difference [-1.52, -.55]. The AC group also scored significantly 
lower than the NC group p < .001, 95% CI of difference [-1.50, -.43]. The OCD group did 
not score significantly differently to the AC group, p = .96, 95% CI of difference [-.64, .50]. 
A one-way ANCOVA (assumptions of homoscedasticity and homogeneity of 
regression were met) indicated that, after controlling for NA, there were no longer significant 
between groups differences on the MDRAS Everyday Coping Scale, F (2, 59) = .88, p = .42, 
η
2
 = .03. 
 
Future Coping Scale. 
ANOVA results indicated that there was a significant main effect for Group on the 
MDRAS Future Coping scale, F (2, 62) = 10.10, p < .001, η
2
 = .25. Post-hoc comparisons 
with Tukey’s HSD revealed that the OCD group scored significantly lower than the NC 
group, p < .001, 95% CI of difference [-1.28, -.35]. The AC group also scored significantly 
lower than the NC group, p = .01, 95% CI of difference [-1.16, -.13]. The OCD group did not 
score significantly differently to the AC group, p = .72, 95% CI of difference [-.72, .37]. 
A one-way ANCOVA (assumptions of homoscedasticity and homogeneity of 
regression were met) showed that, after controlling for NA, there were no longer significant 





Correlations Between Measures 
 It was of theoretical interest to examine the pattern of relationships between the 
MDRAS scores, NA, and OCD symptom dimensions (OCI-R scores). Bivariate correlations 
between measures were computed separately for the clinical and non-clinical groups. Given 
that ANOVAs had failed to differentiate the OCD and the AC group, these were combined in 
order to increase power. Despite this, the small group sizes render the correlational analyses 
somewhat unreliable and results must be treated as exploratory. 
 As demonstrated in Table 8.2, NA did not correlate significantly with any of the 
MDRAS scales among the non-clinical participants. It should be noted that in most cases, the 
relationship was in the expected direction (i.e., higher MDRAS probability and cost ratings 
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were related to higher levels of negative affect) but failed to reach significance, possibly 
because of the small sample size. Interestingly, the relationships between the OCI-R total 
scales and the MDRAS total scales were significant and in the expected direction – higher 
levels of OCD symptoms were associated with higher perceived probability and cost, and 
lower coping self-efficacy. There were not consistent relationships between the MDRAS 
scales and the OCI-R subscales. 
  
Table 8.2 



















NA .05 .16 -.05 .19 .18 .17 -.18 -.17 -.15 
OCI-R 
total 
.38* .35 .29 .39* .30 .40* -.46* -.39* -.41* 
OCI-R 
wash 
.11 .05 .13 -.02 -.12 .08 -.03 -.03 -.02 
OCI-R 
obsess 
.50** .31 .51** .30 .20 .34 -.33 -.32 -.27 
OCI-R 
hoard 
.19 .22 .10 .27 .07 .41* -.30 -.15 -.36 
OCI-R 
order 
.04 .13 -.06 .15 .24 .05 -.25 -.25 -.20 
OCI-R 
check 
.20 .26 .09 .29 .30 .23 -.25 -.18 -.25 
OCI-R 
neutral 
.29 .18 .29 .29 .27 .26 -.31 -.35 -.21 
Age .20 .16 .18 -.23 -.21 -.21 .06 -.04 .13 
Note. ** p < .01. * p < .05. 
 
As can be seen in Table 8.3, the pattern of correlations among the clinical group was 
somewhat different to that observed in the non-clinical group. Among clinical individuals, 
levels of negative affect were correlated significantly with every MDRAS scale except 
Everyday Probability. Correlations were in the expected direction, with higher levels of 
negative affect being related to higher perceived probability and cost, and lower coping self-
efficacy. The OCI-R total score only correlated with MDRAS Total Cost and MDRAS 
Everyday Cost, although non-significant correlations with other MDRAS scales again appear 
to be due to the small sample size. As with the non-clinical group, there were not consistent 
























NA .38* .25 .41* ..47** .47** .35* -.42* -.37* -.41* 
OCI-R 
total 
.21 .14 .21 .34* .34* .26 -.27 -.23 -.27 
OCI-R 
wash 
.10 .05 .12 .18 .16 .17 -.10 -.06 -.13 
OCI-R 
obsess 
.23 .18 .19 .34* .30 .30 -.23 -.21 -.21 
OCI-R 
hoard 
.20 .02 .36* .24 .27 .14 -.38* -.37* -.32 
OCI-R 
order 
.15 .14 .10 .24 .30 .11 -.14 -.17 -.08 
OCI-R 
check 
.03 .06 -.01 .19 .12 .23 -.08 .02 -.20 
OCI-R 
neutral 
.10 .09 .06 .16 .18 .09 -.13 -.10 -.15 
Age .20 .11 .23 -.06 .10 -.24 -.16 -.25 -.01 
Note. ** p < .01. * p < .05. 
 
PANAS NA and OCI-R total scores were both correlated with MDRAS Total Cost 
and MDRAS Everyday Cost scores among the clinical group. Therefore, it was of interest to 
examine, through regression analysis, whether negative affect or OCD symptom levels were 
more closely related to MDRAS Cost scores. Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) suggested that, 
for regression analyses, a sample size of 104 + m is required to test individual predictors. 
This would require a sample size of 106 in this study. Clearly the current sample size of 36 
did not approach this figure so the analysis must be treated as exploratory and interpreted 
with extreme caution. For this reason, only the MDRAS Total Cost scale was subject to 
regression analysis. A standard multiple regression analysis was conducted, with MDRAS 
Total Cost as the DV and PANAS NA and OCI-R total as the DVs. The combination of 
PANAS NA and OCI-R total scores accounted for a significant amount of variance in 
MDRAS Total Cost scores, R
2 
= .26, F (2, 33) = 5.66, p = .008. This was a medium to large-
sized effect (f
2
 = .34). Regression coefficients (see Table 8.4) indicated that NA accounted for 






Unstandardised (B) and Standardised (β) Regression Coefficients, and Part Correlations 
(sr
2
), For Each Predictor in a Regression Model Predicting MDRAS Total Cost 
Variable 
 
B 95% CI for B β sr
2
 
NA* .035 [.006, .065] .398 .371 
OCI-R .009 [-.006, .024] .197 .184 
Note. * p < .05. 
 
Discussion 
 This study investigated differences between individuals with OCD, anxious controls, 
and non-clinical individuals in the perception of probability and cost of general unpleasant 
events, along with perceived ability to cope with those events. As was hypothesised, the 
clinical groups rated potential negative events as more costly than did non-clinical individuals 
(with the exception of the cost of potential future events among the AC group), and rated 
their ability to cope with those events as lower. Also as hypothesised, individuals with OCD 
did not rate the probability of those events occurring as being higher than non-clinical 
individuals. However, contrary to hypotheses, individuals with other anxiety disorders also 
did not estimate the probability of everyday or future general negative events as higher than 
did non-anxious individuals. There were no differences between individuals with OCD and 
other anxious individuals in terms of perceived probability, cost, or ability to cope with 
negative general everyday or potential future events. Importantly, after controlling for 
negative affect, there were no differences between any of the groups on any MDRAS scale, 
suggesting that negative affect, rather than specific symptoms, is related to heightened cost 
and lowered coping ability estimates among anxious individuals. It is important to note that 
the Everyday and Future scales of the MDRAS did not typically produce different results to 
the Total MDRAS scale. Consequently, unless otherwise stated, this discussion will be 
referring to the results of the Total, Everyday, and Future scales simultaneously when 
mentioning MDRAS results. 
Among the OCD group, the results are consistent with the literature suggesting that 
overestimation of threat and consequent risk-aversion among individuals with OCD are likely 
to be largely related to inflated perceptions of the cost of negative events, and/or reduced 
coping self-efficacy for those events (Aelterman et al., 2011; Ehntholt et al., 1999; Grayson, 
2010; Mancini et al., 2004; Menzies et al., 2000; Moritz & Jelinek, 2009; Overton and 
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Menzies, 2002, 2005; Rector et al., 2002; Rees et al., 2006; Salkovskis 1985, 1989; 
Salkovskis, Forrester, & Richards, 1998; Steketee et al., 1998; Thorpe et al., 2011; Woods et 
al., 2002). The results are also consistent with evidence that overestimation of the probability 
of negative events is not central to OCD anxiety (Grayson, 2010; Rees, 2001; Thorpe et al., 
2011; Woods et al., 2002). Given the small effect sizes observed in the MDRAS Probability 
ANOVAs, this does not appear to be simply the result of insufficient sample size. It does 
indeed appear that the risk/threat judgements of individuals with OCD can be differentiated 
from those of non-clinical individuals based on inflated perceptions of the cost/awfulness of 
negative events, along with perceived inability to cope with the potential negative 
consequences of threatening scenarios. It also appears likely that these processes are 
important in threat perception among individuals with OCD regardless of the type of event 
that is feared, be it general (everyday or future) threat, or OCD-specific threat (e.g., Moritz & 
Jelinek, 2009; Steketee et al., 1998; Thorpe et al., 2011). What remains to be determined, 
however, is the extent to which one or other of these biases is more important to threat 
overestimation in various situations. 
 The observed elevated cost and reduced coping estimates among the AC group are 
consistent with the literature suggesting that anxious individuals are likely to be generally 
risk-aversive (Lorian & Grisham, 2010, 2011; Maner & Schmidt, 2006, Maner et al., 2007). 
Previous research has consistently demonstrated that anxious individuals overestimate the 
cost of negative events related to their disorder (e.g., Berenbaum, Thompson, & Pomerantz, 
2007; de Jong & Peters, 2005; McManus et al., 2000; Poulton & Andrews, 1996; Rheingold 
et al., 2003; Smari et al., 2001; Stopa & Clark, 2000; Uren et al., 2004; Voncken et al., 2003; 
Voncken et al., 2007). However, little previous research has investigated whether anxious 
individuals overestimate the cost of negative events that do not relate to their anxiety 
disorder, although Uren et al. (2004) found that this was true for individuals with panic 
disorder, but not for individuals with social phobia. However, Uren et al.’s findings were 
based on anxious individuals’ perceptions of threat in scenarios relevant to other anxiety 
disorders, rather than general threats. The current results indicate that anxious individuals 
estimate the potential cost of general risks as being higher than do non-anxious individuals. 
This is consistent with them being generally risk-aversive (e.g., Lorian & Grisham, 2011) and 
is also consistent with Beck et al.’s (1985) general model linking anxiety to risk-aversion. 
However, a high percentage of the AC group had a primary diagnosis of panic disorder (with 
or without agoraphobia) or GAD. Given previous evidence that individuals with panic 
disorder overestimate the cost of a range of events (Uren et al., 2004) and that individuals 
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with GAD are likely to perceive elevated threat in a variety of scenarios (Cicolini & Rees, 
2003; Lorian & Grisham, 2011), this result will require replication among various other 
anxious groups. It remains possible that some anxiety disorders might be characterised by 
cost overestimation for disorder-specific events only, and not for general risks of the type 
assessed by the MDRAS (Uren et al., 2004). 
 The finding of low perceived ability to cope with general negative events among the 
AC group is consistent with evidence that low coping self-efficacy is pervasive among 
anxious individuals and is central to threat overestimation and consequent anxiety among 
various clinically anxious groups (e.g., Bouchard et al., 2007; Casey, Oei, & Newcombe, 
2004; Casey, Oei, Newcombe, & Kenardy, 2004; Cloitre et al., 1992; Hoffart, 1995b; Smari 
et al., 2001; Stopa & Clark, 1993; Waters, Mogg, et al., 2008; White et al., 2006). However 
this is the first time that this has been demonstrated with respect to negative events that are 
not specifically related to the anxiety disorder in question. This suggests that low perceived 
ability to cope with the potential consequences of negative events is involved in high levels 
of threat perception, and consequent risk-avoidance, among anxious individuals in a range of 
situations. Once again, this result requires replication among other anxious samples. 
 The AC group did not estimate higher probability of general negative events than did 
non-clinical individuals on the MDRAS. This is somewhat surprising, given the wide body of 
literature demonstrating that probability overestimation is prevalent among anxious 
individuals (e.g., Berenbaum, Thompson, & Pomerantz, 2007; Butler & Mathews, 1987; 
Gasper & Clore, 1998; Maner et al., 2007; Maner & Schmidt, 2006; Macleod et al., 1991; 
Suarez & Bell-Dolan, 2001; Stober, 1997; Uren et al., 2004; Voncken et al., 2007; Warren et 
al., 1989; Weinstein, 2000). However, the majority of this research has focused on disorder-
specific threats and negative events and studies have consistently demonstrated that anxious 
individuals tend to overestimate probability for disorder-specific scenarios but not for 
scenarios relevant to other anxiety disorders (Foa et al., 1996; Klumpp & Amir, 2010; Nelson 
et al., 2010; Uren et al., 2004; Woods et al., 2002). Additionally, evidence has indicated that 
perceived probability does not predict risk-aversion in general situations among non-clinical 
individuals, although perceived cost does (Maner & Schmidt, 2006; Mitte, 2007). Indeed, it is 
likely that overestimation of the probability of negative events among anxious individuals 
largely results from ease of memory access to previous similar scenarios that have involved 
negative outcomes – i.e., highly developed threat schemata (Butler & Mathews, 1983,1987; 
Gasper & Clore, 1998; Kverno, 2000; MacNamara & Hajcak, 2010). Presumably, however, 
most anxious individuals will not have particularly elaborate threat schemata for general 
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risks. This could explain why they do not appear to estimate a high probability of the 
occurrence of negative outcomes that do not relate to their anxiety disorder. This hypothesis, 
however, awaits empirical validation. 
Crucially, the current results do not provide evidence that general threat 
overestimation is unique to OCD, or even that it is elevated among individuals with OCD 
compared to other anxious groups. This indicates that general risk-aversion is unlikely to be 
specifically related to OCD. Although this is contrary to some previous suggestions (e.g., 
Cicolini & Rees, 2003), prior research into general risk-aversion among individuals with 
OCD has only compared OCD groups to non-clinical groups (Cicolini & Rees, 2003; Frost et 
al., 1994; Steketee & Frost, 1994). Therefore, the lack of significant differences between 
individuals with OCD and other anxious individuals in terms of threat perceptions for general 
events is not a surprising finding. Indeed, it is consistent with the transdiagnostic model 
where risk-aversion is a core feature of anxiety in general (e.g., Lorian, 2011; Lorian & 
Grisham, 2010, 2011; Maner et al., 2007; Maner & Schmidt, 2006). Also consistent with the 
transdiagnostic model is the fact that, after controlling for NA, neither anxious group scored 
higher than the NC group on any of MDRAS scales. This suggests that threat overestimation 
(as assessed by the subjective probability and cost of negative events, and subjective ability 
to cope with them) and consequent risk-aversion is primarily related to NA and anxiety, 
rather than to specific symptom patterns or beliefs. This assertion is further supported by the 
fact that, among the clinical groups in this study, correlations and regressions indicated that 
OCD symptoms do not appear to be uniquely related to risk perceptions. However, given the 
lack of difference between the OCD and the AC groups in terms of OCD symptoms, these 
results will require replication. In addition, although the OCD group scored higher than the 
NC group on perceived cost of potential future threats, the same was not true for the AC 
group. This suggests the possibility that individuals with OCD might overestimate the cost of 
potential future events compared to other anxious individuals (Rees, 2001; Salkovskis, 1985) 
but that larger sample sizes are required to detect this difference. If this is the case, it is likely 
to be related to inflated responsibility beliefs among individuals with OCD (Salkovskis, 
Forrester & Richards, 1998). 
 The observed patterns of correlations in the clinical and non-clinical groups are 
interesting because they suggest that perceptions of the probability and cost of potential 
negative events, along with perceived ability to cope with those events, are related to 
different factors among anxious individuals compared to non-anxious individuals. Non-
clinical individuals’ perceptions of probability, cost, and coping ability were not closely 
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related to NA. Conversely, clinical individuals’ perceptions of probability, cost, and coping 
ability appear to be closely related to NA, but not to level of OCD symptoms. It should be 
noted, however, that these results could be unreliable because of the small sample size and 
restricted range of scores. This is particularly likely given that the MDRAS scales correlated 
strongly with NA in the larger non-clinical sample in Study 2, in contrast to the results 
obtained in this study. 
 
Limitations 
 Several cautions are warranted when interpreting the results of the current study. First, 
the size of the clinical groups, although fairly typical for this type of research, was relatively 
small. This suggests that some of the analyses lacked the statistical power to detect small 
effect sizes in the between group comparisons. However, given that the study was designed to 
detect large, clinically significant between group differences in risk perceptions, this is not 
particularly problematic. Nevertheless, it would be theoretically interesting to replicate the 
current study with a larger clinical sample in order to test for the presence of small effects. 
Additional regression analyses on each clinical group, exploring the impact of probability, 
cost, and coping perceptions on NA and clinical symptomatology will require larger sample 
sizes. 
 Conversely, some of the observed between groups differences on the MDRAS might 
be relatively trivial from a clinical point of view. In particular, the 95% confidence intervals 
for the differences between the clinical groups and the non-clinical group on the MDRAS 
Total Cost and Future Cost scales suggest that, although clinical individuals estimate higher 
cost of negative events than do non-clinical individuals (with the exception of future cost for 
the anxious control participants), the magnitude of this difference might not be large. If this is 
the case, attempting to reduce perceived cost estimates among anxious individuals might not 
be particularly effective in reducing anxiety levels. The between groups differences on 
perceived coping ability appear to be larger, and might represent a more important 
therapeutic target. 
It is possible that the failure to find elevated probability estimates among the clinical 
groups compared to the non-clinical group in this study could be an artefact of therapy. Both 
anxious groups were involved in therapy at the time of participation in the study and, given 
that cognitive therapy tends to emphasise probability re-estimation, it is possible that initial 
overestimates of the probability of negative events had been corrected, whereas estimates of 
the cost of those events, or of one’s ability to cope with the events, remained unchanged. This 
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explanation is unlikely, especially given the evidence that individuals with OCD appear not 
to overestimate the probability even of OCD-specific events compared to non-clinical 
individuals (e.g., Grayson, 2010; Rees, 2001; Thorpe et al., 2011). In addition, from a clinical 
perspective, if estimates of the probability of negative general events are reduced through 
standard therapy, no further specific focus on probability estimation is needed in order to 
reduce general risk perceptions. However, this will require further investigation, perhaps 
through longitudinal treatment studies that assess perceived probability, cost, and coping 
ability prior to treatment and at various times throughout the treatment process. 
It is also important to consider the possibility that risk-aversive cognitions might be 
partially state-dependent among individuals with OCD.  In particular, if perceived 
probability, perceived cost, or perceived coping ability are uniquely related to OCD (e.g., 
Rees, 2001), then the therapy received by individuals with OCD participating in the current 
study (if it has reduced their OCD symptom levels) could have suppressed, to some extent, 
elevations in these biases compared to other clinical individuals, explaining the lack of 
differences between the OCD and the AC groups in risk perceptions. This appears somewhat 
unlikely, given that the cognitive biases studied appear to be more closely related to NA than 
to OCD symptoms and given previous tentative evidence that reduction in OCD symptoms is 
not necessarily accompanied by reduced risk-aversion (Garratt-Reed, 2004). However, 
studies utilising the MDRAS to assess changes in risk perceptions with therapy among 
individuals with OCD are required to definitively answer this question. 
Another potential caution stems from the OCD sample used. OCI-R scores indicate 
that several individuals in the OCD group had significant hoarding behaviours. Although this 
is not necessarily problematic, it has been suggested that hoarding is somewhat separate to 
other OCD symptom dimensions and involves somewhat different cognitive processes (e.g., 
Abramowitz, Lackey, & Wheaton, 2009). Therefore, it is possible that the current results 
have been influenced by the presence of a high proportion of OCD hoarders. Future studies 
should examine the differences, if any, in risk perceptions between individuals with OCD 
hoarding and other OCD symptom dimensions. In addition, examination of patterns of risk 
perception on the MDRAS among individuals with different OCD symptom types would be 
theoretically interesting, and could suggest different therapeutic avenues for addressing risk-
aversion in individuals with various OCD symptoms. Finally, the fact that additional 
diagnostic information was not available for most individuals in this study should be 
remedied in future studies, so that the impact of various comorbid conditions on risk 
perceptions can be delineated. 
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Another limitation of the current study is that the OCD and AC groups were not 
differentiated in terms of level of OCD symptoms. This appears to have stemmed from the 
relatively low level of OCD symptoms in the OCD group combined with a relatively high 
level of OCD symptoms in the AC group.  The relatively low scores on the OCI-R among the 
OCD group compared to OCD groups in other studies (e.g., Foa et al., 2002; Huppert et al., 
2007) is likely to reflect the fact that the majority of these individuals were undergoing 
treatment, which is likely to have reduced their level of OCD symptoms. It should be noted, 
however, that mean levels of OCD symptomatology were still in the clinically significant 
range (Abramowitz et al., 2005) in the current study. The high level of OCD symptomatology 
in the AC group, however, is more difficult to explain. Overall the mean level of symptoms 
fell marginally below the clinically significant cut-off (Abramowitz et al., 2005), but was not 
significantly different to the level of symptoms displayed by the OCD group. Given that none 
of the AC participants met diagnostic criteria for OCD, this is surprising. It is difficult to 
predict how this is likely to have impacted the current results, given the paucity of research 
assessing risk perceptions among individuals with OCD and a consequent lack of 
understanding on the impact of OCD symptoms on these perceptions. However, if level of 
OCD symptoms is important in perceptions of probability, cost, and coping ability for 
negative events, it could be argued that two clinical groups with similar levels of OCD 
symptoms (regardless of diagnostic status) would be unlikely to differ in these perceptions. 
From that perspective it is unclear whether the current results can be generalised to suggest 
that there are no differences between individuals with OCD and other anxious individuals 
(without elevated OCD symptom levels) in terms of perceptions of the probability and cost of 
general negative events, or of their ability to cope with those events. It would be equally 
plausible that the lack of observed differences in the current study could be attributed to 
similar levels of OCD symptoms in both groups. 
However, it has previously been argued that risk-aversion among individuals with 
OCD and other anxious individuals is largely independent of symptom experience and might 
be a premorbid risk factor for the development of anxiety symptoms (Cicolini & Rees, 2003; 
Rees, 2001). In addition, results from the current study suggested that, among the clinical 
groups, levels of OCD symptoms were not related to any of the MDRAS scales after 
controlling for NA. Along with the previous finding that reduction of OCD symptomatology 
did not influence general risk-aversion among individuals with OCD (Garratt-Reed, 2004), 
this indicates that levels of OCD symptomatology are not central to cognitions involving risk 
estimation among anxious individuals. This suggests that the finding that individuals with 
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OCD cannot be distinguished from other equally anxious individuals in terms of their general 
risk perceptions (probability, cost, or coping ability) is likely to be robust. However, this will 
require further investigation among other anxious samples without high levels of OCD 
symptomatology and until this time, the lack of differences between the OCD and AC groups 
on the MDRAS must be interpreted cautiously. 
Another limitation is that the MDRAS is a new scale and has not previously been 
used to examine differences in risk perceptions among anxious individuals. It is possible that 
the failure to find differences between the OCD and AC groups in this study is due to 
insensitivity in the MDRAS scales. This seems unlikely, however, given that the MDRAS 
Cost and MDRAS Coping scales successfully differentiated anxious and non-anxious 
individuals, and given that the pattern of results largely conformed to theory-driven 
hypotheses. Further investigation into the utility of interpreting separate Everyday and Future 
scales in the MDRAS is warranted, however, given that they generally did not produce 
different patterns of results to the MDRAS Total scale. 
 
Clinical Implications 
It has been argued that targeting general risk-aversion among individuals with OCD is 
likely to be important in terms of maintaining treatment gains (e.g., Lyoo et al., 2001; Rees, 
2001; Rees et al., 2006). Maner and Schmidt (2006) made a similar suggestion pertaining to 
anxiety disorders in general. These results indicate that the suggestion is valid for OCD and 
for other anxious individuals. Indeed, for all anxious individuals, it appears likely that 
therapeutic components targeting elevated levels of perceived cost of general negative events, 
and/or low perceived ability to cope with those events, are likely to be required to reduce 
general risk-aversion (e.g., Grayson, 2010; Rees et al., 2006). Given the clinical importance 
of general risk-aversion among anxious individuals, treatments focusing on reducing these 
biases need to be investigated. It is important to note that this is a separate process to 
targeting cognitive biases surrounding disorder-specific concerns. If biased estimates 
regarding the cost of general negative events, and subjective ability to cope with them, can be 
reduced among anxious individuals, so will levels of general risk-aversion. Presumably, this 
will break the cycle of inflated perceptions of threat and anxiety, and consequent risk-
aversion, among anxious individuals, leading to long-term treatment benefits (Maner & 






Overall, the results of Study 3 indicate that anxious individuals, regardless of their 
diagnostic status, appear to estimate a higher cost of potential negative events and to evaluate 
themselves as less able to cope with the occurrence of these events, compared to non-anxious 
individuals. It is likely that these biases are driving general risk-aversion among anxious 
individuals (e.g., Lorian & Grisham, 2010; 2011). However, anxious individuals appear to 
estimate a similar level of the probability of the occurrence of general negative events as do 
non-clinical individuals. 
The lack of differences on the MDRAS between the OCD and AC groups, and the 
fact that MDRAS scores were largely related to NA rather than OCD symptoms among the 
clinical groups, suggest that there is not disorder-based specificity in the cognitive biases 
driving general threat overestimation and risk-aversion among anxious individuals. Although 
this result requires replication among samples of individuals with different anxiety disorders, 
it is consistent with the argument that general risk-aversion is present across anxious 
individuals and is likely to represent a risk factor for the development of anxiety disorders 
(Maner & Schmidt, 2006). It is also consistent with Beck et al.’s (1985) assertion that anxiety 
in general is linked to higher levels of perceived threat. This strongly suggests the potential 
efficacy of developing treatments targeting perceived cost and perceived coping ability for 
general threats among anxious individuals. 
The results of Study 3 are also promising in terms of the validity and clinical utility of 
the MDRAS, with the scales performing as predicted by theory and demonstrating high levels 
of internal consistency. Nevertheless, further validation of the MDRAS is required on a 
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The overarching aim of the current research was to examine the cognitive basis of 
general risk-aversion among individuals with OCD in order to inform potential treatments to 
reduce this problematic cognitive and behavioural pattern. This aim was achieved and 
therefore this research has the potential to improve treatments for individuals with OCD and 
anxious individuals in general. 
This discussion will begin discussing the utility of the MDRAS, including its potential 
as a clinical and research instrument and future directions for the scale. Implications of this 
research for theories of risk-aversion will be discussed, followed by clinical implications of 
the current research in terms of threat perceptions and risk-aversion. Potential therapeutic 
avenues for addressing biased estimates of the cost of negative events, and of subjective 
ability to cope with those events among anxious individuals will also be reviewed, given that 
these biases appear to be related to general risk-aversion. Future directions for research and 
clinical practice will be discussed, before outlining some general limitations of the current 
research and making concluding statements. 
 
Utility of the MDRAS 
It appears that the MDRAS is accurately assessing cognitive variables that drive 
threat/risk estimation for potential general everyday and future non-pleasurable risks. In 
addition, it can differentiate individuals with OCD from non-anxious individuals in a manner 
that is consistent with existing theory on threat perception biases among individuals with 
OCD (e.g., Moritz & Jelinek, 2009; Moritz & Pohl, 2009; Salkovskis, Forrester, & Richards, 
1998; Thorpe et al., 2011). Although the MDRAS is still in its infancy, its potential 
importance for clinical practice and future research is extensive. The MDRAS is a theory-
driven measure that can assist in the exploration and understanding of broad risk attitudes in a 
diverse array of clinical and non-clinical populations. This is important given the likely 
negative impact of these cognitive biases upon anxiety and treatment outcomes (Maner & 
Schmidt, 2006). The MDRAS extends on previous risk measures because of its focus on 
events that are not symptom-specific and because of evidence of its validity among clinical 
and non-clinical individuals.  This represents a major contribution of the current body of 
research to the field of OCD in particular and anxiety disorder research in general. 
Indeed, a potential clinical use for the MDRAS is as an assessment tool for all 
individuals with OCD (and perhaps for other anxious individuals) upon entry into therapy. 
Examining which cognitive bias or biases are driving general risk-aversion in each individual 
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client is likely to provide clinicians with insight into how to address this problem in therapy. 
It is certainly possible that some individuals with OCD will be characterised by low coping 
estimates but not high cost estimates, or vice-versa. If this is the case, cognitive approaches 
addressing the wrong bias are unlikely to be effective. Hence, the MDRAS could be used to 
inform treatment choices in each individual client. 
 
Future directions for the MDRAS. 
As was mentioned in Study 3, future studies using the MDRAS among individuals 
with OCD should further examine how various OCD symptom types relate to threat 
perception biases. This is particularly important given that OCD symptom dimensions appear 
to be related to specific cognitive distortions (e.g., Taylor et al., 2010; Tolin et al., 2008). It is 
possible that some OCD symptom types are characterised by strong biases in one or more of 
the components of threat perception but that other symptom types are not. Based on current 
findings, however, it would appear that NA, rather than OCD symptoms, is primarily related 
to threat perception biases. This issue requires further investigation. 
It is likely that the MDRAS can be used to further understanding of the cognitive 
biases driving threat overestimation and consequent general risk-aversion among various 
groups of anxious individuals (e.g., Lorian & Grisham, 2010, 2011). Again, this will provide 
insight into potential therapeutic methods to address these biases (e.g., Maner & Schmidt, 
2006). One caution is that the MDRAS items were selected to avoid tapping into OCD-
specific fears and symptoms, but not to avoid fears or symptoms that might be related to 
other anxiety disorders. Therefore, future studies examining the relations between the 
MDRAS scales and various anxiety disorder symptom patterns are required. Indeed, 
modification of the MDRAS to avoid tapping into specific anxiety symptoms might be 
necessary. Nevertheless, the MDRAS appears to be a useful tool for furthering understanding 
of the cognitive biases that drive the complex phenomenon (e.g., Lorian & Grisham, 2010) of 
general risk-aversion among various groups of anxious individuals. 
The current finding that individuals with OCD were not differentiated from other 
anxious individuals on any MDRAS scale does not diminish the importance of examining the 
cognitive basis of general risk-aversion among various groups of anxious individuals, 
especially given previous evidence that different anxious groups exhibit different cognitive 
biases surrounding inflated risk perceptions (Uren et al., 2004). The anxious control group in 
Study 3 was limited by its small size, high level of OCD symptoms, and concentration of 
individuals with panic disorder or GAD. Therefore, it is unclear to what extent the biased 
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estimates of cost and coping ability for general events among this group will be present 
among various other anxious groups. Ideally, future studies should examine samples of 
individuals with various specific anxiety diagnoses in order to determine how biased 
estimates of probability, cost, and coping ability are related to specific symptomatologies as 
well as to general anxiety. In addition, studies are required to investigate how these biases are 
related to symptom changes during therapy. 
 
Research Findings Regarding Threat Perception and Risk-Aversion  
Despite the need for further investigation, Study 3 demonstrated that threat perception 
biases are largely related to negative affect rather than specific symptoms. Importantly, there 
was little evidence of disorder-specificity in patterns of risk perception, with individuals with 
OCD and other anxious individuals exhibiting similar perceptions of the probability and cost 
of negative events, and of their ability to cope with those events. This requires further 
investigation given the likely complexity of general risk-aversion among clinical individuals 
(Lorian & Grisham, 2010, 2011). However, it suggests that anxious individuals are generally 
risk-aversive as a function of anxiety/NA, rather than specific symptomatology. This is 
consistent with the transdiagnostic model of risk-aversion (e.g., Maner et al., 2007; Maner & 
Schmidt, 2006), which suggests that general risk-aversion is implicated in the development of 
anxiety pathology in general. Results are not consistent with suggestions that OCD is 
specifically a risk-aversive disorder (e.g., Cicolini & Rees, 2003; Rees et al., 2006; Steiner, 
1972; Steketee & Frost, 1994), although this is not particularly surprising because few studies 
have compared risk-aversion in individuals with OCD to that in other anxious individuals. 
The clinical implications of the current research would therefore appear to extend beyond 
OCD and apply to anxiety disorders in general. 
 
Clinical Implications of the Current Research 
This body of research has achieved its primary objective of informing potential 
therapeutic methods of reducing general risk-aversion among individuals with OCD. The 
evidence gathered in Study 3 suggests that, among individuals with OCD, targeting estimates 
of the probability of the occurrence of everyday negative events is unlikely to be effective, 
given that they do not appraise these events as being more likely than do other individuals. 
This is in line with expectations based on previous research findings (e.g., Moritz & Jelinek, 
2009; Moritz & Pohl, 2009; Thorpe et al., 2011). Probability re-estimation has previously 
proven ineffective among individuals with OCD (e.g., Moritz & Pohl, 2009), so other 
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cognitive methods of reducing general threat perception are likely to be required. It also 
appears likely that general risk-aversion among other anxious individuals is not mediated by 
inflated estimates of the probability of negative outcomes. However, given evidence that 
disorder-specific risk-aversion is related to probability overestimation among anxious 
individuals (e.g., Nelson et al., 2010; Uren et al., 2004), it is possible that what determines the 
emergence of clinical symptoms in some disorders is the belief that negative outcomes are 
not only costly and difficult to cope with, but are also probable. However, this is unlikely to 
be the case in OCD (Salkovskis, Forrester, & Richards, 1998; Thorpe et al., 2011) and this 
hypothesis awaits validation. 
It appears that individuals with OCD, along with other anxious individuals, are 
generally risk-aversive because they perceive a high cost of potential negative events, and/or 
have low coping self-efficacy for those events. This suggests that interventions attempting to 
reduce general risk-aversion among anxious individuals (e.g., Maner & Schmidt, 2006) 
should focus on reducing catastrophic thinking (i.e., perceived cost of negative events) and/or 
on improving coping self-efficacy. Potential methods for achieving this will now be briefly 
reviewed. 
 
Therapeutic strategies to target inflated cost estimations. 
Strategies to specifically target catastrophic thinking (i.e., assuming the worst possible 
outcomes within a scenario) are potential avenues for reducing the perceived cost of general 
risks. Although traditional cognitive-behavioural approaches sometimes include elements 
focused on reducing catastrophising, a targeted approach specifically aimed at reducing this 
cognitive style is likely to be required in order to achieve long-term change (Thorn, Boothby, 
& Sullivan, 2002). 
Thorn et al. (2002) proposed a CBT approach for chronic pain that directly targeted 
catastrophising through raising awareness of catastrophic thinking and promoting awareness 
that catastrophic thoughts are not necessarily accurate. Subsequently, catastrophic thoughts 
are restructured by promoting awareness of alternative (less severe) outcomes associated with 
pain. In addition, coping mechanisms other than catastrophising are taught. Thorn et al. 
(2002) acknowledged that this type of treatment does occur in many treatment programs, but 
that it is rarely afforded the priority required to create enduring reductions in catastrophising. 
In a subsequent trial of this treatment approach, Thorn et al. (2007) demonstrated that 
a specific clinical focus on catastrophising was effective in reducing headache pain and 
distress, as well as overall anxiety levels, among chronic migraine sufferers. In addition, 
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reductions in catastrophising were associated with improved self-efficacy for managing 
headaches. Changes in catastrophising have been demonstrated to predict significant variance 
in treatment outcomes among individuals with chronic pain (Rodero, Campayo, Fernandez, & 
Sobradiel, 2008; Smeets, Vlaeyen, Kester, & Knottnerus, 2006; Spinhoven et al., 2004; 
Vowles, McCracken, & Eccleston 2007, 2008). 
It is certainly possible that a cognitive strategy similar to that suggested by Thorn et 
al. (2002) could be efficacious for reducing the cost estimates associated with general risks 
among individuals with OCD and other anxious individuals (potentially, inflated probability 
estimates, if present, could be addressed in a similar manner). In particular, if individuals can 
learn to recognise that their feared consequences are not the only possible outcomes of taking 
various general risks, their perceptions of the potential cost of negative outcomes could be 
reduced, resulting in lower perceived threat and consequently less anxiety. As individuals 
learn to recognise their catastrophic thinking in various situations, this approach has the 
potential to generalise into other general risk situations and result in enduring reductions in 
anxiety.  
Along these lines, Rees (2001) argued that, among individuals with OCD, it might be 
possible to reduce the salience and perceived cost of possible negative consequences through 
cognitive techniques to raise the salience of the positive or neutral consequences that can 
result from risks. Although risk-aversive individuals are preoccupied with the possible 
negative outcomes of risk (Mann, 1992), they do not underestimate the value of positive 
outcomes, nor do they view these outcomes as particularly unlikely (Eisenberg et al., 1998). 
Using this rationale, Rees developed a cognitive strategy that focused on encouraging the 
client to consciously consider the utility of risk-taking by focusing on potential positive or 
neutral outcomes of various forms of risk-taking, and to use these images to replace images 
of places and activities as dangerous. The incidence of risk-taking behaviour increased as a 
consequence of this intervention. It should be noted that the cognitive mechanism/s of this 
change was not assessed and it cannot be asserted that it was definitely related to reduced cost 
estimates. In addition, Rees’ study involved a case study of a single individual with OCD, 
and requires replication among larger diverse clinical samples of risk-avoidant individuals. 
Nevertheless, this cognitive strategy, possibly in combination with Thorn et al.’s (2007) 
approach to reducing catastrophising, might prove useful in reducing the avoidance of 
general risks among anxious individuals. Indeed, this is consistent with Najmi and Amir’s 
(2010) finding that directing attention away from threat was effective in reducing disorder-
specific risk-aversion among individuals with OCD. 
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It should be noted, however, that self-efficacy for coping with pain appears to 
partially mediate the relationship between catastrophising and physical functioning 
(McKnight, Afram, Kashdan, Kasle, & Zautra, 2010). If this result extends to anxiety and 
risk-aversion, it might be more important to target self-efficacy and perceived coping ability 
in order to reduce general risk-aversion among individuals with OCD and other anxious 
individuals. 
 
Therapeutic strategies to improve actual and perceived coping ability. 
Therapy specifically aimed at enhancing perceived coping ability would appear to be 
important in efforts to reduce threat perception, anxiety, and general risk-aversion among 
individuals with OCD and among other anxious individuals. Strangely, coping has received 
little interest in the treatment literature, either among individuals with OCD or individuals 
with other clinical disorders (Sandahl, Gerge, & Herlitz, 2004). However, in order to target 
perceived coping ability it would seem pertinent to take a positive approach to cognitive 
therapy. In particular, enhancing problem-solving skills (e.g., Arean, 2009) and using 
strategies to build self-efficacy could engender a cognitive set whereby the individual, upon 
encountering a general risk scenario, thinks in terms of “what can I do in this situation”, 
rather than in terms dangers and uncontrollability.  
As was discussed in Chapter 4, self-efficacy is crucial to perceptions of coping ability, 
and is therefore central to risk-taking and risk-avoidant behaviour patterns (Nicholls et al., 
2010; Sandahl et al., 2004; Wyatt, 1992). Individuals who exhibit low self-efficacy in a given 
situation are unlikely to take risks associated with that situation because they doubt their 
ability to control the consequences of risky behaviour, or to cope with any negative outcomes 
(Wyatt, 1992). Given previous evidence that individuals with OCD have unrealistically low 
perceptions of their own competence in general life situations (i.e., pervasive low levels of 
self-efficacy), and low levels of self-esteem (Boekaerts, 1991; Dar et al., 2000; Hoffart, 
1995a; McNally & Kohlbeck, 1993; Rector et al., 2002; Rees et al., 2006; Samuels et al., 
2000; van den Hout & Kindt, 2003; Williams & Zane, 1989), it is likely that low self-efficacy 
is a major contributor to their low perceived ability to cope with general risk scenarios. 
Raising levels of self-efficacy and self-esteem in individuals with OCD should result 
in them gaining enhanced perceptions of their own ability to cope with aversive events that 
could result from general risk-taking. This should cause a decline in the levels of anxiety that 
are elicited by these situations (Beck et al., 1985), resulting in a reduction of general risk-
aversion and consequently improved overall therapeutic outcomes (Maner & Schmidt, 2006). 
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The finding that other anxious individuals also underestimate their coping ability suggests 
that raising self-efficacy is a treatment goal that should be included in therapy for a range of 
anxiety disorders. 
Traditional CBT has a minimal impact on self-efficacy (Williams, Turner, & Peer, 
1985). However, guided mastery therapy is a technique that directly aims to improve 
individuals’ self-efficacy (Hoffart, 1995a, 1998; Williams et al., 1985). Guided mastery 
therapy is based on self-efficacy theory (Bandura, 1977, 1997), and emphasises building a 
sense of mastery by promoting rapid proficient performance accomplishments in 
feared/avoided situations (Hoffart, 1995a; Williams & Zane, 1989). 
Guided mastery treatment was initially conceived as a means of improving treatment 
outcomes for individuals with agoraphobia (Williams, 1990). These individuals tend to have 
a variety of phobic fears and avoidance and consequently cannot be exposed to the full range 
of their fears. Therefore, Williams (1990) argued that treatment requires a specific focus on 
improving performance in feared situations while simultaneously helping clients to appraise 
their performance in a manner that results in “an enduring generalized sense of mastery” (p. 
90). Fostering a sense of enduring mastery across situations would be ideal when addressing 
general risk-aversion among individuals with OCD and other anxious individuals, given that 
the range of events judged as threatening is likely to be too diverse for exposure therapy to 
cover entirely. 
Guided mastery therapy is a performance-based technique that relies on behavioural 
mechanisms to create change. The therapist actively encourages and guides the client to 
perform progressively more difficult tasks as rapidly as possible. The goal is initially to raise 
the level of performance and self-efficacy by assisting clients to perform tasks that they 
would otherwise find too difficult (i.e., anxiety provoking). Therapists often employ 
modelling to demonstrate effective coping behaviours and task performance. In general, 
clients are encouraged to master subtasks leading to an overall behavioural goal, although the 
objective is always to help the client to progress as quickly as possible (Williams, 1990). The 
sense of mastery experienced by the client is critical to therapeutic progress, but the level of 
anxiety experienced is not considered important (Williams, 1990). 
Once the client can perform adequately within the feared situation, the therapist then 
assists him/her to reduce coping rituals and defensive behaviours (such as always sitting near 
an exit or muscular rigidity when within a feared situation) within the feared situation 
because they prevent a sense of mastery and maintain a sense of low self-efficacy. Finally, 
the therapist fosters independent performance of tasks by intervening only when it is essential 
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to promote progress and by training clients to be their own therapists. Treatment engenders a 
sense of self-influence among clients that is likely to generalise to new fears and situations, 
even after treatment has ceased (Williams, 1990).  It is the quality of performance that is 
emphasised in guided mastery therapy, and it is assumed that as individuals become more 
proficient at performing various tasks, their self-efficacy related to those tasks will be 
enhanced. These increases in self-efficacy should generalise to other tasks and situations, 
reducing levels of anxiety in those situations (Hoffart, 1995a, 1998; Williams, 1990; 
Williams et al., 1985).  
Guided mastery therapy has proven effective in enhancing self-efficacy and perceived 
coping ability among individuals with phobias (especially agoraphobia) of various severity 
(Hoffart, 1995a, 1998; Williams, Dooseman, & Kleifield, 1984; Williams et al., 1985; 
Williams & Zane, 1989; Zane & Williams, 1993). It has also proven effective in reducing 
symptoms of agoraphobia, with improved self-efficacy in feared situations being an 
important mediator of this change (e.g., Hoffart, Sexton, Hedley, & Martinsen, 2008; Reilly, 
Gill, Dattilio, & McCormick, 2005; Williams & Zane, 1989). Some evidence has suggested 
that guided mastery is more effective than standard CBT for reducing symptoms of 
agoraphobia (e.g., Williams et al., 1985; Williams & Zane, 1989). However, other studies 
have obtained opposite results (e.g., Hoffart, 1995a, 1998).  
There is reason to believe that guided mastery therapy might be effective as a method 
to increase self-efficacy for coping with general risk activities among individuals with OCD 
and among other anxious individuals. This should reduce perceived threat and, consequently, 
anxiety and risk-aversion in general risk situations. Treatments that specifically focus on 
effective behavioural performance, both in disorder-specific and general situations, could 
easily be incorporated into standard CBT regimens – essentially conducting exposure 
exercises but with a focus on behaviour rather than anxiety. Heightened self-efficacy should 
generalise from these situations into other situations that are avoided and, once defensive 
behaviours are eliminated, facilitate a reduction in risk-aversion across a range of situations 
(Williams, 1990). However, guided mastery therapy has not previously been used to target 
general risk-aversion and consequently its effectiveness for such a task is unclear. Future 
clinical studies should investigate the utility of guided mastery therapy for enhancing self-
efficacy and reducing general risk-aversion among individuals with OCD or other anxiety 
disorders. In addition, the manner in which this treatment should be incorporated into existing 
therapy programs for various disorders requires investigation. It should be noted, however, 
that guided mastery has not always proved effective for treating some types of anxiety 
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symptoms (e.g., Zinta, 2008). Therefore, other means of improving coping ability among 
anxious individuals, particularly focusing on cognitive approaches, should also be 
investigated. 
Little research has been conducted into devising individual treatments to improve 
self-esteem (Hall & Tarrier, 2003). However, cognitive techniques that involve working with 
clients to elicit positive self-attributes, and then identify specific examples that provide 
evidence of those attributes, appear to produce sustained increases in self-esteem among most 
clinical individuals (Hall & Tarrier, 2003; Warren, McLellarn, & Ponzoha, 1988). It is 
possible that cognitive techniques designed to make anxious individuals more aware of their 
ability to cope (for example, by increasing the salience of previous similar instances in which 
they have successfully coped) could enhance perceived coping ability and consequently 
reduce general risk-aversion. These cognitive approaches should be clinically trialled among 
individuals with OCD and other anxious individuals in order to examine this hypothesis. 
In addition to building self-efficacy, it is likely that the adoption of adaptive 
behaviour in everyday risk scenarios will require specific skills training. Arean (2009) 
suggested that adequate problem solving occurs when an individual possesses both positive 
self-efficacy and effective problem-oriented behaviours. Therefore, interventions that focus 
specifically on teaching problem-solving skills are likely to be effective in increasing 
perceived coping ability among individuals with OCD and other anxious individuals. 
Individuals could be assessed to determine specific types of daily situations that they avoid, 
then work on each separately to improve problem-solving skills. The problem is defined and 
analysed, defining behavioural goals. Potential solutions are generated and discussed before 
selecting the best option to trial. This option is then divided into a series of steps to be 
implemented outside of therapy, with successes and failures reviewed in subsequent therapy 
sessions (Arean, 2009). The focus is not only on specific problems, but also on the process 
used to solve those problems. This type of approach has proved successful in increasing 
problem-solving skills and reducing symptomatology among a wide range of clinical 
populations, including individuals with self-harming behaviours (Bannan, 2010), individuals 
with GAD (Khodarahimi & Pole, 2010), and depressed individuals (Arean, 2009; Klein et al., 
2011). Problem-solving therapy is designed to enhance positive behavioural functioning and 
improve general quality of life, as well as to reduce rates of relapse among clinical 
individuals (D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010). It could be implemented as part of treatment regimens 
for various anxious individuals, in combination with guided mastery therapy, to improve 
183 
 
actual and perceived coping ability and consequently reduce perceived threat and general 
risk-aversion. 
 
Targeting intolerance of uncertainty. 
This research suggests that another potential therapeutic avenue for reducing general 
risk-aversion among individuals with OCD in particular is to target intolerance of uncertainty 
(e.g., Grayson, 2010). Given that they do not appear to overestimate the probability of 
general negative events, it appears that any possibility of those events is sufficient to allow 
for inflated threat estimation. Grayson (2010) suggested that, in order to help individuals with 
OCD cope with uncertainty, cognitive techniques highlighting the impossibility of achieving 
certainty, as well as highlighting other situations in which the individual successfully 
manages uncertainty are important. However, Grayson (2010) suggested that further research 
into treating intolerance of uncertainty is required. An examination of how non-anxious 
individuals deal with uncertainty surrounding general risks could be a useful basis for 
determining the best methods of reducing intolerance of uncertainty among individuals with 
OCD. If individuals with OCD learn to tolerate uncertainty more effectively, this could 
reduce general risk-aversion and improve overall treatment outcomes. 
 
Future Clinical Directions 
Research is required into effective methods for reducing the perceived cost of 
potential negative events, and for improving perceived ability to cope with those events 
among individuals with OCD. It is likely that this will also be applicable to individuals with 
other anxiety disorders, given that they appear to demonstrate similar threat perception biases 
in general situations. A clinical trial of guided mastery therapy is warranted, along with a trial 
of cognitive methods for reducing catastrophising. However, other methods might be 
required and it is likely that different techniques might be useful for different clients. If, as 
previously suggested, the MDRAS is used as part of assessment procedures, individualised 
treatments could be designed based on which threat perception distortion/s require modifying. 
Research into the processes involved in adaptive cognitions and behaviours surrounding risk 
could provide further insights into potential avenues through which these processes could be 
nurtured among clinically anxious individuals. 
Importantly, future clinical trials should investigate not only whether treatments are 
effective in reducing cost estimates or improving perceived coping ability, but also whether 
changes in these cognitive variables influence actual behaviours surrounding general risks. 
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Treatments that effectively reduce general threat perception should, theoretically, reduce 
anxiety and consequently reduce general risk-aversion. This should begin to erode the cycle 
of heightened threat perception causing anxiety and risk-aversion, which generates further 
threat overestimation (e.g., Cano-Vindel et al., 2009; Klumpp & Amir, 2010; Maner & 
Schmidt, 2006). However, clinical trials into whether (and which) cognitive changes result in 
behaviour changes surrounding general risk (i.e., reduced risk-aversion) among individuals 
with OCD and other anxious individuals are required. 
In addition, longitudinal treatment outcome studies are required to determine whether 
reduced general risk-aversion among individuals with OCD improves treatment outcomes 
and reduces relapse rates. Theoretically, this should be the case (e.g., Lyoo et al., 2001; 
Maner & Schmidt, 2006; Rees, 2001; Rees et al., 2006). However studies comparing standard 
cognitive-behavioural treatment with treatments incorporating methods for reducing general 
threat perception (likely through reducing perceived cost of harm or increasing coping self-
efficacy) will be required. Such studies should measure OCD symptoms, risk perceptions, 
anxiety levels, and overall levels of functioning over time. Similar studies, with relevant 
outcome measures should also be conducted among other anxious groups.  
 
Limitations 
The limitations of each of the studies conducted as part of this research have been 
acknowledged. However, it should be recognised that cognitive conceptualisations of threat, 
although important in determining anxiety and situational behaviour, are not the only 
determinants of risk-related behavioural outcomes. Indeed, factors such as emotional 
reactions towards risky events, including state anxiety and how much the individual likes or 
dislikes activities involved in risk, can influence risky decision-making (Cheung & Mikels, 
2011; Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Lerner & Keltner, 2001). The current 
research did not account for these factors. Therefore, changing threat perceptions among 
individuals with OCD will not necessarily translate into equivalently sized behavioural 
changes surrounding risk, although it certainly represents an important step towards 
achieving such changes (Maner & Schmidt, 2006). 
A methodological limitation across this research is that all data were self-report. It has 
been observed that self-report data do not always correspond strongly to data collected 
through other means (e.g., Dell’Osso et al., 2002; Schwerdtfeger, 2004; Sohler et al., 2009), 
are open to the influence of social desirability (e.g., Huang, Liao, & Change, 1998) and can 
be differentially influenced by personality factors such as neuroticism (de Jong & Slaets, 
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2005). Consequently, it is possible that different results would have been obtained had other 
methods (such as interviewing) been used to collect the data. It is also possible that anxious 
individuals might have responded differently to non-anxious individuals because of 
personality differences between the groups, or that they might have underreported their actual 
perceived probability because they perceive this to be socially desirable (especially if they 
have likely been taught to re-estimate probability in therapy). In addition, it has been 
suggested that, among individuals with OCD, self-report data regarding probability 
estimation is somewhat flawed because, although they do not perceive negative events as 
being more likely per se, they do perceive themselves as more likely to experience those 
events compared to other people (Moritz & Jelinek, 2009). However, Moritz and Jelinek 
(2009) used OCD-specific negative events and it is likely that individuals with OCD would 
perceive these events as more likely to happen to them than others because of low perceived 
sense of control (e.g., Moulding & Kyrios, 2006) rather than skewed estimates of the 
probability of negative events. 
Despite its inherent flaws, it is difficult to envisage a manner in which perceptions of 
threat could be assessed through means other than self-report data. Interviewing would have 
been prohibitively time consuming and is likely to be more prone to social desirability 
estimates than self-report data (Dell’Osso et al., 2002). Behavioural measures of risk taking 
can demonstrate how an individual reacts to potential threats, but they cannot determine the 
cognitive basis of this reaction, as was the goal in the current research. Therefore, self-report 
data was the only viable option for assessing the cognitive basis of threat overestimation 
among anxious individuals in general threat scenarios. Indeed, self-report data is widely used 
in research into risk/threat perception and anxiety, so the current methods are consistent with 
other studies (e.g., Cicolini & Rees, 2003; Steketee & Frost, 1994). In addition, the results of 
the current research are broadly consistent with those of Lorian and Grisham (2010), who 
found anxious individuals to be risk-aversive using a behavioural analogue task. However, in 
terms of the validity of the MDRAS scales, it would be useful to determine the extent to 
which the MDRAS scales correlate with behavioural measures of general risk taking in future 
studies. However, such measures do not currently exist, so this will represent a significant 
new area of research.  
Another potential limitation relates to the non-clinical samples used in this research. It 
appears that risk preferences are involved in the decision to participate in research (Harrison, 
Lau, & Rutstrom, 2009). Therefore, the non-clinical individuals who chose to participate in 
this research might not be representative of the general population in terms of perceptions of 
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probability, cost, and coping ability regarding potential negative events. However, results 
from the other measures used in this research suggested that the non-clinical groups were 
similar to those used in previous studies. 
A final limitation of the current research is that some recent evidence suggests that 
only some individuals with OCD are likely to be motivated by harm avoidance, whereas 
others are motivated more by the desire to get things “just right” (Pietrefesa & Coles, 2009). 
“Not just right” experiences appear to be primarily linked to perfectionism (Moretz & 
McKay, 2009) and it is possible that individuals who are motivated by these experiences 
might not overestimate threat in general situations. If the OCD sample in Study 3 contained 
individuals who are not harm-avoidant, this could have suppressed potential differences on 
the MDRAS scales between the OCD and the anxious control groups. In addition, therapeutic 
methods for targeting general risk-aversion are unlikely to result in treatment gains for 
individuals who are motivated by “not just right” experiences. However, this 
conceptualisation of OCD requires further investigation and cannot be assigned a high level 
of certainty at this stage. Nevertheless, future studies should ensure that OCD samples are 




The research reported in this thesis has potentially wide-ranging implications for the 
understanding and treatment of OCD and other anxiety disorders. It represents the first 
attempt to examine the cognitive underpinnings of general risk-aversion among individuals 
with OCD, based on Beck et al.’s (1985) well-established cognitive theory. From this 
perspective, it has provided insight into why individuals with OCD are risk-aversive in their 
daily lives and has begun the process of identifying potential cognitive methods to treat this 
unhealthy cognitive, behavioural, and emotional state. This has the potential to improve 
short-term treatment gains and long-term treatment maintenance among individuals with 
OCD.  
The fact that cognitive biases relating to risk perceptions did not distinguish 
individuals with OCD from other anxious individuals does not diminish the clinical 
importance of the current findings for OCD. Conversely, it extends the importance of this 
research and suggests that similar therapeutic gains could be achieved by targeting these 
biases among a range of anxious individuals (e.g., Maner & Schmidt, 2006). Future studies 
should investigate the optimal methods for addressing cognitive biases related to risk 
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perception across anxiety disorders. However treatments targeted at specific clients are likely 
to be the most effective and the MDRAS could be used to determine which bias represents 
the most important therapeutic target for each client.  
The MDRAS itself is also an important contribution provided by the current research. 
Indeed, this measure has the potential to be of substantial clinical and research utility across 
anxiety disorders. Its possible uses in broad-scale studies as well as on an individual client 
basis have been discussed. It can be used to further understand general risk-aversion in 
diverse populations, informing treatments and improving cognitive-behavioural 
conceptualisations of various anxiety disorders. 
Overall, in order to reduce general risk-aversion among anxious individuals, this 
research has indicated that targeting faulty estimates of the cost of negative events, and of 
one’s ability to cope with those events, is required. In order to achieve these goals, a positive 
approach to therapy should be adopted. A focus on building self-efficacy, increasing 
problem-solving skills and proficiency, and promoting awareness of potential positive 
outcomes associated with daily risk would appear to be promising avenues for reducing threat 
perception biases. This should result in increased willingness to engage in general risks, 
improving long-term anxiety reduction and treatment outcomes, and increasing quality of life 






Abed, R. T. & de Pauw, K. W. (1999). An evolutionary hypothesis for obsessive-compulsive
 disorder: A psychological immune system? Behavioural Neurology, 11(4), 245-250. 
Abramowitz, J. S., Brigidi, B. D., & Roche, K. R. (2001). Cognitive-behavioral therapy for
 obsessive-compulsive disorder: A review of the treatment literature. Research on
 Social Work Practice, 11, 357-372. doi:10.1177/104973150101100305 
Abramowitz, J. S., & Deacon, B. J. (2006). Psychometric properties and construct validity of
 the Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised: Replication and extension with a
 clinical sample. Anxiety Disorders, 20, 1016-1035. doi:10.1016/j.janxdis.2006.03.001 
Abramowitz, J. S., Deacon, B. J, Woods, C. M., & Tolin, D. F. (2004). Association
 between protestant religiosity and obsessive-compulsive symptoms and cognitions.
 Depression and Anxiety, 20, 70-76. doi:10.1002/da.20021 
Abramowitz, J. S., Foa, E. B., & Franklin, M. E. (2003). Exposure and ritual prevention for
 obsessive-compulsive disorder: Effects of intensive versus twice-weekly sessions.
 Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 71, 394-398. 
doi:10.1037/0022006X.71.2.394 
Abramowitz, J. S., Khandker, M., Nelson, C. A., Deacon, B. J., & Rygwall, R. (2006). The
 role of cognitive factors in the pathogenesis of obsessive-compulsive symptoms: A
 prospective study. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 44, 1361-1374.
 doi:10.1016/j.brat.2005.09.011 
Abramowitz, J. S., Lackey, G. R., & Wheaton, M. G. (2009). Obsessive-compulsive
 symptoms: The contribution of obsessional beliefs and experiential avoidance.
 Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 23, 160-166. doi:10.1016/j.janxdis.2008.06.003 
Abramowitz, J. S., Nelson, C. A., Rygwall, R., & Khandker, M. (2007). The cognitive
 mediation of obsessive-compulsive symptoms: A longitudinal study. Journal of
 Anxiety Disorders, 21, 91-104. doi:10.1016/j.janxdis.2006.05.003 
Abramowitz, J. S., Tolin, D. F., & Diefenbach, G. J. (2005). Measuring change in OCD:
 Sensitivity of the Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised. Journal of
 Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, 27, 317-324. 
doi:10.1007/s10862-005-2411-y 
Abramowitz, J. S., Whiteside, S., Lynam, D., & Kalsy, S. (2003). Is thought-action fusion
 specific to obsessive-compulsive disorder?: A mediating role of negative affect.




Aelterman, N., De Clercq, B., De Bolle, M., & De Fruyt, F. (2011). General and maladaptive
 personality dimensions in pediatric obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Child
 Psychiatry and Human Development, 42, 24-41. doi:10.1007/s10578-010-0199-9 
Allen, P., & Bennett, K. (2008). SPSS for the health and behavioural sciences. Melbourne,
 Australia: Thomson. 
Allgulander, C., Cloninger, C. R., Przybeck, T. R., & Brandt, L. (1998). Changes on the
 temperament and character inventory after paroxetine treatment in volunteers with
 generalised anxiety disorder. Psychopharmacology Bulletin, 34, 165-166.
 doi:10.1007/s10578-010-0199-9 
Alonso, P., Menchon, J. M., Jimenez, S., Segalas, J., Mataix-Cols, D., Jaurrieta, N., … Pujol
 J. (2008). Personality dimensions in obsessive-compulsive disorder: Relation to
 clinical variables. Psychiatry Research, 157(1-3), 159-168. 
Altin, M., & Gencoz, T. (2011). How does thought-action fusion relate to responsibility
 attitudes and thought suppression to aggravate the obsessive-compulsive symptoms?
 Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 39, 99-114.
 doi:10.1017/S1352465810000524 
Altman, A. (2004). The impact of self-efficacy, catastrophizing, and pain intensity on
 psychological distress levels in individuals with chronic pain [Abstract]. Dissertation
 Abstracts International: Section B: The Sciences and Engineering, 65(1-B), 477. 
Amir, N., Cobb, M., & Morrison, A. S. (2008). Threat processing in obsessive-compulsive
 disorder: Evidence from a modified negative priming task. Behaviour Research and
 Therapy, 46, 728-736. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2008.03.001 
Amir, N., McNally, R. J., Riemann, B. C., & Clements, C. (1996). Implicit memory bias for
 threat in panic disorder: Application of the white noise paradigm. Behaviour Research
 and Therapy, 34, 157-162. doi:10.1016/0005-7967(95)00054-2 
Amir, N., Najmi, S., & Morrison, A. S. (2009). Attenuation of attention bias in obsessive
 compulsive disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 47, 153-157.
 doi:10.1016/j.brat.2008.10.020 
Amir, N., Weber, G., Beard, C., Bomyea, J., & Taylor, C. T. (2008). The effect of a single-
 session attention modification program on response to a public-speaking challenge in




American Psychiatric Association. (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental
 disorder (4
th
 ed. text revision). Washington, DC: Author.  
Andrews, G., Creamer, M., Crino, R., Hunt, C., Lampe, L., & Page, A. (2003). The treatment
 of anxiety disorders: Clinician guides and patient manuals (2
nd
 ed.). Cambridge, U.K:
 Cambridge University Press. 
Angst, J. (1994). The epidemiology of obsessive-compulsive disorder. In E. Hollander, J.
 Zohar, D. Marazziti, & B. Oliver (Eds.), Current insights in obsessive-compulsive
 disorder (pp. 93-104). Chichester, NY: John Wiley. 
Arean, P. A. (2009). Problem-solving therapy. Psychiatric Annals, 39, 854-862.
 doi:10.392800485713-20090821-01 
Arntz, A., Voncken, M., & Goosen, A. C. A. (2007). Responsibility and obsessive-
 compulsive disorder: An experimental test. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 45,
 425-435. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2006.03.016 
Bandura, A. (1977).  Self-efficacy: Toward a unifying theory of behavioral change.
 Psychological Review, 84(2), 191-215. 
Bandura, A. (1997). Self-efficacy: The exercise of control. New York, NY: Freeman. 
Bannan, N. (2010). Group-based problem-solving therapy in self-poisoning females: A pilot
 study. Counselling and Psychotherapy Research, 10, 201-213.
 doi:10.1080/14733140903337292 
Bar-Haim, Y., Lamy, D., Pergamin, L., Bakermans-Kranenburg, M. J. & van Ijzendoorn, M.
 H. (2007). Threat-related attentional bias in anxious and non-anxious individuals: A
 meta-analytic study. Psychological Bulletin, 133, 1-24. 
doi:10.1037/0033-2909.133.1.1 
Beck, A. T., & Clark, D. A. (1997). An information processing model of anxiety: Automatic
 and strategic processes. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 35, 49-58.
 doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(96)00069-1 
Beck, A. T., Emery, G., & Greenberg, R. L. (1985). Anxiety disorders and phobias. New
 York, NY: Basic Books. 
Beck, J. G., Novy, D. M., Diefenbach, G. J., Stanley, M. A., Averill, P. M., & Swann, A. C.
 (2003). Differentiating anxiety and depression in older adults with generalized anxiety
 disorder. Psychological Assessment, 15, 184-192. doi:10.1037/1040-3590.15.2.184 
Belloch, A., Morillo, C., Luciano, J. V., Garcia-Soriano, G., Cabedo, E., & Carrio, C. (2010).
 Dysfunctional belief domains related to obsessive-compulsive disorder: A further
191 
 
 examination of their dimensionality and specificity. The Spanish Journal of
 Psychology, 13, 376-388. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2006.03.016 
Benet-Martnez, V., & Karakitapoglu-Aygun, Z. (2003). The interplay of cultural syndromes
 and personality in predicting life satisfaction: Comparing Asian Americans and
 European Americans. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 34, 38-60.
 doi:10.1177/0022022102239154 
Benight, C. C., & Bandura, A. (2004). Social cognitive theory of posttraumatic recovery: The
 role of perceived self-efficacy. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 42, 1129-1148.
 doi:10.1016/j.brat.2003.08.008 
Berenbaum, H., Thompson, R. J., & Bredemeier, K. (2007). Perceived threat: Exploring its
 association with worry and its hypothesized antecedents. Behaviour Research and
 Therapy, 45, 2473-2482. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2007.03.015 
Berenbaum, H., Thompson, R. J., & Pomerantz, E. (2007). The relation between worrying
 and concerns: The importance of perceived probability and cost. Behaviour Research
 and Therapy, 45, 301-311. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2006.03.009 
Blais, A., & Weber, E. U. (2006). A domain-specific risk-taking (DOSPERT) scale for adult
 populations. Judgment and Decision Making, 1(1), 33-47. 
Bobes, J., Gonzalez, M. P., Bascaran, M. T., Arango, C., Saiz, P. A., & Bousono, M. (2001).
 Quality of life and disability in patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder.
 European Psychiatry, 16, 239-245. doi:10.1016/s0924-9338(01)00571-5 
Boekaerts, M. (1991). Subjective competence, appraisals and self-assessment. Learning and
 Instruction, 1, 1-17. doi:10.1016/0959-4752(91)90016-2 
Bogels, S. M., & Zigterman, D. (2000). Dysfunctional cognitions in children with social
 phobia, separation anxiety disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder. Journal of
 Abnormal and Child Psychology, 28(2), 205-211. 
Bouchard, C., Rheaume, J., & Ladouceur, R. (1999). Responsibility and perfectionism in
 OCD: An experimental study. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 37, 239-248.
 doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(98)00141-7 
Bouchard, S., Gauthier, J., Nouwen, A., Ivers, H., Vallieres, A., Simard, S., & Fournier, T.
 (2007). Temporal relationship between dysfunctional beliefs, self-efficacy and panic
 apprehension in the treatment of panic disorder with agoraphobia. Journal of
 Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 38, 275-292.
 doi:10.1016/j.jbtep.2006.08.002  
192 
 
Brown, T. A., White, K. S., Forsyth, J. P., & Barlow, D. H. (2004). The structure of
 perceived emotional control: Psychometric properties of a revised anxiety control
 questionnaire. Behavior Therapy, 35, 75-99. doi:10.1016/S0005-7894(04)80005-4 
Brun, W. (1992). Cognitive components in risk perception: Natural versus manmade risks.
 Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 5(2), 117-132.   
Brune, M. (2006). The evolutionary psychology of obsessive-compulsive disorder: The role
 of cognitive metarepresentation. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, 49(3), 317-
 329. 
Buhi, E. R., Goodson, P., & Neilands, T. B. (2008) Out of sight, not out of mind: Strategies
 for handling missing data. American Journal of Health Behavior, 32(1), 83-92. 
Burns, G. L., Keortge, S. G., Formea, G. M., & Sternberger, L. G. (1996). Revision of the
 Padua inventory of obsessive compulsive disorder symptoms: Distinctions between
 worry, obsessions, and compulsions. Behavior Research and Therapy, 34, 163-
 173. doi:10.1016/0005-7967(95)00035-6 
Butler, G., & Mathews, A. (1983). Cognitive processes in anxiety. Advances in Behaviour
 Research & Therapy, 5, 51-62. doi:10.1016/0146-6402(83)90015-2 
Butler, G., & Matthews, A. (1987). Anticipatory anxiety and risk perception. Cognitive
 Therapy and Research, 11, 551-565. doi:10.1007/BF01183858 
Calleo, J. S., Hart, J., Bjorgvinsson, T., & Stanley, M. A. (2010). Obsessions and worry
 beliefs in an inpatient OCD population. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 24, 903-908.
 doi:10.1016/j.janxdis.2010.06.015 
Cano-Vindel, A., Miguel-Tobal, J. J., Gonzalez-Ordi, H., & Iruarrizaga, I (2009). Arousal
 versus threat when inducing an anxiety reaction [Abstract]. Psicothema, 21(2), 177. 
Carmin, C. N. (2005). The role of cognitions in OCD treatment: Toward rapprochement.
 Cognitive Behaviour Therapy, 34, 193-200. doi:10.1080/16506070510043769 
Carr, A. T. (1971). Compulsive neurosis: Two psychophysiological studies. Bulletin of the
 British Psychological Society, 24, 256-257. 
Carr, A. T. (1974). Compulsive neurosis: A review of the literature. Psychological Bulletin,
 81(5), 311-318. 
Casey, L. M., Oei, T. P. S., & Newcombe, P. A. (2004). An integrated model of panic
 disorder: The role of positive and negative cognitions. Clinical Psychology Review,
 24, 529-555. doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2004.01.005 
193 
 
Casey, L. M., Oei, T. P. S., Newcombe, P. A., & Kenardy, J. (2004). The role of catastrophic
 misinterpretation of bodily sensations and panic self-efficacy in predicting panic
 severity. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 18, 325-340. 
doi:10.1016/S0887-6185(02)00257-8  
Catapano, F., Perris, F., Masella, M., Rossano, F., Cigliano, M., Magliano, L., & Maj, M.
 (2006). Obsessive-compulsive disorder: A 3-year prospective follow-up study of
 patients treated with serotonin reuptake inhibitors. Journal of Psychiatric Research,
 40, 502-510. doi:10.1016/j.jpsychires.2005.04.010 
Chamberlain, S. R., & Menzies, L. (2009). Endophenotypes of obsessive compulsive
 disorder: Rationale, evidence and future potential. Expert Review of
 Neurotherapeutics, 9, 1133-1146. doi:10.1586/ERN.09.36 
Cheung, E., & Mikels, J. A. (2011). I'm feeling lucky: The relationship between affect and
 risk-seeking in the framing effect. Emotion, 11, 852-859. doi:10.1037/a0022854 
Chik, H. M., Calamari, J. E., Rector, N. A., & Riemann, B. C. (2010). What do low-
 dysfunctional beliefs obsessive-compulsive disorder subgroups believe? Journal of
 Anxiety Disorders, 24, 837-846. doi:10.1016/j.janxdis.2010.06.006 
Cho, S., Jung, S., Kim, B., Hwang, J., Shin, M., Kim, J., … Kim, H. W. (2008).
 Temperament and character among Korean children and adolescents with anxiety
 disorders. European Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 18, 60-64.
 doi:10.1007/s00787-008-0699-3 
Cicolini, T., & Rees, C. S. (2003). Measuring risk-taking in obsessive-compulsive disorder:
 An extension of the Everyday Risk Inventory with an Australian sample. Behavioural
 and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 31, 247-259. doi:10.1017/S1352465803003023 
Cieslak, R., Benight, C. C., & Lehman, V. C. (2008). Coping self-efficacy mediates the
 effects of negative cognitions on posttraumatic distress. Behaviour Research and
 Therapy, 46, 788-798. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2008.03.007 
Cisler, J. M., & Koster, E. H. W. (2010). Mechanisms of attentional biases towards threat in
 anxiety disorders: An integrative review. Clinical Psychology Review, 30, 203-216.
 doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2009.11.003 
Cisler, J. M., & Olatunji, B. O. (2010). Components of attentional biases in contamination
 fear: Evidence for difficulty in disengagement. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 48,
 74-78. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2009.09.003 
194 
 
Clark, D. A. (2005). Focus on “cognition” in cognitive behavior therapy for OCD: Is it really
 necessary? Cognitive Behaviour Therapy, 34, 131-139.
 doi:10.1080/16506070510041194 
Clark, D. A., & Purdon, C. (1993). New perspectives for a cognitive theory of obsessions.
 Australian Psychologist, 28(3), 161-167. 
Clark, D. M. (1986). A cognitive approach to panic. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 24,
 461-470. doi:10.1016/0005-7967(86)90011-2 
Clark, L. A. (1993). Manual for the Schedule of Nonadaptive and Adaptive Personality.
 Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 
Clayton, I. C., Richards, J. C., & Edwards, C. J. (1999). Selective attention in obsessive-
 compulsive disorder. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 108, 171-175. 
doi:10.1037/0021-843X.108.1.171 
Cloitre, M., Heimberg, R. G., Liebowitz, M. R., & Gitow, A. (1992). Perceptions of control
 in panic disorder and social phobia. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 16, 569-577.
 doi:10.1007/BF01175142 
Cloninger, C. R. (1987). A systematic method for clinical description and classification of
 personality variants: A proposal. Archives of General Psychiatry, 44(6), 573-588. 
Cloninger, C. R. (1994). The Temperament and Character Inventory (TCI): A guide to its
 development and use. St Loius, MO: Washington University. 
Cloninger, C. R., Svrakic, D. M., & Przybeck, T. R. (1993). A psychobiological model of
 temperament and character. Archives of General Psychiatry, 50(12), 975-990. 
Coakes, S. J., & Steed, L. G. (1999). SPSS analysis without anguish. Brisbane, Australia:
 John Wiley and Sons. 
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences (2
nd
 ed.). Hillsdale,
 NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Coles, M. E., Turk, C. L., & Heimberg, R. G. (2007). Memory bias for threat in generalized
 anxiety disorder: The potential importance of stimulus relevance. Cognitive
 Behaviour Therapy, 36, 65-73. doi:10.1080/16506070601070459 
Conley, T. D., & Peplau, L. A. (2010). Gender and perceptions of romantic partners’ sexual
 risk. Journal of Sexual Medicine, 7, 794-802. doi:10.1111/j.1743-6109.2009.01598.x 
Constans, J. I., & Mathews, A. M. (1993). Mood and the subjective risk of future events.
 Cognition and Emotion, 7, 545-560. doi:10.1080/02699939308409205 
Corchs, F., Corregiari, F., Ferrao, Y. A., Takakura, T., Mathis, M. E., Lopes, A. C., …
 Bernik, M. (2008). Personality traits and treatment outcome in obsessive-compulsive
195 
 
 disorder. Revista Brasileira de Psquitria, 30, 246-250. Retrieved from
 http://www.scielo.br/pdf/rbp/v30n3/a12v30n3.pdf 
Corruble, E., Duret, C., Pelissolo, A., Falissard, B., & Guelfi, J. D. (2002). Early and delayed
 personality changes associated with depression recovery? A one-year follow-up study.
 Psychiatry Research, 109, 17-25. doi:10.1016/S0165-1781(01)00366-3 
Costa, P. T., & McCrae, R. R. (1992). Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R) and
 NEO Five-Factor Inventory: Professional manual. Odessa, FL: Psychological
 Assessment Resources. 
Cottraux, J., Bouvard, M. A., & Milliery, M. (2005). Combining pharmacotherapy with
 cognitive-behavioral interventions for obsessive-compulsive disorder. Cognitive
 Behaviour Therapy, 34, 185-192. doi:10.1080/16506070510043750 
Cottraux, J., & Gerard, D. (1998). Neuroimaging and neuroanatomical issues in obsessive-
 compulsive disorder: Towards an integrative model – perceived impulsivity. In R. P.
 Swinson, M. M. Anthony, S. Rachman, & M. A. Richter (Eds.), Obsessive-
 compulsive disorder: Theory, research, and treatment (pp. 154-180). New York, NY:
 Guilford Press. 
Cougle, J. R., Lee, H. J., & Salkovskis, P. M. (2007). Are responsibility beliefs inflated in
 non-checking OCD patients? Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 21, 153-159.
 doi:10.1016/j.janxdis.2006.03.012 
Cougle, J. R., Salkovskis, P. M., & Thorpe, S. J. (2008). “Perhaps you only imagined doing
 it”: Reality-monitoring in obsessive-compulsive checkers using semi-ideographic
 stimuli. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 39, 305-320.
 doi:10.1016/j.jbtep.2007.08.001 
Crawford, J. R., & Henry, J. D. (2004). The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
 (PANAS): Construct validity, measurement properties and normative data in a large
 non-clinical sample. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 43(3), 245-265. 
Crocker, P. R. E. (1997). A confirmatory factor analysis of the Positive Affect Negative
 Affect Schedule (PANAS) with a youth sport sample. Journal of Sport and Exercise
 Psychology, 19(1), 91-97. 
Cruz-Fuentes, C., Blas, C., Gonzalez, L., Camarena, B., & Nicolini, H. (2004). Severity of
 obsessive-compulsive symptoms is related to self-directedness character trait in
 obsessive-compulsive disorder. CNS Spectrums, 9(8), 607-612. 
196 
 
Dar, R., Rish, S., Hermesh, H., Taub, M., & Fux, M. (2000). Realism of confidence in
 obsessive-compulsive checkers. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 109, 673-678.
 doi:10.1037/0021-843X.109.4.673 
De Cort, K., Hermans, D., Spruyt, A., Griez, E., & Schruers, K. (2008). A specific attentional
 bias in panic disorder? Depression and Anxiety, 25, 951-955.
 doi:10.1002/da.20376 
de Jong, P. J., & Peters, M. L. (2005). Do blushing phobics overestimate the
 undesirable communicative effects of their blushing? Behaviour Research and
 Therapy, 43, 747-758. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2004.06.005 
de Jonge, P., & Slaets, J. P. J. (2005). Response sets in self-report data and their associations
 with personality traits. The European Journal of Psychiatry, 19(4), 209-214. 
Dell’Osso, L., Rucci, P., Cassano, G. B., Maser, J. D., Endicott, J., Shear, K. M., … Frank, E.
 (2002). Measuring social anxiety and obsessive-compulsive spectra: Comparison of
 interviews and self-report instruments. Comprehensive Psychiatry, 43, 81-87.
 doi:10.1053/comp.2002.30795 
Demaree, H. A., DeDonna, M. A., Burns, K. J., & Everhart, D. E. (2008). You bet: How
 personality differences affect risk-taking preferences. Personality and Individual
 Differences, 44, 1484-1494. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2008.01.005 
Derogatis, L. R. (1977). SCL-90 administration, scoring and procedures manual - I.
 Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins. 
Diamantopoulos, A., & Siguaw, J. A. (2000). Introducing Lisrel: A guide for the uninitiated.
 London, UK: Sage Publications Ltd. 
Doron, G., & Kyrios, M. (2005). Obsessive compulsive disorder: A review of possible
 specific internal representations within a broader cognitive theory. Clinical
 Psychology Review, 25, 415-432. doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2005.02.002 
Doron, G., Kyrios, M., & Moulding, R. (2007). Sensitive domains of self-concept in
 obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD): Further evidence for a multidimensional
 model of OCD. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 21, 433-444.
 doi:10.1016/j.janxdis.2006.05.008 
Dorsey, A. M., Miller, K. I., & Scherer, C. W. (1999). Communication, risk behavior and
 perceptions of threat and efficacy: A test of a reciprocal model. Journal of Applied
 Communication Research, 27, 377-395. doi:10.1080/00909889909365546 
Drabant, E. M., Kuo, J. R., Ramel, W., Blechert, J., Edge, M. D., Cooper, J. R., ... Gross, J. J.
 (2011). Experiential, autonomic, and neural responses during threat anticipation
197 
 
 vary as a function of threat intensity and neuroticism. Neuroimage, 55, 401-410.
 doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.11.040 
Dyck, M. J., Jolly, J. B., & Kramer, T. (1994). An evaluation of positive affectivity, negative
 affectivity, and hyperarousal as markers for assessing between syndrome
 relationships. Personality and Individual Differences, 17, 637-646.  
doi:10.1016/0191-8869(94)90136-8 
D’Zurilla, T. J., & Nezu, A. M. (2010). Problem-solving therapy. In K. S. Dobson (Ed.),
 Handbook of cognitive-behavioral therapies (3
rd
 ed.) (pp. 197-225). New York, NY:
 Guilford Press. 
Egan, S. J., Wade, T. D., & Shafran, R. (2011). Perfectionism as a transdiagnostic process: A
 clinical review. Clinical Psychology Review, 31, 203-212. 
doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2010.04.009 
Ehlers, A. (2002). Cognitive factors in panic attacks: Symptom probability and sensitivity. In
 R. L. Leahy & T. E. Dowd (Eds.), Clinical advances in cognitive psychotherapy:
 Theory and application (pp. 240-258). New York, NY: Springer Publishing
 Company. 
Ehlers, A., & Breuer, P. (1995). Selective attention to physical threat in subjects with panic
 attacks and specific phobias. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 9, 11-31.
 doi:10.1016/0887-6185(94)00025-6 
Ehntholt, K. A., Salkovskis, P. M., & Rimes, K. A. (1999). Obsessive-compulsive disorder,
 anxiety disorders, and self-esteem: An exploratory study. Behaviour Research and
 Therapy, 37, 771-781. doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(98)00177-6 
Eisen, J. L., Mancebo, M. A., Pinto, A., Coles, M. E., Pagano, M. E., Stout, R., &
 Rasmussen, S. A. (2006). Impact of obsessive-compulsive disorder on quality of life.
 Comprehensive Psychiatry, 47, 270-275. doi:10.1016/j.comppsych.2005.11.006 
Eisenberg, A. E., Baron, J., & Seligman, M. E. P. (1998). Individual differences in risk-
 aversion and anxiety. Unpublished manuscript, University of Pennsylvania. 
Eldar, S., Yankelevitch, R., Lamy, D., & Bar-Haim, Y. (2010). Enhanced neural reactivity
 and selective attention to threat in anxiety. Biological Psychology, 85, 252-257.
 doi:10.1016/j.biopsycho.2010.07.010 
Endrass, T., Kloft, L., Kaufmann, C., & Kathmann, N. (2011). Approach and avoidance




Ettelt, S., Grabe, H. J., Ruhrmann, S., Buhtz, F., Hochrein, A., Kraft, S., … Wagner, M.
 (2008). Harm avoidance in subjects with obsessive-compulsive disorder and their
 families. Journal of Affective Disorders, 107, 265-269. doi:10.1016/j.jad.2007.08.017 
Etter, J. (2010). Smoking and Cloninger’s temperament and character inventory. Nicotine &
 Tobacco Research, 12, 919-926. doi:10.1093/ntr/ntq116 
Fairfax, H. (2008). The use of mindfulness in obsessive-compulsive disorder: Suggestions for
 its application and integration in existing treatment. Clinical Psychology and
 Psychotherapy, 15, 53-59. doi:10.1002/cpp.557 
Faull, M., Joseph, S., Meaden, A., & Lawrence, T. (2004). Obsessive beliefs and their
 relation to obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Clinical Psychology & Psychotherapy,
 11, 158-167. doi:10.1002/cpp.403 
Feldner, M. T., & Hekmat, H. (2001). Perceived control over anxiety-related events as a
 predictor of pain behaviors in a cold pressor task. Journal of Behavior Therapy and
 Experimental Psychiatry, 32, 191-202. doi:10.1016/S0005-7916(01)00034-9 
Feygin, D. L., Swain, J. E., & Leckman, J. F. (2006). The normalcy of neurosis: Evolutionary
 origins of obsessive-compulsive disorder and related behaviors. Progress in Neuro
 Psychopharmacology and Biological Psychiatry, 30, 854-864.
 doi:10.1016/j.pnpbp.2006.01.009 
Field, A. P., & Lester, K. J. (2010). Is there room for ‘development’ in developmental models
 of information processing biases to threat in children and adolescents? Clinical Child
 and Family Psychology Review, 13, 315-332. doi:10.1007/s10567-010-0078-8 
Fineberg, N. A., Fourie, H., Gale, T. M., & Sivakumaran, T. (2005). Comorbid depression in
 obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD): Symptomatic differences to major depressive
 disorder. Journal of Affective Disorders, 87, 327-330. doi:10.1016/j.jad.2005.04.004  
Finucane, M. L., Alhakami, A., Slovic, P., & Johnson, S. M. (2000). The affect heuristic in
 judgments of risks and benefits. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 13(1), 1-17. 
First, M. B., Spitzer, R. L., Gibbon, M. & Williams, J. B. W. (1996). Structured Clinical
 Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders (SCID-I/P, Version 2.0). (Patient ed.). New
 York, NY: Biometrics Research Department, New York State Psychiatric Institute. 
Foa, E. B., Amir, N., Bogert, K. V. A., Molnar, C., & Przeworski, A. (2001). Inflated
 perception of responsibility for harm in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Anxiety
 Disorders, 15, 259-275. doi:10.1016/S0887-6185(01)00062-7 
199 
 
Foa, E. B., & Franklin, M. E. (2001). Obsessive-compulsive disorder. In D. H. Barlow (Ed.),
 Clinical handbook: A step-by-step treatment manual (pp.209-253). New York, NY:
 Guilford Press. 
Foa, E. B., Franklin, M. E., & Kozak, M. J. (1998). Psychosocial treatments for obsessive
 compulsive disorder: Literature review. In R. P. Swinson, M. M. Anthony, S.
 Rachman, & M. A. Richter (Eds.), Obsessive-compulsive disorder: Theory, research,
 and treatment (pp.258-276). New York, NY: Guilford Press. 
Foa, E. B., Franklin, M. E., Perry, K. J., & Herbert, J. D. (1996). Cognitive biases in
 generalized social phobia. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 105(3), 433-439. 
Foa, E. B., Huppert, J. D., Leiberg, S., Langner, R., Kichic, R., Hajcak, G., & Salkovskis, P.
 (2002). The Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory: Development and validation of a short
 version. Psychological Assessment, 14, 485-496. doi:10.1037//1040-3590.14.4.485 
Foa, E. B., Ilai, D., McCarthy, P. R., Shoyer, B., & Murdock, T. (1993). Information
 processing in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 17,
 173-189. doi:10.1007/BF01172964 
Foa, E. B., & Kozak, M. J. (1986). Emotional processing of fear: Exposure to corrective
 information. Psychological Bulletin, 99(1), 20-35. 
Foa, E. B., Liebowitz, M. R., Kozac, M. J., Davies, S., Campeas, R., Franklin, M. E., ... Tu,
 X. (2005). Randomized, placebo-controlled trial of exposure and ritual prevention,
 clomipramine, and their combination in the treatment of obsessive-compulsive
 disorder. The American Journal of Psychiatry, 162(1), 151-161. 
Foa, E. B., Mathews, A., Abramowitz, J. S., Amir, N., Przeworski, A., Filip, J. C., & Alley,
 A. (2003). Do patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder have deficits in decision
 making? Cognitive Therapy and Research, 27(4), 431-445. 
Foa, E. B., & McNally, R. J. (1986). Sensitivity to feared stimuli in obsessive-compulsives: A
 dichotic listening analysis. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 10, 477-485.
 doi:10.1007/BF01173299 
Folkman, S., & Moskowitz, J. T. (2004). Coping: Pitfalls and promise. Annual Review of
 Psychology, 55, 745-774. doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.55.090902.141456 
Fontenelle, L. F., Mendlowicz, M., Marques, C., & Versiani, M. (2004). Trans-cultural
 aspects of obsessive-compulsive disorder: A description of a Brazilian sample and a
 systematic review of international clinical studies. Journal of Psychiatric Research,
 38, 403-411. doi:10.1016/j.jpsychires.2003.12.004 
200 
 
Friedman, S., Smith, L. C., Halpern, B., Levine, C. Paradis, C., Viswanathan, R., …
 Ackerman, R. (2003). Obsessive-compulsive disorder in a multi-ethnic urban
 outpatient clinic: Initial presentation and treatment outcome with exposure and ritual
 prevention. Behavior Therapy, 34(3), 397-410. doi:10.1016/S0005-7894(03)80008-4 
Frost, R. O., & Steketee, G. (1997). Perfectionism in obsessive-compulsive disorder patients.
 Behaviour Research and Therapy, 35, 291-296. doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(96)00108-8 
Frost, R.O., & Steketee, G. (2002). Cognitive approaches to obsessions and compulsions:
 Theory, assessment and treatment. Oxford, UK: Elsevier. 
Frost, R. O., Steketee, G., Cohn, L., & Griess, K. (1994). Personality traits in subclinical and
 non-obsessive-compulsive volunteers and their parents. Behaviour Research and
 Therapy, 32, 47-56. doi:10.1016/0005-7967(94)90083-3 
Fullana, M. A., Mataix-Cols, D., Trujillo, J. L., Caseras, X., Serrano, F., Alonso, P., …
 Torrubia, R. (2004). Personality characteristics in obsessive-compulsive disorder and
 individuals with subclinical obsessive-compulsive problems. British Journal of
 Clinical Psychology, 43(4), 387-398. 
Fullana, M. A., Tortella-Feliu, M., Caseras, X., Andion, O., Torrubia, R., & Mataix-Cols, D.
 (2005). Psychometric properties of the Spanish version of the Obsessive-Compulsive
 Inventory-Revised in a non-clinical sample. Anxiety Disorders, 19, 893-903.
 doi:10.1016/j.janxdis.2004.10.004 
Garratt-Reed, D. (2004). Can cognitive-behaviour therapy reduce everyday risk-aversion in
 OCD? Unpublished honour’s dissertation, Curtin University of Technology, Western
 Australia, Australia. 
Gasper, K., & Clore, G. L. (1998). The persistent use of negative affect by anxious
 individuals to estimate risk. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74(5),
 1350-1363. 
Gaudreau, P., Sanchez, X., & Blondin, J-P. (2006). Positive and negative affective states in a
 performance-related setting: Testing the factorial structure of the PANAS across two
 samples of French-Canadian participants. European Journal of Psychological
 Assessment, 22, 240-249. doi:10.1027/1015-5759.22.4.240 
Geer, J. H., Davidson, G. C., & Gatchel, R. J. (1970). Reduction of stress in humans through
 nonveridical perceived control of aversive stimulation. Journal of Personality and
 Social Psychology, 16(4), 731-738. 
Gentes, E.L., & Ruscio, A. M. (2011). A meta-analysis of the relation of intolerance of
 uncertainty to symptoms of generalized anxiety disorder, major depressive disorder,
201 
 
 and obsessive-compulsive disorder. Clinical Psychology Review, 31, 923-933.
 doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2011.05.001 
Gladstone, G. L., Parker, G. B., Mitchell, P. B., Wilhelm, K. A., & Malhi, G. S. (2005).
 Relationship between self-reported childhood behavioral inhibition and lifetime
 anxiety disorders in a clinical sample. Depression and Anxiety, 22, 103-113.
 doi:10.1002/da.20082 
Glinski, K., & Page, A. C. (2010). Modifiability of neuroticism, extraversion, and
 agreeableness by group cognitive behaviour therapy for social anxiety disorder.
 Behaviour Change, 27(1), 42-52. 
Gonner, S., Hahn, S., Leonhart, R., Ecker, W., & Limbacher, K. (2009). Identification of
 main symptoms in OCD patients by use of symptom scales: Criterion validity and
 diagnostic accuracy of the OCI-R [Abstract]. Verhaltenstherapie, 19(4), 251. 
Gonner, S., Leonhart, R., & Ecker, W. (2008). The Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised
 (OCI-R): Validation of the German version in a sample of patients with OCD, anxiety
 disorders, and depressive disorder. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 22, 734-749.
 doi:10.1016/j.janxdis.2007.07.007 
Goodman, W. K., Price, L. H., Rasmussen, S. A., Mazure, C., Fleischmann, R. L., Hill, C. L.,
 … Charney, D. S. (1989). The Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale: I.
 Development, use, and reliability. Archives of General Psychiatry, 46(11), 1006-
 1011. 
Gothelf, D., Aharonovsky, O., Horesh, N., Carty, T., & Apter, A. (2004). Life events and
 personality factors in children and adolescents with obsessive-compulsive disorder
 and other anxiety disorders. Comprehensive Psychiatry, 45, 192-198.
 doi:10.1016/j.comppsych.2004.02.010 
Grayson, J. B. (2010). OCD and intolerance of uncertainty: Treatment issues. Journal of
 Cognitive Psychotherapy: An International Quarterly, 24, 3-15. 
doi:10.1891/0889-8391.24.1.3 
Greenberg, D., & Witzum, E. (1994). Cultural aspects of obsessive-compulsive disorder. In
 E. Hollander, J. Zohar, D. Marazziti, & B. Oliver (Eds.), Current insights in
 obsessive-compulsive disorder (pp. 11-22). Chichester, NY: John Wiley. 
Grisham, J. R., & Williams, A. D. (2009). Cognitive control of obsessional thoughts.
 Behaviour Research and Therapy, 47, 395-402. doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2009.01.014  
Gross, R., Sasson, Y., Chopra, M., & Zohar, J. (1998). Biological models of obsessive-
 compulsive disorder: The serotonin hypothesis. In R. P. Swinson, M. M. Anthony, S.
202 
 
 Rachman, & M. A. Richter (Eds.), Obsessive-compulsive disorder: Theory, research,
 and treatment (pp.141-153). New York, NY: Guilford Press. 
Guidano, V. F., & Liotti, G. (1983). Cognitive processes and emotional disorders. New
 York, NY: Guilford Press. 
Gulec, M. Y. (2010). Temperament and character in psychosomatic disorders [Abstract].
 Psikiyatride Guncel Yaklasimlar, 1(3), 201. 
Hajcak, G., Huppert, J. D., Simons, R. F., & Foa, E. B. (2004). Psychometric properties of
 the OCI-R in a college sample. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 42, 115-123.
 doi:10.1016/j.brat.2003.08.002 
Hall. P. L., & Tarrier, N. (2003). The cognitive-behavioural treatment of low self-esteem in
 psychotic patients: A pilot study. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 41, 317-332.
 doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(02)00013-X 
Halvorsen, M., Wang, C. E., Richter, J., Myrland, I., Pedersen, S. K., Eisemann, M., &
 Waterloo, K. (2009). Early maladaptive schemas, temperament and character traits in
 clinically depressed and previously depressed subjects. Clinical Psychology and
 Psychotherapy, 16, 394-407. doi:10.1002/cpp.618 
Harrison, G. W., Lau, M. I., & Rutstrom, E. (2009). Risk attitudes, randomization to
 treatment, and self-selection into experiments. Journal of Economic Behavior &
 Organization, 70, 498-507. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2008.02.011 
Hayton, J. C., Allen, D. G., & Scarpello, V. (2004). Factor retention decisions in exploratory
 factor analysis: A tutorial on parallel analysis. Organizational Research Methods, 7,
 191-205. doi:10.1177/1094428104263675 
Hazen, R. A., Vasey, M. W., & Schmidt, N. B. (2009). Attentional retraining: A randomized
 clinical trial for pathological worry. Journal of Psychiatric Research, 43, 627-633.
 doi:10.1016/j.jpsychires.2008.07.004 
Helson, R., Kwan, V. S. Y., John, O. P., & Jones, C. (2002). The growing evidence for
 personality change in adulthood: Findings from research with personality
 inventories. Journal of Research in Personality, 36, 287-306. 
doi:10.1016/S0092-6566(02)00010-7 
Henselmans, I., Fleer, J., de Vries, J., Bass, P. C., Sanderman, R., & Ranchor, A. V. (2010).
 The adaptive effect of personal control when facing breast cancer: Cognitive and




Hermans, D., Martens, K., De Cort, K., Pieters, G., & Eelen, P. (2003). Reality monitoring
 and metacognitive beliefs related to cognitive confidence in obsessive-compulsive
 disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 41, 383-401. 
doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(02)00015-3 
Himle, M. B., & Franklin, M. E. (2009). The more you do it, the easier it gets: Exposure and
 response prevention for OCD. Cognitive and Behavioral Practice, 16, 29-39.
 doi:10.1016/j.cbpra.2008.03.002 
Hobson, C. J & Delunas, L. (2001). National norms and life-event frequencies for the revised
 Social Readjustment Rating Scale. International Journal of Stress Management, 8(4),
 299-314. 
Hodgson, R. J., & Rachman, S. (1977). Obsessional-compulsive complaints. Behaviour
 Research and Therapy, 15, 389-395. doi:10.1016/0005-7967(77)90042-0 
Hoffart, A. (1995a). A comparison of cognitive and guided mastery therapy of agoraphobia.
 Behaviour Research and Therapy, 33, 423-434. doi:10.1016/0005-7967(94)00056-P 
Hoffart, A. (1995b). Cognitive mediators of situation fear in agoraphobia. Journal of
 Behaviour Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 26, 313-320. 
doi:10.1016/0005-7916(95)00043-7 
Hoffart, A. (1998). Cognitive and guided mastery therapy of agoraphobia: Long-term
 outcome and mechanisms of change. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 22(3), 195-
 207. 
Hoffart, A., & Hedley, L. M. (1997). Personality traits among panic disorder with
 agoraphobia patients before and after symptom-focused treatment. Journal of
 Anxiety Disorders, 11, 77-87. doi:10.1016/S0887-6185(96)00036-9 
Hoffart, A., Sexton, H., Hedley, L. M., & Martinsen, E. W. (2008). Mechanisms of change in
 cognitive therapy for panic disorder with agoraphobia. Journal of Behavior Therapy
 and Experimental Psychiatry, 39, 262-275. doi:10.1016/j.jbtep.2007.07.006 
Holaway, R. M., Heimberg, R. G., & Coles, M. E. (2006). A comparison of intolerance of
 uncertainty in analogue obsessive-compulsive disorder and generalized anxiety
 disorder. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 20, 158-174
 doi:10.1016/j.janxdis.2005.01.002 
Hollander, E. (1997). Obsessive-compulsive disorder: The hidden epidemic. Journal of
 Clinical Psychiatry, 58(Suppl. 12), 3-6. 
Holmes, T. H., & Rahe, R. H. (1967). The Social Readjustment Rating Scale. Journal of
 Psychosomatic Research, 11, 213–218. doi:10.1016/0022-3999(67)90010-4 
204 
 
Hooper, D., Coughlan, J., & Mullen, M. (2008). Structural equation modelling: Guidelines
 for determining model fit. Electronic Journal of Business Research Methods, 6(1), 53-
 60. 
Horvath, P., & Zuckerman, M. (1993). Sensation seeking, risk appraisal, and risky behavior.
 Personality and Individual Differences, 14, 41-52. 
doi:10.1016/0191-8869(93)90173-Z 
Hruby, R., Nosalova, G., Ondrejka, I., & Preiss, M. (2009). Personality changes during
 antidepressant treatment. Psychiatria Danubina, 21, 25-32. Retrieved from
 http://hrcak.srce.hr 
Hu, L., & Bentler, P. M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure
 analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. Structural Equation
 Modelling, 6, 1-55. doi:10.1080/10705519909540118 
Huang, C. Y., Liao, H. Y., & Change, S. H. (1998). Social desirability and the clinical self-
 report inventory: Methodological reconsideration. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 54,
 517-528. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1097-4679 
Huppert, J. D., Walther, M. R., Hajcak, G., Yadin, E., Foa, E. B., Blair Simpson, H., &
 Liebowitz, M. R. (2007). The OCI-R: Validation of the subscales in a clinical sample.
 Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 21, 394-406. doi:10.1016/j.janxdis.2006.05.006 
Huynh, C., Guile, J. M., Breton, J. J., Desrosiers, L., & Cohen, D. (2010). The Cloninger’s
 psychobiological model of temperament and character in adult bipolar disorders: A
 literature review. Annales Medico-Psychologiques, 168, 325-332.
 doi:10.1016/j.amp.2010.03.015 
Irak, M., & Flament, M. F. (2009). Attention in sub-clinical obsessive-compulsive checkers.
 Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 23, 320-326. doi:10.1016/j.janxdis.2009.01.007 
Jackson, D. N. (1970). Jackson Personality Inventory manual. Port Huron, MI: Research
 Psychologists Press. 
Jones, M. K., & Menzies, R. G. (1997). The cognitive mediation of obsessive-compulsive
 handwashing. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 35, 843-850. 
doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(97)00035-1 
Jones, M. K., & Menzies, R. G. (1998a). Danger ideation reduction therapy (DIRT) for
 obsessive-compulsive washers. A controlled trial. Behaviour Research and Therapy,
 36, 959-970. doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(98)00057-6 
Jones, M. K., & Menzies, R. G. (1998b). Role of perceived danger in the mediation of
 obsessive-compulsive washing. Depression and Anxiety, 8, 121-125. 
205 
 
Julien, D., Careau, Y., O'Connor, K. P., Bouvard, M., Rheaume, J., Langlois, F., … Cottraux,
 J. (2008). Specificity of belief domains in OCD: Validation of the French version of
 the Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire and a comparison across samples. Journal of
 Anxiety Disorders, 22, 1029-1041. doi:10.1016/j.janxdis.2007.11.003 
Kaiser, B., Bouvard, M., & Milliery, M. (2010). Washing, checking, and rumination: Are the
 belief domains, obsessions and compulsions specific to OCD subtypes? [Abstract].
 L'Encephale: Revue de Psychiatrie Clinique Biologique et Therapeutique, 36(1), 54. 
Kampman, M., Keijsers, G. P. J., Verbraak, M. J. P. M., Naring, G., & Hoogduin, C. A. L.
 (2002). The emotional Stroop: A comparison of panic disorder patients, obsessive
 compulsive patients, and normal controls, in two experiments. Journal of Anxiety
 Disorders, 16, 425-441. doi:10.1016/S0887-6185(02)00127-5 
Karademas, E. C., & Kalantzi-Azizi, A. (2004).  The stress process, self-efficacy
 expectations, and psychological health. Personality and Individual Differences, 37,
 1033-1043. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2003.11.012 
Khodarahimi, S. (2009). Satiation therapy and exposure response prevention in the treatment
 of obsessive compulsive disorder. Journal of Contemporary Psychotherapy, 39,
 203-207. doi:10.1007/s10879-009-9110-z 
Khodarahimi, S., & Pole, N. (2010). Cognitive behavior therapy and worry reduction in an
 outpatient with generalized anxiety disorder. Clinical Case Studies, 9, 53-62.
 doi:10.1177/1534650109351306 
Kibler, J. L., & Lyons, J. A. (2004). Perceived coping ability mediates the relationship
 between PTSD severity and heart rate recovery in veterans. Journal of Traumatic
 Stress, 17, 23-29. doi:10.1023/B:JOTS.0000014672.16935.9c 
Kim, S. W. & Grant, J. E. (2001). Personality dimensions in pathological gambling disorder
 and obsessive-compulsive disorder. Psychiatry Research, 104, 205-212.
 doi:10.1016/S0165-1781(01)00327-4 
Kima, S. J., Kang, J. I., & Kima, C. (2009). Temperament and character in subjects with
 obsessive-compulsive disorder. Comprehensive Psychiatry, 50, 567-572.
 doi:10.1016/j.comppsych.2008.11.009 
Klein, D. N., D’ Zurilla, T. J., Black, S. R., Vivian, D., Dowling, F., Markowitz, J. C., …
 Kocsis, J. H. (2011). Social problem solving and depressive symptoms over time: A
 randomized clinical trial of cognitive-behavioral analysis system of psychotherapy,
 brief supportive psychotherapy, and pharmacotherapy. Journal of Consulting and
 Clinical Psychology, 79, 342-352. doi:10.1037/a0023208 
206 
 
Kline, R. B. (1998). Principles and practice of structural equation modelling. New York,
 NY: Guilford Press. 
Klumpp, H., & Amir, N. (2010). Preliminary study of attention training to threat and neutral
 faces on anxious reactivity to a social stressor in social anxiety. Cognitive Therapy
 and Research, 34, 263-271. doi:10.1007/s10608-009-9251-0 
Kotov, R., Gamez, W., Schmidt, F., & Watson, D. (2010). Linking “big” personality traits to
 anxiety, depressive, and substance use disorders: A meta-analysis. Psychological
 Bulletin, 136, 768-821. doi:10.1037/a0020327 
Krochmalik, A., Jones, M. K., Menzies, R. G., & Kirkby, K. (2004). The superiority of
 Danger Ideation Reduction Therapy (DIRT) over Exposure and Response Prevention
 (ERP) in treating compulsive washing. Behaviour Change, 21(4), 251-268. 
Kusunoki, K., Sato, T., Taga, C., Yoshida, T., Komori, K., Narita, T., … Ozaki, N. (2000).
 Low novelty-seeking differentiates obsessive-compulsive disorder from major
 depression. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 101, 403-405. 
doi:10.1034/j.1600-0447.2000.101005403.x 
Kverno, K. S. (2000). Trait anxiety influences on judgments of frequency and recall.
 Personality and Individual Differences, 29, 395-404. 
doi:10.1016/S0191-8869(99)00201-9 
Ladouceur, R., Leger, E., Rheaume, J., & Dube, D. (1996). Correction of inflated
 responsibility in the treatment of obsessive-compulsive disorder. Behaviour Research
 and Therapy, 34, 767-774. doi:10.1016/0005-7967(96)00042-3 
Lang, A. J., & McNiel, D. E. (2006). Use of the anxiety control questionnaire in psychiatric
 inpatients. Depression and Anxiety, 23, 107-112. doi:10.1002/da.20133 
Lapsekili, N., Uzun, O., & Ak, M. (2010). Sensation seeking behavior in patients with
 obsessive compulsive disorder [Abstract]. Klinik Psikiyatri Dergisi: The Journal of
 Clinical Psychiatry, 13(4), 170. 
Lavy, E., van Oppen, P., & van den Hout, M. (1994). Selective processing of emotional
 information in obsessive compulsive disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 32,
 243-246. doi:10.1016/0005-7967(94)90118-X 
Lazarus, R. S. (1966). Story telling and the measurement of motivation: The direct versus
 substitutive controversy. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 30(6), 483-487. 
Legerstee, J. S., Tulen, J. H. M., Kallen, V. L., Dieleman, G. C., Treffers, P. D. A., Verhulst,
 F. C., & Utens, E. M. W. J. (2009). Threat-related selective attention predicts
207 
 
 treatment success in childhood anxiety disorders. Journal of the American Academy of
 Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 48(2), 196-205. 
Lejuez, C. W., Read, J. P., Kahler, C. W., Richards, J. B., Ramsey, S. E., Stuart, G. L., …
 Brown, R. A. (2002). Evaluation of a behavioral measure of risk-taking: The balloon
 analogue risk task (BART). Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 8, 75-84.
 doi:10.1037//1076-898X.8.2.75 
Lerner, J. S., & Keltner, D. (2001). Fear, anger, and risk. Journal of Personality and Social
 Psychology, 81, 146-159. doi:10.1037//O022-3514.81.1.146 
Leue, A., & Beauducel, A. (2011). The PANAS structure revisited: On the validity of a
 bifactor model in community and forensic samples. Psychological Assessment, 23,
 215-225. doi:10.1037/a0021400 
Lind, C., & Boschen, M. J. (2009). Intolerance of uncertainty mediates the relationship
 between responsibility beliefs and compulsive checking. Journal of Anxiety
 Disorders, 23, 1047-1052. doi:10.1016/j.janxdis.2009.07.005 
Lochner, C., Hemmings, S., Seedat, S., Kinnear, C., Schoeman, R., Annerbrink, K., … Stein,
 D. J. (2007). Genetics and personality traits in patients with social anxiety disorder: A
 case control study in South Africa. European Neuropsychopharmacology, 17, 321-
 327. doi:10.1016/j.euroneuro.2006.06.010 
Lochner, C., Seedat, S., du Toit, P. L., Nel, D. G., Niehaus, D. J. H., Sandler, R., & Stein, D.
 J. (2005). Obsessive-compulsive disorder and trichotillomania: A phenomenological
 comparison. BMC Psychiatry, 5. doi:10.1186/1471-244X-5-2. 
Lorian, C. N. (2011). Risk-Avoidance and Anxiety Pathology. Unpublished manuscript,
 School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, New South Wales, Australia. 
Lorian, C. N., & Grisham, J. R. (2010). The safety bias: Risk-avoidance and social anxiety
 pathology. Behaviour Change, 27(1), 29-41. 
Lorian, C. N., & Grisham, J. R. (2011). Clinical implications of risk aversion: An online
 study of risk-avoidance and treatment utilization in pathological anxiety. Journal of
 Anxiety Disorders, 25, 840-848. doi:10.1016/j.janxdis.2011.04.008 
Lovibond, P. F., Mitchell, C. J., Minard, E., Brady, A., & Menzies, R. G. (2009). Safety
 behaviours preserve threat beliefs: Protection from extinction of human fear
 conditioning by an avoidance response. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 47, 716-
 720. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2009.04.013 
208 
 
Lu, W., Daleiden, E., & Lu, S. (2007). Threat perception bias and anxiety among Chinese
 school children and adolescents. Journal of Clinical Child and Adolescent
 Psychology, 36, 568-580. doi:10.1080/15374410701776301 
Lucock, M. P., & Salkovskis, P. M. (1988). Cognitive factors in social anxiety and its
 treatment. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 26, 297-302. 
doi:10.1016/0005-7967(88)90081-2 
Lyoo, I. K., Lee, D. W., Kim, Y. S., Kong, S. W., & Kwon, J. S. (2001). Patterns of
 temperament and character in subjects with obsessive-compulsive disorder. Journal of
 Clinical Psychiatry, 62(8), 637-641. 
Lyoo, I. K., Yoon, T., Kang, D. H., & Kwon, J. S. (2003). Patterns of changes in
 temperament and character inventory scales in subjects with obsessive-compulsive
 disorder following a 4 month treatment. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 107, 298-
 304. doi:10.1034/j.1600-0447.2003.00054.x 
MacDonald, P. A., Antony, M. M., Macleod, C. M., & Richter, M. A. (1997). Memory and
 confidence in memory judgments among individuals with obsessive compulsive
 disorder and non-clinical controls. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 35, 497-505.
 doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(97)00013-2 
MacLeod, A. K., Williams, J. M. G., & Bekerian, D. A. (1991). Worry is reasonable: The role
 of explanations in pessimism about future personal events. Journal of Abnormal
 Psychology, 100(4), 478-486. 
MacLeod, C., Rutherford, E., Campbell, L., Ebsworthy, G., Holker, L. (2002). Selective
 attention and emotional vulnerability: Assessing the causal basis of their association
 through the experimental manipulation of attentional bias. Journal of Abnormal
 Psychology, 111, 107-123. doi:10.1037//0021-843X.111.1.107 
MacNamara, A., & Hajcak, G. (2010). Distinct electrocortical and behavioral evidence for
 increased attention to threat in generalized anxiety disorder. Depression and Anxiety,
 27, 234-243. doi:10.1002/da.20679 
Magee, J. C., & Teachman, B. A. (2007). Why did the white bear return? Obsessive
 compulsive symptoms and attributions for unsuccessful thought suppression.
 Behaviour Research and Therapy, 45, 2884-2898. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2007.07.014 
Malouff, J. M., Thorsteinsson, E. B., & Schutte, N. S. (2005). The relationship between the
 five-factor model of personality and symptoms of clinical disorders: A meta-analysis.




Malpica, M. J., Ruiz, V. M., Godoy, A., & Gavino, A. (2009). Obsessive-Compulsive
 Inventory-Revised (OCI-R): Applicability to general population [Abstract]. Anales de
 Psicologia, 25(2), 217. 
Mancini, F., D’Olimpio, F., & Cieri, L. (2004). Manipulation of responsibility in non-clinical
 subjects: Does expectation of failure exacerbate obsessive-compulsive behaviors?
 Behaviour Research and Therapy, 42, 449-457. doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(03)00153-0 
Mancini, F., & Gangemi, A. (2004). Aversion to risk and guilt. Clinical Psychology and
 Psychotherapy, 11, 199-206. doi:10.1002/cpp.418 
Maner, J. K., Richey, J. A., Cromer, K., Mallot, M., Lejuez, C. W., Joiner, T. E., & Schmidt,
 N. B. (2007). Dispositional anxiety and risk-avoidant decision-making. Personality
 and Individual Differences, 42, 665-675. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2006.08.016 
Maner, J. K., & Schmidt, N. B. (2006). The role of risk avoidance in anxiety. Behavior
 Therapy, 37, 181-189. doi:10.1016/j.beth.2005.11.003 
Mann, L. (1992). Stress, affect, and risk-taking. In F. J. Yates (Ed.), Risk-taking behavior (pp.
 202-230). Oxford, U.K: John Wiley. 
Marchesi, C., Ampollini, P., DePanfilis, C., & Maggini, C. (2008). Temperament features in
 adolescents with ego-syntonic or ego-dystonic obsessive-compulsive symptoms.
 European Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 17, 392-396. 
doi:10.1007/s00787-008-0681-0 
Marsh, H.W., Hau, K.T., & Wen, Z. (2004). In search of golden rules: Comment on
 hypothesis-testing approaches to setting cutoff values for fit indexes and dangers in
 overgeneralizing Hu and Bentler’s (1999) findings. Structural Equation Modeling,
 11, 320-341. doi:10.1207/s15328007sem1103_2 
Mathews, A., Mackintosh, B., & Fulcher, E. P. (1997). Cognitive biases in anxiety and
 attention to threat. Trends in Cognitive Science, 1, 340-345. 
doi:10.1016/S1364-6613(97)01092-9 
McCrae, R. R., Costa, P. T., Ostendorf, F., Angleitner, A., Hrebickova, M., Avia, M. D., …
 Smith, P. B. (2000). Nature over nurture: Temperament, personality, and life span
 development. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 173-186.
 doi:10.1037//0022-3514.78.1.173 
McFall, M. E., & Wollersheim, J. P. (1979). Obsessive-compulsive neurosis: A cognitive-
 behavioral formulation and approach to treatment. Cognitive Therapy and Research,
 3, 333-348. doi:10.1007/BF01184447 
210 
 
McKnight, P. E., Afram, A., Kashdan, T. B., Kasle, S., & Zautra, A. (2010). Coping self-
 efficacy as a mediator between catastrophizing and physical functioning: Treatment
 target selection in an osteoarthritis sample. Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 33,
 239-249. doi:10.1007/s10865-010-9252-1 
McLaren, S., & Crowe, S. F. (2003). The contribution of perceived control of stressful life
 events and thought suppression to the symptoms of obsessive-compulsive disorder in
 both non-clinical and clinical samples. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 17, 389-403.
 doi:10.1016/S0887-6185(02)00224-4 
McManus, F., Clark, D. M., & Hackmann, A. (2000). Specificity of cognitive biases in social
 phobia and their role in recovery. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 28(3),
 201-209. 
McNally, R. J., & Foa, E. B. (1987). Cognition and agoraphobia: Bias in the interpretation of
 threat. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 11, 567-581. doi:10.1007/BF01183859 
McNally, R. J., & Kohlbeck, P. A. (1993). Reality monitoring in obsessive-compulsive
 disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 31, 249-253. 
doi:10.1016/0005-7967(93)90023-N 
Menzies, R. G., Harris, L. M., Cumming, S. R., & Einstein, D. A. (2000). The relationship
 between inflated personal responsibility and exaggerated danger expectancies in
 obsessive-compulsive concerns. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 38, 1029-
 1037. doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(99)00149-7 
Merz, E. L., & Roesch, S. C. (2011). Modeling trait and state variation using multilevel factor
 analysis with PANAS daily diary data. Journal of Research in Personality, 45, 2-9.
 doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2010.11.003 
Mishra, S., & Lalumiere, M. L. (2011). Individual differences in risk-propensity:
 Associations between personality and behavioral measures of risk. Personality and
 Individual Differences, 50, 869-873. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2010.11.037 
Mitte, K. (2007). Anxiety and risky decision making: The role of subjective probability and
 subjective costs of negative events. Personality and Individual Differences, 43,
 243-253. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2006.11.028 
Moretz, M. W., & McKay, D. (2009). The role of perfectionism in obsessive-compulsive
 symptoms: “Not just right” experiences and checking compulsions. Journal of Anxiety
 Disorders, 23, 640-644. doi:10.1016/j.janxdis.2009.01.015 
Moritz, S., Fischer, B., Hottenrott, B., Kellner, M., Fricke, S., Randjbar, S., & Jelinek, L.
 (2008). Words may not be enough! No increased emotional Stroop effect in
211 
 
 obsessive-compulsive disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 46, 1101-1104.
 doi:10.1016/j.brat.2008.05.005 
Moritz, S., & Jelinek, L. (2009). Inversion of the “unrealistic optimism” bias contributes to
 overestimation of threat in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Behavioural and Cognitive
 Psychotherapy, 37, 179-193. doi:10.1017/S1352465808005043 
Moritz, S., & Pohl, R. F. (2009). Biased processing of threat-related information rather than
 knowledge deficits contributes to overestimation of threat in obsessive-compulsive
 disorder. Behavior Modification, 33, 763-777. doi:10.1177/0145445509344217 
Moritz, S., & von Muhlenen, A. (2008). Investigation of an attentional bias for fear-related
 material in obsessive-compulsive checkers. Depression and Anxiety, 25, 225-229.
 doi:10.1002/da.20294 
Moritz, S., Wahl, K., Zurowsk, B., Jelinek, L., Hand, I., & Fricke, S. (2007). Enhanced
 perceived responsibility decreases metamemory but not memory accuracy in
 obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). Behaviour Research and Therapy, 45,
 2044-2052. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2007.03.003 
Mortberg, E., Bejerot, S., & Wistedt, A. A., (2007). Temperament and character dimensions
 in patients with social phobia: Patterns of change following treatments? Psychiatry
 Research, 152, 81-90. doi:10.1016/j.psychres.2006.10.003 
Moulding, R., Doron, G., Kyrios, M., & Nedeljkovic, M. (2008). Desire for control, sense of
 control and obsessive-compulsive checking: An extension to clinical samples. Journal
 of Anxiety Disorders, 22, 1472-1479. doi:10.1016/j.janxdis.2008.03.001 
Moulding, R., & Kyrios, M. (2006). Anxiety disorders and control related beliefs: The
 exemplar of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). Clinical Psychology Review, 26,
 573-583. doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2006.01.009 
Moulding, R., & Kyrios, M. (2007). Desire for control, sense of control, and obsessive-
 compulsive symptoms. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 31, 759-772.
 doi:10.1007/s10608-006-9086-x 
Moulding, R., Kyrios, M., & Doron, G. (2007). Obsessive-compulsive behaviours in specific
 situations: The relative influence of appraisals of control, responsibility, and threat.
 Behaviour Research and Therapy, 45, 1693-1702. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2006.08.020 
Moulding, R., Kyrios, M., Doron, G., & Nedeljkovic, M. (2009). Mediated and direct effects
 of general control beliefs on obsessive compulsive-symptoms. Canadian Journal of
 Behavioural Science, 41, 84-92. doi:10.1037/a0014840 
212 
 
Muller, J., & Roberts, J. E. (2005). Memory and attention in obsessive-compulsive disorder:
 A review. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 19, 1-28. doi:10.1016/j.janxdis.2003.12.001 
Muris, P., & van Doorn, M. (2003). “Danger is lurking everywhere, even in parts of a jigsaw
 puzzle”: Anxiety-related threat perception abnormalities in children: Their assessment
 with projective material. Behaviour Change, 20(3), 151-159. 
Myers, S. G., Fisher, P. L., & Wells, A. (2008). Belief domains of the Obsessive Beliefs
 Questionnaire-44 (OBQ-44) and their specific relationship with obsessive-compulsive
 symptoms. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 22, 475-484.
 doi:10.1016/j.janxdis.2007.03.012 
Najmi, S., & Amir, N. (2010). The effect of attention training on a behavioral test of
 contamination fears in individuals with subclinical obsessive-compulsive symptoms.
 Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 119, 136-142. doi:10.1037/a0017549 
Najmi, S., Hindash, A. C., & Amir, N. (2010). Executive control of attention in individuals
 with contamination-related obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Depression and Anxiety,
 27, 807-812. doi:10.1002/da.20703 
Naragon-Gainey, K., & Watson, D. (2011). The anxiety disorders and suicidal ideation:
 Accounting for co-morbidity via underlying personality traits. Psychological
 Medicine: A Journal of Research in Psychiatry and the Allied Sciences, 41, 1437-
 1447. doi:10.1017/S0033291710002096 
Nelson, E. A., Deacon, B. J., Lickel, J. J., & Sy, J. T. (2010). Targeting the probability versus
 cost of feared outcomes in public speaking anxiety. Behaviour Research and Therapy,
 48, 282-289. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2009.11.007 
Nicholls, A. R., Polman, R., & Levy,A. R. (2010). Coping self-efficacy, pre-
 competetive anxiety, and subjective performance among athletes. European Journal
 of Sport Science, 10, 97-102. doi:10.1080/17461390903271592 
Nicholson, N., Soane, E., Fenton-O’Creevy, M., & Willman, P. (2005). Personality and
 domain-specific risk taking. Journal of Risk Research, 8, 157-176.
 doi:10.1080/1366987032000123856 
Norman, G. R., & Streiner, D. L. (2008). Biostatistics: The bare essentials (3
rd
 ed.). Ontario,
 Canada: B. C. Decker. 
Norris, M., & Lecavalier, L. (2010). Evaluating the use of exploratory factor analysis in
 developmental disability psychological research. Journal of Autism and
 Developmental Disorders, 40, 8-20. doi: 10.1007/s10803-009-0816-2 
213 
 
Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group (1997). Cognitive assessment of
 obsessive-compulsive disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 35, 667–681.
 doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(97)00017-X 
Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group. (2001). Development and initial
 validation of the Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire and the Interpretation of Intrusions
 Inventory. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 39, 987-1006. 
doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(00)00085-1 
Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group. (2003). Psychometric validation of the
 Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire and the Interpretation of Intrusions Inventory: Part I.
 Behaviour Research and Therapy, 41, 863-878. doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(02)00099-2 
Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group. (2005). Psychometric validation of the
 Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire and the Interpretation of Intrusions Inventory – Part
 2: Factor analyses and testing of a brief version. Behaviour Research and Therapy,
 43, 1527-1542. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2004.07.010 
Olatunji, B. O., Connolly, K., Lohr, J. M., & Elwood, L. S. (2008). Access to information
 about harm and safety in contamination-related obsessive-compulsive disorder.
 Journal of Cognitive Psychotherapy: An International Quarterly, 22, 57-67.
 doi:10.1891/0889.8391.22.1.57 
Olatunji, B. O., Unoka, Z. S., Beran, E., David, B., & Armstrong, T. (2009). Disgust
 sensitivity and psychopathological symptoms: Distinctions from harm avoidance.
 Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, 31, 137-142.
 doi:10.1007/s10862-008-9096-y 
O’Leary, E. M., Rucklidge, J. J., & Blampied, N. (2009). Thought-action fusion and inflated
 responsibility beliefs in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Clinical Psychologist, 13,  
94-101. doi:10.1080/13284200903369557 
Olsen, T., Mais, A. H., Bilet, T., & Martinsen, E. G. (2008). Treatment of obsessive-
 compulsive disorder: Personal follow-up of a 10-year material from an outpatient
 county clinic. Nordic Journal of Psychiatry, 62, 39-45.
 doi:10.1080/08039480801960230 
Ongur, D., Farabaugh, A., Iosifescu, D. V., Perlis, R., & Fava, M. (2005). Tridimensional
 Personality Questionnaire factors in major depressive disorder: Relationship to
 anxiety disorder comorbidity and age of onset. Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics,
 74, 173-178. doi:10.1159/000084002 
214 
 
Oportot, M. (2004). A cross-sectional analysis of self-efficacy and coping in female
 caregiving spouses and daughters of Alzheimer’s disease patients [Abstract].
 Dissertation Abstracts International: Section B: The Sciences and Engineering,
 64(11-B), 5810. 
Overton, S. M., & Menzies, R. G. (2002). A comparison of checking-related beliefs in
 individuals with obsessive compulsive disorder and normal controls. Behaviour
 Change, 19(2), 67-74. 
Overton, S. M., & Menzies, R. G. (2005). Cognitive change during treatment of compulsive
 checking. Behaviour Change, 22(3), 172-184. 
Ozer, E. M., & Bandura, A. (1990). Mechanisms governing empowerment effects: A self
 efficacy analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58(3), 472-486. 
Park, H. S., Dailey, R., & Lemus, D. (2002). The use of exploratory factor analysis and
 principal components analysis in communication research. Human Communication
 Research, 28, 562-577. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2958.2002.tb00824.x 
Pavan, C., Vindigni, V., Semenzin, M., Mazzoleni, F., Gardiolo, M., Simonato, P., & Marini,
 M. (2006). Personality, temperament, and clinical scales in an Italian plastic surgery
 setting: What about body dysmorphic disorder? International Journal of Psychiatry in
 Clinical Practice, 10, 91-96. doi:10.1080/13651500500487677 
Pawlowski, B., Atwal, R., & Dunbar, R. I. M. (2008). Sex differences in everyday risk-taking
 behavior in humans. Evolutionary Psychology, 6(1), 29-42. 
Pelissolo, A., Andre, C., Pujol, H., Yao, S. N., Servant, D., Braconnier, A., … Lepine, J. P.
 (2002). Personality dimensions in social phobics with or without depression. Acta
 Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 105, 94-103. doi:10.1034/j.1600-0447.2002.01115.x 
Perneger, T. V. (1998). What’s wrong with Bonferroni adjustments. British Medical Journal,
 316, 1236-1238. doi:10.1136/bmj.316.7139.1236 
Pfohl, B., Black, D., Noyes, R., Kelley, M., & Blum, N. (1990). A test of the tridimensional
 personality theory: Association with diagnosis and platelet imipramine binding in
 obsessive-compulsive disorder. Biological Psychiatry, 28, 41-46. 
doi:10.1016/0006-3223(90)90430-A 
Piedmont, R. L. (2001). Cracking the plaster cast: Big five personality change during
 intensive outpatient counselling. Journal of Research in Personality, 35, 500-520.
 doi:10.1006/jrpe.2001.2326 
Pietrefesa, A. S., & Coles, M. E. (2009). Moving beyond an exclusive focus on harm
 avoidance in obsessive-compulsive disorder: Behavioral validation for the separability
215 
 
 of harm avoidance and incompleteness. Behavior Therapy, 40, 251-259.
 doi:10.1016/j.beth.2008.06.003 
Polman, A., O’Connor, K. P., & Huisman, M. (2011). Dysfunctional belief-based subgroups
 and inferential confusion in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Personality and
 Individual Differences, 50, 153-158. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2010.09.017 
Poulton, R. G., & Andrews, G. (1996). Change in danger cognitions in agoraphobia and
 social phobia during treatment. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 34, 413-421.
 doi:10.1016/0005-7967(96)00009-5 
Purdon, C. & Clark, D. A. (2000). White bears and other elusive intrusions: Assessing the
 relevance of thought suppression for obsessional phenomena. Behavior Modification,
 24, 425-453. doi:10.1177/0145445500243008 
Raaijmakers, Q. A. W. (1999). Effectiveness of different missing data treatments in surveys 
with Likert-type data: Introducing the relative mean substitution approach.
 Educational and Psychological Measurement, 59, 725-748.
 doi:10.1177/0013164499595001 
Rachman, S. (1997). A cognitive theory of obsessions. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 35,
 793-802. doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(97)00040-5 
Rachman, S. (1998). A cognitive theory of obsessions: Elaborations. Behaviour Research and
 Therapy, 36, 385-401. doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(97)10041-9 
Rachman, S. J., & de Silva, P. (1978). Abnormal and normal obsessions. Behaviour Research
 and Therapy, 16, 233-248. doi:10.1016/0005-7967(78)90022-0 
Rachman, S., & Shafran, R. (1998). Cognitive and behavioural features of obsessive-
 compulsive disorder. In R. P. Swinson, M. M. Anthony, S. Rachman, & M. A. Richter
 (Eds.), Obsessive-compulsive disorder: Theory, research, and treatment (pp. 51-78).
 New York, NY: Guilford Press.  
Radomsky, A. S., Rachman, S., & Hammond, D. (2001). Memory bias, confidence, and
 responsibility in compulsive checking. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 39, 813-
 822. doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(00)00079-6 
Rapee, R. M. (1997). Perceived threat and perceived control as predictors of the degree of 
 fear in physical and social situations. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 11, 455-461.
 doi:10.1016/S0887-6185(97)00022-4 
Rapee, R. M., Craske, M. G., Brown, T. A., & Barlow, D. H. (1996). Measurement of




Rapee, R. M., Schniering, C. A., & Hudson, J. L. (2009). Anxiety disorders during childhood
 and adolescence: Origins and treatment. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 5,
 311-341. doi:10.1146/annurev.clinpsy.032408.153628 
Rassin, E., Diepstraten, P., Merckelbach, H., & Muris, P. (2001). Thought-action fusion and
 thought suppression in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Behaviour Research and
 Therapy, 39, 757-764. doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(00)00051-6 
Rector, N. A., Hood, K., Richter, M. A., & Bagby, R. M. (2002). Obsessive-compulsive
 disorder and the five-factor model of personality: Distinction and overlap with major
 depressive disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 40, 1205-1219.
 doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(02)00024-4 
Rees, C. S. (2001, September). Understanding risk in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Invited
 national address for the Tracy Goodall Early Career Award presented at the 24
th
 AACBT National Conference, Sydney, Australia. 
Rees, C. S., Anderson, R. A., & Egan, S. J. (2006). Applying the five-factor model of
 personality to the exploration of the construct of risk-taking in obsessive-compulsive
 disorder. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 34, 31-42.
 doi:10.1017/S135246580500247X 
Rees, C. S., & van der Klift, P. (2000). “Risky business”: New avenues for improving
 cognitive behavioural treatment for obsessive-compulsive disorder. Paper presented at
 the 23
rd
 AACBT National Conference, Melbourne, Australia. 
Reilly, K. P., Gill, M. J., Dattilio, F. M., & McCormick, A. (2005). Panic and agoraphobia:
 Do treatments targeted for one problem also improve the other? A pilot study.
 Archives of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, 7(1), 11-28. 
Rettew, D. C., Doyle, A. C., Kwan, M., Stanger, C., & Hudziak, J. J. (2006). Exploring the
 boundary between temperament and generalized anxiety disorder: A receiver
 operating characteristic analysis. Anxiety Disorders, 20, 931-945.
 doi:10.1016/j.janxdis.2006.02.002 
Rheaume, J., Freeston, M. H., Dugas, M. J., Letarte, H., & Ladouceur, R. (1995).
 Perfectionism, responsibility, and obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Behaviour
 Research and Therapy, 33, 785-794. doi:10.1016/0005-7967(95)00017-R 
Rheingold, A. A., Herbert, J. D., & Franklin, M. E. (2003). Cognitive bias in adolescents with
 social anxiety disorder. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 27(6), 639-655. 
217 
 
Richter, M. A., Summerfeldt, L. J., Joffe, R. T., & Swinson, R. P. (1996). The Tridimensional
 Personality Questionnaire in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Psychiatry Research, 65,
 185-188. doi:10.1016/S0165-1781(96)02944-7 
Riley, G. A., Dennis, R. K., & Powell, T. (2010). Evaluation of coping resources and self-
 esteem as moderators of the relationship between threat appraisals and avoidance of
 activities after traumatic brain injury. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation, 20, 869-
 882. doi:10.1080/09602011.2010.503041 
Roberts, B. W. (1997). Plaster or plasticity: Are adult work experiences associated with
 personality change in women? Journal of Personality, 65, 205-232.
 doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.1997.tb00953.x 
Roberts, M. E., & Wilson, M. S. (2008). Factor structure and response bias of the Obsessive-
 Compulsive Inventory-Revised (OCI-R) in a female undergraduate sample from New
 Zealand. New Zealand Journal of Psychology, 37(2), 2-7.  
Rodero, B., Campayo, J. G., Fernandez, B. S., & Sobradiel, N. (2008). Imagined exposure as
 treatment of catastrophizing in fibromyalgia: A pilot study [Abstract]. Actas
 Espanolas de Psiquitria, 36(4), 223. 
Rousset, I., Kipman, A., Ades, P., & Gorwood, P. (2004). Personality, temperament, and
 anorexia nervosa. Annales Medico Psychologiques, 162, 180-188.
 doi:10.1016/j.amp.2003.01.001 
Rowa, K., Antony, M. M., Summerfeldt, L. J., Purdon, C., Young, L., & Swinson, R. P.
 (2007). Office-based vs. home-based behavioral treatment for obsessive-
 compulsive disorder: A preliminary study. Behavior Research and Therapy, 45,
 1883-1892. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2007.02.009 
Roy, A. K., Vasa, R. A., Bruck, M., Mogg, K., Bradley, B. P., Sweeney, M., … Pine, D. S.
 (2008). Attention bias toward threat in pediatric anxiety disorders. Journal of the
 American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 47(10), 1189-1196. 
Salkovskis, P. M. (1985). Obsessional-compulsive problems: A cognitive-behavioural
 analysis. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 23, 571-583. 
doi:10.1016/0005-7967(85)90105-6 
Salkovskis, P. M. (1989). Cognitive behavioural factors and the persistence of intrusive




Salkovskis, P. M., Forrester, E., & Richards, C. (1998). Cognitive-behavioural approach to
 understanding obsessional thinking. British Journal of Psychiatry, 173(Suppl. 35), 53-
 63. 
Salkovskis, P. M., Forrester, E., Richards, H. C., & Morrison, N. (1998). The devil is in the
 detail: Conceptualising and treating obsessional problems. In N. Tarrier, A. Wells, &
 G. Haddock (Eds.), Treating complex cases: The cognitive behavioural therapy
 approach (pp. 46-80). Chichester, NY: John Wiley. 
Salkovskis, P. M., & Freeston, M. H. (2001). Obsessions, compulsions, motivation, and
 responsibility for harm. Australian Journal of Psychology, 53, 1-6.
 doi:10.1080/00049530108255113 
Salkovskis, P. M., Thorpe, S. J., Wahl, K., Wroe, A. L., & Forrester, E. (2003). Neutralizing
 increases discomfort associated with obsessional thoughts: An experimental study
 with obsessional patients. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 112, 709-715.
 doi:10.1037/0021-843X.112.3.709 
Salkovskis, P. M., Wroe, A. L., Gledhill, A., Morrison, N., Forrester, E., Richards, C., …
 Thorpe, M. (2000). Responsibility attitudes and interpretations are characteristic of
 obsessive compulsive disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 38, 347-372.
 doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(99)00071-6 
Samuels, J., Nestadt, G., Bienvenu, O. J., Costa, P. T., Riddle, M. A., Liang, K. Y., ... Cullen,
 B. A. M. (2000). Personality disorders and normal personality dimensions in
 obsessive compulsive disorder. British Journal of Psychiatry, 177, 457-462.
 doi:10.1192/bjp.177.5.457 
Sandahl, C., Gerge, A., & Herlitz, K. (2004). Does treatment focus on self-efficacy result in
 better coping? Paradoxical findings from psychodynamic and cognitive behavioural
 group treatment of moderately alcohol dependent patients. Psychotherapy Research,
 14, 388-397. doi:10.1093/ptr/kph032 
Sandoval, A. M. R., & Acuna, L. (2008). The Social Readjustment Rating Scale for
 elementary school children in Mexico [Abstract]. Revista Latinoamericana de
 Psicologia, 40(2), 335. 
Santor, D. A., Bagby, R. M., & Joffe, R. T. (1997). Evaluating stability and change in
 personality and depression. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73(6),
 1354-1362.  
219 
 
Sassaroli, S., Lauro, L. J. R., Ruggiero, G. M., Mauri, M. C., Vinai, P., & Frost, R. (2008).
 Perfectionism in depression, obsessive-compulsive disorder and eating disorders.
 Behaviour Research and Therapy, 46, 757-765. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2008.02.007 
Sasson, Y., Zohar, J., Chopra, M., Lustig, M., Iancu, I., & Hendler, T. (1997). Epidemiology
 of obsessive-compulsive disorder: A world view. Journal of Clinical Psychiatry,
 58(Suppl. 12), 7-11. 
Savron, G., Bartolucci, G., & Pitti, P. (2004). Psychopathological modification after cognitive
 behaviour treatment of obsessive-compulsive patients [Abstract]. Rivista di
 Psichiatria, 39(3), 171. 
Savron, G., Montanaro, R., Mordent, S., & Pitti, P. (2007). Predictors and therapeutic
 efficacy in the treatment of obsessive-compulsive disorder [Abstract]. Rivista di
 Psichiatria, 42(1), 34. 
Schwartz, C. E., Snidman, V., & Kagan, J. (1999). Adolescent social anxiety as an outcome
 of inhibited temperament in childhood. Journal of the American Academy of Child
 and Adolescent Psychiatry, 38(8), 1008-1015. 
Schwerdtfeger, A. (2004). Predicting autonomic reactivity to public speaking: Don’t get fixed
 on self-report data! International Journal of Psychophysiology, 52, 217-224.
 doi:10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2003.10.008 
Scully, J. A., Tosi, H., & Banning, K. (2000). Life event checklist: Revisiting the Social
 Readjustment Rating Scale after 30 years. Educational and Psychological
 Measurement, 60, 864-876. doi:10.1177/00131640021970952 
Senbanjo, R., Wolff, K., Marshall, J. E., & Strang, J. (2009). Persistence of heroin use despite
 methadone treatment: Poor coping self-efficacy predicts continued heroin use. Drug
 and Alcohol Review, 28, 608-615. doi:10.1111/j.1465-3362.2009.00064.x 
Shafran, R., Cooper, Z., & Fairburn, C. G. (2002). Clinical perfectionism: A cognitive
 behavioural analysis. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 40, 773-791.
 doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(01)00059-6 
Shujuan, W., Meihua, Q., & Jianxin, Z. (2009). Factorial structure of the Anxiety Control
 Questionnaire in Chinese adolescents. Journal of Psychoeducational Assessment, 27,
 334-344. doi: 10.1177/0734282908329830 
Siev, J., Huppert, J. D., & Chambless, D. L. (2010). Obsessive-compulsive disorder is
 associated with less of a distinction between specific acts of omission and




Simms, L. J. (2008). Classical and modern methods of psychological scale construction.
 Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 2, 414-433. 
doi:10.1111/j.1751-9004.2007.00044.x 
Simpson, H. B., Zuckoff, A., Page, J. R., Franklin, M. E., & Foa, E. B. (2008). Adding
 motivational interviewing to exposure and ritual prevention for obsessive-compulsive
 disorder: An open pilot trial. Cognitive Behaviour Therapy, 37, 38-49.
 doi:10.1080/16506070701743252 
Sitkin, S. B., & Pablo, A. L. (1992). Reconceptualizing the determinants of risk behavior. 
 The Academy of Management Review, 17, 9-38. doi:10.5465/AMR.1992.4279564. 
Skinner, E. A., Edge, K., Altman,J., & Sherwood, H. (2003). Searching for the structure of
 coping: A review and critique of category systems for classifying ways of coping.
 Psychological Bulletin, 129, 216-269. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.129.2.216 
Smari, J., Petursdottir, G., & Porsteinsdottir, V. (2001). Social anxiety and depression in
 adolescents in relation to perceived competence and situational appraisal. Journal of
 Adolescence, 24, 199-207. doi:10.1006/jado.2000.0338 
Smeets, R. J. E. M., Vlaeyen, J. W. S., Kester, A. D. M., & Knottnerus, J. A. (2006).
 Reduction of pain catastrophizing mediates the outcome of both physical and
 cognitive-behavioral treatment in chronic low back pain. The Journal of Pain, 7,
 261-271. doi:10.1016/j.jpain.2005.10.011 
Smith, L. A. (1998). Factor analysis: A non-technical introduction. Unpubilshed manuscript. 
Sohler, N. L., Coleman, S. M., Cabral, H., Naar-King, S., Tobias, C., & Cunningham, C. O.
 (2009). Does self-report data on HIV primary care utilization agree with medical
 record data for socially marginalized populations in the United States? AIDS Patient
 Care and STDs, 23, 837-843. doi:10.1089/apc.2009.0056. 
Spinhoven, P., ter Kuile, M., Kole-Snijders, A. M. J., Mansfeld, M. H., den Ouden, D., &
 Vlaeyen, J. W. S. (2004). Catastrophizing and internal pain control as mediators of
 outcome in the multidisciplinary treatment of chronic low back pain. European
 Journal of Pain, 8, 211-219. doi:10.1016/j.ejpain.2003.08.003 
Spittlehouse, J.K., Pearson, J. F., Luty, S. E., Mulder, R. T., Carter, J. D., McKenzie, J. M., &
 Joyce, P. R. (2010). Measures of temperament and character are differentially




Srivastava, S., John, O. P., Gosling, S. D., & Potter, J. (2003). Development of personality in
 early and middle adulthood: Set like plaster or persistent change? Journal of
 Personality and Social Psychology, 84, 1041-1053. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.84.5.1041 
Stapinski, L. A., Abbott, M. J., & Rapee, R. M. (2010). Fear and perceived uncontrollability
 of emotion: Evaluating the unique contribution of emotion appraisal variables to
 prediction of worry and generalised anxiety disorder. Behaviour Research and
 Therapy, 48, 1097-1104. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2010.07.012 
Starcevic, V., Uhlenhuth, E. H., Fallon, S., & Pathak, D. (1996). Personality dimensions in
 panic disorder and generalized anxiety disorder. Journal of Affective Disorders, 37,
 75-79. doi:10.1016/0165-0327(95)00058-5 
Steiner, J. (1972). A questionnaire study of risk-taking in psychiatric patients. British Journal
 of Medical Psychology, 45(4), 365-374. 
Steketee, G. S. (1993). Treatment of obsessive-compulsive disorder. New York, NY: Guilford
 Press. 
Steketee, G., & Frost, R. O. (1994). Measurement of risk-taking in obsessive-compulsive
 disorder. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 22, 287-298.
 doi:10.1017/S1352465800013175 
Steketee, G., Frost, R. O., & Cohen, I. (1998). Beliefs in obsessive-compulsive disorder.
 Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 12, 525-537. doi:10.1016/S0887-6185(98)00030-9 
Stengler-Wenzke, K., Kroll, M., Matschinger, H., & Angermeyer, M. C. (2006). Quality of
 life of relatives of patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder. Comprehensive
 Psychiatry, 47, 523-527. doi:10.1016/j.comppsych.2006.02.002 
Stober, J. (1997). Trait anxiety and pessimistic appraisal of risk and chance. Personality and
 Individual Differences, 22, 465-476. doi:10.1016/S0191-8869(96)00232-2 
Stobie, B., Taylor, T., Quigley, A., Ewing, S., & Salkovskis, P. M. (2007). “Contents may
 vary": A pilot study of treatment histories of OCD patients. Behavioural and
 Cognitive Psychotherapy, 35, 273-282. doi:10.1017/S135246580700358X 
Stopa, L., & Clark, D. M. (1993). Cognitive processes in social phobia. Behaviour Research
 and Therapy, 31, 255-267. doi:10.1016/0005-7967(93)90024-O 
Stopa, L., & Clark, D. M. (2000). Social phobia and interpretation of social events. Behaviour
 Research and Therapy, 38, 273-283. doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(99)00043-1 
Suarez, L., & Bell-Dolan, D. (2001). The relationship of child worry to cognitive biases:
 Threat interpretation and likelihood of event occurrence. Behavior Therapy, 32,
 425-442. doi:10.1016/S0005-7894(01)80029-0 
222 
 
Summerfeldt, L. J. (2004). Understanding and treating incompleteness in obsessive-
 compulsive disorder. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 60, 1155-1168.
 doi:10.1002/jclp.20080 
Szabo, M. (2009). Worry in adults and children: Developmental differences in the importance
 of probability and cost judgements. Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral
 Assessment, 31, 235-245. doi:10.1007/s10862-008-9108-y 
Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (2001). Using multivariate statistics (4
th
 ed.). Boston, MA:
 Allyn & Bacon. 
Tallis, F. (1995). Obsessive-compulsive disorder: A cognitive and neuropsychological
 perspective. Chichester, NY: John Wiley.   
Tata, P. R., Leibowitz, J. A., Prunty, M. J., Cameron, M. & Pickering, A. D. (1996).
 Attentional bias in Obsessional Compulsive Disorder. Behaviour Research and
 Therapy, 34, 53-60. doi:10.1016/0005-7967(95)00041-U 
Taylor, S. (2005). Treatment of obsessive-compulsive disorder: Beyond behavior therapy.
 Cognitive Behaviour Therapy, 34, 129-130. doi:10.1080/16506070510041185 
Taylor, S., Abramowitz, J. S., McKay, D., Calamari, J. E., Sookman, D., Kyrios, M…
 Carmin, C. (2006). Do dysfunctional beliefs play a role in all types of obsessive
 compulsive disorder? Anxiety Disorders, 20, 85-97.
 doi:10.1016/j.janxdis.2004.11.005 
Taylor, S., Coles, M. E., Abramowitz, J. S., Wu, K. D., Olatunji, B. O., Timpano, K. R.,
 …Tolin, D. F. (2010). How are dysfunctional beliefs related to obsessive-
 compulsive symptoms? Journal of Cognitive Psychotherapy: An International
 Quarterly, 24, 165-176. doi:10.1891/0889-8391.24.3.165 
Taylor, S., McKay, D., & Abramowitz, J. S. (2005). Hierarchical structure of dysfunctional
 beliefs in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Cognitive Behaviour Therapy, 34, 216-
 228. doi:10.1080/16506070510041167 
Teachman, B. A. (2005). Information processing and anxiety sensitivity: Cognitive
 vulnerability to panic reflected in interpretation and memory biases. Cognitive
 Therapy and Research, 29, 479-499. doi:10.1007/s10608-005-0627-5 
Teachman, B. A., & Clerkin, E. M. (2007).  Obsessional beliefs and the implicit and explicit




Teachman, B. A., Smith-Janik, S. B., & Saporito, J. (2007). Information processing biases
 and panic disorder: Relationships among cognitive and symptom measures. Behaviour
 Research and Therapy, 45, 1791-1811. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2007.01.009 
Teachman, B. A., Woody, S. R, & Magee, J. C. (2006).  Implicit and explicit appraisals of the
 importance of intrusive thoughts. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 44, 785-805.
 doi:10.1016/j.brat.2005.05.005 
Thorn, B. E., Boothby, J. L., & Sullivan, M. J. L. (2002). Targeted treatment of
 catastrophizing for the management of chronic pain. Cognitive and Behavioral
 Practice, 9, 127-138. doi:10.1016/S1077-7229(02)80006-2 
Thorn, B. E., Pence, L. B., Ward, L. C., Kilgo, G., Clements, K. L., Cross, T. H., … Tsui, P.
 W. (2007). A randomized clinical trial of targeted cognitive behavioral treatment to
 reduce catastrophizing in chronic headache sufferers. The Journal of Pain, 8, 938-
 949. doi:10.1016/j.jpain.2007.06.010 
Thorpe, S. J., Barnett, J., Friend, K., & Nottingham, K. (2011). The mediating roles of disgust
 sensitivity and danger expectancy in relation to hand washing behaviour. Behavioural
 and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 39, 175-190. doi:10.1017/S1352465810000676 
Tolin, D. F. (2009). Alphabet soup: ERP, CT, and ACT for OCD. Cognitive and Behavioral
 Practice, 16, 40-48. doi:10.1016/j.cbpra.2008.07.001 
Tolin, D. F., Abramowitz, J. S., Brigidi, B. D., Amir, N., Street, G. P., & Foa, E. B. (2001).
 Memory and memory confidence in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Behaviour
 Research and Therapy, 39, 913-927. doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(00)00064-4 
Tolin, D. F., Abramowitz, J. S., Brigidi, B. D., & Foa, E. B. (2003). Intolerance of 
 uncertainty in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 17,
 233-242. doi:10.1016/S0887-6185(02)00182-2 
Tolin, D. F., Brady, R. E., & Hannan, S. (2008).  Obsessional beliefs and symptoms of
 obsessive-compulsive disorder in a clinical sample. Journal of Psychopathology and
 Behavioral Assessment, 30, 31-42. doi:10.1007/s10862-007-9076-7 
Tolin, D. F., Hannan, S., Maltby, N., Diefenbach, G. J., Worhunsky, P., & Brady, R. E.
 (2007). A randomized controlled trial of self-directed versus therapist directed
 cognitive-behavioral therapy for obsessive-compulsive disorder patients with prior
 medication trials. Behavior Therapy, 38, 179-191. doi:10.1016/j.beth.2006.07.001 
Tolin, D. F., Woods, C. M., & Abramowitz, J. S. (2003). Relationship between obsessive
 beliefs and obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 27,
 657-669. doi:10.1023/A:1026351711837 
224 
 
Tolin, D. F., Worhunsky, P., & Maltby, N. (2006). Are 'obsessive' beliefs specific to OCD?:
 A comparison across anxiety disorders. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 44, 469-
 480. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2005.03.007 
Tuccitto, D. E., Giacobbi, P. R., & Leite, W. L. (2010). The internal structure of positive and
 negative affect: A confirmatory factor analysis of the PANAS. Educational and
 Psychological Measurement, 70, 125-141. doi:10.1177/0013164409344522 
Tucker, S., Brust, S., Pierce, P., Fristedt, C., & Pankratz, V. S. (2004). Depression coping
 self-efficacy as a predictor of relapse 1 and 2 years following psychiatric hospital-
 based treatment. Research and Theory for Nursing Practice: An International
 Journal, 18(2-3), 261-275. 
Tukel, R., Meteris, H., Koyuncu, A., Tecer, A., & Yazici, O. (2006).  The clinical impact of
 mood disorder comorbidity on obsessive-compulsive disorder. European Archives of
 Psychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience, 256, 240-245. doi:10.1007/s00406-006-0632-z 
Twohig, M. P., Hayes, S. C., & Masuda, A. (2006). Increasing willingness to experience
 obsessions: Acceptance and commitment therapy as a treatment for obsessive-
 compulsive disorder. Behavior Therapy, 37, 3-13. doi:10.1016/j.beth.2005.02.001 
Uren, T. H., Szabo, M., & Lovibond, P. F. (2004). Probability and cost estimates for social
 and physical outcomes social phobia and panic disorder. Anxiety Disorders, 18,
 481-498. doi:10.1016/S0887-6185(03)00028-8 
van den Hout, M., & Kindt, M. (2003). Phenomenological validity of an OCD memory model
 and the remember/know distinction. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 41, 369-
 378. doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(02)00097-9 
Verkuil, B., Brosschot, J. F., Putman, P., & Thayer, J. F. (2009). Interacting effects of worry
 and anxiety on attentional disengagement from threat. Behaviour Research and
 Therapy, 47, 146-152. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2008.11.003 
Viar, M. A., Bilsky, S. A., Armstrong, T., & Olatunji, B. O. (2011). Obsessive beliefs and
 dimensions of obsessive-compulsive disorder: An examination of specific
 associations. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 35, 108-117. 
doi:10.1007/s10608-011-9360-4 
Voncken, M. J., Bogels, S. M., & de Vries, K. (2003). Interpretation and judgmental biases in
 social phobia. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 41, 1481-1488.
 doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(03)00143-8 
Voncken, M. J., Bogels, S. M., & Peeters, F. (2007). Specificity of interpretation and
 judgemental biases in social phobia versus depression. Psychology and
225 
 
 Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice, 80, 443-453.
 doi:10.1348/147608306X161890 
Vowles, K. E., McCracken, L. M., & Eccleston, C. (2007). Processes of change in treatment
 for chronic pain: The contributions of pain, acceptance, and catastrophizing.
 European Journal of Pain, 11, 779-787. doi:10.1016/j.ejpain.2006.12.007 
Vowles, K. E., McCracken, L. M., & Eccleston, C. (2008). Patient functioning and
 catastrophizing in chronic pain: The mediating effects of acceptance. Health
 Psychology, 27, S136-S143. doi:10.1037/0278-6133.27.2(Suppl.).S136 
Warren, R., Gershuny, B. S., & Sher, K. J. (2002). Cognition in obsessive compulsive
 disorder. In R. O. Frost & G. Steketee (Eds.), Cognitive approaches to obsessions and
 compulsions: Theory, assessment, and treatment (pp. 337-360). Amsterdam,
 Netherlands: Pergamon. 
Warren, R., McLellarn, R., & Ponzoha, C. (1988). Rational emotive therapy vs general
 cognitive-behavior therapy in the treatment of low self-esteem and related emotional
 disturbances. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 12, 21-38. doi:10.1007/BF01172778 
Warren, R., Zgourides, G., & Jons, A. (1989). Cognitive bias and irrational belief as
 predictors of avoidance. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 27, 181-188.
 doi:10.1016/0005-7967(89)90077-6 
Waters, A. M., Mogg, K., Bradley, B. P., & Pine, D. S. (2008). Attentional bias for emotional
 faces in children with generalized anxiety disorder. Journal of the American Academy
 of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 47, 435-442. 
Waters, A. M., Wharton, T. A., Zimmer-Gembeck, M. J., & Craske, M. G. (2008). Threat
 based cognitive biases in anxious children: Comparison with non-anxious children
 before and after cognitive behavioural treatment. Behaviour Research and Therapy,
 46, 358-374. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2008.01.002 
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief
 measures of positive and negative affect: The PANAS scales. Journal of Personality
 and Social Psychology, 54(6), 1063-1070. 
Weinstein, N. D. (2000). Perceived probability, perceived severity, and health-protective
 behavior. Health Psychology, 19, 65-74. doi:10.1037//0278-6133.19.1.65 
Wells, A. (1995). Meta-cognition and worry: A cognitive model of generalized anxiety




Wells, A. (2000). Emotional disorders and metacognition: Innovative cognitive therapy. New
 York, NY: John Wiley and Sons. 
Wells, A., & Papageorgiou, C. (1998). Relationships between worry, obsessive-compulsive
 symptoms and meta-cognitive beliefs. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 36, 899-
 913. doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(98)00070-9 
Wheaton, M. G., Abramowitz, J. S., Berman, N. C., Riemann, B. C., & Hale, L. R. (2010).
 The relationship between obsessive beliefs and symptom dimensions in obsessive-
 compulsive disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 48, 949-954.
 doi:10.1016/j.brat.2010.05.027 
White, K. S., Brown, T. A., Somers, T. J., & Barlow, D. H. (2006). Avoidance behavior in
 panic disorder: The moderating influence of perceived control. Behaviour Research
 and Therapy, 44, 147-157. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2005.07.009 
Whittal, M. L., Robichaud, M., Thordarson, D. S., & McLean, P. D. (2008). Group and
 individual treatment of obsessive-compulsive disorder using cognitive therapy and
 exposure plus response prevention: A 2-year follow-up of two randomized trials.
 Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 76, 1003-1014.
 doi:10.1037/a0013076 
Wilhelm, S., McNally, R. J., Baer, L., & Florin, I. (1996). Directed forgetting in obsessive-
 compulsive disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 34, 633-641.
 doi:10.1016/0005-7967(96)00040-X 
Williams, S. L. (1990). Guided mastery treatment of agoraphobia: Beyond stimulus exposure.
 Progress in Behavior Modification, 26, 89-121. 
Williams, S. L., Dooseman, G., & Kleifield, E. (1984). Comparative effectiveness of guided
 mastery and exposure treatments for intractable phobias. Journal of Consulting and
 Clinical Psychology, 52(4), 505-518. 
Williams, S. L., Turner, S. M., & Peer, D. F. (1985). Guided mastery and performance
 desensitization treatments for severe acrophobia. Journal of Consulting and Clinical
 Psychology, 53(2), 237-247. 
Williams, S. L, & Watson, N. (1985). Perceived danger and perceived self-efficacy as
 cognitive determinants of acrophobic behavior. Behavior Therapy, 16, 136-146.
 doi:10.1016/S0005-7894(85)80041-1 
Williams, S. L., & Zane, G. (1989). Guided mastery and stimulus exposure treatments for
 severe performance anxiety in agoraphobics. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 27,
 237-245. doi:10.1016/0005-7967(89)90042-9 
227 
 
Woo, C. W., Kwon, S. M., Lim, Y. J., & Shin, M. S. (2010). The Obsessive-Compulsive
 Inventory-Revised (OCI-R): Psychometric properties of the Korean version and the
 order, gender, and cultural effects. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental
 Psychiatry, 41, 220-227. doi:10.1016/j.jbtep.2010.01.006 
Woods, C. M., Frost, R. O., & Steketee, G. (2002). Obsessive compulsive (OC) symptoms
 and subjective severity, probability, and coping ability estimations of future negative
 events. Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy, 9, 104-111. doi:10.1002/cpp.304 
Woods, C. M., Tolin, D. F., & Abramowitz, J. S. (2004). Dimensionality of the Obsessive
 Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ). Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral
 Assessment, 26(2), 113-125. 
Wu, K. D., & Carter, S. A. (2008). Further investigation of the Obsessive Beliefs
 Questionnaire: Factor structure and specificity of relations with OCD symptoms.
 Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 22, 824-836. doi:10.1016/j.janxdis.2007.08.008 
Wu, K. D., Clark, L. A., & Watson, D. (2006). Relations between obsessive-compulsive
 disorder and personality: Beyond Axis I-Axis II comorbidity. Anxiety Disorders, 20,
 695-717. doi:10.1016/j.janxdis.2005.11.001 
Wu, K. D., & Cortesi, G. T. (2009). Relations between perfectionism and obsessive-
 compulsive symptoms: Examination of specificity among the dimensions. Journal of
 Anxiety Disorders, 23, 393-400. doi:10.1016/j.janxdis.2008.11.006 
Wyatt, G. (1992). Risk-taking and risk-avoiding behavior: The impact of some dispositional
 and situational variables. The Journal of Psychology, 124(4), 437-447. 
Yang-Wallentin, F., & Joreskog, K. G. (2001). Robust standard errors and chi-squares for
 interaction models. In G. A. Marcoulides, & R. E. Schumacker (Eds.), New
 developments and techniques in structural equation modeling (pp. 159-171).
 Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Yates, J. F., & Stone, E. R. (1992). The risk construct. In J. F. Yates (Ed.), Risk-taking
 behaviour (pp. 1-25). Oxford, UK: John Wiley. 
Yorulmaz, O., Gencoz, T., & Woody, S. (2010). Vulnerability factors in OCD symptoms:
 Cross-cultural comparisons between Turkish and Canadian samples. Clinical
 Psychology and Psychotherapy, 17, 110-121. doi: 10.1002/cpp.642 
Young, J. E. (1994). Cognitive therapy for personality disorders: A schema-focused
 approach. Sarasota, FL: Professional Resource Press. 
Young, J. E. (1999). Cognitive therapy for personality disorders: A schema-focused
 approach (3
rd
 ed.). Sarasota, FL: Professional Resource Press. 
228 
 
Zane, G., & Williams, S. L. (1993). Performance-related anxiety in agoraphobia: Treatment
 procedures and cognitive mechanisms of change. Behavior Therapy, 24, 625-643.
 doi:10.1016/S0005-7894(05)80322-3 
Zebb, B. J., & Moore, M. C. (1999). Another look at the psychometric properties of the
 Anxiety Control Questionnaire. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 37, 1091-1103.
 doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(98)00206-X 
Zebb, B. J., & Moore, M. C. (2003). Superstitiousness and perceived anxiety control as
 predictors of psychological distress. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 17, 115-130.
 doi:10.1016/S0887-6185(02)00176-7 
Zhou, L. P., & Kong, L. M. (2010). Effect of trait anxiety and gender difference on risk-
 avoidance in decision-making in 316 college students [Abstract]. Chinese Mental
 Health Journal, 24(2), 153. 
Zinta, R. L. (2008). Effectiveness of guided mastery treatment for reducing test-anxiety
 among self-efficacious students. Journal of the Indian Academy of Applied
 Psychology, 34(2), 233-239. Retrieved from
 http://medind.nic.in/jak/t08/i2/jakt08i2p233.pdf 
Zuckerman, M. (1984). Sensation seeking: A comparative approach to a human trait.
 Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 7, 413-471. doi:10.1017/S0140525X00018938 
Zuckerman, M., Kolin, E. A., Proce, L., & Zoob, I. (1964). Development of a sensation-
 seeking scale. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 28(6), 477-482. 
Zvolensky, M. J., Heffner, M., Eifert, G. H., Spira, A. P., & Feldner, M. T. (2001).
 Incremental validity of perceived control dimensions in the differential prediction of
 interpretive biases for threat. Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment,
 23, 75-83. doi:10.1023/A:1010935407194 
  
 
Every reasonable effort has been made to acknowledge the owners of copyright material. I 




Appendix A: Multi-Dimensional Risk Assessment Scale (MDRAS) 
 
Consider the following situations: 
 
1. You are driving at 20km/h above the speed limit on a major road. There is a risk that 
you will receive a speeding fine. 
 
a) What is the probability that you will receive a speeding fine? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 Almost              Very               Quite            Moderate            Quite                Very              Almost   
  None                Low                 Low                                        High                 High              Certain 
 
b) If you did receive a speeding fine, how bad would that be for you? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Not At All   Minor        Inconvenience       Quite      Bad            Extremely    As Bad As I  
    Bad         Inconvenience                                Bad                                          Bad         Can Imagine 
 
c) How easily could you cope if you did receive a speeding fine? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Cope Very         Cope           Cope Quite     Cope, But            Difficult       Extremely        Could Not 
   Easily             Easily              Easily         With Some          To Cope         Difficult             Cope 
               Difficulty              To Cope 
 
2. You are driving at 20km/h above the speed limit on a major road. There is a risk that 
you will be involved in an accident, causing you to break your leg. 
 
a) What is the probability that you will be involved in an accident, causing you to break 
your leg? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 Almost              Very               Quite            Moderate            Quite                Very              Almost   
  None                Low                 Low                                        High                 High              Certain 
 
b) If you were involved in such an accident, how bad would that be for you? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Not At All   Minor        Inconvenience       Quite      Bad            Extremely    As Bad As I  
    Bad         Inconvenience                                Bad                                          Bad         Can Imagine 
 
c) How easily could you cope with the consequences of being involved in such an 
accident? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Cope Very         Cope           Cope Quite     Cope, But            Difficult       Extremely        Could Not 
   Easily             Easily              Easily         With Some          To Cope         Difficult             Cope 
               Difficulty              To Cope 
 
3. You are outside for several hours without a coat on a cold, wet day. There is a risk that 
you will catch the flu. 
 
a) What is the probability that you will catch the flu? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 Almost              Very               Quite            Moderate            Quite                Very              Almost   
  None                Low                 Low                                        High                 High              Certain 
 
b) If you did catch the flu, how bad would that be for you? 
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      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Not At All   Minor        Inconvenience       Quite      Bad            Extremely    As Bad As I  
    Bad         Inconvenience                                Bad                                          Bad         Can Imagine 
 
c) How easily could you cope if you did catch the flu? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Cope Very         Cope           Cope Quite     Cope, But            Difficult       Extremely        Could Not 
   Easily             Easily              Easily         With Some          To Cope         Difficult             Cope 
               Difficulty              To Cope 
 
4. You borrow something from a friend without asking because he/she is unavailable.
 There is a risk that he/she will be very angry, placing strain on your friendship. 
 
d) What is the probability that he/she will be very angry, placing strain on your friendship? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 Almost              Very               Quite            Moderate            Quite                Very              Almost   
  None                Low                 Low                                        High                 High              Certain 
 
e) If he/she were very angry, placing strain on your friendship, how bad would that be for 
you? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Not At All   Minor        Inconvenience       Quite      Bad            Extremely    As Bad As I  
    Bad         Inconvenience                                Bad                                          Bad         Can Imagine 
 
f) How easily could you cope if he/she were very angry, placing strain on your friendship? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Cope Very         Cope           Cope Quite     Cope, But            Difficult       Extremely        Could Not 
   Easily             Easily              Easily         With Some          To Cope         Difficult             Cope 
               Difficulty              To Cope 
 
5. You drive to a friend’s house without looking up directions or taking a map, even 
though you have only been there once before and it is a long drive. There is a risk that 
you will get lost, with no means of checking the correct route. 
 
a) What is the probability that you will get lost along the way, with no means of checking 
the correct route? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 Almost              Very               Quite            Moderate            Quite                Very              Almost   
  None                Low                 Low                                        High                 High              Certain 
 
b) If you did get lost with no means of checking the correct route, how bad would that be 
for you? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Not At All   Minor        Inconvenience       Quite      Bad            Extremely    As Bad As I  
    Bad         Inconvenience                                Bad                                          Bad         Can Imagine 
 
c) How easily could you cope if you did get lost with no means of checking the correct 
route? 
     1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Cope Very         Cope           Cope Quite     Cope, But            Difficult       Extremely        Could Not 
   Easily             Easily              Easily         With Some          To Cope         Difficult             Cope 




6. You are forced to drive in a severe storm to do an errand you cannot postpone. There
 is a risk that this will be an unpleasant experience for you. 
 
a) What is the probability that this will be an unpleasant experience? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 Almost              Very               Quite            Moderate            Quite                Very              Almost   
  None                Low                 Low                                        High                 High              Certain 
 
b) If the experience were distressing, how bad would that be for you? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Not At All   Minor        Inconvenience       Quite      Bad            Extremely    As Bad As I  
    Bad         Inconvenience                                Bad                                          Bad         Can Imagine 
 
c) How easily could you cope if the experience was distressing? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Cope Very         Cope           Cope Quite     Cope, But            Difficult       Extremely        Could Not 
   Easily             Easily              Easily         With Some          To Cope         Difficult             Cope 
               Difficulty              To Cope 
 
 
7. You allow a stranger into your house to use the telephone. There is a risk that he/she 
will try to harm you. 
 
d) What is the probability that he/she will try to harm you? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 Almost              Very               Quite            Moderate            Quite                Very              Almost   
  None                Low                 Low                                        High                 High              Certain 
 
e) If he/she did try to harm you, how bad would that be for you? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Not At All   Minor        Inconvenience       Quite      Bad            Extremely    As Bad As I  
    Bad         Inconvenience                                Bad                                          Bad         Can Imagine 
 
f) How easily could you cope if he/she tried to harm you? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Cope Very         Cope           Cope Quite     Cope, But            Difficult       Extremely        Could Not 
   Easily             Easily              Easily         With Some          To Cope         Difficult             Cope 
               Difficulty              To Cope 
 
8. You are in an expensive restaurant with some friends. There is a risk that you will
 accidentally trip and drop your plate, which smashes and spills food all over you,
 causing everyone in the restaurant to stare at you and to giggle, and making you feel
 very embarrassed. 
 
a) What is the probability that this embarrassing experience will happen to you? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 Almost              Very               Quite            Moderate            Quite                Very              Almost   
  None                Low                 Low                                        High                 High              Certain 
 
b) If the experience did occur, how bad would that be for you? 




      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Not At All   Minor        Inconvenience       Quite      Bad            Extremely    As Bad As I  
    Bad         Inconvenience                                Bad                                          Bad         Can Imagine 
 
c) How easily could you cope if the experience occurred? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Cope Very         Cope           Cope Quite     Cope, But            Difficult       Extremely        Could Not 
   Easily             Easily              Easily         With Some          To Cope         Difficult             Cope 
               Difficulty              To Cope 
 
9. In the future there is a risk that your spouse or partner will die while you are still
 alive. 
 
a) What is the probability that this will happen? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 Almost              Very               Quite            Moderate            Quite                Very              Almost   
  None                Low                 Low                                        High                 High              Certain 
 
b) If this happened, how bad would it be for you? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Not At All   Minor        Inconvenience       Quite      Bad            Extremely    As Bad As I  
    Bad         Inconvenience                                Bad                                          Bad         Can Imagine 
 
c) How easily could you cope if this happened? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Cope Very         Cope           Cope Quite     Cope, But            Difficult       Extremely        Could Not 
   Easily             Easily              Easily         With Some          To Cope         Difficult             Cope 
               Difficulty              To Cope 
 
10. In the future there is a risk that you will suffer serious injury or illness. 
 
a) What is the probability that this will happen? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 Almost              Very               Quite            Moderate            Quite                Very              Almost   
  None                Low                 Low                                        High                 High              Certain 
 
b) If this happened, how bad would it be for you? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Not At All   Minor        Inconvenience       Quite      Bad            Extremely    As Bad As I  
    Bad         Inconvenience                                Bad                                          Bad         Can Imagine 
 
 c) How easily could you cope if this happened? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Cope Very         Cope           Cope Quite     Cope, But            Difficult       Extremely        Could Not 
   Easily             Easily              Easily         With Some          To Cope         Difficult             Cope 
               Difficulty              To Cope 
 
11. In the future there is a risk that you will be fired from your job. 
 
a) What is the probability that this will happen? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 Almost              Very               Quite            Moderate            Quite                Very              Almost   





b) If this happened, how bad would it be for you? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Not At All   Minor        Inconvenience       Quite      Bad            Extremely    As Bad As I  
    Bad         Inconvenience                                Bad                                          Bad         Can Imagine 
 
 c) How easily could you cope if this happened? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Cope Very         Cope           Cope Quite     Cope, But            Difficult       Extremely        Could Not 
   Easily             Easily              Easily         With Some          To Cope         Difficult             Cope 
               Difficulty              To Cope 
 
12. In the future there is a risk that you will be forced to serve time in jail. 
 
a) What is the probability that this will happen? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 Almost              Very               Quite            Moderate            Quite                Very              Almost   
  None                Low                 Low                                        High                 High              Certain 
 
b) If this happened, how bad would it be for you? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Not At All   Minor        Inconvenience       Quite      Bad            Extremely    As Bad As I  
    Bad         Inconvenience                                Bad                                          Bad         Can Imagine 
 
 c) How easily could you cope if this happened? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Cope Very         Cope           Cope Quite     Cope, But            Difficult       Extremely        Could Not 
   Easily             Easily              Easily         With Some          To Cope         Difficult             Cope 
               Difficulty              To Cope 
 
13. In the future there is a risk that you will experience chronic insomnia. 
 
a) What is the probability that this will happen? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 Almost              Very               Quite            Moderate            Quite                Very              Almost   
  None                Low                 Low                                        High                 High              Certain 
 
b) If this happened, how bad would it be for you? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Not At All   Minor        Inconvenience       Quite      Bad            Extremely    As Bad As I  
    Bad         Inconvenience                                Bad                                          Bad         Can Imagine 
 
 c) How easily could you cope if this happened? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Cope Very         Cope           Cope Quite     Cope, But            Difficult       Extremely        Could Not 
   Easily             Easily              Easily         With Some          To Cope         Difficult             Cope 
               Difficulty              To Cope 
 
14. In the future there is a risk that you will experience a divorce. 
a) What is the probability that this will happen? 




      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 Almost              Very               Quite            Moderate            Quite                Very              Almost   
  None                Low                 Low                                        High                 High              Certain 
 
b) If this happened, how bad would it be for you? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Not At All   Minor        Inconvenience       Quite      Bad            Extremely    As Bad As I  
    Bad         Inconvenience                                Bad                                          Bad         Can Imagine 
 
 c) How easily could you cope if this happened? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Cope Very         Cope           Cope Quite     Cope, But            Difficult       Extremely        Could Not 
   Easily             Easily              Easily         With Some          To Cope         Difficult             Cope 
               Difficulty              To Cope 
 
15. In the future there is a risk that you will experience sexual difficulties. 
 
a) What is the probability that this will happen? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 Almost              Very               Quite            Moderate            Quite                Very              Almost   
  None                Low                 Low                                        High                 High              Certain 
 
b) If this happened, how bad would it be for you? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Not At All   Minor        Inconvenience       Quite      Bad            Extremely    As Bad As I  
    Bad         Inconvenience                                Bad                                          Bad         Can Imagine 
 
 c) How easily could you cope if this happened? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Cope Very         Cope           Cope Quite     Cope, But            Difficult       Extremely        Could Not 
   Easily             Easily              Easily         With Some          To Cope         Difficult             Cope 
               Difficulty              To Cope 
 
16. In the future there is a risk that you will be required to completely stop eating your
 favourite food. 
 
a) What is the probability that this will happen? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 Almost              Very               Quite            Moderate            Quite                Very              Almost   
  None                Low                 Low                                        High                 High              Certain 
 
b) If this happened, how bad would it be for you? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Not At All   Minor        Inconvenience       Quite      Bad            Extremely    As Bad As I  
    Bad         Inconvenience                                Bad                                          Bad         Can Imagine 
 
 c) How easily could you cope if this happened? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Cope Very         Cope           Cope Quite     Cope, But            Difficult       Extremely        Could Not 
   Easily             Easily              Easily         With Some          To Cope         Difficult             Cope 
               Difficulty              To Cope 
 
17. In the future there is a risk that you will be forced to permanently use a walking stick. 
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a) What is the probability that this will happen? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 Almost              Very               Quite            Moderate            Quite                Very              Almost   
  None                Low                 Low                                        High                 High              Certain 
 
b) If this happened, how bad would it be for you? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Not At All   Minor        Inconvenience       Quite      Bad            Extremely    As Bad As I  
    Bad         Inconvenience                                Bad                                          Bad         Can Imagine 
 
 c) How easily could you cope if this happened? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Cope Very         Cope           Cope Quite     Cope, But            Difficult       Extremely        Could Not 
   Easily             Easily              Easily         With Some          To Cope         Difficult             Cope 
               Difficulty              To Cope 
 
18. In the future there is a risk that you will be forced to begin a new line of work. 
 
a) What is the probability that this will happen? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 Almost              Very               Quite            Moderate            Quite                Very              Almost   
  None                Low                 Low                                        High                 High              Certain 
 
b) If this happened, how bad would it be for you? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Not At All   Minor        Inconvenience       Quite      Bad            Extremely    As Bad As I  
    Bad         Inconvenience                                Bad                                          Bad         Can Imagine 
 
 c) How easily could you cope if this happened? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Cope Very         Cope           Cope Quite     Cope, But            Difficult       Extremely        Could Not 
   Easily             Easily              Easily         With Some          To Cope         Difficult             Cope 
               Difficulty              To Cope 
 
19. In the future there is a risk that you will experience conflict with your new boss at
 work. 
 
a) What is the probability that this will happen? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 Almost              Very               Quite            Moderate            Quite                Very              Almost   
  None                Low                 Low                                        High                 High              Certain 
 
b) If this happened, how bad would it be for you? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Not At All   Minor        Inconvenience       Quite      Bad            Extremely    As Bad As I  
    Bad         Inconvenience                                Bad                                          Bad         Can Imagine 
 
 c) How easily could you cope if this happened? 
      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Cope Very         Cope           Cope Quite     Cope, But            Difficult       Extremely        Could Not 
   Easily             Easily              Easily         With Some          To Cope         Difficult             Cope 
               Difficulty              To Cope
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What is your age in years and months? 
 





What is your gender? 
 
Male       Female 
 


































My name is David Garratt-Reed and I am a PhD (Clinical Psychology) student at 
Curtin University of Technology. 
 I am conducting research in the area of anxiety. Specifically, I am interested in 
determining why anxious individuals seem to avoid risky situations more frequently than 
other people do. In order to achieve this goal, it is necessary for me to assess the thoughts of 
anxious people in “risky” situations, and to compare them to the thoughts of other individuals 
in the same situations. 
 
 Please complete all of the questionnaires in the package and return them to the box 
that I have placed in the office at the School of Psychology. 
 Your participation in this research is completely voluntary and non-participation will 
have no influence on your academic rights or results. However, return of the completed 
questionnaires will be deemed as an indication of your consent to participate in the study. 
Because identifying information will not be collected (with the exception of age and gender) 
it will not be possible to withdraw consent after you have submitted the questionnaires. All of 
the information that you divulge will be completely anonymous, and the data will not be 
identifiable. 
 If you experience distress due to the completion of these questionnaires, please 
contact the counselling service at Curtin University on 9266 7850. 
 
 For further information please do not hesitate to contact me on 9266 2559 or 9266 
3037. The supervisor of this project, Dr Clare Rees, can be contacted on 9266 3039. 
 
 This study has been approved by the Curtin University Human Research Ethics 
Committee. If needed, verification of approval can be obtained either by writing to the Curtin 
University Human Research Ethics Committee, c/- Office of Research and Development, 
Curtin University of Technology, GPO Box U1987, Perth, 6845 or by telephoning 9266 2784 
or by emailing hrec@curtin.edu.au.  
 
 
 Thank you for your time!
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My name is David Garratt-Reed and I am a PhD (Clinical Psychology) student at 
Curtin University of Technology. 
 I am conducting research in the area of anxiety. Specifically, I am interested in 
determining why anxious individuals seem to avoid risky situations more frequently than 
other people do. In order to achieve this goal, it is necessary for me to assess the thoughts of 
anxious individuals in “risky” situations, and to compare them to the thoughts of other 
individuals in the same situations. 
 
 Please complete all of the questionnaires in the package and return them to me via 
mail, using the enclosed envelope. 
 Your participation in this research is completely voluntary. Return of the completed 
questionnaires will be deemed as an indication of your consent to participate in the study. 
Because identifying information will not be collected (with the exception of age and gender) 
it will not be possible to withdraw consent after you have submitted the questionnaires. All of 
the information that you divulge will be completely anonymous, and the data will not be 
identifiable. 
 If you experience distress due to the completion of these questionnaires, please 
contact the psychology clinic at Curtin University on 9266 3436. 
 
 For further information please do not hesitate to contact me on 9266 2559 or 9266 
3037. The supervisor of this project, Dr Clare Rees, can be contacted on 9266 3039. 
 
 This study has been approved by the Curtin University Human Research Ethics 
Committee. If needed, verification of approval can be obtained either by writing to the Curtin 
University Human Research Ethics Committee, c/- Office of Research and Development, 
Curtin University of Technology, GPO Box U1987, Perth, 6845 or by telephoning 9266 2784 
or by emailing hrec@curtin.edu.au.  
 
 
 Thank you for your time!
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This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read each 
item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to the word. Indicate to what extent 
you generally feel this way, that is, how you feel on the average. Use the following scale to record 
your answers. 
 
1   2   3         4   5 
   very slightly                  a little      moderately   quite a bit      extremely 
   or not at all 
 
 
    interested      irritable 
    distressed      alert 
    excited      ashamed 
    upset       inspired 
    strong       nervous 
    guilty       determined 
    scared       attentive 
    hostile      jittery 
    enthusiastic      active 




Appendix F – Anxiety Control Questionnaire (ACQ) 
 
Listed below are a number of statements describing a set of beliefs. Please read each statement 
carefully and, on the 0-5 scale given, indicate how much you think each statement is typical of you. 
 
0  1  2  3  4  5 
      Strongly        Moderately        Slightly            Slightly        Moderately         Strongly 
      Disagree         Disagree          Disagree            Agree              Agree               Agree 
 
     1.  I am usually able to avoid threat quite easily. 
     2.  How well I cope with difficult situations depends on whether I have outside help. 
     3.  When I am put under stress, I am likely to lose control. 
     4.  I can usually stop my anxiety from showing. 
     5.  When I am frightened by something, there is generally nothing I can do. 
     6.  My emotions seem to have a life of their own. 
     7.  There is little I can do to influence people’s judgements of me. 
     8. Whether I can successfully escape a frightening situation is always a matter of 
chance with me. 
     9. I often shake uncontrollably. 
     10. I can usually put worrisome thoughts out of my mind easily. 
     11. When I am in a stressful situation, I am able to stop myself from breathing too hard. 
     12. I can usually influence the degree to which a situation is potentially threatening to 
me. 
     13. I am able to control my level of anxiety. 
     14. There is little I can do to change frightening events. 
     15. The extent to which a difficult situation resolves itself has nothing to do with my 
actions. 
     16. If something is going to hurt me, it will happen no matter what I do. 
     17. I can usually relax when I want. 
     18. When I am under stress, I am not always sure how I will react. 
     19. I can usually make sure people like me if I work at it. 
     20. Most events that make me anxious are outside my control. 
     21. I always know exactly how I will react to difficult situations. 
     22. I am unconcerned if I become anxious in a difficult situation, because I am confident 
in my ability to cope with my symptoms. 
     23. What people think of me is largely outside my control. 
     24 I usually find it hard to deal with difficult problems. 
     25. When I hear that someone has a serious illness, I worry that I am next. 
     26. When I am anxious, I find it difficult to focus on anything other than my anxiety. 
     27. I am able to cope as effectively with unexpected anxiety as I am with anxiety that I 
expect to occur. 
     28. I sometimes think, “Why even bother to try to cope with my anxiety when nothing I 
do seems to affect how frequently or intensely I experience it?”. 
     29. I often have the ability to get along with “difficult” people. 
     30. I will avoid conflict due to my inability to successfully resolve it.
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This inventory lists different attitudes or beliefs that people sometimes hold. Read each statement carefully and decide how much you agree or 
disagree with it. 
 For each of the statements, choose the number matching the answer that best describes how you think. Because people are different, there are no 
right or wrong answers. 
 To decide whether a given statement is typical of your way of looking at things, simply keep in mind what you are like most of the time. 
 Use the following scale: 
 
                    
1  2    3  4       5       6       7 
                    
Disagree          Disagree moderately              Disagree          Neither agree       Agree               Agree              Agree very much 
very much                                                       a little              nor disagree         a little              moderately 
 
In making your ratings, try to avoid using the middle point of the scale (4), but rather indicate whether you usually disagree or agree with the 
statements about your own beliefs and attitudes. 
 
  1.  I often think things around me are unsafe.           1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
  2.  If I’m not absolutely sure of something, I’m bound to make a mistake.        1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
  3.  Things should be perfect according to my own standards.         1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
  4.  In order to be a worthwhile person, I must be perfect at everything I do.        1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
5.  When I see any opportunity to do so, I must act to prevent bad things from        
happening.                1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
6.  Even if harm is very unlikely, I should try to prevent it at any cost.        1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
7.  For me, having bad urges is as bad as actually carrying them out.        1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
8.  If I don’t act when I foresee danger, then I am to blame for any consequences.       1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
9.  If I can’t do something perfectly, I shouldn’t do it at all.          1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
  10.  I must work to fulfil my potential at all times.           1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
  11.  It is essential for me to consider all possible outcomes of a situation.        1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
  12.  Even minor mistakes mean a job is not complete.          1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
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13.  If I have aggressive thoughts or impulses about my loved ones, this means I may 
secretly want to hurt them.              1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
14.  I must be certain of my decisions.            1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
15.  In all kinds of daily situations, failing to prevent harm is just as bad as deliberately 
causing harm.                1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
16.  Avoiding serious problems (for example, illness or accidents) requires constant 
effort on my part.               1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
17.  For me, not preventing harm is as bad as causing harm.          1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
18.  I should be upset if I make a mistake.            1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
19. I should make sure others are protected from any negative consequences of my 
decisions or actions.               1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
20.  For me, things are not right if they are not perfect.          1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
21.  Having nasty thoughts means I am a terrible person.          1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
22. If I do not take extra precautions, I am more likely than others to have or cause a 
serious disaster.               1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
23. In order to feel safe, I have to be as prepared as possible for anything that could go 
wrong.                 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
24.  I should not have bizarre or disgusting thoughts.          1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
25.  For me, making a mistake is as bad as failing completely.         1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
26.  It is essential for everything to be clear cut, even in minor matters.        1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
27.  Having a blasphemous thought is as sinful as committing a sacrilegious act.       1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
28.  I should be able to rid my mind of unwanted thoughts.          1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
29.  I am more likely than other people to accidentally cause harm to myself or to others.      1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
30.  Having bad thoughts means I am weird or abnormal.          1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
31.  I must be the best at things that are important to me.          1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
32.  Having an unwanted sexual thought or image means I really want to do it.       1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
33. If my actions could have even a small effect on a potential misfortune, I am 
responsible for the outcome.              1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
34.  Even when I am careful, I often think that bad things will happen.        1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
35.  Having intrusive thoughts means I’m out of control.          1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
36.  Harmful events will happen unless I am very careful.          1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
37.  I must keep working at something until it’s done exactly right.         1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
38.  Having violent thoughts means I will lose control and become violent.        1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
39.  To me, failing to prevent a disaster is as bad as causing it.         1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
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40.  If I don’t do a job perfectly, people won’t respect me.          1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
41.  Even ordinary experiences in my life are full of risk.          1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
42.  Having a bad thought is morally no different than doing a bad deed.        1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
43.  No matter what I do, it won’t be good enough.           1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
44.  If I don’t control my thoughts, I’ll be punished.           1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
244 
 
Appendix H – Formla for Calculating the Significance of the Difference between Two 
Correlated Correlations 
 
Whether two correlated predictors (same dependent variable) differ. 
 
 
1. = ryx 2. = ryz 
 






















The 95% confidence limits are given by: 
 
z1' - z2' ± 1.96[(2(1 -rxz)h)/(N-3)]
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Appendix I – Obsessive Compulsive Inventory-Revised (OCI-R) 
 
             
            
The following statements refer to experiences that many people have in their everyday lives. Circle the 
number that best describes HOW MUCH that experience has DISTRESSED or BOTHERED you during 
the PAST MONTH. The numbers refer to the following verbal labels: 
 
         0      1      2     3   4 
                   Not at all          A little            Moderately           A lot         Extremely 
 
 1.  I have saved up so many things that they get in the way.    0    1    2    3    4 
 2.  I check things more often than necessary.      0    1    2    3    4 
 3.  I get upset if objects are not arranged properly.      0    1    2    3    4 
 4.  I feel compelled to count while I am doing things.      0    1    2    3    4 
 5.  I find it difficult to touch an object when I know it has been touched by strangers 
      or certain people.         0    1    2    3    4 
 6.  I find it difficult to control my own thoughts.      0    1    2    3    4 
 7.  I collect things I don’t need.                                                                                           0    1    2    3    4 
 8.  I repeatedly check doors, windows, drawers etc.     0    1    2    3    4 
 9.  I get upset if others change the way I have arranged things.    0    1    2    3    4 
10. I feel I have to repeat certain numbers.      0    1    2    3    4 
11. I sometimes have to wash or clean myself simply because I feel contaminated.  0    1    2    3    4 
12. I am upset by unpleasant thoughts that come into my mind against my will.   0    1    2    3    4 
13. I avoid throwing things away because I am afraid I might need them later.   0    1    2    3    4 
14. I repeatedly check gas and water taps and light switches after turning them off. 0    1    2    3    4 
15. I need things to be arranged in a particular order.     0    1    2    3    4 
16. I feel that there are good and bad numbers.      0    1    2    3    4 
17. I wash my hands more often and longer than necessary.    0    1    2    3    4 
18. I frequently get nasty thoughts and have difficulty getting rid of them.  0    1    2    3    4 
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My name is David Garratt-Reed and I am a PhD (Clinical Psychology) student at 
Curtin University of Technology. 
 I am conducting research in the area of anxiety. Specifically, I am interested in 
determining why anxious individuals seem to avoid risky situations more frequently than 
other people do. In order to achieve this goal, it is necessary for me to assess the thoughts of 
anxious individuals in “risky” situations, and to compare them to the thoughts of other 
individuals in the same situation. In addition, I am collecting information about mood and 
clinical symptoms to use in my analysis of the thought patterns exhibited by various 
individuals in “risky” situations. 
  
 Please complete all of the questionnaires in the package and return them to your 
therapist at the clinic. 
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary and non-participation will 
have no influence on your ongoing treatment. Return of the completed questionnaires will be 
deemed as an indication of your consent to participate in the study. Because identifying 
information will not be collected (with the exception of age and gender) it will not be 
possible to withdraw consent after you have submitted the questionnaires. All of the 
information that you divulge will be completely anonymous, and the data will not be 
identifiable. 
 If you experience distress due to the completion of these questionnaires, please 
contact the psychology clinic at Curtin University on 9266 3436. 
 
 For further information please do not hesitate to contact me on 9266 3037. The 
supervisor of this project, Dr Clare Rees, can be contacted on 9266 3442. 
 
 This study has been approved by the Curtin University Human Research Ethics 
Committee. If needed, verification of approval can be obtained either by writing to the Curtin 
University Human Research Ethics Committee, c/- Office of Research and Development, 
Curtin University of Technology, GPO Box U1987, Perth, 6845 or by telephoning 9266 2784 
or by emailing hrec@curtin.edu.au.  
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determining why anxious individuals seem to avoid risky situations more frequently than 
other people do. In order to achieve this goal, it is necessary for me to assess the thoughts of 
anxious individuals in “risky” situations, and to compare them to the thoughts of other 
individuals in the same situation. In addition, I am collecting information about mood and 
clinical symptoms to use in my analysis of the thought patterns exhibited by various 
individuals in “risky” situations. 
  
 Please complete all of the questionnaires in the package and return them to the box 
that I have placed in the office at the School of Psychology. 
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary and non-participation will 
have no influence on your ongoing academic rights. Return of the completed questionnaires 
will be deemed as an indication of your consent to participate in the study. Because 
identifying information will not be collected (with the exception of age and gender) it will not 
be possible to withdraw consent after you have submitted the questionnaires. All of the 
information that you divulge will be completely anonymous, and the data will not be 
identifiable. 
 If you experience distress due to the completion of these questionnaires, please 
contact the counselling service at Curtin University on 9266 7850. 
 
 For further information please do not hesitate to contact me on or 9266 3037. The 
supervisor of this project, Dr Clare Rees, can be contacted on 9266 3442. 
 
 This study has been approved by the Curtin University Human Research Ethics 
Committee. If needed, verification of approval can be obtained either by writing to the Curtin 
University Human Research Ethics Committee, c/- Office of Research and Development, 
Curtin University of Technology, GPO Box U1987, Perth, 6845 or by telephoning 9266 2784 
or by emailing hrec@curtin.edu.au.  
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